



THE POLISH
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY
IN THE 20TH CENTURY



Stanisław Kamiński

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THE POLISH CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE 20TH CENTURY

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Stanisław Kamiński

Edited by
Rev. Kazimierz Marek Wolsza

Ignatianum University Press

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I.

STANISŁAW KAMIŃSKI:
PERSON AND WORK

STANISLAW KAMIŃSKI: BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

BIOGRAPHY

Stanisław Kamiński was born on October 24, 1919 in the manor of Gubernia (now Radzyń Podlaski) in Poland, to Helena *née* Gmur and Jan Kamiński, a car mechanic by profession. In 1938 he passed his *matura*, a secondary education final exam in grammar school (Gimnazjum Biskupie) in Siedlce and entered the higher theological seminary in Janów Podlaski, which was later moved to Siedlce in 1940. He was ordained as a Roman Catholic priest in 1946 and worked for a short time as a curate in The Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary parish in Kosowo Lackie. In the same year he started studying philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL), which he completed in 1948. He did not serve in any army or partisan units, nor did he belong to any organizations during World War II. One of his brothers was shot by the Gestapo in 1940 for belonging to the Polish Scouting Association.¹ His second brother, Marian, lived with his family in Lublin after the war.

Kamiński died on March 21, 1986 in Freiburg in Breisgau (Germany), in the Catholic Loretto Krankenhaus hospital, and was buried in Lublin.

The major themes of his work are formal logic, history of logic, general methodology of sciences, philosophy of science, methodology of philosophy, science studies, methodology of theology. He worked

¹ S. Kamiński, "Ankieta personalna" (1954) in the Archive of the Catholic University of Lublin.

in the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw school, and continued the work of the Krakow Circle. He was one of the founders, together with Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, O.P. (1921–2008), Stefan Swieżawski (1907–2004) and Marian Kurdziałek (1920–1997), of the Lublin Philosophical School.

He said about himself that he was a type of an encyclopedist, he had a gift for synthetic views and noticing connections between distant fields.² A good, wise, well-liked man, although a strict examiner. Known for his sense of humor, the life and soul of the party, a winner of the Order of the Smile of “Eutraperia” (student cabaret at KUL). “Stanisław Kamiński Memorial Lectures”, during which famous philosophers from abroad have lectured, have been held since May 2002. His most famous students are: Andrzej Bronk, Anna Buczek, Józef Herbut, Jerzy Kopania, Tadeusz Kwiatkowski, Stanisław Majdański, Witold Marciszewski, Mikołaj Poletyło, Jan Przybyłowski, Antoni B. Stępień, Tadeusz Szubka, Kazimierz Trzęsicki, Czesław Wojtkiewicz, Urszula Żegleń. Kamiński was the author of two books, the co-author of another, and he also wrote many articles, reviews, short announcements, and encyclopedia entries.

DEGREES AND ACADEMICS TITLES

Kamiński defended his master thesis “Pojęcie i podział supozycji terminów u Piotra Hiszpana, jego komentatorów, nominalistów XIV w. i eklektyków późnego średniowiecza” [*The Concept and Division of Supposition of Terms by Petrus Hispanus, his Commentators, 14th-Century Nominalists and Eclectists of the Late Middle Ages*] at the Catholic University of Lublin in 1948, supervised by Fr. Prof. Antoni Korcik. A year later at the same university, the young Kamiński defended his doctoral dissertation “Fregego dwuwartościowy system aksjomatyczny zmiennych zdaniowych w świetle współczesnej metodologii nauk dedukcyjnych” [*Frege’s Two-Valued Axiomatic System of Propositional Variables in the Light of Modern Methodology of Deductive Science*], under Fr. Dr. Józef Pastuszka (1897–1989) supervision. There is a review written by prof. Narcyz Łubnicki (1904–1988) and a draft copy

² A.I. Buczek, “Świadectwo kresu,” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 35, no. 1 (1987), pp. 384–388.

review by Fr. Prof. Antoni Korcik (1892–1969) in the Archive of the Catholic University of Lublin. Kamiński maintained that his reviewers had also been prof. Jerzy Śłupecki (1904–1987), however, the review remains undiscovered.³ Currently, Kamiński's PhD thesis is considered one of the first works in the world devoted to Frege's logic.

Kamiński's attempt to obtain the academic title of *docent* lasted almost 5 years, from February 19, 1954 to November 27, 1958. It was started and completed on the basis of the government act "Ustawa z 15 grudnia 1951 r. o szkolnictwie wyższym i o pracownikach nauki,"⁴ and on a document which stated that academics with PhD titles (of the old style) could apply for the title of *docent* only until June 30, 1954.⁵ After that date, the title was to be awarded only to academics with a degree of a candidate of sciences,⁶ something which Kamiński did not have since he was a doctor. The requirements regarding academic accomplishments and didactic work were accompanied by a requirement to demonstrate knowledge of the leading Soviet academic scholars, the principles of dialectical and historical materialism and an ability to apply them in their own work. Kamiński did not meet these last conditions.

It is likely that Kamiński was encouraged by his university to apply for the title of *docent* on the basis of the so-called old type PhD degree. He started the procedure on the basis of unpublished papers, reviews and a script from logic.

The application was sent to the Ministry of Higher Education five days before the end of the transitional period. Kamiński received positive reviews written by: Fr. Prof. Korcik, Prof. Jerzy Kalinowski (1916–2000), Prof. Piotr Chojnacki (1897–1969).⁷ Three and a half

³ S. Kamiński, "Autobiogram," *Ruch Filozoficzny* 42, no. 1–2 (1985), pp. 106–112.

⁴ In the wording of "Obwieszczenie Ministra Szkolnictwa Wyższego z 10 października 1956 roku w sprawie ogłoszenia jednolitego tekstu uchwały z 15 grudnia 1956 roku o szkolnictwie wyższym i o pracownikach nauki".

⁵ The government act "Uchwała nr 1 Centralnej Komisji Kwalifikacyjnej dla Pracowników Nauki z 29 kwietnia 1953 roku w sprawie zasad postępowania przy nadawaniu stopnia kandydata nauk".

⁶ Between 1951 and 1958 the degree of "doctor" was replaced in Poland by "a candidate of sciences" to follow the Soviet model.

⁷ A. Korcik, "Opinia o pracach naukowych Ks. dra Stanisława Kamińskiego" (Lublin 1954) in Archive of the Catholic University of Lublin; J. Kalinowski, "Opinia o całokształcie działalności naukowej ks. dr Stanisława Kamińskiego, uzasadniająca wniosek o nadanie mu tytułu naukowego docenta" (Lublin 1954),

years later, on December 12, 1957, the Social Sciences Section of the Central Qualification Commission decided that the award of the title would be possible after the publication of two works by Kamiński in *Studia Logica*. Those two expected papers⁸ and three additional ones⁹ were sent less than a year later, on October 10, 1958. Then the procedure speeded up noticeably, with reviews of the updated work written by: Prof. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890–1963), Prof. Tadeusz Czeżowski (1889–1981) and Dr. Andrzej Grzegorzczak (1922–2014),¹⁰ although these reviews are not currently extant. The 39-year old Kamiński was awarded the title of *docent* on November 27, 1958.

Kamiński never started the necessary procedure for habilitation but whilst he formally never received the degree, he is described as having one in the ordinary professor's application form.¹¹

Both professorial titles, extraordinary and ordinary, were given to Kamiński on the basis of a governmental act which started with the following sentence: "Universities are actively involved in the construction and consolidation of socialism in Polish People's Republic."¹²

His procedure of extraordinary professorship started in January 1964. All university units of philosophy were told to evaluate Kamiński's achievements. Positive assessments were presented by: Prof. Narcyz Łubnicki from the Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, Prof. Maria Kokoszyńska-Lutmanowa (1905–1981) from the University of Wrocław, Prof. Piotr Chojnacki from the Academy of Catholic Theology in Warsaw, Fr. Prof. Józef Iwanicki (1902–1995) from the Academy of Catholic Theology in Warsaw, Prof. Janina Kotarbińska

ibidem; P. Chojnacki, "Opinia o dorobku naukowym Ks. Dra Stanisława Kamińskiego przedstawionego do nadania mu tytułu docenta naukowego" (Lublin 1954), ibidem.

⁸ S. Kamiński, "O początkach indukcji matematycznej," *Studia Logica* 7 (1958), pp. 221–241; S. Kamiński, "Hobbesa teoria definicji," *Studia Logica* 7 (1958), pp. 43–69.

⁹ S. Kamiński, "Fregego logika zdań," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 5, no. 1 (1955–1957), pp. 31–64; S. Kamiński, "Rola Locke'a i Condillaca w dziejach teorii definicji," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 5, no. 4 (1955–1957), pp. 67–101; S. Kamiński, "Nauka o indukcji w logice XVI-ego wieku," *Collectanea Theologica* 28 (1957), pp. 235–258.

¹⁰ S. Kamiński, "Autobiogram," p. 107.

¹¹ M.A. Krąpiec, "Wniosek o nadanie przez Radę Państwa tytułu profesora zwyczajnego w zakresie metodologii nauk dr. hab. Stanisławowi Kamińskiemu" (Lublin 1970) in Archive of the Catholic University of Lublin.

¹² "Ustawa z 5 listopada 1958 roku o szkołach wyższych".

(1901–1997) from the University of Warsaw, Prof. Izydora Dąmbska (1904–1983) from the Jagiellonian University in Krakow.¹³ Some of the units did not answer but there were no negative assessments.

On November 29, 1965, the Ministry of Higher Education awarded the 46-year-old Kamiński the title of extraordinary professor and appointed him to the position of extraordinary professor at the Department of Methodology of Sciences at the Catholic University of Lublin.

In 1970 Kamiński started the procedure of applying for the academic title and position of ordinary professor.¹⁴ Reviews were written by: Prof. Czeżowski, Prof. Iwanicki,¹⁵ and Prof. Dąmbska. Below is an extract from Prof. Dąmbska's conclusion:

Stanisław Kamiński is uncompromising in the pursuit of objectivity, versatility and formal precision of the results. Due to his scientific and ethical attitude he is a teacher creating the best atmosphere for the development of young adepts of knowledge around him. Both the briefly described activities of professor Kamiński as well as this scholar and teacher's LOGOS and ETHOS expressed therein fully justify the application for granting him the title of ordinary professor.¹⁶

On January 4, 1971 Kamiński was awarded "the ordinary professor title being in force at the Catholic University of Lublin and was appointed to the position of ordinary professor at the Department

¹³ Dąmbska wrote an opinion for Kamiński in the last days of her work at the Jagiellonian University. At the turn of June and July 1964, by a decision of the state authorities and against her will, she was moved from the Jagiellonian University to the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences for the position of extraordinary professor. J. Perzanowski, ed., *Izydora Dąmbska 1904–1983* (Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 2001), pp. 62, 72; *Encyklopedia filozofii polskiej*, vol. 1, s.v. "Dąmbska Izydora," pp. 277–280.

¹⁴ The following governmental documents were then in force: "Ustawa z 31 marca 1965 roku o stopniach naukowych i tytułach naukowych"; "Zarządzenie Ministra Szkolnictwa Wyższego i Sekretarza Naukowego PAN z 13 grudnia 1965 roku w sprawie trybu składania przez rady wydziału i rady naukowe wniosków o przedstawienie kandydatów do tytułu naukowego".

¹⁵ T. Czeżowski, "Ocena dorobku naukowego profesora nadzwyczajnego dr hab. Stanisława Kamińskiego jako podstawa do wniosku o przyznanie mu tytułu naukowego profesora zwyczajnego" (Toruń 1970) in Archive of the Catholic University of Lublin; J. Iwanicki, *Recenzja działalności piśmienniczej profesora nadzw. dr. Stanisława Kamińskiego* (Warszawa 1970), *ibidem*.

¹⁶ I. Dąmbska, *Referat dotyczący dorobku naukowego Ks. prof. dr Stanisława Kamińskiego* (Kraków 1970), p. 5, in Archive of the Catholic University of Lublin.

of Methodology of Sciences at the Faculty of Christian Philosophy.”¹⁷ The 51-year-old Kamiński held this position for the next 16 years, until his death.

UNIVERSITY EMPLOYMENT

In the years 1947–1949, Kamiński conducted logic and Roman law classes at the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences of the Catholic University of Lublin, initially as a volunteer assistant. Kamiński, as a Senior Research Assistant, had lectures for the first time on general methodology in the academic year 1949/50. As an adjunct/assistant professor, from September 1950 to August 1956, he conducted the following activities for philosophy students: (1) lectures: theory of knowledge (also for the Faculty of Humanities), elements of logic (also for the Faculty of Theology), general methodology of sciences; (2) classes: logic, general methodology of sciences; (3) seminar: logic; (4) monographic lectures: selected issues in general methodology of sciences, selected issues in modern logic, selected issues in logic.

From September 1956 Kamiński was a substitute professor of methodology for two years and lectured the following to philosophy students: (1) lecture: logic (also for the Faculty of Theology), general methodology of sciences, theory of knowledge, logic with theory of knowledge (for the Faculty of Theology); (2) classes: general methodology of sciences, logic, formal logic; (3) seminars: logic and methodology; (4) monographic lectures: selected issues in logic, selected issues in general methodology of sciences.

Kamiński was in the position of *docent* from 1959 to 1964 and conducted the following activities: (1) lectures: logic (also for the Faculty of Humanities), general methodology of sciences, methodology of history (for the Faculty of Theology); (2) classes: general methodology of sciences; (3) seminar: general methodology of sciences; (4) monographic lectures: selected issues in formal logic, selected issues in general methodology of science, selected issues in logic, elements of methodology of philosophical sciences.

¹⁷ “Dokument wystawiony przez Ministerstwo Oświaty i Szkolnictwa Wyższego do Obywatela Rektora KUL” (Warszawa 1971) in Archive of the Catholic University of Lublin.

Between the academic year 1965/66 and January 1971 he worked as an extraordinary professor and conducted the following activities: (1) lectures: logic (also for the Faculty of Humanities), general methodology of sciences, elements of methodology of history (the Faculty of Humanities), methodology of historical sciences (the Faculty of Theology); (2) classes: logic (the Faculty of Humanities); (3) seminar: general methodology of sciences; (4) monographic lectures: elements of methodology of philosophy, selected issues in methodology of sciences, selected issues in formal logic, selected issues in general methodology of sciences and theory of knowledge, philosophy of mathematics; (5) discussion sessions: methodology of humanities (together with Prof. Czesław Zgorzelski for workers of the Faculty of Christian Philosophy), methodology of humanities (the Faculty of Humanities).

In the last period of his university work, from January 1971 until his death in 1986, he worked as an ordinary professor and conducted the following activities: (1) lectures: logic (also for the Faculty of Humanities), general methodology of sciences, methodology (the Faculty of Canon Law), elements of historical methodology (the Faculty of Theology), didactics of philosophy, introduction to philosophy, methodology of canon law (the Faculty of Canon Law), logic with elements of methodology of humanities (the Faculty of Humanities), methodology of history (the Faculty of Theology), methodology of legal sciences (the Faculty of Canon Law), history of science; (2) classes: logic (the Faculty of Humanities); (3) seminar: methodology of sciences; (4) monographic lectures: Monism or pluralism in philosophy of science, elements of methodology of philosophy, methodology of history, philosophy of mathematics, selected issues in general methodology of sciences, history of science and science studies methods, theory of science; (5) discussion sessions: methodology, methodology of canon law (the Faculty of Canon Law).

UNIVERSITY AND OTHER POSITIONS, ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP

Kamiński held several temporary university positions at the Catholic University of Lublin. From 1957 to his death he was the head of the first Department of Methodology of Sciences in Poland, established earlier by Fr. Prof. Iwanicki in 1952.

He worked on a systematic catalogue of the university library from 1969.¹⁸ He was a warden of the Department of Logic from 1969, the dean of the Faculty of Christian Philosophy in the years 1970–1975, 1977–1979, 1981–1986, the vice-dean in the academic year 1979/80, the head of the section of theoretical philosophy at the Faculty of Christian Philosophy between 1957 and 1970.

Kamiński belonged to the Faculty of Scientific Society of the Catholic University of Lublin from 1949, first as a member-co-worker, thereafter as a member-correspondent and finally as an active member.¹⁹ Initially he was secretary, then treasurer and finally chair from 1985 until his death.²⁰

Moreover, he was vice-chair of the Faculty of Humanities at Lublin Scientific Society, the head of Inter-Faculty Seminar of Methodology of Humanity/Arts, a member of the Classification of Sciences Team at the Centre for Documentation and Scientific Information PAN [Polish Academy of Sciences], a member of the Philosophical Sciences Committee PAN in the years 1981–1984.

Kamiński was responsible for the section of theoretical philosophy in the editorial staff of *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 1–5 and belonged to the team of chief editors of volume five. He was also a co-editor of the journal *Roczniki Filozoficzne*, the head of the Senate Housing Committee and the Senate Financial and Economic Committee. He was a member of the Senate Committee for Science Issue, the Scientific Council of John Paul II Institute, the Committee for Academic Leave, and the Senate Committee for Scientific and Didactic Staff.

¹⁸ G. Wilczyńska, “Nauka i metanauka a katalog systematyczny Biblioteki Uniwersyteckiej KUL,” *Archiwa, Biblioteki i Muzea Kościelne* 79 (2003), pp. 207, 208, 211.

¹⁹ A.B. Stępień, “Działalność naukowa i organizacyjna ks. prof. Stanisława Kamińskiego 1919–1986,” *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 29, no. 1 (1986), p. 18.

²⁰ Z.E. Roskał, “Wydział Filozoficzny Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL,” in *Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne czyli z dziejów filozofii jako nauki instytucjonalnej*, ed. B. Markiewicz, J.J. Jadacki and R. Jadczał (Warszawa: Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, 1999), p. 214.

PARTICIPATION IN ACADEMIC LIFE

Kamiński took an active part in both Polish and—as far as it was possible in those times—foreign academic life.

In 1958, awaiting the verdict of the Central Qualifying Commission regarding his application for the title of *docent*, he applied for a two-year trip to Germany, to the universities of Bonn and Cologne and to the Albertus-Magnus-Institut in Münster, where he wanted to broaden his knowledge of the history of medieval logic. Unfortunately, that trip fell through but in 1964 he participated in the third international congress of medieval philosophy in Milan and in the congress of Renaissance researchers in Venice. In 1973 he gave two lectures at the Johannes Gutrnberg-Universität in Mainz: “Wissenschaftstheoretische Aspekte: Rationale Faktoren in der modernen Wissenschaft und Theologie” [*Scientific Aspects: Rational Factors in Modern Science and Theology*] and “Typen von Ethik” [*Types of Ethics*].

From 1950 to 1952 Kamiński participated in a seminar on the foundations of mathematics conducted by Prof. Andrzej Mostowski (1913–1975) in the State Institute of Mathematics in Warsaw.

He was active in the Philosophical Weeks organized annually at the Catholic University of Lublin from 1958.

From 1953 Kamiński was a member of the history of logic group at the Institute of Philosophy (the University of Warsaw), thereafter at the Philosophical Committee PAN, next at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology PAN (at least until 1964). He participated in the Science Studies Seminar at the Department of the History of Science and Technology PAN, conducted by prof. Tadeusz Kotarbiński (1886–1981).

In a special way, Kamiński was scientifically connected with Ajdukiewicz, Czeżowski, Dąbmska, Swieżawski and Krąpiec. Apart from Lublin, he worked mainly with two centers: Warsaw and Krakow.

2.

HOW TO UNDERSTAND AND PRACTICE PHILOSOPHY? ON THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY DEVELOPED BY STANISŁAW KAMIŃSKI

What is dealt here is a particular type of philosophy which is substantially related to tradition but as regards methodology—it makes efforts to present the concept in a more modern way.¹

What occurs in culture or—approaching the matter more contemporarily—in many different cultures, are numerous ways of understanding and practicing philosophy. Moreover, some of them are contradictory in their fundamental assumptions, some exclude each other from aspiring to the highly valued name of “philosophy”, and some compete for primacy, superiority or even exclusiveness in a particular field of philosophical problems and explorations. Some philosophers will view this situation of far-reaching dissimilarities as a culture- and value-creating variety, globally considered to be a desired dynamic state. This takes place because what can gain significance, in compliance with the principle of equal rights, is a multitude of different standpoints, out of which all (or nearly all) turn out to be intellectually interesting and inspiring in some respects. However, there are also philosophers

¹ S. Kamiński, “O metodzie filozofii klasycznej,” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 34, no. 1 (1986), p. 5.

who will recognize that, by confronting the own options and views with this multiple diversity of philosophical attitudes and aspirations, it is necessary—with consistency and ethical seriousness (in a binding way, not only by trying and exercising the consecutive possible variants)—to ask how philosophy should be understood and how it should be practiced. Guided by such metaphilosophical-axiological beliefs, they undertake to elaborate the concept of philosophy that will be the most appropriate, as philosophy understood and practiced in this way will effectively fulfil the cognitive (theoretical) and practical requirements with which it is faced.

The group of philosophers who recognized that such a task should be reliably fulfilled was joined with conviction by Stanisław Kamiński. From the mid-1950s, and over the next three decades, he elaborated a concept of philosophy which was—in its possibly most complete form—to fulfil the hopes it raised. This took place within Kamiński's debate on many standpoints and, at the same time, during his co-creation (as an epistemic authority) of a distinctly specified intellectual environment and his efforts to permeate this environment with a logical-methodological culture. Yet, he also shared the irony-tinted observation that “it is not difficult to philosophize if one does not know how to philosophize, but when one knows, this is an entirely different matter.”² Moreover, elaborating a concept of responsible practicing of philosophy in a tight relation with metaphilosophical reflection seems to enhance the difficulties associated with practicing it. This elaboration adds “extra loading”, refrains from the hasty expression of ultimately decisive and peremptory formulas, and reminds us that the initial questions should be revisited many times, analyzed and approached anew, but from different angles. Thus, with methodological discipline as its characteristic feature, the elaboration of a concept of philosophy requires a strong methodological-anthropological motivation, a strong belief in the sense, value of philosophy and its essential—even unalienable—role in human life and the creation of culture.

While undertaking the familiarization and well-organized presentation of Kamiński's understanding of philosophy, as well as indicating the characteristics of his concept of philosophy, it is important

² S. Kamiński, “Metody współczesnej metafizyki,” (1967/1978), in S. Kamiński, *Filozofia i metoda: Studia z dziejów metod filozofowania*, prepared for publication by J. Herbut (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993), p. 117.

to be aware that he followed his own, multifaceted and highly-developed metaphilosophical-historical studies. The directions and values of his research were discussed (in 1970 while providing an opinion on Kamiński's output for the title of full-professor) by Tadeusz Czeżowski (1889–1981), one of the most outstanding representatives of the analytical Lvov-Warsaw School:

Professor Kamiński administers a vast and thorough historical knowledge as well as a systematic knowledge of philosophical sciences, with special regard to logical (in its broad meaning) issues, which comprise both formal logic and the methodology of sciences. In this field, he is one of the most eminent Polish philosophical workers, outrivaling many others in the scope of his knowledge and the range of his interests. His large output is growing unceasingly, confirming the author's creative abilities and his diligence.³

Being a result of both continuous studies of diverse expert literature and the participation in discussions of different philosophical environments (schools), "a vast and thorough historical knowledge as well as a systematic knowledge of philosophical sciences" (which comprised the current knowledge of contemporary formal logic and methodology of sciences applied within the methodology of philosophy) had an impact on understanding philosophy and on elaborating

³ This very positive assessment of the expertise in philosophical sciences was expressed by a demanding, high class expert in these issues, with whom Kamiński stayed in in an intellectually prolific contact and who co-created his philosophical face. Referring to and supplementing Czeżowski's evaluation, Antoni B. Stępień, closely collaborating and discussing with Kamiński within the Lublin school, states that: "S. Kamiński is a perfect embodiment of a certain model of a methodologist of sciences, which was once elaborated by the Lvov-Warsaw School and hardly finds followers after K. Ajdukiewicz, T. Czeżowski, I. Dąmbska. Kamiński combines his broad and deep erudition in broadly understood logic, traditional and contemporary philosophy with the ability of concise, objective synthesizing of the discussed matters and views. Even if in an undertaken matter nothing new is discovered, no valuable forgotten thought is reminded, no new approach is suggested, he will multisidedly, clearly, calmly present, organize, and explain a given topic in the wide historical and philosophical background. He opts for the pluralism of rational human knowledge and he reveals and emphasizes the philosophical determinants of both practicing sciences and practicing the theory of science." A.B. Stępień, "Charakterystyka dorobku naukowego i działalności naukowej Księdza Profesora Stanisława Kamińskiego," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 35, no. 1 (1987), p. 7.

its concept. Such knowledge could have burdened this concept or overloaded it with excessive erudite information, however—the concept was not meant to be a variant of the analytical current, nor an eclectic juxtaposition of what was considered important in other concepts. In compliance with the applied and declared assumptions, it was a part of the broad centuries-old tradition of classical, peripatetic, Thomistic philosophy, which co-created the doctrine and school of existential Thomism and its metaphysics (as a theory of being), held together with other disciplines of philosophy.

In Kamiński's metaphilosophical-historical explorations, aimed at capturing the different sides of philosophical multidimensionality, four major fields can be distinguished (a task which was accomplished by Andrzej Bronk SVD in his methodological and logical studies on Kamiński).⁴ Apart from the well-developed (also for the needs of didactics of philosophy) findings and organizing-explanatory results, Kamiński's research into understanding and practicing philosophy comprises a much more authorial assessing-evaluative approach and normative-projective suggestions. In compliance with his beliefs, Kamiński theoretically shows and justifies here the most appropriate and practically most wanted way of practicing philosophy.

While considering the issues focused on the question which also constitutes the title of his dissertation *Jak pojmują filozofię współcześni filozofowie polscy?* (1966), Kamiński stated that “there are too few general and organizing elaborations of current concepts of philosophy.”⁵ Two matters seem to be comprised in this statement. Firstly, Kamiński feels the shortage of such systematizing works and he recognizes the need for creating them, as they are also useful in the effective developing of the own concept. Secondly, a suggestion can be noticed here that the authors or representatives of particular

⁴ “... he led them on many platforms, sometimes at the same time: the reporting-descriptive, organizing-explanatory, valuative-evaluative or normative-projective ones.” A. Bronk, “Filozofia nauki i nauka w ujęciu Stanisława Kamińskiego,” *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 29, no. 1 (1993), p. 156. See A. Bronk, “Stanisław Kamiński—Philosopher and Historian of Science,” in *Polish Philosophers of Science and Nature in the 20th Century*, ed. W. Krajewski (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 74), (Amsterdam; New York: Rodopi, 2001) pp. 141–151.

⁵ S. Kamiński, “Jak pojmują filozofię współcześni filozofowie polscy,” (1966), in S. Kamiński, *Filozofia i metoda*, p. 177.

concepts were not conscious enough of the whole of their concepts to report them—in the comparative approach—or they were not sufficiently able in methodology to present them in a systematizing way. They focused more on object-oriented practicing philosophy than on the accompanying meta-object-oriented reflection upon how they understand philosophy and what concept of philosophy they work out or apply. By preferring multisided methodological analyses in approaching different types of knowledge, Kamiński consistently aimed at possibly the most complete and proper explanation of his own understanding of philosophy.

Kamiński's concept of philosophy takes into account not only the special difficulties in understanding philosophy aptly identified by him but also the rather unclear context of studies on various concepts of philosophy:

What authors call philosophy is an enormously complicated and heterogeneous cultural phenomenon. Thus, the systemizing of discussion on it faces obstacles and complications. Although ... philosophy is talked about, often its different moments are focused on.⁶

While presenting Kamiński's understanding of philosophy, the understanding he considered the most appropriate and most aptly rendering its sense as—first of all—a particular type of metaphysics, it is necessary to take into account a weaker or stronger impact of this context, which disturbs the aiming at the desired unambiguity. Firstly, it is important not to identify his understanding of philosophy with the contents which were alien to him or only secondary, even though they are widely spread and to some extent similar to those he comprised in his specific concept of philosophy. Secondly, despite its methodological rigor and purism, his own understanding of philosophy might have yielded—to a certain degree—to the complexity and heterogeneity of the phenomena called “philosophy”, including various aims and tendencies within itself. What should be considered is the time spacing of Kamiński's concept of philosophy and the influence of many various concepts, which—as a methodologist of sciences—he made a subject of comparative metaphilosophical and historical

⁶ Ibidem.

studies.⁷ Moreover, Kamiński's concept of philosophy is tied up with this context, to some extent unfavorable for it but at the same time analytically used by it as a reference point. The distinguishing and clarification of Kamiński's concept requires the profound familiarization with this context and the polemic references to it, as well as the identification of what is alien and might be destructive, the clear cutting off from what is unwanted, in order to specify accurately the identity of his own concept of philosophy.

The need to elicit and emphasize what is typical (e.g. the method, terminology) of a particular concept of philosophy was frequently raised by Kamiński—also as if by the way in his review of *Słownik filozofów* (Warszawa 1966), in which he drew attention to some shortages concerning the entries: "What is particularly important is to find proportional place for certain generally applied technical terms aimed at specifying the doctrine or method typical of a philosopher."⁸ This lexicographic comment seems significant as his own understanding of philosophy was explained by Kamiński in a systematic and essential form, for instance in an encyclopedia entry in *Encyklopedia katolicka*.⁹

⁷ Characterizing the sources and transformations in the understanding of philosophy by Kamiński, Bronk distinguishes two main sources and three stages: "S. Kamiński admitted mostly to two traditions: classical and analytical philosophy (scholastic one and philosophy of the Lvov-Warsaw School). The first (realistic theory of being and cognition and history of philosophy) gave him the philosophical and historical interests in science and generally in methodological culture, the second—logical ones. He went through ... three characteristic stages: from the non-metaphysical, enchanted by the possibilities of formal logic and methodology, through pro-metaphysical (methodologically-philosophical), to distinctly philosophical and sapiential attitude. In his methodological development, at first he faithfully accepted the theory of learning logical ... empiricism, modified later by Popper's philosophy, strengthened—to avoid skepticism—with intellectualism: the belief in the existence of intellect, the third, apart from discursive mind and senses, intuitive (and rational) cognitive authority." A. Bronk, "Filozofia nauki i nauka w ujęciu Stanisława Kamińskiego," p. 157.

⁸ S. Kamiński, review of *Słownik filozofów*, vol. 1 (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1966), pp. VI + 250; col. 500, *Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki* 12, no. 4 (1967), p. 839.

⁹ What is worth mentioning is that, in order to highlight the context of creating a concept of philosophy, Kamiński established the Research Team for the Dictionary of Methodological Terms at the Lexicographic Department of the Catholic University of Lublin. See *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 5, s.v. "Kamiński Stanisław", pp. 457–462.

The aforementioned critical comment also constitutes a guideline for the elicitation of certain elements in the analyses concerning Kamiński's understanding of philosophy. However, as Bronk and Stanisław Majdański claim—methodologists close to him, his disciples and experts in his works—Kamiński himself did not straightforwardly explain the sense of one of the important terms for his mature concept of philosophy and for the name of school suggested by him:

The notion of classical philosophy was somehow self-evident to him. This can be confirmed by the fact that, although in the historical-systematic entry “philosophy” the term “classical” appears several times (classical texts, classical philosophical issues, approach to classical philosophy, classical concept of philosophy), this notion itself is not explicitly introduced.¹⁰

This is one of the issues which requires critical consideration in further studies: what, to what extent and for what reasons was regarded by Kamiński as “somehow self-evident” in the understanding of philosophy preferred by him—as if something irresistibly imposing itself due to “the nature of philosophy itself” (in the way he perceived it) and inherited as the legacy of tradition (considered to be an integral part of the own intellectual identity)?

As a critically reflective but friendly inclined methodologist, Kamiński developed, improved and justified (legitimized) his concept of philosophy for those among his close philosophers who directly practiced metaphysics (“metaphysicized”) and came closer to the right fulfilment of the concept explored and specified by him. As regards the approach to philosophy, among metaphysicists, Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, O.P. (1921–2008) seemed to be the closest to him—e.g. they both wrote the foundational work for the so-called Lublin School of classical philosophy entitled *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* (1962). The publication of Krąpiec's main work *Metafizyka. Zarys podstawowych zagadnień* (1966), the flagship work for the Lublin School, took place with Kamiński's review, in which he stated that it was Krąpiec who created and presented the “consciously practiced metaphysics in the classical sense, which was the epistemologically autonomous and

¹⁰ A. Bronk and S. Majdański, “Klasycyzm filozofii klasycznej,” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 39, no. 1 (1991–1992), p. 374.

rational philosophy of being as being.”¹¹ Thus, this is the philosophy which fulfils the (simultaneously imposed on it in Kamiński’s concept) conditions of autonomy and rationality and which is a theory of being (being as being). The usually reserved Kamiński talks about Krapiec as a philosopher with respect or even emphasis:

... this is not only someone writing about metaphysics but also practically metaphysicizing—in the fullest sense of this word: with passion but responsibly, authentically but referring in a multisided and deep way to classics in this field, providing the outline of traditional answers but with particular care and—to a large extent—drawing the questions and their genesis in a modern way.¹²

It can be recognized that the model and pattern is shown here of a philosopher practicing metaphysics in compliance with its concept. According to Kamiński, the narrative style of *Metafizyka* is absolutely appropriate for expressing the essential contents of philosophy and raises a lot of genuine interest in them as the issues one has to handle oneself. The task of a metaphysical treatise, written compliantly with the concept of philosophy which is regarded as proper, is

... not presenting for memorization a certain amount of formulas (most frequently in the type of definitions) comprising ontological principles, but—as Kamiński claims—helping in the personal noticing of the undoubtedly difficult but important metaphysical subject matter, in understanding it and finding solutions. Therefore, actively behaving readers should notice both what they analyze or justify and the way of seeing, investigating and arguing.¹³

The reader of a metaphysical treatise is neither its passive recipient (a consumer of the provided product) nor a learner subjected to didactic rigor, who acquires (crams) ready theses in order to repeat them. Such a learner goes through a way of investigation, revealed to him by an author who “metaphysicizes live.” This understanding of the function and style of philosophical narration is an important part of the

¹¹ S. Kamiński, review of M.A. Krapiec, *Metafizyka: Zarys podstawowych zagadnień* (Poznań: Pallottinum, 1966), pp. 558, *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 3, no. 2 (1967), p. 303.

¹² *Ibidem*.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 304.

concept of philosophy promoted by Kamiński. Yet, as an acute and critical methodologist, Kamiński not only presents what (out of the concept of philosophy he believes in) Krąpiec fulfilled in a satisfactory way, but—applying a more analytical point of view—he points to the striking shortages in the conduct which follows the assumptions of the concept of philosophy:

Father Krąpiec's language can be assessed as controversial. With no doubt, in many places it is not sufficiently precise and is lengthy. ... Still, the whole of it fulfils the informative function sufficiently precisely. Moreover, some formulations are received differently if it is taken into account that the course of the lecture often has a form of as if a report from metaphysicizing live. Therefore, a desideratum can be willingly put forward to describe the procedure itself of creating metaphysical notions with even bigger accuracy. Partially, it seems worth here to follow phenomenologists and the method of analytical philosophy.¹⁴

In his typical style applied in some of his arguments, Kamiński takes a dual approach to the flaws in the used language, which to some extent defends itself (if “a form of as if a report from metaphysicizing live” is spotted), but at the same time—applying particular methodological standards recognized as universally important—the lack of precision and transparent presentation of the procedure of creating metaphysical notions cannot be accepted. To remedy these drawbacks, Kamiński suggests reaching for the achievements of the phenomenological and analytical tradition without resigning from the values of “metaphysicizing live.” This openness to creative acquisition of the values, especially in the field of methods and language, brought about by other traditions of practicing philosophy, constitutes another significant component of the concept of philosophy elaborated by Kamiński.

Undertaking (in the late 1950s) the shaping of (as he assumed) a pertinent concept of philosophy, in terms of contents and its methodologically mature form, that he would like to present as the closest to him, appropriately fulfilling the basic and inalienable tasks attributed to philosophy in its most proper sense, Kamiński started with the absolutely negative assessment of the striking lack of metaphilosophical

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 306.

reflection (merged with the achievements of methodology of sciences) in the currents of peripatetic philosophy. It was the concept of philosophy derived from these currents which he wanted to modernize in an appropriate and feasible way. Simultaneously, Kamiński expressed his far-reaching optimism concerning the widespread popularity of metaphilosophical aspirations as an indispensable part of practicing philosophy. He believed that “each concept of philosophy is aimed at reflected self-identification.”¹⁵ If expressed with more reservation, this thesis obviously pertains to Kamiński’s concept of philosophy, as (taking into account the current debates and methodological arguments) it is consistently and dynamically “aimed at reflected self-identification.” This takes place not just once, as an act of confessing the metaphilosophical *credo*, but in the consecutive approaches and views.

While differentiating, comparing and ordering various concepts of philosophy, Kamiński recommended paying attention in metaphilosophical-historical studies mostly to three aspects of the concept of philosophy: the epistemological, methodological and functional one. (1) The epistemological aspect should constitute “the most fundamental criterion for organizing philosophy.”¹⁶ In its analysis, it should be recognized what comes to the forefront in a particular concept of philosophy—whether this concerns the purely cognitive nature of philosophizing or whether other, practical functions are focused on. It is possible to specify how the practiced philosophy refers to the issues of rationality and empiricism or scientific cognition. (2) The methodological aspect allows for recognizing in a particular philosophy what methods (styles) of practicing it are dominant. (3) The functional aspect enables “differentiating the concept of philosophy according to the role which it plays in the whole of the culture.” It is this aspect which “today provides most materials for discussion and most findings which are burdened with consequences for philosophy itself.”¹⁷

Ad (1): In the concept of philosophy elaborated by Kamiński, the universal scope and universal importance of philosophical cognition is assumed (although its engagement is allowed as well). In compliance with classical philosophy, Kamiński states:

¹⁵ S. Kamiński, “Jak pojmują filozofię współcześni filozofowie polscy,” p. 177.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 178.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 179.

Basically, the field of philosophical studies is unlimited. It deals with everything—*scientia universalis*. In fact, however, the research field is narrowing. ... Thus, philosophy turns to the whole world but investigates it in the most fundamental aspect.¹⁸

Such cognitive functions are totally fulfilled by philosophy, as the human being

persistently asks why something exists if it does not have to exist, whether any necessity takes place within what really exists and owing to which this reality exists in such a way and is just such, why the good and bad exists at all, why eventually humanity exists and what ultimate sense the suffering imposed on it by fate has.¹⁹

What lies at the heart of the epistemological characterization of the concept and method of classical philosophy is the strong anthropological conviction that this kind of philosophical cognition corresponds to (self-generated) human cognitive pursuits.

In Kamiński's concept of philosophy, object-oriented cognition is preferred as the basic one and philosophy is not limited here to meta-object-oriented cognition. While approaching the acts of philosophical cognition, the experience based on common sense is referred to—the experience regarded as valuable and cognitively reliable. This takes place with the use of colloquial language, but with the awareness that this experience remains “embroiled in various theories as it makes use of the whole tradition of knowledge.”²⁰ Therefore it is important to recognize carefully which theories this tradition is involved with, how it is stigmatized with them, to which traditions it reaches, in which traditions and how deep it is grounded and how it is determined by a particular colloquial language (through its characteristic features and peculiarities).

If philosophical (metaphysical) cognition is to preserve autonomy and rationality, it should be—using Kamiński's wording—“separate rational cognition [of the reality], explaining it ultimately and

¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 185. “What has been disputed on some occasions is which aspect is the most important, what thematization is closer to a contemporary philosopher” (ibidem).

¹⁹ S. Kamiński, “O metodzie filozofii klasycznej,” p. 9.

²⁰ Ibidem, p. 11.

with necessity.”²¹ If there is a need for such ultimate and necessity-driven explanation of necessity, the validity should be recognized of the fundamental (but controversial) theses of gnoseological maximalism that humanity ought to aim “at the deepest explanation (in fact at the undisprovable indication of ultimate rights of the existence order) of the whole reality.”²² One who intends to practice philosophy understood in this way assumes that it is possible and even desired to recognize these rules which can be regarded as the most general (ultimate) and that it is possible to reach what is essential and necessary in things. It is assumed that things contain what is essential and necessary and that this is not only a formula imposed by the recognizing subject or an unreflected language custom. Thus, philosophy is primarily the theory of “concrete beings, approached in the aspect of proportional generalness and the final reason of existence.”²³

As the effects of appropriately conducted philosophical cognition, “the theses of metaphysics basically have the character of undisprovable cognition due to its being both analytical and realistic.”²⁴ By using a “specifically analytic” phrase which suggests a different state from the standard one, Kamiński explains what this indispensable specificity consists of:

This analytical nature is grounded neither solely in the rules of language nor solely in the ability of some cognitive authority or forms of the mind but simultaneously in the object (necessity-based structures of reality), in the disposition of cognitive authority (intellectual intuition) and in the notional apparatus (a high degree of the theoretization and the subsequent analyzation of the language of the theory of existence).²⁵

Explaining the understanding of analyzation applied in his concept of philosophy, Kamiński argues that, while formulating “an argument from duality”, this analyzation which is dealt here is “neither only «x» nor only «y»”. It is not like in other concepts of philosophical

²¹ S. Kamiński, “Teoria bytu a inne dyscypliny filozoficzne: Aspekt metodologiczny,” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 23, no. 1 (1975), p. 5, footnote 1.

²² S. Kamiński, “O metodzie filozofii klasycznej,” p. 9.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

²⁴ S. Kamiński, “Metody współczesnej metafizyki,” p. 106.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

cognition, in which «x» and «y» are separated from each other (either «x» or «y») — what needs to be recognized is that “«x» and «y» occur simultaneously.”

As regards the division of philosophy to particular disciplines of metaphysics, although these disciplines are “independent in the starting point, they structurally depend from general metaphysics, because, in their ultimate explanation, they refer to its theses as well.”²⁶

To justify such a concept of philosophical cognition, Kamiński refers to the idea of “significant pluralism of rational knowledge,” not agreeing with the extremely reductionalist (in his opinion) thesis that “only the scientific type of cognition [is] epistemologically-methodologically valuable.”²⁷ Although Kamiński did not accept scientific monism in approaching rational knowledge, as Bronk notices, “despite its many limitations, science remained for him the model of rational cognition and, deep inside, he was convinced that the scientist’s aim is to reach the true (and in philosophy — necessary) knowledge.”²⁸ Kamiński believed that the theory of existence understood in this way “meets half-way the contemporary demand for autonomous philosophy,”²⁹ which allows for acquiring universal cognitive values.

Ad (2): As regards the basic procedures and methods of cognition, Kamiński states that “explaining is mostly of intuitive-reductive nature.”³⁰ He distinguishes three basic explanatory operations in the theory of existence: (a) “highlighting the investigated existential aspect of reality,” which “occurs through the analysis of the data concerning the sensual-intellectual approach to the world in the light of being as being”; (b) “indicating the only reasons which are not contradicted by particular existential states”; (c) using “negative argumentations for supporting the statements.”³¹ Owing to such conduct,

²⁶ S. Kamiński, “Osobliwość metodologiczna teorii bytu,” (1979), in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować? Studia z metodologii filozofii klasycznej*, prepared for publication by T. Szubka (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1989), p. 77.

²⁷ S. Kamiński, “O metodzie filozofii klasycznej,” p. 10.

²⁸ A. Bronk, “Filozofia nauki i nauka w ujęciu Stanisława Kamińskiego,” p. 162.

²⁹ S. Kamiński, “Osobliwość metodologiczna teorii bytu,” p. 78.

³⁰ S. Kamiński, “O metodzie filozofii klasycznej,” p. 8. “The reasoning applied here is mostly of intuitive-reductive character.” S. Kamiński, “Osobliwość metodologiczna teorii bytu,” pp. 84–85.

³¹ S. Kamiński, “Osobliwość metodologiczna teorii bytu,” p. 85.

as Kamiński argues, “the informational contents of the notion of being is explicated and enriched in different statements which express the properties of being in general or its particular types. The rules of being achieved in this way specify as if the deepest nature of being and its dynamics.”³²

It seems worth drawing attention to the formulation of the thought about “the sensual-intellectual approach to the world in the light of being as being” and to wonder to what extent the phrase “in the light of being as being,” used here and based on the traditional luminist-optical imagery, is an (even involuntary) reference to the classical model of viewing reality, given to the intellect in some metaphysically understood light. It might even take place in the concept of philosophy presented here that the justification is provided earlier (by reality itself, which gives it in a basic way as the pre-assumption of “metaphysicizing”) and then the philosopher viewing reality “in the light of being as being” starts the explanatory procedure to reach this fundamental and founding justification and to give it a verbal expression which will affirm it.

As regards the characteristics of the language of the theory of existence, Kamiński shows it has its specificity and is clearly different from “the language of other types of knowledge, and what is more it is difficult to determine it fully in the semiotic sense.”³³ Emphasizing the specific features of the language of the theory of being, Kamiński approaches this language in compliance with the model of dualism (or circulation), in which some features may occur simultaneously whereas they exclude each other in different approaches (models):

Even though as regards analyzation, it gets closer to the language of formal sciences, it is unambiguously characterized by integral and almost extreme realism. It pertains to the qualitative side of reality but it also attributes the ontic and cognitive primacy to the general existential aspect. This language is genetically derived from colloquial language on which it is mostly based, but it also uses terminology comprising highly specialist semiotic functions. Finally, it uses names in their broadest scope, but simultaneously—it attributes not scanty contents to them.³⁴

³² Ibidem.

³³ Ibidem, p. 81.

³⁴ Ibidem.

The use of language formulated in this way requires a specified research conduct, because

... these notions are reached through the intellectual analysis of the properties of the absolutely approached beings (static ones) or the beings related to something (relative, dynamic ones). These will be the following notions: a thing (a specified existing content), unity (indivisibility in itself, non-contradiction of existentiality), something (separateness of existentiality), truth (rationality, comprehensibility) and good (subordination to desire or the aim of natural aspiration).³⁵

In the defense of controversial acts of intuition and the state of obviousness of an object, Kamiński thinks that it is possible to prepare methodically for such cognitive activities and for the perception of their results:

The acts of intellectual (especially repeatable) intuition referring to simple necessary relations are neither sudden illuminations (having an idea, lightening operation) nor a combination of accidental, unrelated observations, but an appropriately prepared (especially by accurate indication of the subject of cognition and well-specified abstractions) reading (*intus legere*) of the holistically or indirectly approached situation with obviousness of the object.³⁶

Will such an approach and justification of these cognitive activities and outcomes satisfy their critics?

Taking a stand concerning the issue of possible axiomatization of metaphysics, suggested by the Krakow Circle, Kamiński only partially allows this possibility and only along with preserving the primary identity of metaphysics:

If classical general metaphysics was possible to be axiomatized, it could only take place on the condition of the inviolability of its concept. Therefore, this does not concern axiomatization at all costs, for instance the cost of modification of metaphysics itself, but such axiomatization which would ensure the tightest preservation

³⁵ S. Kamiński, "O języku teorii bytu," (1969), in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, p. 97.

³⁶ S. Kamiński, "Osobliwość metodologiczna teorii bytu," p. 84.

of the specific nature of cognition called classical general metaphysics.³⁷

In the emerging axiological conflict in relations between such values as accuracy and precision, obtained owing to axiomatization, and the values brought about by practicing metaphysics inherited by tradition, Kamiński supports the care for preserving the values of metaphysics. For this reason, he suggests maintaining caution and restraint in the most radical slogans and far-reaching attempts at implementing a logistic reform of metaphysics:

A better chance for successful fulfilment seems to come with autonomous formalization of some fragments of metaphysics. However, even here watchful attention should be paid to: 1° the conscious finding out whether the categorical-deductive or only hypothetical-deductive system is provided, 2° significant incompleteness of the axiom system for richer systems, 3° the exact determination of the value scope of variables, 4° the issue of the formalization of existence. The issue of metaphysical existence probably cannot be solved in a formal-logical way.³⁸

The understanding of metaphysical existence is a fundamental issue for the existential theory of being, promoted by Kamiński.

Expressing due appreciation (despite the objections raised by others) for the achievements of contemporary logic, Kamiński postulates—in practicing classical philosophy (especially the theory of existence)—the use of “the method of reconstructing the notions, which leads to replacing some vague metaphysical notions with more precise expressions, determined in compliance with the principles of modern language logic.”³⁹

³⁷ S. Kamiński, “Aksjomatyzowalność klasycznej metafizyki ogólnej,” *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 1, no. 2 (1965), p. 104. “Thus, if logical calculation is interpreted as a certain theory of a particular field of reality, what should be conducted with far-reaching caution is the reflection whether this particular field can be a model of this logical calculation. Moreover, it should be accurately indicated with which interpretation of logical terms it becomes this model. As regards classical metaphysics, its subject matter does not constitute a model for any of classical logical calculations.” *Ibidem*, p. 114.

³⁸ *Ibidem*.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 115.

Ad (3): By emphasizing the validity, fundamentality and inalienability of the metaphilosophical thesis on special features and values of philosophy in the whole of knowledge and culture: “Philosophy as philosophy constitutes universally important knowledge”, Kamiński warns that:

Engaged philosophy a priori deprives itself of universal cognitive values, limiting itself to the role of a tool in the individual type. Even if this philosophy contains cognitive elements, they occur only in such an approach which is convenient to a particular social group.⁴⁰

He is convinced that philosophy, maintaining its specific epistemological status, also gains practical significance: “Methodologically autonomous (in relation both to particular sciences and to supernatural faith) philosophy seems to be practically indispensable.”⁴¹

Thus, Kamiński does not refuse philosophy the right to fulfil non-cognitive functions as well, he even declares that it is “practically indispensable,” but what it requires is rigorous following the specified order of these functions. Yet, he negatively evaluates the situation when “philosophy is attributed some non-cognitive functions without precise highlighting their relation to purely theoretical ones.”⁴² Moreover, he does this without accepting with intellectual humbleness that “philosophy does not possess the complete vision of the world.”⁴³ The undertaking of non-cognitive functions by philosophy should be subordinated to fulfilling its cognitive functions. Kamiński even puts forward a rule (which sounds like recommendations formulated within business ethics and concerns practical values of honesty and trust): “non-cognitive functions will be more abundant and valuable when cognitive ones are more completely fulfilled.”⁴⁴ A similar formula is used by Kamiński while indicating the most fundamental principles of the functioning (based on the appropriate understanding and practicing philosophy) of university: “Universities become utilitarian in

⁴⁰ S. Kamiński, “Jak pojmują filozofię współcześni filozofowie polscy,” pp. 186–187.

⁴¹ S. Kamiński, “O metodzie filozofii klasycznej,” p. 11.

⁴² S. Kamiński, “Jak pojmują filozofię współcześni filozofowie polscy,” p. 186.

⁴³ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 187.

the best way when, within their main tasks, they practice science in an anti-utilitarian manner.”⁴⁵ Then, he adds his favorite *dictum*: “There is no more practical thing in the world than a good theory” (Gauss).⁴⁶

As regards the non-cognitive functions of classical philosophy—in Kamiński’s opinion—“by applying maximalist theoretical and practical aims of philosophizing, we stay in compliance with the needs posed by life itself.”⁴⁷ It is also the pragmatism of life and its needs which generate the concept of philosophy developed by Kamiński. This concept gains relatively important references—based on feedback—to the sphere of religious life as well.⁴⁸

The need for philosophy to aim at practical goals, specified in a maximalist way and based on earlier achieving the theoretical goals specified in the same way, is emphasized by Kamiński in the basic (for him) sense of philosophy which he presented in *Encyklopedia katolicka*:

The deepest and aptly content-based cognition of the world and the hierarchy of values is indispensable for human culture-creating activity. Philosophy should serve here as a guide as it indicates and—in the ontic order—ultimately justifies why particular value-creating behaviors ought to be preferred. It also uniformly solves problems which go beyond particular fields of culture (religion, morality, science, art) and, finally, provides means for understanding its transformations and the criteria for its achievements. Thus, philosophy constitutes as if the self-awareness of culture; it permeates culture but is not reduced to any of its disciplines, which it harmonizes in such a way that humanity could improve itself in an even and full way: it creates culture.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda: Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk*, prepared for publication by A. Bronk (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1992), p. 196.

⁴⁶ Ibidem.

⁴⁷ S. Kamiński, “O metodzie filozofii klasycznej,” p. 9.

⁴⁸ “Maximalistically understood philosophy ..., in its cognitive claims, constitutes a kind of a pendant to the religious attitude. It fulfils as if para-religious functions, comparable to religious ones and overlapping with them, despite respecting the methodological-epistemological and semiotic autonomy of both disciplines as well as despite declaring the (also cognitive) accidentality of human existence.” A. Bronk and S. Majdański, “Klasycyzm filozofii klasycznej,” p. 390.

⁴⁹ *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 5, s.v. “Filozofia”, col. 254.

Referring to the basic practical aims of philosophy understood in this way, Bronk says that what is indicated here is “the fundamental (almost religious) generally cultural function of philosophy.”⁵⁰ This strong understanding of the (fundamental and funding) functions of philosophy, without fulfilling which it is hard to imagine the development of human culture, is assumed in Kamiński’s concept. Philosophy practiced compliantly with the thought of this concept should fulfil these maximalist theoretical and practical aims of philosophizing in the most appropriate way.

Taking into account not only the purely cognitive aims of philosophy, its educational and didactic functions need to be considered first of all. This was done by Kamiński, who “not only with his publications excellently enriched readers’ knowledge and methodological self-awareness but also devoted a lot of energy to universally fruitifying didactics (he conducted a lecture on didactics of philosophy for many years).”⁵¹ While enquiring about the right way of understanding and practicing philosophy, the questions (both in their theoretical and practical dimension) concerning the functions of philosophy in the whole education should not be omitted.

What needs emphasizing in the end is that, following the recommendations of Desiré Mercier (1851–1926), Kamiński recognizes the topicality and significance of the advice that if philosophy is understood mostly as classical philosophy (metaphysics), it is necessary to work out a belief that “we are not the exclusive possessors of truth and that the truth we possess is not the whole truth.”⁵² What cannot be done is to regard the acceptance of the concept of maximalist classical philosophy and the attempts at practicing it as synonymous to the exclusive possessing of the whole truth, because then the concept of this philosophy loses its basic sense and the “possessor of the whole truth”—out of a searching and critically reflective philosopher—transforms into an ideologist who is uncritically sure of the rightness of their arguments. This destructive transformation (at

⁵⁰ A. Bronk, “Antyfundamentalizm filozofii hermeneutyczno-pragmatycznej i fundamentalizm filozofii klasycznej,” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 36, no. 1 (1988), p. 178.

⁵¹ A.B. Stępień, “Charakterystyka dorobku naukowego i działalności naukowej Księdza Profesora Stanisława Kamińskiego,” p. 7.

⁵² S. Kamiński, “Metody współczesnej metafizyki,” p. 87.

least for the appropriate understanding of philosophy) into a believer of ideology was what Kamiński warned of, at the same time aiming at practicing philosophy always alongside the metaphilosophical reflection, in which the question of the cognitive value of this philosophy is always valid.

STANISŁAW KAMIŃSKI: A LOGICIAN, HISTORIAN OF LOGIC AND A PHILOSOPHER OF LOGIC

CONCEPT OF LOGIC

Kamiński started his teaching and research from logic (including the history of logic), gradually moving onto the general methodology of sciences, philosophy of science and methodology of philosophy. In 1952 he took part in the First Conference of Logicians in Warsaw. He gave no lecture but the debates had a very significant impact on his later research. Present at the conference was Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890–1963), and he gave a lecture *Research Plan in the Area of Logic*.¹ He suggested doing research on a set of subjects, at least two of which were later realized by Kamiński: (1) Fallacy taxonomy, including fallacies: against accuracy, giving reasons for unjustified propositions, extortion of unjustified beliefs, invalid reasonings; (2) Research on the creation and disambiguation of scientific notation, for example on definitions. Kamiński's further logical studies were also influenced by other lectures: (1) Janina Kotarbińska's (1901–1997) devoted to definitions²;

¹ K. Ajdukiewicz, "Plan prac badawczych w zakresie logiki," *Studia Logica* 2 (1955), pp. 267–277.

² Published as J. Kotarbińska, "Definicja," *Studia Logica* 2 (1955), pp. 301–327; reprinted in: J. Kotarbińska, *Z zagadnień teorii nauki i teorii języka* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1990), pp. 128–151.

(2) Tadeusz Kotarbiński's (1886–1981) in which he gave a broad definition of logic, assumed later with some changes by Kamiński (Kotarbiński included the following topics in logic: logical semantics, formal logic, general methodology, technique of mind's work, investigation on the relationship between branches of logic and other scientific disciplines)³; (3) Tadeusz Czeżowski's (1889–1981) on reasoning's divisions.⁴

Kamiński maintained that logic (similarly to mathematics) is an independent research discipline and performs a serving, instrumental function in relation to other sciences: it is their tool or a form. He distinguished logic in a broad sense, logic in a main sense and service-orientated logic. There are the following branches of logic in a broad sense:⁵ (1) formal logic; (2) logical semiotics; (3) methodology and theory of sciences; (4) theory (philosophy) of logic and theory of scientific knowledge.

Formal logic is understood as an arrangement of

... deductive systems built of formal schemes of reliable reasoning.

The schemes, in form of laws or rules, are built of logical constants

³ H. Stonert, "Sprawozdanie z I Konferencji Logiki," *Studia Logica* 2 (1955), p. 252. Marian Przełęcki (1923–2013) wrote that such a broad understanding of logic corresponding to the content of T. Kotarbiński *Elementy teorii poznania, logiki formalnej i metodologii nauk* (Lwów: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1929; Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich & Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1990) was in the line with Lvov-Warsaw School's tradition. See M. Przełęcki, "O działalności nauczycielskiej Janiny Kotarbińskiej," *Ruch Filozoficzny* 49, no. 2 (1992), p. 127.

⁴ Kamiński gave a paper on reasoning in 1953, later published. See S. Kamiński, "O klasyfikacji rozumowań," *Summarius* 10 (1981), pp. 381–396; reprinted in: S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować? Studia z metodologii filozofii klasycznej*, prepared for publication by T. Szubka (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1989), pp. 231–245.

⁵ S. Kamiński, "Logika współczesna a filozofia," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 9, no. 1 (1961), p. 56; S. Kamiński, "O zastosowaniach logiki współczesnej do metafizyki klasycznej," in M.A. Krąpiec and S. Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* (Lublin, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1962), pp. 281–282; S. Kamiński, "O definicji logiki formalnej," *Sprawozdania z Czynności Wydawniczej i Posiedzeń Naukowych Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL* 6 (1952–1953), p. 74; S. Kamiński, "Kanta ujęcie przedmiotu logiki formalnej," *Sprawozdania z Czynności Wydawniczej i Posiedzeń Naukowych Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL* 10 (1959), pp. 185–190; S. Kamiński, "Czy logika jest dyscypliną praktyczną?," *Ateneum Kapłańskie* 57 (1958), pp. 228–233. Elsewhere he added also eristic and logical-psychological-praxeological theory of reasonings: S. Kamiński, "Systematyzacja typowych błędów logicznych," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 10, no. 1 (1962), pp. 5–39.

and variables. They express truth-conditions ... between propositions taking into consideration the inner structure of elementary propositions (system of name's variables) or not (system of propositional variables).⁶

Logical semiotics is understood as a logic of language, it deals with the meaningful side of expressions in order to improve the accuracy of using them. In addition, it classifies expressions, describes their syntactic, semantic and pragmatic functions, analyses logical structure of language and fallacies occurring in language.⁷

Methodology and theory of sciences are theories of how to do science in a rational way. Within them, typologies of reasoning are carried out. One subsequently analyses their research, justification and systematization methods, as well as any fallacies occurring in the reasoning. The nature and types of sciences are also defined there. Meta-logic and meta-mathematics are included in such methodology.⁸

Theory (philosophy) of logic and theory of scientific knowledge were not characterized. Kamiński wrote only that in philosophy of logic one searches for "... an answer to the question of what formal logic involves, how to describe ontically its subject matter."⁹

Mathematical logic is a study on the structure of mathematical theories and its meta-logical properties. He regarded mathematical logic as the most-developed branch of logic. There are other types of logic of a specialized and service character as well: logic for lawyers, logic for humanists, logic for philosophers. Here he would probably include the didactics of logic as well.¹⁰

These are the areas of logic in which Kamiński worked in a broad sense: (1) formal logic: syllogistic; (2) logical semiotics: concept of logical semiotics, suppositions of terms, logical fallacies; (3) methodology and theory of sciences: Frege's logic and the methodology of deductive system, mathematical induction and method of induction, theory of definition; (4) philosophy of logic and theory of scientific knowledge: concept of logic, subject matter of logic, form and formalism, the

⁶ S. Kamiński, "Logika współczesna a filozofia," p. 56.

⁷ Ibidem.

⁸ Ibidem, p. 57.

⁹ Ibidem; S. Kamiński, "O zastosowaniach logiki współczesnej do metafizyki klasycznej," p. 282.

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 284.

meaning of Gödel's theorem; (5) logic of a specialized and service character: logic for philosophy, in particular for Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, didactics of logic.

Even though Kamiński repeatedly wrote that he dealt with the history of logic, he did not include it in logic.¹¹ Maybe he did it consciously, assuming that: (1) each of the above divisions has its own history (history separated from a given discipline; style of historians of logic); (2) history is understood as an introductory subject for each of the above divisions of logic (history as an integral part of a given discipline; Giuseppe Peano's style). I believe that the latter solution would correspond to the style of Kamiński's writing, including his script on logic: each logical notion has its own history and the reader has to be informed about it competently.

SYLLOGISTICS

Kamiński dealt with formal logic only in an area of contemporary syllogistic approaches, also investigating it from a historical point of view. He was a continuator of the work of Polish logicians in this area: Antoni Korcik (1892–1969), Tadeusz Czeżowski (1889–1981), Jan Śleszyński (1854–1931), Jan Łukasiewicz (1878–1956), Jerzy Słupecki (1904–1987), Henryk Greniewski (1903–1972). Developing syllogistic, he examined the possibility of treating it as a part of the two-valued propositional calculus, which was the implementation of Greniewski's idea:

¹¹ The following are Kamiński's papers on the history of logic which have not been mentioned until now: S. Kamiński, review of A. Korcik, *Teoria sylogizmu zdań asertorycznych u Arystotelesa na tle logiki tradycyjnej. Studium historyczno-krytyczne* (Lublin, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1948), *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 2–3 (1949–1950), pp. 459–460; S. Kamiński, "Sprawozdanie z wydanych w Polsce pozycji z dziedziny logiki," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 5, no. 2 (1955–1957), p. 221–224; S. Kamiński, "Historia logiki: Spis bibliograficzny pozycji z lat 1956–1959," *Ruch Filozoficzny* 20 (1960–1961), pp. 9–19; S. Kamiński and S. Majdański, "Dwudziestolecie logiki na KUL," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 8, no. 3 (1965), pp. 37–39; S. Kamiński, "Rozwój logiki i metodologii nauk w Polsce po II wojnie światowej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 24, no. 1 (1976), pp. 113–122; S. Kamiński, "Ludwik Borkowski jako kontynuator logiczno-metodologicznych prac szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 32, no. 1 (1984), pp. 7–17; *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 1, s.v. "Ajdukiewicz Kazimierz," col. 205; *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 2, s.v. "Bornstein Benedykt," col. 819; *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 3, s.v. "Chwistek Leon," col. 435–436.

We will define a square of opposition as a propositional function of four propositional variables, and then we will build—somewhat richer than traditional theory—a square of opposition calculus, which will be a chapter of the two-valued propositional calculus.¹²

Kamiński expressed logical constants of syllogistic using one four-valued connective “illustrating” a square of opposition, where a particular proposition with an index from 1 to 4 refers to syllogistic propositions: SaP, SiP, SeP, SoP.¹³ There are the laws of the propositional calculus in force and four-part transformation equivalence, as the basis of the so-called equipollency and conversion.¹⁴ This system enables: (1) extension of the connective until eight-element to express syllogistic with higher number of logical constants¹⁵; (2) presentation of direct inferences: obversion, conversion, contraposition and complete inversion¹⁶; (3) it can be represented graphically by means of a logical octagon drawing, which is a combination of a traditional square of opposition with a square of propositions of a denied subject term and illustrating 28 relations among eight propositional schemes.¹⁷

He believed that the laws or principles of direct inference given in traditional logic can be presented as a calculus that is a division of a two-valued calculus of propositional variables.¹⁸ In this way, he implemented Greniewski’s postulate that “instead of a patinated traditional theory one should lecture on the calculus of a square of opposition, built according to the principles of modern logic.”¹⁹

He showed that the number of important syllogistic moods (and the formula for it) depends on whether the following are allowed: (1) a simple exchange of S and P variables, also in the conclusion; (2) a change of order of premises; (3) weakening of premises (with derivative moods); (4) moods based on rules of conversion. He wrote:

¹² H. Greniewski, “Próba ‘odmłodzenia’ kwadratu logicznego,” *Studia Logica* 1 (1953), p. 276.

¹³ S. Kamiński, “Tradycyjna teoria wnioskowania bezpośredniego jako pewien fragment dwuwartościowego rachunku zdań,” *Studia Logica* 11 (1961), p. 10.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 16.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 12, 18.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

¹⁹ H. Greniewski, “Próba ‘odmłodzenia’ kwadratu logicznego,” p. 276.

The notion of figure and mood are not absolute but relative in the sense that they depend on one or another determination of previous concepts in syllogistic. In consequence of this one should give an answer in a relative way to the question of how many syllogistic figures or moods there are. The formulation of this kind of a response requires a prior comprehensive characterization of the syllogism.²⁰

He listed all ten possibilities of counting correct syllogistic moods. The lowest number of valid syllogistic moods is 14. Allowing for all the above postulates, however, we will get 96 valid syllogistic moods. He presented in an interesting graphic form a layout of possible and valid moods, pointing to some noticeable regularities in the graphic layout.²¹

He gave matrix tables illustrating geometrically the possible elementary relations that can occur between the two ranges (they can be empty or universal, but in a non-empty universe).²²

He further listed the rules of valid syllogism allowing patterns with a denied subject term and assuming non-empty and non-universal ranges of individual variables²³ and a table showing possible and necessary concluding moods.²⁴ Later, Kamiński did not study syllogistics anymore, he only showed its usefulness (or its limitation) in referring to Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics.

LOGICAL SEMIOTICS

For Kamiński, logical semiotics (or logic of language) is a branch of logic in a broad sense that meets the following research efforts:²⁵ (1) studying language as a tool for knowledge and scientific communication; (2) improvement of correctness and efficiency of language,

²⁰ S. Kamiński, "W sprawie liczby konkludujących trybów sylogistycznych," *Studia Logica* 8 (1958), p. 167.

²¹ *Ibidem*.

²² S. Kamiński, "Kwantyfikacja terminów w zdaniach logiki tradycyjnej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 8, no. 1 (1960), pp. 8–11.

²³ S. Kamiński, "Reguły sylogizmów z uwzględnieniem schematów o zaprzczonym podmiocie," *Studia Logica* 16 (1965), p. 47.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 48.

²⁵ S. Kamiński, "Logika współczesna a filozofia," p. 56; S. Kamiński, "Kierunki rozwoju problematyki semiotycznej," pp. 94, 108.

its rationality (accuracy and precision) and instrumental efficiency, the properties that determine the occurrence of logical relations between expressions are examined (Kamiński carried out this task studying the language of classical metaphysics); (3) classification of expressions due to their semiotic functions and discussion of these functions; (4) determining the structure and models of languages; (5) Analysis of the logical structure of the language; (6) discovering the sources of language misunderstandings, ways to avoid nonsense and defects in communicating thoughts, examining fallacies (Kamiński often undertook this research work); (7) studying the relationship between thought and language; the relationship of the structure and content of language to the corresponding state of affairs (the problem of truth and adequacy).

He maintained that the main object of interest of logical semiotics are formalized languages and axiomatic theory languages and then transferring the findings into ordinary language.

Apart from logical semiotics, bearing in mind the interdisciplinary character of semiotics itself, Kamiński distinguished other kinds:²⁶ (1) philosophical, which studies the origin and nature of language, the mutual relationship between language, thinking and the reality; sometimes the semiotic analysis of language is treated as a philosophical method; (2) cultural studies—it is interested in signable character of culture; (3) linguistics—which studies the functioning of the structure of language.

Language was characterized in the area of philosophical semiotics as follows:

Language is not something in principle ontically self-acting. Linguistic signs—as signs—are intentional, they are signs of something for someone. They are—figuratively speaking—transparent. In principle, language is used only as an instrument for expressing the cognition of reality. ... the language adapts to the proper and possibly adequate description of the object and expression of thought. ... The language adapts to the observed nature of things, not *vice versa*.²⁷

²⁶ Ibidem, pp. 93, 108–109.

²⁷ S. Kamiński, “Czy możliwe są ogólne i konieczne twierdzenia rzeczowe,” in M.A. Krąpiec and S. Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*, pp. 307–308.

Later he introduced the distinction between logical semiotics (1) understood on a basic level, as “the totality of syntactic, semantic and pragmatics properties and functions of language expression system,”²⁸ and (2) understood on an upper, meta-level which deals with constructing and studying language systems in terms of their syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties.²⁹

LOGICAL FALLACIES

Kamiński was influenced by Ajdukiewicz in his investigation of fallacies.³⁰ He reported fallacy taxonomies since Aristotle’s time throughout currently forgotten mediaeval researchers until those from the first half of the 20th century. On this basis he sorted out different kinds of fallacies and built a very broad register (he did not call it a classification).³¹ A fallacy can be understood as:

- (1) incompatibility with valid logical rules, and these change with the ruling logic at a given time:
 - (a) theory of discussion and proving—fallacy was an eristic defect;
 - (b) logical rules also referred to knowledge sources—the cognitive errors were added;

²⁸ S. Kamiński, “Kierunki rozwoju problematyki semiotycznej,” p. 94.

²⁹ Ibidem, p. 94.

³⁰ S. Kamiński, “O błędach słownego przekazywania myśli,” *Sprawozdania z Czynności Wydawniczej i Posiedzeń Naukowych Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL* 9 (1958), pp. 84–88; S. Kamiński, “Próba klasyfikacji błędów wysłowienia myśli,” *Studia Logica* 9 (1960), pp. 241–244; S. Kamiński, “Koncepcja błędu logicznego,” *Sprawozdania z Czynności Wydawniczej i Posiedzeń Naukowych Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL* 12 (1961), pp. 44–46; S. Kamiński, “Systematyzacja typowych błędów logicznych,” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 10, no. 1 (1962), pp. 5–39 (reprinted in: S. Kamiński, *Metoda i język: Studia z semiotyki i metodologii nauk*, prepared for publication by U.M. Żegleń [Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1994], pp. 199–230); S. Kamiński, “O typowych błędach podziału i definicji,” *Sprawozdania z Czynności Wydawniczej i Posiedzeń Naukowych Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL* 14 (1964), pp. 59–63; *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 1, s.v. “Ab esse ad posse valet, a posse ad esse non valet consequential,” col. 14; *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 1, s.v. “Ab universali ad particulare valet, a particulari ad universale non valet consequentialia,” col. 49; *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 1, s.v., “Amfibolia,” col. 452.

³¹ S. Kamiński, “Systematyzacja błędów logicznych,” pp. 29–39.

- (c) logic was focused on the language—semiotic errors were added;
 - (d) with the development of science—formal fallacy became a scientific cognition error, including its deductive and inductive methods (the fallacies, thus understood, become outdated, illegible, unobvious and artificial).³²
- (2) Cognitive error being the result of violating the rules of formal logic, semiotics, theory of reasoning, methodology of sciences, epistemology.³³
- (3) Violation of logical rules, which is difficult to recognize, typical methods of logical misleading,³⁴ deceptive tricks in extortion of assertion,³⁵ disguised transgressions of logical rules,³⁶ the detection of which is tricky even for a rationally thinking person.³⁷

SUPPOSITIONS OF TERMS

The topic was developed by Kamiński only in his master's thesis, which consists of three chapters: "Genesis of the Theory of Supposition"; "Concept and Division of Supposition in its Creators"; "Function and Division of Supposition in its Further Development". The chapters are preceded by an introduction and the conclusion is called "The Concept and Division of the Supposition of Terms in the Reborn Scholastics and Modern Logic."³⁸ Kamiński never published the results of these studies, however, he used this knowledge in his didactic work.

³² Ibidem, p. 25

³³ Ibidem, p. 26.

³⁴ Ibidem.

³⁵ Ibidem, p. 28.

³⁶ Ibidem.

³⁷ Ibidem, pp. 45–46.

³⁸ S. Kamiński, *Pojęcie i podział supozycji terminów u Piotra Hiszpana, jego komentatorów, nominalistów XIV w. i eklektyków późnego średniowiecza* (Lublin, 1948) (MA thesis).

FREGE'S LOGIC AND THE METHODOLOGY OF DEDUCTIVE SYSTEM

Kamiński was interested in many aspects of deduction,³⁹ however, his most important research results were in the field of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) logic.⁴⁰

He assumed the following method in his doctoral dissertation: starting from the contemporary (with Kamiński) methodology of the deductive system, to look at the work of Frege. The dissertation consists of two chapters (“Methodology of system”; “erivation of system’s statements”), an appendix “Frege’s system of axiomatic foundations of arithmetic” and Bibliography, showing the Kamiński’s remarkable technical competencies. These are the topics presented in the first paragraph: Generally, on the deductive system; On primitive terms of the system; On definitions in the system; On axioms of the system; On rules in the system.

What I consider the most interesting part of his research on Frege’s logical system is the second chapter, in which he showed a deep knowledge of Frege’s logic. Not only did he show his logical derivations, but he also reconstructed this system (written in the original Frege’s language but difficult to read) in the notation of modern logic. Unfortunately, Kamiński did not return to this research.

Taking into account all of Kamiński’s texts concerning Frege, I would like to highlight some of his conclusions. He aptly pointed to

³⁹ S. Kamiński, review of J. Iwanicki, *Dedukcja naturalna i logistyczna* (Warszawa: Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne, 1949), pp. 164, *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 2–3 (1949–1950), pp. 462–463; S. Kamiński, “Rola Pascala w dziejach metody dedukcji: W 300-lecie śmierci Pascala,” *Sprawozdania z Czynności Wydawniczej i Posiedzeń Naukowych Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL* 13 (1962), pp. 43–45; S. Kamiński, *Dedukcja w metafizyce tomistycznej*, in M.A. Krąpiec and S. Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*, pp. 355–364; *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 1, s.v. “Aksjomat,” col. 261–262; *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 4, s.v. “Dowód,” col. 173–176; *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 4, s.v. “Elenktyczny dowód,” col. 877–878.

⁴⁰ S. Kamiński, *Fregego dwuwartościowy system aksjomatyczny zmiennych zdaniowych w świetle współczesnej metodologii nauk dedukcyjnych* (Lublin, 1949) (PhD thesis); S. Kamiński, “Fregego ujęcie roli definicji w systemie dedukcyjnym,” *Sprawozdania z Czynności Wydawniczej i Posiedzeń Naukowych Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL* 7 (1953–1956), pp. 216–217; S. Kamiński, “Fregego logika zdań,” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 5, no. 2 (1955–1957), pp. 31–64.

the specific understanding of function, the key category for Frege's logic and philosophy. He wrote:

[Frege] understood the function not as a value of an argument as it had been understood up to then, but as a rule that enables to go from an argument to a value. Using this concept of function he could call the two-unit relations functions.⁴¹

This understanding of the function also made it possible to treat concepts as a kind of function. Later he emphasized the evolution of Frege's notion of function and he described the function differently. At the beginning, for Frege function was a kind of connective (broader, of the propositional function), and later a being defined by a functional expression:⁴² (1) for a propositional function—a property; (2) for a descriptive function (*Gegenstandsfunktion*)—a thing.

He emphasized the unique accuracy of Frege's logic. He suggested calling Frege's logical system a two-valued theory of propositional variables, and not using the name "propositional calculus"⁴³ but later he did not repeat this suggestion.⁴⁴ He suggested reading Frege's assertion sign as "is a proposition" or "is a tautology" and agreed with those who considered this sign redundant.⁴⁵ According to Kamiński, truth-values (truth and falsehood) as reference of propositions goes against one's intuition.⁴⁶

He maintained that Frege:⁴⁷

- (1) Created an absolute logical axiomatic system that begins with the logic of proposition.

⁴¹ S. Kamiński, *Fregego dwuwartościowy system aksjomatyczny zmiennych zdaniowych w świetle współczesnej metodologii nauk dedukcyjnych*, pp. 3.

⁴² S. Kamiński, "Fregego logika zdań," p. 41. There is an ongoing discussion on how Frege understood function. See R. Heck and R. May, "The Function is Unsaturated," in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy*, ed. M. Beaney (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 825–851.

⁴³ S. Kamiński, *Fregego dwuwartościowy system aksjomatyczny zmiennych zdaniowych w świetle współczesnej metodologii nauk dedukcyjnych*, p. 16.

⁴⁴ S. Kamiński, "Fregego logika zdań", p. 40.

⁴⁵ Ibidem.

⁴⁶ Ibidem, pp. 36–37.

⁴⁷ Ibidem, pp. 61–62.

- (2) Introduced a notion of a logical variable, especially with a quantifier; he understood the logical variable as an expression with undefined content, and the logical constant as an expression with specific content.
- (3) Used symbolism not modeled on mathematics, what helped him to construct his logicism.
- (4) Distinguished between inference rules and premises, language and meta-language, system and meta-system.
- (5) Proposed the minimum number of axioms.
- (6) He gave the foundations of a syntactic method of building a deductive theory.
- (7) Studied conditions of correct definitions.

MATHEMATICAL INDUCTION AND INDUCTIVE METHOD

Kamiński dealt with induction as one of the methods of scientific cognition. He collected accounts of this topic, which along with argumentation had appeared in the literature on the history of mathematics. To that end, he reviewed long-forgotten textbooks on logic from the first half of the 16th century. The extensive literature review conducted and the research competence of Kamiński are astonishing.

He discussed the results of different studies on who was the first to discover the principle of mathematical induction. Was it Francesco Maurolyco (1494–1575), Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), who used mathematical induction in *Traité du triangle arithmétique* (1654), Jacob Bernoulli (1654–1705), who used it in *Acta Eruditorum* (1686), Euclid, Bhaskara II (a 12th-century mathematician from India), or Theodorus (Plato's teacher)? Kamiński concluded, however, that it was Bernoulli who formulated the principle of mathematical induction.⁴⁸ It was not until the beginning of 19th century that people began to use the term "induction." Even Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) still used the term *Fermatian inference*.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ S. Kamiński, "O początkach indukcji matematycznej," *Studia Logica* 7 (1958), p. 239; S. Kamiński, "Początki indukcji matematycznej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 5, no. 2 (1955–1957), pp. 171–182.

⁴⁹ S. Kamiński, "O początkach indukcji matematycznej," p. 221.

Regarding the examined conceptions, Kamiński noted that one should distinguish between mathematical induction and the empirical method of inference, which does not guarantee the reliability necessary in mathematical proofs. This was the case, for example, of Theon of Smyrna (70–135), who acknowledges the truth of a general thesis on the basis of the truth of its four particular cases.⁵⁰

Kamiński also listed the philosophical foundations of the principle of mathematical induction:

Greek arithmeticians assumed the harmony of the world, in particular in the world of numbers. In the Middle Ages it was believed that there were determinate relationships between beings without free will, and that even more order and oneness was present in the world of numbers.⁵¹

He also studied induction prior to Francis Bacon (1561–1626). He found “rules of verifying induction using a kind of elimination” in Albert the Great’s (ca. 1193/1200–1280) papers.⁵² In addition, Duns Scotus (1266–1308) defended incomplete induction by writing:

Although experience does not refer to all individual cases, but to many, nor does it refer to them always, but only frequently, the one who experiences acknowledges reliably that it is so—both always and in all cases, and this is due to this assertion that rests in the soul: “whatever happens as in most cases due to a cause that is not free is the natural result of that cause.”⁵³

THEORY OF DEFINITION

For the first time Kamiński dealt with definitions in his doctoral dissertation devoted to Frege’s logic, so he became interested in this subject before attending the First Conference of Logicians

⁵⁰ Ibidem, p. 233.

⁵¹ Ibidem, p. 238.

⁵² S. Kamiński, “Teoria indukcji przed Franciszkiem Baconem,” *Sprawozdania z Czynności Wydawniczej i Posiedzeń Naukowych Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL 7* (1953–1956), p. 223; S. Kamiński, “Nauka o indukcji w logice XVI-ego wieku,” pp. 235–258 (reprinted in: S. Kamiński, *Metoda i język*, p. 305).

⁵³ Ibidem. Translated from Latin by Sebastian Śpiewak.

in 1952.⁵⁴ However, the continuation of the work on the theory of definition was undoubtedly an answer to the appeals of Ajdukiewicz and Kotarbińska, who wrote about the urgent need to study this topic:

Confusion in logic, whose one of the main tasks is fight against confusion, is especially bad. Confusion in the theory of definition—the main tool in the fight against confusion—is simply a mortal sin.⁵⁵

This mean that Kamiński:

- (1) worked in the 1950s on:
 - (a) definitions in Frege's system, also from the perspective of the methodology of deductive sciences contemporary with Kamiński;
 - (b) history of definition, in particular Joseph Gergonne's (1771–1859),⁵⁶ John Locke's (1632–1704), Étienne Condillac's (1714–1780) and Thomas Hobbes's (1588–1679) investigations.⁵⁷
- (2) while in the 1960s he worked on definitions according to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, excluding the perspective of 20th-century methodology; he referred to definitions in metaphysics as well.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Kamiński did not published his doctoral thesis, however, he devoted a short announcement and a part of his paper to definitions: S. Kamiński, "Fregego ujęcie roli definicji w systemie dedukcyjnym," *Sprawozdania z Czynności Wydawniczej i Posiedzeń Naukowych Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL* 7 (1953–1956), pp. 216–217; S. Kamiński, "Fregego logika zdań," pp. 48–54.

⁵⁵ J. Kotarbińska, "Definicja," p. 301.

⁵⁶ S. Kamiński, *Gergonne'a teoria definicji* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1958). This book was a preparation to an investigation of definitions from the point of view of methodology of deductive science.

⁵⁷ S. Kamiński, "Rola Locke'a i Condillaca w dziejach teorii definicji," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 5, no. 4 (1955–1957), pp. 67–101; S. Kamiński, "Hobbesa teoria definicji," *Studia Logica* 7 (1958), pp. 43–69.

⁵⁸ S. Kamiński, "O definicjach w systemie metafizyki ogólnej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 8, no. 1 (1960), pp. 37–54; S. Kamiński, "Rola definicji w systemie scholastycznej metafizyki," in M.A. Krąpiec and S. Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*, pp. 341–354.

It is likely that he was inspired by an extensive excerpt from a book written by Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, O.P. (1921–2008) *Realizm ludzkiego poznania*.⁵⁹

- (3) In different periods he studied definitions at a meta-level.⁶⁰

REASONING

Kamiński gave a broad general description of reasoning as a complex process consisting of various mental activities; there are propositions at the beginning and the end of the process.⁶¹ He divided different examples of reasoning due to the characteristics of:⁶²

- (1) connections occurring between propositions at the starting point and at the end of the reasoning:
 - (a) that can be of a formal nature,
 - (b) that take into account other relationships, e.g. the order of cognition or assertion of propositions;
- (2) the reasoning activity itself, defined by:
 - (a) the starting point of reasoning and the reasoning goal,
 - (b) the characteristics of particular thought processes included in the reasoning (methodological-psychological or pragmatic approach).

⁵⁹ M.A. Krąpiec, *Realizm ludzkiego poznania* (Poznań: Pallottinum, 1959).

⁶⁰ S. Kamiński, "O typowych błędach podziału i definicji," *Sprawozdania z Czynności Wydawniczej i Posiedzeń Naukowych Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL* 14 (1964), pp. 59–63; S. Kamiński, "O definicjach kontekstowych i uwikłanych," *Sprawozdania z Czynności Wydawniczej i Posiedzeń Naukowych Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL* 8 (1957), pp. 52–56; *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 3, s.v. "Definicja," col. 1090–1092 (reprinted in: *Leksykon filozofii klasycznej*, ed. J. Herbut [Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1997], pp. 102–104; reprinted in: *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 2, pp. 451–453).

⁶¹ S. Kamiński, "O klasyfikacji rozumowań," *Summarium* 10 (1981), pp. 381–396 (reprinted in: S. Kamiński, *Metoda i język*, pp. 231–245).

⁶² S. Kamiński, "O klasyfikacji rozumowań," *Sprawozdania z Czynności Wydawniczej i Posiedzeń Naukowych Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL* 7 (1953–1956), pp. 213–214.

He sought a criterion of division of reasoning that would lead to a natural useful division in the methodology of sciences. For methodology, inference (or more broadly the relations between propositions) is not sufficient, although it is enough for formal logic. He called his division of different kinds of reasoning a typology. He distinguished between simple and complex reasoning and next he divided the broad category of simple reasoning into two groups, inferences and puzzle-solving. Inferences are divided into further two groups: those of reliable inferences (deduction, complete induction by simple enumeration or recursion) and those of non-reliable inferences (incomplete induction, inference by analogy, reduction). Complex reasoning comprises as follows: explanation (theoretical explanation, explanation by universalization, explanation by comparing with an ideal type) or intermediate justification. The latter can be empirical (verification or falsification) or theoretical (analytic or synthetic proving, direct or indirect proving).

ADDITIONAL LOGICAL ISSUES

Kamiński indicated three positions regarding the subject-matter of formal logic: (1) the lack of the object of logic, logic is only a form of operation; (2) a separate ontic category distinguished from the reality; (3) the most general and formal side of the reality.⁶³ He presented the history of connections between logic and philosophy.⁶⁴ He wrote the following entries in the field of formal logic: alternative, deontic logic, falsehood.⁶⁵ It is said that falsehood as the opposition of truth, is “a term designating disagreement between a creative intellect and

⁶³ S. Kamiński, “Logika współczesna a filozofia,” pp. 57–60; S. Kamiński, “O zastosowaniach logiki współczesnej do metafizyki klasycznej,” in M.A. Krąpiec and S. Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*, pp. 281–302. Other views in texts: S. Kamiński, “Kanta ujęcie przedmiotu logiki formalnej,” p. 186; S. Kamiński, “O definicji logiki formalnej,” p. 73. See S. Kiczuk, *Przedmiot logiki formalnej* (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 2001).

⁶⁴ S. Kamiński, “Logika współczesna a filozofia,” op. cit.; S. Kamiński, “O zastosowaniach logiki współczesnej do metafizyki klasycznej,” op. cit.

⁶⁵ *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 1, s.v. “Alternatywa,” col. 390; *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 3 s.v. “Deontyczna logika,” col. 1178–1179; *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 5, s.v. “Fałsz,” col. 32–33 (reprinted in: *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 3, p. 372).

the object to which it refers.”⁶⁶ The disagreement can be on the level of logic, metaphysics or ethics.⁶⁷ He also worked on the issue of development of understanding of logical form. Hobbes showed “a tendency to look for the foundations of general relationships in the form of expressions, not in essence of things or in relations between ideas.”⁶⁸ Pascal introduced clear rules regarding justification operations, and he achieved progress in formalization of proof.⁶⁹ Kamiński maintained that Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) had made a revolutionary impact on the development of concept of a logical form. Leibniz emphasized that “the form of valid inferences can be clearly expressed by means of signs themselves.”⁷⁰

Kamiński also described the formalism of formal sciences according to Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)⁷¹ and philosophical context of Kurt Gödel’s (1906–1978) theorem. He maintained that this theorem, showing the internal limitation of formalism, at the same time emphasizes the power of the human mind, since “it was able to create such a conceptual apparatus and such logical tools to prove, by means of which the human mind could solve a metacognitive issue of high generality and utmost importance.”⁷²

From 1959 Kamiński was mainly interested in the methodology of classical philosophy.⁷³ He considered himself a continuator of the work of the Krakow Circle in the study of the possibilities (and limitations) of the applications of formal logic to metaphysics and the initiator of closer research collaboration between logicians and philosophers in the Lublin philosophical community. He argued against the exaggerated tendency to build metaphysics as system of

⁶⁶ *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 4, s.v. “Fałsz”.

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁸ S. Kamiński, “Leibniza koncepcja formy logicznej (w 250-lecie śmierci),” *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 3, no. 1 (1967), p. 298. See I. Dąmbska, *Referat dotyczący dorobku naukowego Ks. prof. dr Stanisława Kamińskiego* (Kraków 1970), p. 4, in Archive of the Catholic University of Lublin.

⁶⁹ S. Kamiński, “Leibniza koncepcja formy logicznej (w 250-lecie śmierci),” p. 298.

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 299.

⁷¹ S. Kamiński, “Kanta ujęcie przedmiotu logiki formalnej,” *op. cit.*

⁷² S. Kamiński, “Filozoficzne implikacje i konsekwencje twierdzenia Gödla,” *Summarium* 10 (1981), pp. 161–162.

⁷³ S. Kamiński, *Życiorys* (1964) in Archive of the Department of Methodology of Sciences at the Catholic University of Lublin.

axioms and postulated the development of logic of transcendental terms.⁷⁴ The results were presented in his papers from 1960s and 1970s.⁷⁵

Our logician is the author of an already inaccessible script on logic in a broad sense and an introduction to logic.⁷⁶ In addition to standard logical knowledge, there is a lot of information about the history of logic, for example information on people who introduced selected logical tautologies. One can see in this approach both the so-called historicism of the Lublin school and the style of Giuseppe Peano's (1858–1932) papers.

CONCLUSION

Kamiński the logician grew out of three traditions that he combined and further developed: (1) the Lvov-Warsaw school by his collaboration with Antoni Korcik,⁷⁷ Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Izydora Dąmbska (1904–1983), Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Ludwik Borkowski (1914–1993),⁷⁸ (2) the Krakow Circle, by reading

⁷⁴ S. Kamiński, "Co daje stosowanie logiki formalnej do metafizyki klasycznej?," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 12, no. 1 (1964), p. 112 (reprinted in: S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, p. 134).

⁷⁵ S. Kamiński, "O logicznych związkach zachodzących między tezami metafizyki ogólnej," *Sprawozdania z Czynności Wydawniczej i Posiedzeń Naukowych Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL* 10 (1959), pp. 180–184; S. Kamiński, "Logika współczesna a filozofia," op. cit.; S. Kamiński, "O zastosowaniach logiki współczesnej do metafizyki klasycznej," op. cit.; S. Kamiński, "Czym są w filozofii i w logice tzw. pierwsze zasady?," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 11, no. 1 (1963), pp. 5–23; S. Kamiński, "Aksjomatyzowalność klasycznej metafizyki ogólnej," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 1, no. 2 (1965), pp. 103–116; S. Kamiński, "B. Russella innowacje w logice i próby ich zastosowania do opisu rzeczywistości," *Ruch Filozoficzny* 29 (1971), pp. 149–153; S. Kamiński, "O logice jako narzędziu filozoficznym u B. Russella," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 20, no. 1 (1972), pp. 15–23.

⁷⁶ S. Kamiński, *Elementy logiki* (Lublin 1952) (script); S. Kamiński, "Elementy logiki formalnej," in A.B. Stępień, *Wstęp do filozofii* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1976 [1989]), pp. 239–269.

⁷⁷ His PhD thesis was supervised by Jan Łukasiewicz. See W. Michałowski: "Krótka charakterystyka działalności naukowej ks. A. Korcika," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 7, no. 3 (1964), p. 71.

⁷⁸ Borkowski attended K. Ajdukiewicz universities activities in Lvov University. See S. Kamiński, "Ludwik Borkowski jako kontynuator logiczno-metodologicznych prac szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 32, no. 1 (1984), pp. 7–17.

Jan Salamucha's (1903–1944) and Józef M. Bocheński's papers (1902–1995) and by post-war discussions with Jan Drewnowski (1896–1978), as well (3) the Thomistic, developed in the Lublin Philosophical School (Kamiński is said to be one of its founders).

In Czeżowski's opinion, Kamiński was "one of the most outstanding Polish philosophers, exceeding many other areas of knowledge and wide range of interests."⁷⁹ Józef Iwanicki emphasized his mastery of composition, extensive erudition, mastery in "not so much in regard to content, as to formal finishing of his works."⁸⁰ All of these academic competencies are visible in Kamiński's works in the field of logic.

⁷⁹ T. Czeżowski, "Ocena dorobku naukowego profesora nadzwyczajnego dr hab. Stanisława Kamińskiego jako podstawa do wniosku o przyznanie mu tytułu naukowego profesora zwyczajnego" (Toruń 1970), p. 3, in Archive of the Catholic University of Lublin.

⁸⁰ J. Iwanicki, "Recenzja działalności piśmienniczej profesora nadzw. dr. Stanisława Kamińskiego" (Warszawa 1970), p. 3, in Archive of the Catholic University of Lublin.

STANISŁAW KAMIŃSKI ON METHODOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Methodology and methodological problems enjoyed a central place in the scholarly work and achievements of Stanisław Kamiński. One can even justifiably say that he looked at science and philosophy through the prism of methods applied in them and the legitimacy of those methods. He was aware of and constantly emphasized the fact that the methodology of science has philosophical involvements of various kinds and cannot be practiced without the philosophy of science, but the latter notion was of secondary importance for him, even though it featured in his publications since 1960s. Presumably this terminological preference was influenced by the anti-philosophical attitude and milieu of logical positivism, from which Kamiński was eagerly drew, and the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School, within which there was a place—as witnessed by the title of an acclaimed and important monographic university textbook by Tadeusz Kotarbiński (1886–1981)¹—for logic, theory of knowledge and methodology of science, but rarely for philosophy of science.

¹ T. Kotarbiński, *Elementy teorii poznania, logiki formalnej i metodologii nauk* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1929, 1961² and later editions); published in English under a rather unfortunate title as: *Gnosiology: The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge*, trans. from the Polish O. Wojtasiewicz, ed. G. Bidwell and C. Pinder (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966).

CONCEPTIONS AND PROBLEMS

According to Kamiński, “the methodology of sciences has been formed out of logic as its practical application for analysis or projection of modes of scientific research and systematization.”² However, in its later development it has not been confined to logical themes, but supplemented them with humanistic, social, and philosophical issues dealing with science and its advancement. This is the main reason why “there are quite different approaches to methodological issues: logical (hence such names for methodology of sciences as: applied logic, practical logic, pragmatic logic), epistemological, humanistic, and praxeological.”³ Moreover, each of these approaches may be implemented in diverse ways. For example, the selection of logical approach, what Kamiński apparently preferred, does not have to lead to the methodology of sciences as a formal theory of scientific methods. Within the logical approach one can also take into account humanistic and philosophical determinants of scientific methods, as well as explain methodological development of science against the social background. Kamiński’s methodology of sciences had precisely this somewhat hybrid (to use this currently fashionable term) nature. If one considers proportions of methodological issues investigated and taught by this thinker, then it will become evident that more prominent in his research and teaching were scholarly and historical discussions of legitimate ways of doing science than logical reconstructions of general scientific procedures. One should also note that Kamiński distinguishes, at least in principle, methodology of science, that is general investigations into methodological procedures common to all sciences or groups of sciences, from methodology of sciences, whose subject matter are methods distinctive of particular scientific disciplines, though in practice he was not always consistent in using this distinction. Yet he emphasized the research and didactic

² S. Kamiński, “Metodologia nauk: Współczesne problemy i tendencje,” (1976), in S. Kamiński, *Metoda i język: Studia z semiotyki i metodologii nauk*, prepared for publication by U.M. Żegleń (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1994), p. 418.

³ S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda: Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk*, prepared for publication by A. Bronk (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1992), p. 42.

importance of the former, “which in its point of departure has to take into account absolutely all disciplines, and gradually to build a system of methods, legitimately applicable in particular sciences.”⁴

Within the domain of methodology of sciences, one may distinguish three fundamental groups of problems: conceptual, internal, and external.⁵

The first group contains meta-methodological problems, since they are about the very conception of methodology of sciences. They are concerned with connections and proportions of logical, humanistic and philosophical investigations in methodology of sciences, with theoretical and practical traits of this discipline, as well as with its normative dimension. According to Kamiński, “methodology of sciences undertakes today more frequently than before comprehensive investigations (both logical but to some extent also humanistic and philosophical) concerning kinds and structure of scientific activities, as well as constitution and diverse functions of scientific theories.”⁶ In ambitious and theoretically advanced methodology of sciences we should not confine ourselves to providing a list of scientific methods in use and their description, but also try to explain their choice and efficacy. What should matter above all is not what methods, with all their deficiencies, were applied in less or more distant past, but what should be applied, that is, what methodological procedures are justified and allows us to achieve in the best possible way scientific aims and goals.

Internal problems of the methodology of sciences are about the structure and function of scientific research and its outcomes. They include problems connected with the nature and function of scientific language, especially with the conditions of its precision and the relationship between observational and theoretical terms; questions of the status of basic statements in science (axioms in formal sciences and observational statements in empirical sciences) and the character and role of measurement; as well as issues involving theory construction in science and the relevant debate between inductivism and anti-inductivism (deductivism). Taking into account the state of the

⁴ W. Stróżewski, “Dialektyka ludzkiego myślenia. Rozmowa z ks. prof. Stanisławem Kamińskim,” *Znak* 21, no. 6 (1969), p. 718.

⁵ S. Kamiński, “Metodologia nauk,” p. 421.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

methodology of sciences in the 1960s and 1970s, Kamiński claimed that the internal methodological problems which were particularly vigorously debated include the principles of verification and falsification, the structure and kinds of scientific explanation, and the role of cybernetic models.⁷

External methodological problems comprise four problem groups. The first one concerns the cognitive status of theory, or what in current terminology is known as the scientific realism debate, that is the debate concerning the relationship between scientific theories and reality. The question is whether these theories describe reality (descriptionism), or whether they explain it (explanationism), or rather they organize empirical knowledge and are predictive tools (instrumentalism). Descriptionism and explanationism are realist views, while instrumentalism has antirealist overtones. For Kamiński, if one assumes “that the principal aim of science is explanation of what is given in experience, and that reality may be indirectly accessible (available not only in direct observation), then explanatory realism turns out to be the view having the strongest justification.”⁸ The second group of external problems includes questions connected with diachronic and synchronic relationships between scientific theories, that is, the possibility of their reduction and the replacement of one theory by the other during the process of historical development. The ties of science with philosophy and ideology are the main focus

⁷ Ibidem, p. 422. Over the last 50 years these problems, although still lively debated today, have undergone a radical transformation. Discussions over principles of verification and falsification have been replaced by inquiries concerning the role of empirical evidence in confirmation and disconfirmation of scientific statements, problems of explanation have been connected with metaphysical issues of the causal structure of the world, while the paradigm of modelling in science has ceased to be cybernetic modelling. See J. Woodward, *Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); M. Strevens, *Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); M. Weisberg, *Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

⁸ S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda*, pp. 224–225. While listing and describing views about the relation of scientific theories to reality, Kamiński did not allow at all for the possibility of a deflationary or quietist view which makes a sustained effort to dissolve this whole philosophical debate. See P.K. Stanford, “Reading Nature: Realist, Instrumentalist, and Quietist Interpretations of Scientific Theories,” in *Physical Theory: Method and Interpretation*, ed. L. Sklar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 94–126.

of the third group of external methodological problems, while the fourth group concerns the possibility and conditions of unification of sciences. The distinction of these four groups of problems is commented by Kamiński as follows: “It is not difficult to notice that almost all questions pertaining to the external account of scientific theories are highly debatable, since their resolutions are essentially constrained, though less or more explicitly, by some implied philosophical standpoint.”⁹ Kamiński seems to suggest in this way that internal problems of methodology of sciences are neutral and relatively independent from philosophy, whereas external problems are essentially philosophical in their nature, and they constitute some kind of philosophy of science within methodology of sciences. Thus, the field of problems of methodology of sciences overlaps with the field of problems of philosophy of science, although in the final analysis everything will depend on the way in which the latter term is understood.

In one of his most important survey publications about contemporary philosophy of science, Kamiński offers a broad understanding of this discipline and gives the following account of it:

Philosophy of science is a study of ontological, epistemological, and logical aspects of scientific knowledge, and especially its presuppositions, subject matter and objectives, as well as inferences and ways of reasoning deployed in it. Philosophy of science analyses the nature of science, trying to find less or more ultimate reasons (what is its subject matter, what are its aims, what are its procedures and structure), and its cognitive value (the relation of cognition to reality, the dependencies between accepted presuppositions of knowledge and the results obtained by it, the proper sense of principal scientific notions and the role of knowledge in the whole of culture).¹⁰

In other publications, especially his later ones, Kamiński distinguishes two main ways of understanding the philosophy of science (and some additional intermediate varieties which I will put aside here in order to simplify the presentation). In the broad sense,

⁹ S. Kamiński, “Metodologia nauk,” p. 422.

¹⁰ S. Kamiński, “Racjonalizm współczesnej filozofii nauki,” (1972), in S. Kamiński, *Metoda i język*, p. 385.

philosophy of science includes “diversified in their character considerations, belonging to methodology of sciences, theory of scientific knowledge (particularly in natural sciences), ontology of scientific subject matter, logic of scientific language, and theory of culture.”¹¹ In contrast, philosophy of science in the narrow sense contains: “theory of science as a kind of being, theory of scientific knowledge (its sources, limits, and its value), as well as the ultimately explanatory theory of science as a domain of culture (especially the place of science in culture and its role on the modern world).”¹² Briefly put, the philosophy of science, broadly understood, comprises science focused investigations pursued from the point of view of various disciplines, while narrowly construed philosophy of science includes exclusively philosophical investigations, usually confined to one particular conception of philosophy (for Kamiński it was to a large extent the neo-scholastic conception of the so-called classical philosophy). One can also distinguish philosophy of sciences from philosophy of science, where the former is concerned with that which is common to all sciences, while the latter is interested in what differentiates them, although in practice it will difficult to draw the relevant demarcation line, analogously like in the case of methodology of science and methodology of sciences.

The primary issues of philosophy of science are epistemological and ontological. They include the question of the scope of observation, that is, the question whether what is given to us are merely sensory impressions and indications of measuring instruments, or presumably something more, namely objects, facts, and perhaps even causal interactions and values. There are ontological issues connected with this question, issues concerning the diversity of reality (distinctiveness and reduction of particular areas of being, for instance, the behavior of humans and animals, and also its structure and dynamics, especially “whether to endorse substance approach, or process approach; phenomenism, or structuralism; determinism, or indeterminism; causal and teleological approach, or mechanism, functionalism and nomologism; individualism, or holism.”¹³ The next group of problems in the philosophy of science concern the aims

¹¹ S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda*, p. 40.

¹² *Ibidem*.

¹³ *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 5, s.v. “Filozofia nauki,” col. 263.

which science pursues or ought to pursue: whether they are exclusively methodological and epistemological (correct resolutions of problems and getting closer to the truth), or rather of the most part socio-economical and humanistic (improving the quality of life and making production of goods more effective, as well as harmonious flourishing of personality and expansion of mental horizons). There is also a considerable range of problems concerning the way science functions in culture. Kamiński writes about this in the definitively normative vein in his encyclopedia entry on philosophy of science:

The fundamental problem is the question of how ultimately to understand science, in order to make it a harmonious constituent of culture (that is, prevent it from contributing to the crisis of culture and blocking the comprehensive and unconstrained human flourishing); for it turns out that science instead of seeking truth, is looking for means of “controlling human beings,” “instead of thinking, manipulates” (M. Heidegger). Even significant advances of science, but without harmony with all areas of culture, may not bring people more comfortable and happy life; if one emphasizes exclusively cognitive, techno-economical or socio-political functions of science, while disregarding its humanistic functions (especially moral values), then manipulative (instrumental) treatment of human beings takes pride of place, which disregards their dignity and their natural environment, as well as scientific freedom is lost, indispensable for proper functioning of science; moreover, scientific and technological revolution seems to exceed biological and psychological potentials of humans, and this may also have catastrophic consequences (E. Fromm).¹⁴

Against a background of considerations of this sort, the questions of the ethics of science arise. For it turns out that it does not suffice to obey methodological rules in scientific inquiries. They must be likewise shaped by a particular code of moral conduct concerning not only the scientific integrity, but also the choice of topics and the direction of research. Thus, one should not only emphasize advances of science and technology, but the progress of scientific ethos as well.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, col. 263.

PLURALISM AND METHODOLOGICAL RATIONALISM

Within methodology of sciences and philosophy of science Kamiński clearly endorses a few principal standpoints, among which one must single out first and foremost his view about the plurality of types of scientific knowledge, and a distinctive methodological rationalism combined with epistemological intellectualism.

The pluralism recommended by Kamiński has historical and systematic dimensions. In the course of his wide-ranging and scholarly inquiries regarding the historical development of the notion of science, Kamiński pointed out that over the centuries many conceptions of science have been formed, and even though they were coming in succession and increasingly theoretically advanced, they did not bring about the complete elimination of what had preceded them. In the final analysis, all these conceptions may be reduced to four. The first one was the vision of scientific knowledge, which in Antiquity was put forward by Aristotle, and which also prevailed through almost the entire Middle Ages. It was “a classical conception of unitary knowledge (philosophical-cum-scientific, aiming at hierarchical account of essence of things) as apodictic intuitive and deductive theory (genetic empiricism together with methodological intellectualism and rationalism).”¹⁵ Aristotle did not distinguish science from philosophy, since the latter was for him simply the most general theory of reality, constituting the foundations of less general sciences. Scientific-cum-philosophical knowledge makes use in its point of departure from widely conceived experience, but its content is scrutinized by intellect and reason. The outcome of this scrutiny allows one to establish, categorically and incontrovertibly, the fundamental principles fixing the essence of things and their causes. “Scientific cognition consists mainly in proving general propositions, describing for the most part effective or ensuing states, one the grounds of apodictic principles which express causal states.”¹⁶ Scientific knowledge, understood in such a way, is supposed to lead ultimately to contemplation of the highest principles and goals, as well as to determine

¹⁵ S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda*, p. 180.

¹⁶ S. Kamiński, “Koncepcja nauki u Arystotelesa,” (1980), in S. Kamiński, *Metoda i język*, p. 252.

the road to wisdom. This conception of science was superseded in modern times by a different one, in which it has been emphasized the necessity of mathematical account of experiential data, and of testing hypotheses and explanations that have been put forward. However, scientific knowledge was still considered as incontrovertible, since “the mind in virtue of its own intuitions expressed in mathematics, or in virtue of the fact that mathematics describes the nature of reality (Galileo Galilei), or eventually in virtue of its own a priori forms (Immanuel Kant) imposes, as it were, a theory onto the world.”¹⁷ The paradigm exemplification of such a conception was the physics of Isaac Newton (1642–1727). In the 19th century, a third idea of science was formed and which is known as the positivist conception. Science, in light of this, amounted to the gathering of experiential data, and establishing regularities within the data thus collected, that in turn formed the basis of formulating laws and hypotheses. When they were formed the stage of verification, based upon new empirical evidence, followed. Nevertheless, the complete and ultimate confirmation of accepted laws and hypotheses would never take place. Steps towards forming the fourth and the last conception of science were taken, according to Kamiński, by Henri Poincaré (1854–1912), Pierre Duhem (1861–1916) and Albert Einstein (1879–1955), but it was fully articulated and elaborated by Karl Raimund Popper (1902–1994). Science in this conception does not amount to the mechanical gathering of experiential data or evidence and seeking regularities among them but consists of a creative and innovative formulation of problems against a background of the received knowledge, and subsequently in resolving them by putting forward bold and rich in content hypotheses, whose value is probed in the process of their criticism and attempts to refute them. This is why “the mind needs (especially at turning or decisive points) wings, rather than lead. For new ideas and hypotheses are windows onto the world, that allow us not only to explain it, but also to make new observations of it.”¹⁸ Even though Kamiński frequently emphasized that he regarded this fourth conception of science as the most accurate one in his publications,¹⁹ he also pointed out that each of

¹⁷ Ibidem, pp. 253–254.

¹⁸ S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda*, p. 181.

¹⁹ In a conversation recorded a few weeks before his death he said: “I am decisively against the inductive approach in the practice of science. In this respect

them made an indispensable contribution to the development of science and a better understanding of the disciplines constituting it.

In accordance with methodological pluralism, there is no one unique way of doing science, and hence there are many types of sciences. This is so because “different subject matters and objectives of knowledge require diverse methods of inquiry and types of research techniques.”²⁰ In one of his later papers Kamiński puts this thesis, crucial for his philosophy, in the following way:

Well, it seems that are not sufficient reasons to advocate monism in the theory of science, that is, to settle for one absolutely binding type of theoretical knowledge, or to support every action by knowledge of the same type. Pluralism in this matter turns out a better justified view, since epistemological value of knowledge may be determined merely in the way relative to the preference of specified aims of knowledge and given a particular subject matter of knowledge. Moreover, one can take into account not only the achieved aims of knowledge itself, but also prediction concerning its practical applications (knowledge fruits).²¹

In the quoted passage the reference is being made to the plurality of theoretical knowledge, and not of science, but for the view discussed here this does not make a difference. Very briefly and somewhat roughly, Kamiński in his later work included in the category of theoretical knowledge advanced explanatory sciences (which are not merely descriptive), as well as philosophy and theology (under the restricted notion of science, often in operation, scientific knowledge is contrasted not only with ordinary knowledge but also with philosophy and theology). In accordance with his account, theoretical knowledge is “an evidentially and argumentatively systematized (inferentially connected system about a uniform domain), empirically and rationally justified answer to the question demanding an explanation of

I am Popperian and hold that Popper is completely right. For this reason, I have placed his conception of science as the fourth one in the history of science. It embraces Duhem, Poincaré, and Einstein”. See “Myśli ks. prof. Stanisława Kamińskiego (fragmenty rozmów – luty 1986 r.)”, prepared for publication by A. Bronk, *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 33–34, no. 2 (1985–1986), p. 11.

²⁰ S. Kamiński, “Koncepcja nauki u Arystotelesa,” p. 248.

²¹ S. Kamiński, “O kryteriach wartościowania wiedzy teoretycznej,” (1982), in S. Kamiński, *Metoda i język*, p. 449.

observed, or provided by other received knowledge, situations.”²² The question mentioned here is not just one; there are some or even several of them, relatively to the kinds of explanation being sought. Kamiński, alluding to the Aristotelian tradition and anticipating the return to causalism in the theory of scientific explanation, holds that the explanations being sought here are ways of fixing and identifying different widely conceived causes, that may be: (a) the earlier states of affairs or efficient states of a subject; (b) ideal or real forms of things or their essences; (c) the predicted future states of affairs; (d) stable relations obtaining between states of affairs or within them. These types of causal explanation (in the broad sense), and the questions connected with them, make an essential impact on the choice of methods of scientific theory building or of systems of theoretical knowledge. Kamiński mentions three crucial methods. The first one is deductive method in which from principles, intellectually read off from empirical reality one draws consequences, or bold hypotheses are being put forward against a background of the received knowledge, and the drawn consequences are compared with reality. The second method is induction which consists in gathering experiential data, their generalization, and subsequently empirical testing and confirming. The third procedure is reductive or reductionist in its character and takes place “when one seeks the unique reasons for empirical statements, or simpler models for a set of empirical statements, or with help of logic and the ontological principle of sufficient reason one transforms the given statements to analytic sentences.”²³ The application of these methods gives us theoretical knowledge of different kinds and, relative to the goals we want to achieve, we make use of this or that system of knowledge. For instance, if we are interested in alteration of inorganic nature, then it would be enough to

²² Ibidem, p. 450. Kamiński holds that this definition encompasses diverse sorts of knowledge and is not involved in the debate between apriorism and aposteriorism. It seems, however, that the application of this definition to formal sciences (logic and mathematics) would require its adjustment, since in these sciences there are no empirical justifications and observational data.

²³ Ibidem, p. 452. Today this procedure is commonly known under the name of abduction or inference to the best explanation, though it is rarely stipulated that it may enable us to establish just one unique reason or the only one adequate explanation. See I. Douven, “Abduction,” in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessed December 21, 2017, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abduction/>.

use theoretical knowledge establishing inductive constant relations obtaining within it. However, if we aim to formulate normative principles guiding the education of humans, then essential to it would be “theoretical knowledge about the ontic nature of human beings and their existential position not only in the inorganic world, but also generally in respect to their ontically ultimate aim (only then one can choose the proper way of their personal perfecting, at least at the earthly or mundane stretch; after all, it is not an ideal aim created by a society that matters here, but the actualization, as full as possible, of potentialities of human nature.”²⁴ Perhaps even in a few situations this sort of knowledge will have to be supplemented and deepened by theological disciplines and a sapiential account of the ultimate aim of human beings.

This briefly outlined pluralism of types of theoretical knowledge, held and defended by Kamiński, is also to some extent reflected in his simple classification of sciences, in which science widely conceived is divided first into theology and natural or worldly knowledge, which next is split into philosophy and special sciences. Special sciences are in turn either formal (logic and mathematics) or real ones, which are divided into natural sciences (physico-chemical and biological) and human sciences (about human beings and society, about culture and history of social human beings and their products).²⁵ Sciences grouped in this way differ essentially in respect of their subject matter, goals, and implemented methods.

Another distinctive feature of Stanisław Kamiński’s philosophy of science is its methodological rationalism combined with epistemological intellectualism. According to him, the traditional epistemological debate between aposteriorism (empiricism) and apriorism (rationalism) is reflected in contemporary discussions concerning the origin of scientific knowledge and assessment of its value. “Modern rationalism—Kamiński writes—manifests itself mainly in putting emphasis upon the following items in the scientific enterprise: theories, theoretical thinking, analytic knowledge, formalization, intellectual

²⁴ S. Kamiński, “O kryteriach wartościowania wiedzy teoretycznej,” pp. 453–454.

²⁵ S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda*, p. 274 and the detailed descriptions of particular groups of sciences in the chapter characteristically entitled “Methodological peculiarities of different sciences” (pp. 285–320).

intuition, etc.”²⁶ This is therefore a very wide construal of rationalism concerning scientific procedures, since it includes even neopositivist views or akin to them (often labelled as instance of logical empiricism), for which the only source and test of valuable scientific knowledge is sensory experience, and the role of the factor independent from experience is limited to the participation of logical and mathematical principles in the construction of theories and their verification. Hence, it is of no surprise that a survey of the development of philosophy of science in the 20th century pushed Kamiński towards the conclusion that in this period it is dominated by varieties of rationalism. He proposes to group these varieties taking into account the following: (a) the way in which theoretical elements are accepted in the scientific basis; (b) the nature of the theoretical thought itself; (c) the function of theoretical factors in particular stages of scientific enterprise.

Given the first criterion from those just mentioned, one can be led to distinguish between dogmatic rationalism, skeptical rationalism, and critical rationalism. Among the advocates of dogmatic rationalism were members of the Vienna Circle and neopositivists in the early stage of the development of their views. Logical and mathematical elements of scientific theories were accepted by them irrevocably, similarly as empirical basic statements, and theoretical terms were introduced by way of definitions. They claimed that all non-empirical principles are analytic in their nature and conventional aspects of them are minor. Kamiński held that “rationalism of this type overestimates the value of theoretical elements in knowing and unjustifiably assumes the dichotomy of experience and non-empirical knowledge.”²⁷ These errors are avoided by the proponents of skeptical rationalism (its major exponent is Willard Van Orman Quine [1908–2000]), but they fall into another extremity. It consists in excessive emphasizing that principles shaping the results of our scientific knowledge are arbitrary and random. According to Kamiński, “these skeptical consequences does not seem right. A theory, though contains conventional elements, is after all grounded both in experience giving rise to it, and in its decisive testing experience.”²⁸ Extremes of dogmatism and

²⁶ S. Kamiński, “Racjonalizm współczesnej filozofii nauki,” p. 386, footnote 4.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 393.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 394.

skepticism are avoided by critical rationalism (Karl Raimund Popper, Norwood Russell Hanson [1924–1967], Imre Lakatos [1922–1974] and Hans Albert [1921–]). Its proponents accept experiential data provisionally, and do not think that proposed theoretical constructions are irrefutable. Decisive considerations about the value of a theory takes place against a background of some definite presuppositions, that are not put into doubt at a given stage of science development. Even though experience does not fix determinately the choice of a theory, yet it somehow constraint the range of theoretical solutions, which may reasonably be taken into account. Kamiński believes that a moderate position of critical rationalists is plausible, although it cannot be endorsed to the full extent. For him “a critical attitude at the initial stage of scientific enterprise is completely and fully justified, but on the condition that there is in view the possibility of making fully justified fundamental assertion of knowledge about the world.”²⁹ The absolutely firm belief of the critical rationalists in getting closer to the truth via harsh criticism and the elimination of errors is not enough. From time to time one simply has to reach the truth in question. In brief, Kamiński’s position is close to critical rationalism, but to avoid skepticism he proposes to combine it with a hint of dogmatism.

Considering the nature of theoretical thinking Kamiński distinguishes deductivist rationalism from inductivist. In accordance with the first rationalism the operations of reason in constructing and testing of a scientific theory are guided exclusively, or almost exclusively, by the principles of deductive logic. From the accepted empirical data logical consequences are drawn, whereas testing of scientific theories, that go beyond available data does not consists in their gradual confirmation, but amounts to attempts to refute them, that is, to find factors falsifying them, that would authorize deductive inference in accordance with the rule that from a conditional and the falsity of its consequent one is entitled to assert the falsity of its antecedent (*modus tollendo tollens*). However, deductivist rationalism does not take into consideration the limitations of deduction, and especially that in virtue of following deductive rules one cannot proceed from singular empirical data to a general theory. It is just this proceeding

²⁹ S. Kamiński, “Racjonalizm we współczesnej metodologii nauk a intelektualizm w epistemologii Tomasza z Akwinu,” (1974), in S. Kamiński, *Metoda i język*, p. 400.

or transition that is the focus of attention of proponents of inductivist rationalism, who claim that it is even possible to work out the logic of induction, different from deductive logic. Moreover, testing scientific theories by no means amounts to incessantly repeated attempts to refute them, but consists rather in their gradual confirmation which is also inductive in its nature. Nevertheless, Kamiński emphasizes that these two kinds of rationalism are far from exhausting all views about the character of theoretical thinking. There is also possible intuitionist or intellectualist rationalism. It gives prominence to the role of reasoning based upon non-discursive insight into states of affairs and intellectual self-evidence. Kamiński briefly justifies the cogency of a view of this kind as follows:

In connection with the conception of understanding in the humanities, and the need to accept non-analytic and at the same time empirically undecidable statements as presuppositions in the external basis of science, it becomes inevitable to use intellectual intuition as direct cognitive grasp of an object in its intrinsic character or in a relation to another object.³⁰

Thus the justification is twofold. On the one hand, intellectual intuition is needed in the humanities during the process of their distinctive understanding of the world of culture and its interpretation, and, on the other hand, with the assistance of it one can validate general philosophical presuppositions accepted in science which constitute the so-called external base of science. Intellectual intuition, as frequently emphasized by Kamiński in his different publications, also plays the role of linking sensory experience with discursive reason, what in the case of science translates itself into combining empirical data with conventions and theoretical constructs. It is also inevitable while one engages in philosophy as autonomous knowledge, called sometimes in the Lublin School classical philosophy.

Considering the function of theoretical factors in scientific enterprises, one may distinguish three kinds of rationalism: formal, instrumental, and explanatory-creative (labelled later by Kamiński as model rationalism). Formal rationalism has its origin in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), although recently this formal

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 395.

role of reason in science has been significantly limited and reduced to analytic logico-mathematical apparatus that constitutes the structure of scientific theories. Such a view has a strong appeal of simplicity but does not take fully into account the role of a theory in shaping the content of empirical data and innovative thinking in putting forward hypotheses and building theories. Proponents of instrumental realism are able to rebut these objections, although they needlessly reduce diverse functions of theoretical thinking to only one: putting the collected empirical evidence in a rational order and predicting future experiences and facts. The most open and pluralistic in this matter is the third rationalism from those mentioned above:

Theory and theoretical thinking not only provide scientific knowing with forms and instruments, but also confirm, correct and creatively extend experiential data, opening up new vistas (by projecting a scheme and framework) for future experiences. While interpreting experience they create hypothetical visions that constitute foundations of experimentation. Whereas senses have more passive character in scientific knowledge, mind is its active and organizing factor, though open new experiences. Theory is a web that is cast to catch the world, that is, to grasp it and rationally explain and work out (Popper).³¹

This explanatory-creative realism was soon replaced by Kamiński with model realism. For he came to the conclusion that these “hypothetical visions” that reason invents do not have indeterminate and speculative status, but are often strict mathematical model with a great number of idealizational assumptions. With respect to this and anticipating current preoccupation with modelling in science he wrote: “Previously mainly heuristic value of model was acknowledged. Nowadays also its explanatory value has been appreciated. It gives a hypothetical, simplified paradigm vision of reality.”³²

Kamiński’s scholarly and versatile investigations concerning the forms of rationalism in contemporary philosophy of science led to the conclusion that its best version is methodological rationalism

³¹ Ibidem, p. 396.

³² Ibidem, p. 402, footnote 12. Reference in the next footnote of the quoted text to a paper by Leszek Nowak gives rise to the conjecture that Kamiński was inspired in this respect by ideas of then developing the Poznań Methodological School.

which is at the same critical, intuitive-cum-intellectualist and model-based. Only in this way does criticism and hypothetism not turn into skepticism. A plurality of types of human knowledge and the distinctiveness of their epistemological status will be also assured, and especially the prospects of pursuing non-hypothetical and apodictic classical philosophy. This is at least how Kamiński himself saw these things. Nevertheless, his approach may be reasonably questioned, since stipulating that science should be carried on in the spirit of critical rationalism, while at the same time insisting that in philosophy, in which the agreement or concord of scholars and researchers is something very rare indeed, we can achieve due to intellectual intuition lasting and irrefutable results, is something very risky and implausible.

METHODOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY

The conceptions of the methodology of sciences and philosophy of science proposed by Kamiński, as well as positions elaborated within them, appear from the contemporary point of view as into be correct in many respects. However, they are often burdened with doubtful assumptions that bear witness to the particular time and context in which these proposals were formulated. The assumptions involved are mainly connected with the idea of a neutral methodology of sciences and its “internal problems” which as a matter of fact has never been implemented. The point at issue here is not the didactic and educational dimension of the methodology of sciences project, since at this level Kamiński put it perfectly into practice by educating a couple of generations of methodologically self-conscious scholars and researchers.³³ However, a methodology of sciences that would be an extension of logic and match it in respect to the results achieved and their acceptability, never materialized. This is especially pertinent to the methodology of the empirical sciences, about which Ryszard Wójcicki claimed the following in the second half of the 20th century:

³³ See an excellent description of this influence in the paper of A. Bronk and S. Majdański, “Metodologia nauk: jej zadania i potrzeby wczoraj i dziś,” in *Metodologia: tradycja i perspektywy*, ed. W. Walczak (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2010), pp. 9–20.

The methodology of the empirical sciences is still not a well constituted scientific discipline. Specialists cannot agree on either the main research problems of methodology, or what kinds of research techniques, and especially what sort of conceptual apparatus, are the most appropriate for this discipline.³⁴

In recent decades nothing has changed for better in this respect; furthermore, the project of neutral general methodology of sciences has been abandoned for good and replaced by a theoretical philosophy of science, which does not claim to be neutral, and practically oriented science studies.

Nowadays, the philosophy of science is a more modest discipline than its predecessor. It is also more diversified and closer to both traditional philosophical disciplines and concrete special sciences in their full complexity. Let us begin by outlining its conception and problems, relying upon two popular academic textbooks.

The first one is Alex Rosenberg's *Philosophy of Science*, to date having enjoyed three editions and translated into several languages.³⁵ This is presumably the most widely used textbook from this discipline at present. For Rosenberg, the philosophy of science is an important discipline because of the close connections obtaining between philosophy and science. Right at the beginning of his considerations, Rosenberg succinctly writes about this as follows: "philosophy deals initially with the questions the sciences cannot yet or perhaps can never answer, and with the further questions of why the sciences cannot answer these questions."³⁶ For some, this understanding of philosophy may be unacceptable, but one should remember that it has historical justification. Particular sciences, such as physics, biology, and psychology, have emerged from philosophy but left their traces in the form of fundamental questions that they were unable to deal with. Therefore, there is a historical and systematic continuity between philosophical and scientific questions. This continuity is so strong that "it is by no means clear that there is a real distinction between philosophical questions and scientific ones, especially those raised at

³⁴ R. Wójcicki, *Wykłady z metodologii nauk* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1982), p. 5.

³⁵ A. Rosenberg, *Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction* (New York: Routledge, [2000] 2012³).

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 1.

the moving frontiers of the sciences.”³⁷ Hence one cannot possibly claim, as neopositivists did, that on the one hand there are sciences that have completely liberated themselves from philosophy, and on the other hand there is metalinguistic logical analysis of science that, given the attachment of many scholars and researchers to the traditional term “philosophy,” may be called philosophy of science. Even though Rosenberg does not deny that logical problems concerning laws and scientific explanations, as well as confirmation and falsification constitute the substantial core of philosophy of science, to the same extent a part of it are also the first order problems involving interpretations of particular scientific theories, such as quantum mechanics or the theory of evolution. Philosophy of science is also a proper place for debating metaphysical questions dealing with the validity and justifiability of naturalism, and with epistemologically motivated answers to the challenges of contemporary critics of science and scientific objectivity, brought up and formulated within feminism and sociology of science.

The second widely used textbook from the philosophy of science is *Theory and Reality* by Peter Godfrey-Smith.³⁸ The author emphasizes that the discipline is currently in a state of crucial flux and the direction of its future development is far from clear. This is in part the result of lively discussions about science and its role in contemporary society, in which its enlightenment glorifications, taken at face value by the earlier generations of philosophers of science, have been severely criticized by radical sociologists of science and post-modern dissenters. The turmoil in the philosophy of science has been also caused by considerable weakening of the influence of its conception as the logic of science that until the middle of 20th century was giving hope for deeper understanding of scientific activity products. Today’s scholars that deal with the actual development of science and social structures connected with it speak rather ironically about advocates of the philosophy of science as the logic of science:

The crusty old philosophers seemed to be deliberately removing their work from any contact with science as it is actually conducted,

³⁷ Ibidem, p. 8.

³⁸ P. Godfrey-Smith, *Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003).

perhaps in order to hang onto a set of myths about the perfect rationality of the scientific enterprise, or in order to have nothing interfere with the endless games that can be played with imaginary theories expressed in artificial languages.³⁹

The vision of philosophy of science as for the most part methodology establishing and justifying rules and procedures that should be rigidly obeyed by scientists will not be met with great enthusiasm as well. Philosophy of science may at best try to describe and explain strategies that scientists deploy in their inquiries about the world and establish what is achieved as the result of their deployment. It will be constituted by: (a) characteristically epistemological questions, concerning rationality, empirical evidence and scientific knowledge; (b) strictly metaphysical issues pertinent to the most general nature of reality, and (c) borderline questions from history and sociology of science. Thus, philosophy of science must be philosophy not only nominally and by courtesy.

Let us finish this brief survey of the current textbook understanding of philosophy of science with a short presentation of the basic ideas of the program of philosophy of science, put forward by Philip Kitcher, one of the most distinguished living philosophers of science. The route taken by Kitcher to the philosophy of science led through mathematics and the history of science. He made use of his acquaintance with the first of these two disciplines to elaborate a philosophy of mathematics directed against apriorism and rationalism and a sharp opposition between the context of discovery and the context of justification, since according to him, it is often the case that the order of validation of knowledge mirrors the order of its acquisition. Kitcher regarded the vision of scientific development proposed by Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996) to be a convincing one and which had adjusted in the course of lively debates carried out by proponents of the historical philosophy of science in the second half of the 20th century. However, he attempted to show that this vision does not necessarily entail skepticism and relativism, since the Kuhnian views on scientific revolutions and the change of paradigms may be reconciled with a modest, and incorporating key episodes in the development of science, conception of scientific progress and scientific rationality. These

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

ideas led Kitcher to the conviction that the practice of science cannot be separated from valuation. In making the case for the appropriate place of valuation in science, Kitcher is disposed to use the following metaphor: “scientific research is like map-making: it must begin from particular purposes, that set the content of what is to be represented, but, once those choices have been made, how the map is best drawn is a value-free matter.”⁴⁰ This determination and valuation of scientific purposes, Kitcher further holds, ought to obey rules of well-ordered science, that is “a science in which the inquiries pursued are those that would respond to human needs in a fair and comprehensive way.”⁴¹ All this has ultimately directed Kitcher towards a pragmatist philosophy of science, influenced chiefly by the thought of John Dewey (1859–1952). According to such a view, an assessment of society and a pursuit to make it better should determine the place of science within it and objectives of scientific research. This will be an important part of implementing the pragmatic strategy “to reconstruct philosophy so that it reconnected with life.”⁴²

From this standpoint, Kitcher critically assesses the achievements of the philosophy of science in recent decades. In general, philosophical inquiries about scientific ethical, social and political questions are ignored or marginalized (with the exception of the feminist movement), and the continuation of problems of philosophy of science from the middle of the past century does not bring nothing interesting besides heaps of technical details. For Kitcher, “most contemporary discussions of issues about explanation, theory structure, confirmation, the character of laws, are quite irrelevant to any significant questions about the sciences.”⁴³ Things are more promising in philosophies of special sciences. In addition to the philosophy of physics, which has traditionally been the focus of great attention, the philosophy of biology has also flourished remarkably, and is a field in which many contemporary philosophers of science are engaged,

⁴⁰ *Philosophy of Science: 5 Questions*, ed. R. Rosenberger (Copenhagen: Automatic Press/VIP, 2010), p. 141.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 141.

⁴² P. Kitcher, “Toward a Pragmatist Philosophy of Science,” *Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science* 28, no. 2 (2013), p. 229.

⁴³ *Philosophy of Science: 5 Questions*, p. 138.

including Philip Kitcher himself. Among other well worked out and fairly independent disciplines in this respect are the philosophy of psychology, the philosophy of economics, and the philosophy of chemistry.

This handful of remarks about recent philosophy of science may be summed up as follows. This discipline is, first and foremost, no longer the logical analysis of science and it remains apart from what Kamiński called the internal problems of methodology of sciences. Even though inquiries about logical aspects of science, sometimes taking the form of the so-called formal philosophy of science, are still being pursued, their influence is rather modest. The current philosophy of science tends to connect with traditional epistemology and metaphysics, on the one hand, and with the history of science and the sociology of knowledge, on the other. The significance of a general philosophy of science is diminishing, at the expense of philosophies of particular sciences which are gaining in importance.

METAPHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES AND THE SHAPING OF THE SELF-AWARENESS OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE RESEARCH OF STANISŁAW KAMIŃSKI

*A particular significance for philosophy was sought
[by Stanisław Kamiński] in its self-awareness,
although he did not make it the only foundation
("Archimedean point") of philosophizing.¹*

What has been left unfinished in Stanisław Kamiński's output is one of his last dissertations, written soon before his death, entitled *O problemach metafizologii*.² It was meant to be a study introducing the first volume of his *Pisma wybrane*, which comprises a large part of his analyses undertaking metaphilosophical issues and the

¹ A. Bronk, "Wielość nauk i jedność nauki (Stanisława Kamińskiego opcje metodologiczne)," in S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda: Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk*, prepared for publication by A. Bronk (Lublin, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1992), p. 352

² "The only entirely new item was to be the introductory dissertation *O problemach metafizologii*. Unfortunately, its edition was only started." T. Szubka, "Od redaktora", in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować? Studia z metodologii filozofii klasycznej*, prepared for publication by T. Szubka (Lublin, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1989), p. 6.

indispensability of epistemological-methodological self-awareness of philosophy. As it can be imagined, this dissertation was aimed at systemizing and in some points possibly correcting the outcomes of Kamiński's longstanding and multidirectional metaphilosophical reflection. He belonged to the group of philosophers and methodologists engaged in metaphilosophical explorations and debates—he treated them as an indispensable part of philosophy, which gives valuable effects. It is quite justified to say that Kamiński was one of the Polish (and not only) leaders in this searching and debating. In his own environment—the so-called Lublin School of classical philosophy, which he co-founded, Kamiński was the supreme figure in metaphilosophical reflection from the late 1950s. Through his publications, lectures and mostly through his didactic activity and the “methodological counselling” which he offered to the interested,³ he shaped their attitude of openness to conducting in-depth and continuous metaphilosophical reflection.

Kamiński's methodological analyses and metaphilosophical studies have played a significant role in the development of epistemological-methodological self-awareness of the philosophical environment—and more broadly: of the humanistic and theological environment of the Catholic University of Lublin. This development and significance are concisely presented by Antoni B. Stępień, one of the most active participants of metaphilosophical debates taking place there:

At first with a distance, Kamiński urged ... by colleagues and older disciples, undertook collaboration with philosophers on the programme and development of metaphilosophy. ... In the both outer (Kamiński—Drewnowski) and inner (Kamiński—Stępień and Majdański) discussion and in contact with Krąpiec's thought, Kamiński worked out a particular style of metaphilosophical

³ This long-lasting field of Kamiński's activity is recalled by Andrzej Bronk S.V.D. and Stanisław Majdański: “What was a very fruitful field of Professor's academic activity was his favourite didactics (the culmination of which took place in his lecturing on general methodology of sciences) and ... methodological counselling in scientific studies ... in various disciplines ..., from master degree ... to habilitation.” A. Bronk and S. Majdański, “Słowo od wydawcy,” in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, p. II; see also A. Bronk and S. Majdański, “Filozofia w życiu człowieka (w nawiązaniu do idei ks. prof. Stanisława Kamińskiego,” *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 40, no. 3–4 (1997), pp. 19–28.

considerations, as well as explored and organized many issues in this field.⁴

The evident inclination of Kamiński towards multisided, acute and systematic metaphilosophical reflection, especially in the dimension of the methodology of philosophy and the controversies around it, may stem from the fact that Kamiński, as Andrzej Bronk S.V.D. says, was a “genius autodidact.”⁵ It is mostly owing to his own interests and cognitive undertakings that he acquired high methodological competences and worked out his own doctrinal standpoint in philosophy. They also caused that, in the subject matter and method of Kamiński’s studies, the “dual legacy”⁶ appeared—the Thomistic (existential Thomism) and the analytical-logical one.

This dualism indicated by Bronk can be clearly seen in Kamiński’s metaphilosophical pursuits when he approaches the considered issue in a dual way, taking into account both how it is viewed from the angle of existential Thomism and, simultaneously, of the different analytical-logical approach. In spite of the differences emerging in these not always complementary approaches, Kamiński applies such a dual view as the most appropriate, because it allows for a reliable and multisided exploration of the issue.

⁴ A.B. Stępień, “Rola księdza profesora Stanisława Kamińskiego w rozwoju środowiska filozoficznego KUL,” in *Zadania filozofii we współczesnej kulturze*, ed. Z.J. Zdybicka (Lublin, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1992), p. 88. It should be added that Stępień wrote—under the supervision of Kamiński—both his M.A. thesis *Analiza krytyczna nelsonowskiego dowodu niemożliwości teorii poznania* (1954) and his doctoral dissertation *Stanowisko Gilsona w sprawie metody teorii poznania: Analiza krytyczna* (1956).

⁵ “S. Kamiński was a genius autodidact, associated with two traditions: the scholastic one and the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School. Through philosophical-theological studies, he placed himself within the framework of existential Thomism. At the same time, he confirmed his spiritual affinity with the ideas of K. Ajdukiewicz, T. Czeżowski, I. Dąbbska, and partially with T. Kotarbiński and J. Słupecki, with whom he had personal contacts. This dual heritage had influenced his analytical-synthetic approach and the direction of his interests.” A. Bronk, “Książd Profesor Stanisław Kamiński (1919–1986),” *Studia Filozoficzne* no. 9 (1986), pp. 197–198.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

A GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEMS IN METAPHILOSOPHY

In the existing introductory fragment of Kamiński's last text, *O problemach metafizologii*, the argumentation starts—in a way typical of his earlier considerations—by drawing attention to anthropological and erotetic issues. They involve the existential situation of a human being, who “used to seek the deepest reasons of everything, especially the reason and sense of the world or human activity in it”⁷ and the nature of radical and universal questions undertaken in philosophy (constantly raised anew by humanity as they impose themselves spontaneously, relentlessly or even persistently).

A human appears as a being “doomed to philosophizing”. Due to the sensations and challenges experienced in life, a human “faces the questions the answers to which can be found neither in any science nor in life practice.”⁸ This co-occurs with the aiming at the acquisition of “realistic, ultimate and indisputable solutions”⁹—at least such maximalist assumptions are applied in classical philosophy, which was close to Kamiński.

The need and sense of practicing philosophy—or at least the basic requirements and aspirations of human existence—seem to be justified by the “human nature” itself. However, after a slightly lofty indication of this unceasing, spontaneous and inalienable human need for practicing (a certain) philosophy, Kamiński refers to two, in his opinion apt but not deprived of skeptical reservation and a certain dose of irony, remarks: (a) “it is not difficult to philosophize if one does not know how to philosophize, but when one knows, this is an entirely different matter”; (b) “there is no such a stupidity that has not been already formulated in philosophy.”¹⁰ Therefore, it is very important today to intensify the development of metaphilosophical reflection, which should aim at working out the desired methods and should help to accurately recognize and effectively eliminate the earlier mistakes. Recognizing the values of methodologically developed metaphilosophical reflection, Kamiński states that “what constitutes

⁷ S. Kamiński, “Wstęp,” in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, p. 11.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

one of the values of contemporary philosophy is its intensified self-awareness.”¹¹

While systematizing the scope and types of metaphilosophical reflection, Kamiński applies its broad view. In his general characterization of this reflection, he points at its three basic dimensions:

- the humanistic (comprising history, psychology and sociology of philosophy);
- the formal (mostly logic and methodology of philosophy);
- the philosophical one (“a certain philosophy of philosophy”).¹²

This outline of systematization ends the fragment of *O problemach metafizyki*. Many issues have been signaled in it, the references to earlier findings are visible here and the paths of further search have been indicated as well. This excerpt, though not only it, encourages to undertake the analysis of metaphilosophical issues, which are present and emphasized in Kamiński’s works.¹³

¹¹ Ibidem.

¹² Ibidem, p. 12.

¹³ This is testified to by the subject matter of many of the texts in the five volumes of *Pisma wybrane*, which is not the whole of his output. They do not contain, for example, the reviews of other texts dealing with metaphilosophical issues. The titles of the consecutive volumes of *Pisma wybrane* point to the leading role of metaphilosophical issues: vol. 1: *Jak filozofować? Studia z metodologii filozofii klasycznej*, prepared for publication by T. Szubka (Lublin, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1989); vol. 2: *Filozofia i metoda: Studia z dziejów metod filozofowania*, prepared for publication by J. Herbut (Lublin, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993); vol. 3: *Metoda i język: Studia z semiotyki i metodologii nauk*, prepared for publication by U.M. Żegleń (Lublin, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1994); vol. 4: *Nauka i metoda: Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk*, prepared for publication by A. Bronk (Lublin, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1992); vol. 5: *Światopogląd, religia, teologia: Zagadnienia filozoficzne i metodologiczne*, prepared for publication by M. Walczak and A. Bronk (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1998). In the series *Dzieła* by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec (vol. 4, Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1994) the work *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*, co-authored by Kamiński, was restarted (first edition: Lublin, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1962). This work, in which Kamiński lectures on the methodology of classical metaphysics, largely formed the Thomism of the Lublin School. The chapter titles indicate the issues undertook by Kamiński in his metaphilosophical reflection in order to improve classical metaphysics: I. “O zastosowaniach logiki współczesnej do metafizyki klasycznej”; II. “Czy możliwe są ogólne i konieczne twierdzenia rzeczowe?”; III. “Struktura systemu scholastycznej metafizyki ogólnej”; IV. “O ostatecznych przesłankach w klasycznej filozofii bytu”; V. “Rola definicji w systemie scholastycznej metafizyki”; VI. “Dedukcja w metafizyce tomistycznej”; VII. “Próba charakterystyki uzasadniania tez w metafizyce klasycznej”.

The fact that Kamiński consistently aimed at developing metaphilosophical reflection and at attributing it an appropriate—also in terms of language—expression can be confirmed by “numerous notes written in ... manuscripts or reprinted parts of these works and in his sketches of supplements on the attached paper pages.”¹⁴ His published texts, though appropriately polished up, are still as if drafts and only reference points for conducting further metaphilosophical reflection and shaping the self-awareness of the currently practiced philosophy.

THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE METAPHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION PANEL VERSUS METAPHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION OF KAMIŃSKI

While viewing the sources and the course of Kamiński’s metaphilosophical explorations, the scope of which is broad as regards the discussed problems and which are (as if in a serving way) directed towards shaping self-awareness and improving classical philosophy, it is necessary to take into account his participation “in two ‘autodidactic’ discussion panels: in the metaphilosophical panel initiated by J[erzy] Kalinowski and the panel on methodological foundations of humanities.”¹⁵ The metaphilosophical panel in particular was situated in the circle of the “dual legacy”, so close to Kamiński: of the Thomistic tradition and the modern analytical-logical current, the proper reception of which was to enhance the development of existential Thomism.

Reminding the major assumptions and the course of the metaphilosophical panel, founded in the 1950s by the staff and students of the

¹⁴ J. Herbut, “Od redaktora,” in S. Kamiński, *Filozofia i metoda*, p. 5. Józef Herbut (1933–2015) shows “how far the changes have gone in earlier published texts ‘Metody współczesnej metafizyki’ were published in two parts (with a time span of 11 years). Here, we merge them into one dissertation, as they were meant as such by the author. The planned part III, presenting metaphysics created in reflective methods (the so called transcendentalizing Thomism), was not finished by Kamiński due to his death. Part I of the original text ‘Metody współczesnej metafizyki’ was provided with large supplementations by the author. After implementing most of them, the current text has been changed in regard to the original almost in one third” (ibidem).

¹⁵ A. Bronk and S. Majdański, “Słowo od wydawcy,” p. II.

Catholic University of Lublin,¹⁶ in the *Preface* to the first volume of *Studia metafizyczne* (Lublin 1993), Antoni B. Stępień and Tadeusz Szubka—the editors, say:

The term “metaphilosophy” was introduced into the Polish literature in the early 1950s precisely by the representatives of this environment (mostly for labelling epistemology and methodology of philosophy). This took place independently from the Anglo-Saxon literature (where the term was used for the first time in 1942 by M[orris] Lazerowitz) and more under the influence of the Lvov-Warsaw School, the representatives of which frequently used such terms as “metalanguage”, “metasystem” and “metascience.”¹⁷

Referring to the groundbreaking paper *Ku próbie konstrukcji metafizyki* (of 13th June, 1953), Jerzy Kalinowski (1916–2000) in *Postscriptum* (November, 1992) maintains the thesis that: “Despite all the differences occurring between philosophy and logic, philosophy has—at least as a possibility if not acting—its metaphilosophy, a set of rules of building philosophy, if figurative expression can be used.”¹⁸ In the context of the methodology of sciences and the analyses in the deductive method in formal sciences (logic and mathematics), Kalinowski suggests a division of the methodological rules of philosophy to (1) language rules, further divided into (1.1) dictionary

¹⁶ A.B. Stępień, “Konwersatorium metafizyczne,” *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 1, no. 3 (1958), pp. 132–136 (reprint in *Studia metafizyczne*, vol. 1: *Dyscypliny i metody filozofii*, ed. A.B. Stępień and T. Szubka [Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993], pp. 335–341). “The attempts at the methodological modernization of Thomism and the reliable ... taking of a stand by its representatives ... towards the results of contemporary logic or semiotics have already had a long tradition in Poland. The main pioneers in this were father J. Salamucha and father J.M. Bocheński. Their attitude is referred to by the team which constitutes ‘The Metaphilosophical Discussion Panel’ ... I speak about referring to the ‘attitude,’ as ... [it does not seem to me that] methodological modernization of Thomism should consist in the mechanical transfer of the tools of mathematical logic to philosophy but rather in ... accurate realising the character and value of the research method used in Thomistic philosophy” (ibidem, [1993], p. 335).

¹⁷ A.B. Stępień and T. Szubka, “Przedmowa,” in *Studia metafizyczne*, vol. 1, p. 5.

¹⁸ J. Kalinowski, “Postscriptum (listopad 1992),” in *Studia metafizyczne*, vol. 1, p. 332. An attempt at working out a set of rules for building philosophy is undertaken by one of the participants of the metaphilosophical panel, Leon Koj (1929–2006), in his metaphilosophical reflection developed for many years.

ones and (1.2) syntactic ones, and (2) the rules of justifying theses, divided into (2.1) the rules of applying primary words and (2.2) of defining (introducing defined words).¹⁹ Metaphilosophical studies inspired with this approach will be undertaken by Kamiński—yet, in his case, this will involve softening the rigors and adjusting them to the possibilities of practicing classical philosophy.

What became an effect of the discussion conducted at the metaphilosophical panel was Stępień's article *Co to jest metafizologia?*²⁰ As he claims, metaphilosophy is focused on the methodological and epistemological aspect of philosophy; it mostly deals with "the structure and functioning of philosophy in regard to the genuineness of its results and with the aim of assessing these results,"²¹ but it also pays attention to the activities of the one who practices philosophy and to its cognitive role.²² In the suggested metaphilosophical studies on philosophical sciences and doctrines, Stępień distinguishes three main stages. The first is their methodological description, the second—their epistemological evaluation, and the third—the decision based on the evaluation and the description which precedes it: the rejection or acceptance of values, an improving intervention or "the confirmation that valuable philosophy is not possible."²³ While considering possible accusations of a vicious circle directed towards metaphilosophical exploration,²⁴ Stępień recalls that similar accusations were—wrongly—formulated towards the theory of cognition. As regards metaphilosophical studies, it should be remembered that "it is not so much important at what cognitive level certain epistemological problems will be solved (whether in the theory or metatheory

¹⁹ J. Kalinowski, "Ku próbie konstrukcji metafizologii," in *Studia metafizyczne*, vol. 1, p. 329.

²⁰ A.B. Stępień, "Co to jest metafizologia?," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 9, no. 1 (1961), pp. 137–140.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 138.

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ *Ibidem*.

²⁴ Stępień resists the accusation of a vicious circle in which it is stated that "metaphilosophy will assess the value of philosophy (the theory of cognition and metaphysics) by using the methods (and their hidden factual assumptions) the value of which should be assessed by the theory of cognition. Metaphilosophy ... unnecessarily does things for the theory of cognition or, using methods of unknown value, has no right to assess the validity of other sciences" (*ibidem*).

of cognition) but that they will be generally solved decently. ... Recognizing the value of cognition can only take place during cognition.”²⁵ However, it can be doubted whether the presented strategy of justifying metaphilosophical reflection will be convincing for those who apply a different approach to understanding and practicing philosophy.

In the text *O metodę filozofii. Rozważania na tle problemu substancji i przypadłości* (1960), written within the influential circle of the metaphilosophical panel, Witold Marciszewski—a participant in the panel and a disciple of Kamiński—justifies his analyses and presents arguments for the indispensability of continuous shaping the in-depth self-awareness of philosophy, for developing metaphilosophical reflection and methodology of philosophy:

The awareness of the own methods and a certain dose of criticism ... is much more necessary for a philosopher than their colleagues practicing natural sciences. It is possible to assess the value of the results obtained by a naturalist without going into analysis of the methods used to reach these results. ... Naturalists do not need to undertake reflection on the methodological foundations of their own sciences. ... In the case of philosophy, it is a different matter. ... The value of the results can be assessed only on the basis of valuing the methods which have led to these results. ... The analysis of methods used in philosophy [is] a necessity which cannot be ignored, otherwise a philosopher will be led to the backroads of incommunicative and unjustified views.²⁶

The directions in the studies of the metaphilosophical discussion panel which are outlined here show the context in which Kamiński's standpoint on shaping the self-awareness of philosophy was formed.

A significant relation between the necessity of undertaking metaphilosophical reflection (the acute analysis of the methods of philosophy, in particular) and the “special difficulties” occurring in its practice) was focused on by Kamiński, among other works, in one of his programme metaphilosophical dissertations *O uzasadnieniu tez filozoficznych* (1962):²⁷ “a versatile and reliable knowledge of the

²⁵ Ibidem, p. 139.

²⁶ W. Marciszewski, “O metodę filozofii: Rozważania na tle problemu substancji i przypadłości”, *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 8, no. 1 (1960), p. 17.

²⁷ S. Kamiński, “O uzasadnieniu tez filozoficznych”, *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 10, no. 3 (1962), pp. 37–65.

method of philosophy is indispensable because philosophical cognition causes special difficulties in acquiring, legitimizing, and communicating it.”²⁸ Kamiński warned that the knowledge of methods should not be limited to technical instructions—to what, how and when to use in conducting the exploration according to methodological guidelines, as “this does not concern the knowledge itself of the methods used to philosophize, but also concerns the awareness of their epistemological value in comparison to the methods of other sciences.” What is indispensable in philosophy is shaping the reliable methodological self-knowledge directed towards values—metaphilosophy cannot become a methodical instruction and implementation into “doing” philosophy in compliance with a certain model. While formulating metaphilosophical recommendations, although he emphasizes the priority of the cognitive dimension of philosophy, Kamiński does not consider it in isolation. He writes:

What cannot be forgotten as well is that philosophical theses are of enormous theoretical-cognitive significance and of colossal practical importance. This forces an even bigger concern for the appropriate way of justifying them.²⁹

Not to make “practical importance” become ideological indoctrination and agitation, it is even more necessary to care for the proper and critically considered (in metaphilosophical reflection) justification of the presented theses.

METAPHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION OPEN TO ANTHROPOLOGICAL ISSUES

Not only the inspiration with philosophy of science and methodology of sciences but also the inspirations from the philosophical analysis of human existence and the beliefs concerning the basic qualities of human nature constitute a significant assumption for metaphilosophical reflection developed by Kamiński and indeed they are its characteristic feature. The strength of these beliefs can

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 37.

²⁹ *Ibidem*.

be confirmed, among other things, by the thesis comprised in the conclusion of the text *Problem prawdy w fizyce* (1961), where Kamiński states that:

Taking fully into account the human nature, it is impossible to ... cross out—from the list of tasks of physics—the truth as a value fulfilling general human interests in the cognition of the world. Truth is ... a mental and ethical driving force of scientific cognition.³⁰

Especially in philosophy and metaphilosophical reflection which comes along with it, in classical philosophy in particular, “the human nature” should be “fully taken into account.” This guideline appears while presenting—particularly in the normative mode—the basic tasks which philosophy and metaphilosophical reflection ought to fulfil. Kamiński assumes that there is an inseparable bond between human nature or its fundamental aspirations and the existentially important questions which philosophy undertakes, because:

[A human] persistently asks why something exists if it does not have to exist, whether any necessity takes place within what really exists and owing to which this reality exists in such a way and is just such, why the good and bad exists at all, why eventually humanity exists and what ultimate sense the suffering imposed on it by fate has.³¹

In his metaphilosophical reflection, Kamiński stresses in many ways the strict association of philosophy with life: “by applying maximalist theoretical and practical aims of philosophizing, people remain in compliance with the needs which life itself puts forward.”³² Then, he adds: “Methodologically autonomous (in relation both to particular sciences and to supernatural faith) philosophy seems to be practically indispensable.”³³ It is first of all the practice of life which

³⁰ S. Kamiński, “Problem prawdy w fizyce,” (1961), in S. Kamiński *Metoda i język*, p. 339.

³¹ S. Kamiński, “O metodzie filozofii klasycznej,” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 34, no. 1 (1986), p. 9.

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 11.

as if requires practicing such philosophy, the most appropriate form of which is recognized (while observing “life itself”) and accurately specified in metaphilosophical reflection.

From the angle of metaphilosophical problems, the relations between problems undertaken by philosophy or the ways of its practicing and the difficult experiences of human existence, as well as the questions raised due to them, were considered by Kamiński in the context of painful and tragic experiences of World War II.³⁴ They stimulated the anthropological explorations in the current of existentialism,³⁵ which also opposed the restrictive eradication of philosophy according to the methodological rigors of neo-positivism. While considering the post-war situation in the sphere of culture and ideas, Kamiński favored the metaphilosophical thesis that “the content wealth of philosophy, the wealth of its manifestations and its expression, which ... is also the evidence of a victory over the program of neo-positivist analysts, has cost us ... a fall in the condition of philosophy: in the accuracy of presenting its achievements and in the methodological awareness of practicing it.”³⁶ Yet, he applied such a vision of the history of human thought in which “the dialectics in the development of intellectual currents” becomes visible: “When the peak is reached, the form gets poorer, the contents disappear” and “after the period of fulfilling the ‘content hunger,’ the demand will wake up for the ordering ... of this wealth of materials, for providing it with a logically appropriate form, for methodological critical reflection, leading to proper explanations and justifications.” Kamiński’s

³⁴ “The cruelty of war, the tragedy of individuals and whole societies placed the human being in the face of new questions which insistently required answers: the questions concerning the sense of human existence, ... the most generally understood matters of life and death. Yet, it is not easy to ... answer such questions rationally.” W Stróżewski, “Dialektyka ludzkiego myślenia: Rozmowa z ks. prof. Stanisławem Kamińskim,” *Znak* 21, no. 6 (1969), p. 714.

³⁵ “The range of problems which have become the subject of philosophical reflection has surprisingly started to expand. It was the humanity who has got into the focus, with its existential problems, ... in conflict, borderline situations.” Furthermore: “The territory of philosophy started to be penetrated by other fields of human creation, fulfilling ... the metaphysical needs of humanity. What has become the means of philosophical expression is literature, poetry, drama (Sartre!), film, ... expressing metaphysical contents in painting and music has become trendy, ... these phenomena confirm ... how deeply the need for philosophy and for metaphysics is rooted in the human being”. *Ibidem*, p. 715.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

acceptance of such a vision was motivated by anthropology. Obtaining “a logically appropriate form” of argumentation, the “proper explanations and justifications”, is the aim of “human nature itself”:

A human ultimately aims at a certain harmonious and rationally justified synthesis of their own acts and their results. What is observed now are ... various forms of theoretical and practical acting. Still, what finally determines these tasks is the will to achieve a certain complete unity, fulfilled by constant overcoming particularizations, which ... turn to be just fragments, developmental stages—that is why they have to be trespassed in the name of the authentic whole. A human, as a thinking subject, is a specific “homeostat” or “self-harmonizer”: accepting the value of fragmentary solutions, people are unable to get satisfied with their fragmentariness and one-sidedness and, therefore, make continuous efforts to find a possibly complete, but also appropriately justified synthesis.³⁷

This concise and strong declaration concerns an understanding of anthropology which brings about metaphilosophical beliefs, supported by Kamiński, who remains here faithful to the promoted vision of human nature.

Metaphilosophical reflection is also indispensable in the recognition of similarities and differences of various anthropologies in order to recognize and specify the methodological status of their statements:

Harmonization and symbiosis pertains not so much to ... different information about humanity, ... to connecting scientific, philosophical and theological knowledge, but rather to specifying how to make use of particular anthropologies and how to combine various types of anthropological cognition ..., especially in the justification of the foundations of a worldview; e.g. in what cases is it allowed to refer epistemologically and methodologically to such or another type of knowledge about humanity?³⁸

Thus, metaphilosophy should constantly co-occur with practicing human philosophy.

³⁷ Ibidem, pp. 715–716.

³⁸ S. Kamiński, “Naukowa, filozoficzna i teologiczna wizja człowieka,” (1982), in S. Kamiński *Jak filozofować?*, p. 291.

AN ATTEMPT AT THE SYNTHETIC CONCEPTUALIZATION OF METAPHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF-AWARENESS OF PHILOSOPHY

(1) Recognizing that “the concept of philosophy constitutes a major and ... very complex problem of all scientific explorations,”³⁹ Kamiński developed metaphilosophical reflection and indicated its significance not only for philosophy but also for the whole of human knowledge and its methodological analyses. Metaphilosophical reflection is usually undertaken in reference to the relation of philosophy to science but Kamiński largely broadens its scope with the relation of philosophy to other disciplines of knowledge and to what is traditionally called “wisdom”.

Currently, metaphilosophical reflection should be developed intensively, because as Kamiński thinks:

The current status of philosophy requires such reflection even more than ever before. The attitude of philosophy to other types of (especially scientific) cognition and its role in the life of the individual and the society brings about many occasions to controversy.⁴⁰

Reliable and multisided metaphilosophical reflection ought to be practiced also in order to overcome the disputes, tinted with rhetoric violence, on the primacy or exclusiveness of a particular doctrine: “radical discreditation of certain approaches in philosophy and the absolute defence of others forces some careful research into what practicing philosophy is and what it should be.”⁴¹

(2) Starting his considerations concerning the notion of science and classification of sciences, Kamiński quotes the thought of Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (1912–2007) that “it is easier to practice science than to understand it.” This observation can be referred to

³⁹ S. Kamiński, “Typy ludzkiej wiedzy,” (1978), in S. Kamiński *Jak filozofować?*, p. 23.

⁴⁰ S. Kamiński, “Jak pojmują filozofię współcześni filozofowie polscy,” (1966), in S. Kamiński *Filozofia i metoda*, p. 177.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*.

philosophy: “it is easier to practice philosophy than to understand it.” According to Kamiński, practicing philosophy should be always connected with aiming at the right understanding of its typical activities and the obtained results, although such a consistent conduct is not easy—many difficulties can appear and this only intensifies the hardships.

While introducing into his comparison of philosophical concepts, Kamiński refers, as if in the form of a slightly ironic warning, to a remark of Curt John Ducasse (1881–1969), from *Philosophy as a science* (1941), that “it has happened rarely that philosophers have answered the question what philosophy is in a way satisfying anyone, including themselves.”⁴²

Accepting self-thematics as a feature typical of philosophy and raising the issue of the principles of valuing philosophy as a matter belonging to the competences of philosophical reasoning, Kamiński recognized the peculiar problems and methodological disputes occurring within philosophy as a normal situation for it:

The criteria of valuable philosophy are set down in metaphilosophy, which already has the philosophical character and is the philosophy of cognition. ... specifying the tasks of philosophy already becomes philosophizing. No wonder then that the discussion ... [is] so difficult.⁴³

If “talking about metaphysics is also metaphysics, then even methodological comments ... on this subject are ... determined by certain metaphysics,” it becomes this irremovable from philosophy situation which causes difficulties with handling the methodological postulate of impartiality and with “the convincing achievement of the final evaluations.”⁴⁴ It is necessary to agree that “the absolute answer to the question which method of metaphysics is the most valuable can be only arbitrary.”⁴⁵

⁴² Ibidem, footnote 2.

⁴³ S. Kamiński, “Filozofia religii i filozofia Boga,” (1982), in S. Kamiński *Jak filozofować?*, p. 245.

⁴⁴ S. Kamiński, “Metody współczesnej metafizyki,” (1967/1978), in S. Kamiński *Filozofia i metoda*, p. 41.

⁴⁵ S. Kamiński, “Współczesne metody metafizyki,” (1967), in S. Kamiński *Filozofia i metoda*, p. 130.

(3) Too radical metaphilosophical postulates (approaching from the side of scientism) and the programmes of reconstructing philosophy (e.g. neo-positivist ones) may cause that, as Kamiński warned, “philosophy transforms into a scientific justification of the resignation from philosophy.”⁴⁶

(4) In methodological and metaphilosophical reflection, Kamiński focused on the pluralism of types of knowledge and the pluralism of epistemological criteria for assessing theoretical knowledge. Thus, in metaphilosophical research it is necessary to “consider the separateness of different varieties of scientific cognition. The pluralism of types of knowledge should be assumed. Undoubtedly, science becomes more and more perfect cognition but it does not fulfil all human interests. For instance, it does not answer the deeply understood question why rather something exists at all than nothing.”⁴⁷ These questions are undertaken in philosophy and metaphysics.

Viewing the criteria of assessing theoretical knowledge, Kamiński draws attention to the monistic tendency occurring in the history of science and philosophy. It is designed to accept only one particular, specially distinguished, type of knowledge as “the absolutely most valuable and ideal” for other knowledge-creating disciplines for accurate evaluation of their tasks, procedures and achievements. According to Kamiński’s pluralistic standpoint, “there are no sufficient reasons to accept monism in theory of science—to fix one absolutely binding type of theoretical knowledge or to base each action on the same type of knowledge.”⁴⁸ Questioning the rightfulness of the monistic tendency co-occurs with the hypothesis “on the relativization of the epistemological qualification for a particular criterion, ... a certain type of theoretical knowledge is more valuable only due to the earlier accepted circumstances (especially the established goal).”⁴⁹

The fundamental reasons for pluralism are seen in the fact that “the epistemological value of knowledge can be set up only in a relativized

⁴⁶ S. Kamiński, “O naturze filozofii,” (1989), in S. Kamiński *Jak filozofować?*, p. 46.

⁴⁷ S. Kamiński, “Typy ludzkiej wiedzy,” p. 23.

⁴⁸ S. Kamiński, “O kryteriach wartościowania wiedzy teoretycznej,” (1982), in S. Kamiński *Metoda i język*, p. 449.

⁴⁹ S. Kamiński, “Typy ludzkiej wiedzy,” p. 23.

way in reference to preferring such, not others, cognitive aims and due to a particular object of cognition.”⁵⁰

(5) In his way of developing peripatetic philosophy, Kamiński draws due attention to the conscious practice of metaphilosophy, which in his opinion has been neglected:

Yet, the way of practicing metaphilosophy at the end of the 19th century was not sufficiently determined by the Peripatetics in terms methodology. Metaphilosophy was not really consciously practiced.⁵¹

Metaphilosophical studies should mostly help in the right methodological choice of the way of practicing metaphysics, which takes into account the context of science and the requirements of contemporary logic and general methodology of sciences. The conduct ought to be different from the traditional lecturing in metaphysics, in which “metaphysical theses are not frequently separated from meta-metaphysical ones.”⁵²

(6) The method of philosophizing which highlights metaphilosophical explorations does not always meet understanding.⁵³ While defending the development of metaphilosophical reflection in the Lublin School, Kamiński opposed the thesis that the concept of being is enough to practice philosophy and if a different conduct takes place, metaphysics gets lost, because “the theory of cognition is developed before metaphysics” or “philosophizing occurs in a metaobjective (meta-object-related) way.” According to him:

⁵⁰ S. Kamiński, “O kryteriach wartościowania wiedzy teoretycznej,” p. 449.

⁵¹ S. Kamiński, “Metody współczesnej metafizyki,” p. 86. The form of didactic communication was focused on by the contents were not deepened. Only “the care for preserving formulas and the rhetoric aspect of lecturing (verbalism) was presented. ... What was important were only recognized theses and their purely logical outer relations, not authentic philosophical thinking (reaching the theorems and their being grounded in the subject.” Ibidem, pp. 87–88.

⁵² Ibidem, p. 95, footnote 101.

⁵³ A definite polemics with the metaphilosophical attitude is undertaken when it is regarded as a serious threat to proper understanding of practicing philosophy, relating this understanding to the extreme scientific programme of scientifying philosophy or even to the challenge of reducing philosophy to metaphilosophy.

The reflected practicing of philosophy cannot omit metaphilosophical considerations—to have the concept of being, an object, aim and method of the theory of being should be determined. This belongs to the metatheory of being.⁵⁴

Metametaphysics, functioning as “permanent control”, should co-occur with the building of the system of metaphysics; it is continuously necessary “to examine the determinants of ... philosophical conduct.”⁵⁵

(7) Suggesting the systematization of various disciplines of philosophy, especially for the use of classical philosophy which he was elaborating, Kamiński very closely connected some of these disciplines with metaphilosophy or directly located them in the field of metaphilosophy:

Our knowledge ... is not first of all self-knowledge. We recognize ourselves also by living in the world and observing it carefully. However, the whole theory-cognitive reflection and semiological explication is placed ... in metaphilosophy. It is here that history of philosophy should be ... used as well. The analyses and interpretations of language, which is a tool of cognition, constitute the preparatory stage of philosophical searching and should be placed in metaphilosophy.⁵⁶

Within classical philosophy, Kamiński places the theory of cognition “in metaphilosophy or in metasciences,” because—as he declares—it is not “right to practice the theory of cognition as one of strictly philosophical disciplines if classical philosophy is treated as realistic and practiced in an objective (object-based) method.”⁵⁷

(8) Specifying the relations investigated by metaphilosophy between philosophy and science, Kamiński emphasized that it should be recognized that the “basic independence” and “methodological autonomy” of philosophy (especially metaphysics) take place in relation to particular sciences. Still, he indicated that relations of various

⁵⁴ S. Kamiński, “Zasadnicze aspekty poznania Boga,” (1982), in S. Kamiński, *Światopogląd, religia, teologia*, p. 289.

⁵⁵ Ibidem.

⁵⁶ S. Kamiński, “O metodzie filozofii klasycznej,” p. 12.

⁵⁷ S. Kamiński, “Zasadnicze aspekty poznania Boga,” p. 289.

types take place as well and that science should consider the existence and role of philosophy.

Following in Kamiński's footsteps in terms of approach to the relation between philosophy-science, Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik claims that "science should be practiced in the context of philosophy—not just philosophizing in the context of science."⁵⁸ Such a view on the relations between philosophy and science is the continuation of Kamiński's polemics pertaining to metaphilosophical programmes.

(9) The category of wisdom and the attitude traditionally called "the love of wisdom"—owing to their Greek lexical sources—are written into the notion of philosophy. Yet, there is no agreement among philosophers how they ought to be interpreted. In metaphilosophical concepts, promoted by Kamiński, the presence of the category of wisdom is emphasized, which shows its unity with the aims and methods of philosophy⁵⁹ and which in some cases attributes it the metaphysical rank. In other ways of understanding philosophy, the category of wisdom is treated as a metaphor, overrated as regards its value and having little significance for practicing philosophy.

The opinion that "nowadays, wisdom is attributed relatively little value,"⁶⁰ is expressed by Kamiński in his monograph *Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk*, where he negatively assesses the spiritual situation of the contemporary civilization. The intensive (and presenting its effects in many fields of life) "development of science and technology preceded ... the development of the desired (by a contemporary human) spirituality so that humanity often becomes a caricature of itself."⁶¹ The usefulness of science is one-sidedly highlighted, omitting

⁵⁸ A. Lekka-Kowalik, *Odkrywanie aksjologicznego wymiaru nauki* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2008), p. 368.

⁵⁹ P. Kawalec, "Nauka, mądrość, autonomia", *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 59, no. 2 (2011), pp. 131–139.

⁶⁰ S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda*, p. 310.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, p. 237. "Science can be used for dehumanization. Yet, this does not flow from its nature, but from outside" (*ibidem*, p. 237). "Science, by becoming a value in itself and by acquiring domination in culture, has broken off the humanity It has started to destroy traditional humanistic values. ... What has gone away ... is the dialogue of scientists and philosophers. It has been replaced with the diktat of technology and natural sciences. ... Science has lost the awareness of its own position and role in culture, ... and has become dependent on technology" (*ibidem*, p. 246).

the issues of the good and wisdom. Such an approach to science results in “the destruction of spiritual culture.”⁶² What seems to be a part of this crisis is not noticing wisdom as an important value or negating it. From the metaphilosophical perspective of classical philosophy, Kamiński claims that “complete metaphysical cognition constitutes the fundamental element of the house of wisdom and that wisdom, taken ideally, is the necessary model, the beginning and the aim of philosophizing.”⁶³ If such metaphilosophical, as well as metaphysical and anthropological, assumptions are accepted, the category (the value) of wisdom becomes indispensable in philosophy.

(10) Kamiński was aware that in his metaphilosophical explorations—as a part of his own narration and argumentation—he used “the formulas or thought shortcuts typical of the philosophical school the doctrine of which might be not clear as it is far from the typical mentality of the end of the 20th century.”⁶⁴ Especially today, this requires some attempts at translating the formulas to the terminology which might be more understandable these days, although some doubt may be raised whether the desired contents are not as if “enchanted” into these formulas and that, after an attempt at translation, they might weaken or disappear. These are some currently topical questions to the followers of Kamiński’s metaphilosophical reflection.

⁶² Ibidem, p. 237. “Among ... the fetishes worshipped by the 20th century humanity, science and technology ... have a high rank” (ibidem, p. 5).

⁶³ Ibidem, p. 310. See also S. Kamiński, “Nauka i filozofia a mądrość,” (1983), in S. Kamiński *Jak filozofować?*, pp. 55–61.

⁶⁴ S. Kamiński, “Wstęp,” in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, p. 12.

THE PARTICIPATION OF STANISŁAW KAMIŃSKI IN PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES

Stanisław Kamiński participated in several philosophical (and metaphilosophical) debates which took place in Polish Christian philosophy after the Second World War. These debates focused on issues such as: the role of logic in the practice of philosophy, classical philosophy in relation to natural science, the concept of philosophical anthropology and the philosophy of God.

PHILOSOPHY WITH RESPECT TO MODERN LOGIC

The discussion on Christian philosophy regarding contemporary logic and the methodology of sciences began in Poland during the interwar period and most probably stemmed from the activity and impact of the Lvov-Warsaw School. In 1936, during the Third Polish Philosophical Congress in Krakow, four philosophers and logicians, Józef M. Bocheński (1902–1995), Jan Salamucha (1903–1944), Jan Franciszek Drewnowski (1896–1978) and Bolesław Sobociński (1906–1980) presented a programme for the modernisation of the Christian philosophy by increasing the use of modern logic. The group was called the Krakow Circle. The presented lectures and ensuing discussions were issued in 1937 as “Myśl katolicka wobec logiki współczesnej” (*Catholic thought in relation to modern logic*).¹ According to

¹ “Myśl katolicka wobec logiki współczesnej,” *Studia Gnesnensia* 15 (1937).

Bocheński, the program of the Krakow Circle advocated three proposals: (1) the use of precise scientific language by philosophers; (2) the use of modern logic (formal logic, semiotics, and methodology of sciences) instead of scholastic logic, and (3) the application of formalism.²

The discussion initiated by the Krakow Circle was interrupted by the war, and it was Kamiński who resumed it in the post-war period by commenting on the work of Salamucha from 1934 “Dowód ‘ex motu’ na istnienie Boga. Analiza logiczna argumentacji św. Tomasza z Akwinu” (*The proof ‘ex motu’ for the existence of God: Logical analysis of St. Thomas’ arguments*).³ It was the first ever attempt to formalize the first argument of St. Thomas (1225–1274) in the language of modern logic. Salamucha died in 1944, but the debate provoked by his work continued for many years and also spurred international interest.⁴ In 1954, at the Department of Methodology of Sciences of the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL), in which Kamiński was an adjunct professor, Leon Koj (1929–2006) wrote a thesis titled *Poglądy ks. Salamuchy na uściślenie filozofii* (Views of Fr. Salamucha on clarification of philosophy), under the supervision of Józef Iwanicki (1902–1995). This was the first direct post-war reference to the work of Salamucha.

Kamiński recognized the advantages of formalization as presented by Salamucha. First of all, it shed more light on the formal structure of St. Thomas’ reasoning. However, the final conclusion voiced by Kamiński was skeptical about this attempt. He stated that it was impossible to fully translate metaphysical evidence into formal

² J.M. Bocheński, *Wspomnienia* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Philed, 1993), p. 123; J.M. Bocheński, “Koło Krakowskie,” *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny* 23, no. 1 (1995), p. 25. See also K. Wolsza, “O polskim ‘tomizmie analitycznym,’” *Arcana* 1, no. 5 (1995), pp. 160–164; K. Wolsza, “Józef M. Bocheński i metodologiczne postulaty Koła Krakowskiego,” *Studia z Filozofii Polskiej* 1 (2006), pp. 115–136.

³ J. Salamucha, “Dowód ‘ex motu’ na istnienie Boga. Analiza logiczna argumentacji św. Tomasza z Akwinu,” (1934) in J. Salamucha, *Wiedza i wiara: Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, ed. J.J. Jadacki, K. Świątorzecka (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1997), pp. 333–364.

⁴ Comments on text of Salamucha: *W kierunku formalizacji tomistycznej teodycei*, ed. E. Nieznański (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo ATK, 1980); E. Nieznański, “Drogi i bezdroża formalizacji teodycei od Salamuchy do Gödla,” in *Logika i metafizologia*, ed. Z. Wolak (Tarnów: Wydawnictwo Biblos; Kraków: OBI, 1995), pp. 99–117; K. Wolsza, “Teodycea sformalizowana,” in *Filozofia Boga*, vol. 2: *Odkrywanie Boga*, ed. S. Janeczka and A. Starościc (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2017), pp. 195–218.

logic for the following reasons: (1) metaphysical concepts are analogous; (2) the fact of existence does not fit into the framework of logical categories; (3) metaphysical evidences take into account the internal structure of being (potency—act; essence—existence), which cannot be expressed in the language of logic.⁵

These reservations also appeared in other works by Kamiński and related not only to the first argument of St. Thomas but also to other propositions of metaphysical reasoning.⁶ He emphasized that logical equations recognized only the relationship of premises and results, whereas metaphysical reasoning gave priority to assuring the validity of premises. Metaphysics constitutes the knowledge of the existential nature of reality while existence is recognized only by means of direct experience. In order to explain the existence of contingent reality, it was necessary to consider a being who is “Pure Existence.” The justification of the existence of God ought to be based on relationships between the components of being, instead of those between theorems expressed by the logical format. Moreover, Kamiński drew attention to the different nature of the language of metaphysics and more formal language. The former consists of content terms issued analogically (intentional), the latter is built with span function words (extensional) and variables running through sets of unambiguously defined objects.

The same issues were also addressed in the polemics of Kamiński and Drewnowski. In 1965 Drewnowski, a representative of the Krakow

⁵ S. Kamiński, “Sformalizowanie dowodu,” in W. Granat, *Teodycea: Istnienie Boga i Jego natura* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1968), p. 111; S. Kamiński, “O formalizacji teorii tomistycznej ruchu,” *Sprawozdania z Czynności Wydawniczej i Posiedzeń Naukowych oraz Kroniki Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL* 15 (1965), pp. 48–52.

⁶ S. Kamiński, “Logika współczesna a filozofia,” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 9, no. 1 (1961), pp. 49–84; S. Kamiński, “Co daje stosowanie logiki formalnej do metafizyki klasycznej,” (1964), in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować? Studia z metodologii filozofii klasycznej*, prepared for publication by T. Szubka (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1989), pp. 125–134; S. Kamiński, “Aksjomatyzowalność klasycznej metafizyki ogólnej,” (1965), in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, pp. 135–149; M.A. Krąpiec and S. Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1962 [1994²]); S. Kamiński and Z.J. Zdybicka, “O sposobie poznania istnienia Boga: Artykuł dyskusyjny,” (1964), in S. Kamiński, *Światopogląd, religia, teologia: Zagadnienia filozoficzne i metodologiczne*, prepared for publication by M. Walczak and A. Bronk (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1998), pp. 179–204.

Circle, reacted twice to Kamiński's texts.⁷ He defended the use of logic in philosophy and insisted that representatives of the Krakow Circle should not translate metaphysics into the language of symbolic logic.⁸ He refuted the claim that it was not possible to create precise symbolism to express the inner structure of being. So far, such symbolism had not been formulated, but this did not deem it impossible.⁹ It seems that in the debates between Kamiński and Drewnowski, the two types of formalization were not always differentiated. This division refers to the work by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890–1963) from 1934 "O stosowalności czystej logiki do zagadnień filozoficznych" (*On the applicability of pure logic to philosophical problems*).¹⁰ Formalization can be understood as a paraphrase of philosophical texts (as understood by Kamiński) and as a presentation of being in the formal object language (as favored by Drewnowski). The second type of formalization is not a translation of philosophical statements into the language of logic but rather the construction of a formalized theory of being.¹¹ An example of such an ontology and philosophy of God can be found in the work of Edward Nieznański *Sformalizowana ontologia orientacji klasycznej* (*Formalized ontology inspired by classical philosophy*).¹²

Kamiński's attitude towards the proposals of the Krakow Circle changed, but mainly with regards to the use of formalism in metaphysics. However, he also accepted and adopted other principles, compatible with his understanding of "classical" philosophy. He believed that such philosophy referred objectively to traditional philosophy,

⁷ J.F. Drewnowski, "Stosowanie logiki symbolicznej w filozofii," (1965), in J.F. Drewnowski, *Filozofia i precyzja: Zarys programu filozoficznego i inne pisma*, ed. S. Majdański and S. Zalewski (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1996), pp. 199–208; J.F. Drewnowski, "Uwagi w związku z artykułem dyskusyjnym ks. Stanisława Kamińskiego i s. Zofii J. Zdybickiej pt. 'O sposobie poznania istnienia Boga'," (1965), in J.F. Drewnowski, *Filozofia i precyzja*, p. 224–233.

⁸ J.F. Drewnowski, "Stosowanie logiki symbolicznej w filozofii," p. 203.

⁹ Ibidem, p. 207.

¹⁰ K. Ajdukiewicz, "O stosowalności czystej logiki do zagadnień filozoficznych," (1934), in K. Ajdukiewicz, *Język i poznanie*, vol. 1: *Wybór pism z lat 1920–1939* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2006³), pp. 211–214.

¹¹ E. Nieznański, "Formalizacja filozofii – metoda czy maniera?," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 35, no. 1 (1987), p. 60; E. Nieznański, "Stanisław Kamiński jako logik," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 29, no. 1 (1993), pp. 168–169.

¹² E. Nieznański, *Sformalizowana ontologia orientacji klasycznej* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo UKSW, 2007).

especially Aristotelian and Thomistic, yet was being further modified and defined in terms of methodology. Therefore, it might take improved forms, in accordance with the demands of logic and methodology of sciences.¹³

PHILOSOPHY WITH RESPECT TO NATURAL SCIENCE

Another long-term debate on the relation of Christian philosophy (especially the philosophy of nature) to natural science was initiated by Kazimierz Kłósak (1911–1982), beginning in 1954 and continuing to this day.¹⁴ According to Michał Heller, this debate halted the development of natural philosophy in Polish Christian thought. For many years, the philosophy of nature was not applied; instead, debates were held on how it should be practiced.¹⁵ Kłósak believed that the neo-Thomistic philosophy of nature is in conflict with contemporary physics and other branches of natural sciences.¹⁶ He pointed to the need for a reinterpretation that would take into account modern scientific knowledge. Kamiński did not speak directly about the philosophy of nature. Among the philosophers associated with the Faculty of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin, the following addressed these issues more frequently: Stanisław Mazierski (1915–1993), later also Zygmunt Hajduk (former assistant to Kamiński), and indirectly: Jerzy Kalinowski (1916–2000) and Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec O.P. (1921–2008).¹⁷ Kłósak, however, referred briefly to Kamiński's views. He wrote:

¹³ S. Kamiński, "O metodzie filozofii klasycznej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 34, no. 1 (1986), pp. 5–6.

¹⁴ K. Kłósak, "Jak pojąć w neoscholastyce przedmiot i metodę filozofii przyrody?," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 4 (1954), pp. 1–31; K. Kłósak, *Z teorii i metodologii filozofii przyrody* (Poznań: Księgarnia Św. Wojciecha, 1980).

¹⁵ M. Heller, "Jak uprawiać filozofię przyrody?," *Znak – Idee* 4 (1999), p. 20.

¹⁶ K. Kłósak, "Zagadnienie współlistnienia filozofii przyrody z nowożytną fizyką teoretyczną," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 7, no. 3 (1959), pp. 5–35; K. Kłósak, *Z teorii i metodologii filozofii przyrody*, pp. 161–182.

¹⁷ S. Mazierski, "Fizykalne a filozoficzne wyjaśnianie rzeczywistości," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 7, no. 3 (1959), p. 39–67; S. Mazierski, *Elementy kosmologii filozoficznej i przyrodniczej* (Poznań; Warszawa; Lublin: Księgarnia Świętego Wojciecha, 1972); Z. Hajduk and S. Mazierski, "Z metodologii filozofii przyrody nieożywionej i przyrodoznawstwa," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 19, no. 2 (1976), pp. 65–69;

I omit the name of Stanisław Kamiński, as the co-author, along with Krąpiec, of the article “Specyficzność poznania metafizycznego” (*Specificity of metaphysical cognition*) ... Although at a certain point, Kamiński acknowledged the viewpoint of his colleague, his own opinion on this issue is slightly different.¹⁸

We shall not investigate here how Kłósak could have known that Kamiński’s own opinion was different from Krąpiec’s and what exactly was the difference. Ultimately, there were no differences as far as the central issue is concerned. Kamiński considered the philosophy of nature to be a part of special metaphysics. Both general metaphysics and the various varieties of special metaphysics should be autonomous in relation to natural sciences. Kamiński presented his view on the matter in 1961, in an article written with Krąpiec “Specyficzność poznania metafizycznego” (*Specificity of metaphysical cognition*), to which Kłósak referred in his polemics.¹⁹ It was one of the first attempts to construct a methodology of metaphysics developed in the KUL circles.

The main thesis of the article stated that every philosophical cognition is a metaphysics: a general (philosophy of being) or a special one. Special fields of metaphysics (including philosophy of nature) do not differ from each other in terms of method.²⁰ In the past, knowledge of nature was developed within philosophy. It was, according to the authors, “a naive physics-philosophy”. In the modern period natural science became independent. It also allowed philosophy (metaphysics) to define its own identity as an autonomous field of science. Therefore, one should not return to the model of “physics-philosophy.” According to Kamiński and Krąpiec, at the present stage of the development of science and philosophy, the old theory of three degrees of abstraction (physical, mathematical, metaphysical) became

Z. Hajduk, *Filozofia przyrody, filozofia przyrodoznawstwa, metakosmologia* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2004); J. Kalinowski, “Esquisse de l’évolution d’une conception de la métaphysique,” *Recherches de Philosophie* 6 (1963), pp. 97–133; M.A. Krąpiec, *Realizm ludzkiego poznania* (Poznań: Pallottinum, 1959), pp. 54, 113–115.

¹⁸ K. Kłósak, *Z teorii i metodologii filozofii przyrody*, pp. 53–54.

¹⁹ S. Kamiński and M.A. Krąpiec, “Specyficzność poznania metafizycznego,” *Znak* 13, no. 5 (1961), pp. 602–637.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 602.

outdated. Philosophy of nature was placed on the first stage of abstraction. According to the authors, the former first degree of abstraction turned into today's empirical sciences (natural and humanistic), the second—into formal science (logic and mathematics), and the third—is relevant to philosophy in general. The third degree of abstraction is called “separation” and constitutes the basic method of practicing metaphysics and philosophy.²¹ A proposal was made to create a separate methodological program for philosophy, free from links with natural sciences, that would be: “theoretically interesting, valuable in life, and deserving of its place in epistemology.”²²

In the following years, Kamiński, together with Krąpiec and other collaborators, created just such a program. It involved a conviction about the autonomy of general and exact metaphysics in relation to natural sciences.²³ This conviction was also expressed by Kamiński in another debate concerning the first argument of St. Thomas, in which he appealed: “Let us protect metaphysics from any confusion with physics whatsoever!”²⁴ This debate will be discussed further.

Andrzej Bronk S.V.D. wrote that Kamiński was infatuated with the factual aspect of science.²⁵ He developed an impressive piece of research on science and saw new philosophical problems stemming from it. Kamiński wrote that “new philosophical issues emerge on the basis of exact sciences and entwine them like ivy, while the old problems of being, cognition, and values revive with enormous strength.”²⁶ Despite this fascination, he believed that philosophy, when undertaking these “old problems” (metaphysics), should be autonomous in relation to natural science.

²¹ Ibidem, p. 605.

²² Ibidem, p. 629.

²³ S. Kamiński, “Typy ludzkiej wiedzy,” (1978), in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, pp. 24–25.

²⁴ S. Kamiński, “Prelekcja stanowiąca zagajenie do dyskusji nad odczytem K. Kłósaka,” (1968), in S. Kamiński, *Światopogląd, religia, teologia*, pp. 269–270.

²⁵ A. Bronk, “Wielość nauk i jedność nauki (Stanisława Kamińskiego opcje metodologiczne),” in S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda: Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk*, prepared for publication by A. Bronk (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1992), p. 346.

²⁶ S. Kamiński, “Metodologiczna problematyka poznania duszy ludzkiej,” (1976), in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, p. 265.

HOW TO PHILOSOPHIZE ABOUT MAN?

After the Second World War, Polish Christian philosophy held many debates concerning the philosophy of man (philosophical anthropology). The first focused on the human soul and was initiated in 1968 by Bohdan Bejze (1929–2005). It was born in Poland in a specific context. On the one hand, the Marxist philosophy denied the existence of the soul, while on the other (in the milieu of Polish Christian philosophy), the anthropological views of those such as Pierre Teilhard de Chardin S.J. (1881–1955) were considered; fascinating for some and controversial for others.²⁷ Kamiński took part in these debates and spoke about the soul.²⁸

According to Kamiński, the proper ground for thinking about the soul is in a form of philosophy which is autonomous of the other sciences.²⁹ He was critical of the two above-mentioned trends in philosophical anthropology: the elimination of the concept of the soul in the Marxist philosophy and other naturalistic trends, and the incorporation of content and terminology derived from various sciences into philosophy. He claimed that in the field of autonomous philosophy, the problem of the soul remained valid. It emerged in the context of reflections on the unity of “Self” and the multiplicity of human acts.³⁰ Accepting the soul as a substantial form of human existence enabled explaining both aspects (the unity of the “Self” and the multiplicity of acts). Such a perception of the soul is metaphysical. Other concepts of philosophical anthropology (e.g. by Teilhard de Chardin) provide for plenty of interesting subjects but do not lead to the classical philosophy of the human soul. Kamiński’s main thesis is as follows:

The theory of being ... seems to be the most profound and consistent when explaining human psychology. However, one should not

²⁷ Ibidem, p. 272. See also A.B. Stępień, “Zagadnienie genezy duszy z materii,” *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 3, no. 1 (1960), pp. 109–117.

²⁸ B. Bejze, “W poszukiwaniu współczesnego pojęcia duszy ludzkiej,” in *W nurcie zagadnień posoborowych*, vol. 2, ed. B. Bejze (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sióstr Loretanek-Benedyktynek, 1968), pp. 59–61.

²⁹ S. Kamiński, “Metodologiczna problematyka poznania duszy ludzkiej,” p. 265.

³⁰ Ibidem, s. 269.

mix its conceptual apparatus and methods of explanation with other systems of philosophical analysis.³¹

The second discussion in the field of philosophical anthropology concerned the monograph of Karol Wojtyła (1920–2005) *Osoba i czyn* (*Person and Act*). Issued in 1969, it prompted numerous comments, also in KUL circles. The discussion on Wojtyła's work became international, stemming from the fact that the author became pope and his work had been translated into several languages.³² Kamiński also took part in the debates on Wojtyła's work and drew attention to the applied method.³³ It was based on the analysis of being by analyzing acts committed by an individual. In his work, Wojtyła gave recognition to the inner experience of man, without rejecting the realistic approach which was characteristic of classical philosophy. Kamiński pointed out the emerging difficulty, which was how to connect the two sources of knowledge about man: internal and external experience. In his opinion, Wojtyła did not solve this problem either at the meta-philosophical, or the practical level. His method was an attempt to combine an approach typical of classical philosophy (explanation by reasoning) with a phenomenological approach (explanation by demonstration). According to Kamiński, such a combination was impossible if philosophical anthropology was given a maximalist goal: the final explanation of the phenomenon of man.³⁴

In further studies Kamiński regarded Wojtyła's proposal as a variety of personalism, in which the ontological aspect is combined with the axiological one. However, he did not recognize Wojtyła's concept as part of the anthropological philosophy which he personally accepted, i.e. the philosophical anthropology understood as exact metaphysics searching for ultimate reasons of human being.³⁵

³¹ Ibidem, s. 277.

³² List of translations in K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn i inne studia antropologiczne* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2000³), p. 44.

³³ S. Kamiński, "Jak filozofować o człowieku?," *Analecta Cracoviensia* 5–6 (1973–1974), pp. 73–79.

³⁴ Ibidem, s. 79.

³⁵ S. Kamiński, "Z metafizyki człowieka," (1974), in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, p. 255; S. Kamiński, "Naukowa, filozoficzna i teologiczna wizja człowieka," (1982), in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, p. 285.

We can also distinguish a third debate held in the Polish philosophy on philosophical anthropology. In 1974 Krąpiec published a major anthropological work *Ja – człowiek. Zarys antropologii filozoficznej (I – Man: An outline of philosophical anthropology)*.³⁶ Kamiński followed the work with a study of the concept of philosophical anthropology which would be “factually relevant and methodologically correct.”³⁷ He believed that interpretations of the human phenomenon proposed by modern philosophy were not exhaustible. Philosophical anthropology ought to apply the methods of ontology and its conceptual apparatus.³⁸ Methodological order requires that the system of philosophical anthropology should incorporate the arguments of metaphysics and natural philosophy while anticipating the arguments of philosophical psychology, ethics, aesthetics and philosophy of culture.³⁹ Kamiński took great care to ensure consistency of terminology and methodology. He defended the presented concept against the charge of being abstract and detached from life. He believed that it provided the tools to solve specific problems: suffering, guilt, relationships with others and with God, and ultimately—death. It also gave the basis for validating theoretical theses of a worldview and principles of actions.⁴⁰

The cohesion of the presented system of philosophical anthropology, regarded by Kamiński as its asset, met with criticism from Józef Tischner (1931–2000). According to Tischner, the given concept of anthropology saw man “through the windows of the system.”⁴¹ He argued mostly with the views of Krąpiec but also mentioned Kamiński. He claimed that the desire to build a coherent system made its authors blind to elementary human experience and that the concern for the coherence of the system was not the appropriate method of discovering the knowledge of man. “We should look for approximations and justifications ... elsewhere, by means of a different mindset and

³⁶ M.A. Krąpiec, *Ja – człowiek. Zarys antropologii filozoficznej* (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1974).

³⁷ S. Kamiński, “Z metafizologii człowieka,” in M.A. Krąpiec, *Ja – człowiek*, pp. 425–439 (reprinted in: S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, pp. 249–262).

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 260.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 261.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 262.

⁴¹ J. Tischner, “Człowiek przez okna systemu,” (1976), in J. Tischner, *Myslenie według wartości* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2000³), pp. 309–335.

different methods”—concluded Tischner.⁴² Kamiński did not respond in detail to Tischner’s claims, although they were also connected with the methodological issues he studied. Tischner continued the debate on the metaphysical approach to philosophical anthropology, whereby, it became the subject of further studies and gained international interest.⁴³ Kamiński, however, did not participate any further in this debate.

THE CONCEPT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF GOD

Polish 20th century philosophy was also involved in several debates on the concept of the philosophy of God. Kamiński took part in three debates on this subject (the presented chronology corresponds to Kamiński’s statements, rather than the debates themselves).

In 1964 Kamiński, together with Zofia J. Zdybicka, published the article “O sposobie poznania istnienia Boga” (*The cognizability of the existence of God*).⁴⁴ An earlier article, co-written with Krąpiec, “Specyficzność poznania metafizycznego” (*Specificity of metaphysical cognition*) (1961), was an attempt to build a methodology of metaphysical cognition. The latter text had a similar character but with reference to the philosophical study of God (the natural theology). The main thesis of the article can be summed up as follows: “The issue of God is an intrinsic issue of metaphysics.”⁴⁵ This means, there is no basis for distinguishing a separate branch of philosophy: the philosophy of God. Hence, the arguments for the existence of God (“proof”) cannot be detached from the metaphysical context, for they are based on specific acts of metaphysical cognition, and not exclusively on logical reasoning.

⁴² Ibidem, p. 335.

⁴³ J. Tischner, *I metodi del pensiero umano* (Bologna: CESO, 1982); V. Possenti, “Józef Tischner – kontestator tomizmu,” trans. E. Zieliński, *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 27, no. 3 (1984), pp. 69–77; A. Wilczek, “W poszukiwaniu prawdy o człowieku. Spór księdza Tischnera z tomizmem,” *Czasopismo Filozoficzne*, no. 4–5 (2009), pp. 52–72.

⁴⁴ S. Kamiński and Z.J. Zdybicka, “O sposobie poznania istnienia Boga: Artykuł dyskusyjny,” (1964), in S. Kamiński, *Światopogląd, religia, teologia*, pp. 179–204.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, p. 189.

The text by Kamiński and Zdybicka included the subtitle “Artykuł dyskusyjny” (*An article for discussion*), which encouraged further debate and dialogue. This invitation was accepted by, among others, Drewnowski, who had previously discussed with Kamiński the usefulness of contemporary logic in philosophy. This issue returned in this debate, however, we omit it here as it has already been presented above. Drewnowski’s response concerned also more general issues. The author was cautious towards the declaration of Lublin philosophers that “existential Thomism” (as referred to by Kamiński and Zdybicka) was the deepest reading of St. Thomas. He argued that the decisive character of some of Kamiński’s and Zdybicka’s statements was unjustified and premature (e.g., that evidence in metaphysics had a different character than in other fields of science), as there was no reason to claim that the theory of existence and being (developed in existential Thomism) was complete and final. Drewnowski wrote:

Existential Thomism is today an attempt to create a modern science of existence, but it does not yet constitute a modern form of the entire scope of classical philosophy.⁴⁶

Kamiński and Zdybicka initially responded to Drewnowski’s comments and then developed their views on the philosophical study of God in a comprehensive text from 1968.⁴⁷ They repeated and developed the key theses of their viewpoint: (1) that the basic form of argumentation for the existence of God was the question of the reason for existence (according to the text by St. Thomas *De ente et essentia*); (2) that acts of intellectual intuition (and not logical reasoning) were essential to this form of argumentation; (3) that metaphysics did not disregard forms of reasoning proposed by formal logic, but recognized their limited scope.

From 1949 to 1968 a great debate took place in Polish philosophy regarding the validity of the first argument of St. Thomas Aquinas

⁴⁶ J.F. Drewnowski, “Uwagi w związku z artykułem dyskusyjnym ks. Stanisława Kamińskiego i s. Zofii J. Zdybickiej pt. ‘O sposobie poznania istnienia Boga,’” p. 233.

⁴⁷ S. Kamiński and Z.J. Zdybicka, “W odpowiedzi na uwagi Jana Fr. Drewnowskiego,” (1965), in S. Kamiński, *Światopogląd, religia, teologia*, pp. 205–324; S. Kamiński and Z.J. Zdybicka, “Poznawalność istnienia Boga,” (1968), in S. Kamiński, *Światopogląd, religia, teologia*, pp. 215–262.

(*ex motu*), i.e. the kinetic argumentation.⁴⁸ The discussion was initiated by the article by Kazimierz Kłósak “Kinetyczny dowód istnienia Boga wobec nowych zarzutów” (*Kinetic proof of the existence of God concerning new claims*),⁴⁹ and was ended by the conference organized by Cardinal Karol Wojtyła in 1968.⁵⁰ Kamiński spoke only in the last phase of the discussion.⁵¹ Earlier, the position of the Lublin philosophical community had been presented by Krąpiec and Zdybicka.⁵² Kamiński’s statement not only concerned the kinetic argument but the very concept of the philosophy of God developed within the framework of metaphysics. Kłósak decided that referring to God to explain the dynamics of nature was no longer valid and that it was impossible to maintain the kinetic argument in its current form. He believed that it contained elements of old physics which had to be replaced by modern physics. Kamiński adopted a different approach. Rather than replacing the old physics with the modern, the revision of the kinetic argument and other arguments ought to be based on purifying them from the remnants of old physics. It was in the course of this debate that the already quoted appeal was made: “Let us protect metaphysics from any confusion with physics whatsoever!”⁵³

Another (third) debate on the philosophy of God was resumed by Bohdan Bejze. In 1969 he invited philosophy lecturers to take part in a survey about the philosophy of God. It contained several dozen

⁴⁸ K. Wolsza, “Dyskusja o argumentacji kinetycznej za istnieniem Boga w polskiej literaturze neotomistycznej (1949–1968),” *Studia z Filozofii Polskiej* 8 (2013), pp. 75–110.

⁴⁹ K. Kłósak, “Kinetyczny dowód istnienia Boga wobec nowych zarzutów,” *Znak* 4, no. 5 (1949), pp. 392–401.

⁵⁰ E. Morawiec, “Symposium filozoficzne poświęcone analizie punktu wyjścia kinetycznego i teleologicznego argumentu na istnienie Boga,” *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 4, no. 2 (1968), pp. 225–270.

⁵¹ S. Kamiński, “Prelekcja stanowiąca zagajenie do dyskusji nad odczytem K. Kłósaka,” (1968), in S. Kamiński, *Światopogląd, religia, teologia*, pp. 263–270.

⁵² M.A. Krąpiec, “Raz jeszcze o kinetycznym dowodzie istnienia Boga,” *Znak* 5, no. 4 (1950), pp. 281–295; M.A. Krąpiec, “O poprawne rozumienie kinetycznego dowodu na istnienie Boga u św. Tomasza,” *Polonia Sacra* 6, no. 4 (1953–54), pp. 97–113; Z.J. Zdybicka, “Charakter rozumowania występującego w Tomaszowym dowodzie kinetycznym istnienia Boga,” *Znak* 13, no. 11 (1961), pp. 1482–1499.

⁵³ S. Kamiński, “Prelekcja stanowiąca zagajenie do dyskusji nad odczytem K. Kłósaka,” p. 270.

questions in eleven groups.⁵⁴ The first asked which of the systems of natural theology could meet the demands of contemporary methodology of science and correspond to the mentality of a modern man. The remaining questions concerned the validity of the Thomistic philosophy of God and the individual arguments of St. Thomas. Initially, 22 lecturers responded to the survey, including Kamiński.⁵⁵

According to Kamiński, expectations of the philosophy of God (maximalist) could be summarized as presented below. The philosophy of God is expected to: (1) take into account human experience; (2) apply a neutral starting point; (3) provide reasonably grounded expertise; (4) lead to cognition—transferable and subject to inter-subjective control, ultimately explaining and universally binding. According to Kamiński, these postulates were most fully applied by the philosophy of God developed within existential Thomism. It could be constantly improved on the methodological level and applied to current philosophical issues. However, it was not a separate philosophical doctrine, but rather a part of the philosophy of existence (metaphysics). Therefore, it was unreasonable to even use the term “philosophy” in relation to the philosophical cognition of God in existential Thomism. For other reasons (e.g., educational) we could establish a separate philosophy of God which would include a synthesis of various philosophical studies of God. However, it would be a collective philosophical discipline and methodologically multiform.

Kamiński’s comments on the five arguments of St. Thomas are very interesting. He believed that the philosophical proof of the existence of God should not take the form of five arguments, as the acceptance of the existence of God entails the ultimate explanation of the existence of the contingent reality (why does something exist if it does not have to exist?). The five arguments can be taught and analyzed for historical reasons and for the purpose of exercises in studying the philosophy of existence. However, St. Thomas’ arguments do not constitute an unchanging code, nor should they be separated from the metaphysical context.

⁵⁴ B. Bejze, “Wśród głównych zagadnień filozofii Boga,” in *O Bogu i o człowieku*, vol. 2, ed. B. Bejze (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sióstr Loretanek–Benedyktynek, 1969), pp. 11–77. List of questions see: *Ibidem*, pp. 14–16.

⁵⁵ S. Kamiński, “Wypowiedź dotycząca głównych zagadnień filozofii Boga,” (1969), in S. Kamiński, *Światopogląd, religia, teologia*, pp. 271–273.

Kamiński's statement in the last debate on the philosophy of God included a summary of views presented in the already mentioned texts. He emphasized (even more than in other works) the relative value of five arguments of St. Thomas and the necessity of interpreting them in the light of questions about the existence of reality.

This outline included the most important philosophical debates in which he had actively participated, along with many Polish philosophers. For Kamiński, these debates were an opportunity to present his own philosophical program and confront it with other views and arguments. All the debates included claims constantly present in Kamiński's program including, among others: (1) that metaphysics was the main domain of philosophy and its other fields were linked to it; (2) that philosophy was autonomous to exact science and strove for final explanations; (3) that philosophy's methodology was distinctive and should not adopt methods from other sciences.

STANISŁAW KAMIŃSKI'S INFLUENCE ON HIS PHILOSOPHICAL AND NON-PHILOSOPHICAL ENVIRONMENT

The activities of Stanisław Kamiński at the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) spanned almost 40 years (1947–1986) and had a noticeable effect on the Polish philosophical and non-philosophical environment. Kamiński influenced research, teaching and organizational work, however, his most influential works were on the theory of science, the methodology of philosophy and theology, and wisdom. The didactic impact, besides the substantive content of his lectures and seminars, was reflected in sensitizing the audience to the value of logical culture. Among the numerous organizational activities, it is worth mentioning Kamiński's concern for the codification of philosophical and methodological terminology.

THEORY OF SCIENCE

In 1961 the first edition of Kamiński's most famous monograph *Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk* (*Concept of science and classification of sciences*) was published. This book was re-published in two subsequent

editions (1970, 1981),¹ while the fourth edition (1992), which appeared after the author's death, contained his notes and planned additions.² In the first edition, containing only three chapters: "Wieloznaczność terminu 'nauka'" (*Polisemy of term 'science'*); "Natura nauki" (*Nature of science*); "Różne typy nauki" (*Different kinds of science*), Kamiński described the book as a "systematic-historical introduction to the theory of science."³ This is also how this work was received by readers and reviewers. Its substantive values were emphasized (a rich source of information on science and its history), as well as its formal values (synthetic and encyclopedic character). Władysław Stróżewski, one of the first reviewers, wrote that Kamiński's book "will be a great textbook for those wanting to become acquainted with the problems of the theory of science in its modern state."⁴ Another reviewer, Antoni B. Stępień, predicted that the book could play a significant role in didactics. He wrote: "The circulation of this book (one thousand copies) seems too low in relation to the role that it can play, thanks to the manner of providing and the scope of the information contained therein."⁵ These predictions turned out to be accurate, and the book has thrived in this environment for years, recognized as a true phenomenon in Polish and foreign literature. New chapters have been added in subsequent editions and historical elements have been considerably expanded. Kamiński's presentation of the history of science is compared to a paradigmatic view, well known from the famous work of Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996) *The structure of scientific revolutions*.⁶

Kamiński's book influenced various circles of recipients; the first were students of the Catholic University of Lublin. The book complemented a lecture on the general methodology of sciences, given by Kamiński for over 30 years at most faculties and, probably, every

¹ S. Kamiński, *Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1961; 1970²; 1981³).

² S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda: Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk*, ed. A. Bronk (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1992).

³ S. Kamiński, *Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk* (1961), p. 58.

⁴ W. Stróżewski, "Wśród publikacji filozoficznych o nauce", *Znak* 14, no. 1 (1962), p. 160.

⁵ A. Stępień, review of S. Kamiński, *Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1961), *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 12, no. 1 (1964), p. 156.

⁶ A. Bronk, "Wielość nauk i jedność nauki (Stanisława Kamińskiego opcje metodologiczne)," in S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda*, p. 345.

student at the university became acquainted with this monograph. Even after Kamiński's death (1986) and the taking over of lectures on the methodology of sciences by his successors (Andrzej Bronk S.V.D., Monika Walczak), the book is still used in didactics. The second group of Kamiński's readers were other university lecturers who used it in their own work. Bronk writes:

For many among the University academic staff, that book was the primary source of information on how to understand and practice science; it shaped their methodological attitude, finding its practical expression in their didactic and publishing activities.⁷

The third section of the book's public was made up of scholars from other backgrounds who were interested in the phenomenon of science. "In the past, many people in Poland have reached for this book, not always admitting it directly"—recalls Bronk.⁸ Praise for Kamiński's work was expressed, for example, by Tadeusz Kotarbiński (1886–1981), who included it in his reflections on science. He considered the monograph to be a "rich in content, informative compendium of the problems of teachings on science." He has alleged that some statements on theology "are in clear discord with the generally sober, from the lay point of view, character of the whole book."⁹ However, including reflections on theology in a work devoted to science provides additional value to the work and constitutes an original element. This contributed to the wide reception of the book in the theological environment.

After Kamiński's death (1986), new works on methodology, philosophy of science and history of science appeared in Polish literature. Some of the authors did not include Kamiński's monograph or his other works on the theory of science.¹⁰ However, the researchers from

⁷ Ibidem, p. 345.

⁸ Ibidem.

⁹ T. Kotarbiński, "Przegląd problemów nauk o nauce," (1964), in T. Kotarbiński, *Drogi dociekań własnych. Fragmenty filozoficzne* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1986), p. 105.

¹⁰ J. Życiński, *Filozofia nauki* (Tarnów: Biblos, 1996); J. Życiński, *The Structure of the Metascientific Revolution: An Essay of the Growth of Modern Science* (Tuscon, AZ: Pachart Publishing House, 1988). Polish translation: *Struktura rewolucji metanaukowej: Studium rozwoju współczesnej nauki*, trans. M. Furman (Kraków: Copernicus Center Press, 2013); A. Grobler, *Metodologia nauk* (Kraków: Aureus; Znak, 2006); M. Heller, *Filozofia nauki* (Kraków: Copernicus Center Press, 2016).

the philosophical community of the Catholic University of Lublin still refer to Kamiński's monograph and his achievements in this area in their current works.¹¹

METHODOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

Andrzej Bronk S.V.D., Kamiński's successor at the Department of Methodology of Sciences at KUL, distinguished three stages in his work, being non-metaphysical, pro-metaphysical and wisdom-oriented.¹² The first edition of the aforementioned monograph, *Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk* (*Concept of science and classification of sciences*), was created in the non-metaphysical period. At that time, Kamiński was under the spell of contemporary logic and heavily influenced by the Lvov-Warsaw School, especially Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890–1963). In his "Autobiogram" Kamiński wrote that, under the influence of Ajdukiewicz, his interests, initially mainly logical, had expanded into the field of general methodology of sciences and epistemology. In turn, under the influence of Stefan Swieżawski (1907–2004) and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec O.P. (1921–2008)—colleagues from the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Lublin—he had turned to the methodology of classical philosophy.¹³ He had undergone a noticeable reorientation—a transition from the non-metaphysical attitude to a pro-metaphysical one. It was then that the thought emerged to use the output of modern logic, methodology of sciences and epistemology in the development of philosophy—metaphysics and its sub-divisions.

¹¹ Z. Hajduk, *Ogólna metodologia nauk: Skrypt dla studiujących kierunki przyrodnicze oraz filozofię przyrody* (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 2000); J. Herbut, *Elementy metodologii filozofii: Skrypt do wykładu* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2004; 2007²); *Słownik terminów naukoznawczych: Teoretyczne podstawy naukoznawstwa*, ed. J. Herbut and P. Kawalec (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskiej Szkoły Biznesu, 2009); *Metodologia: tradycja i perspektywy*, ed. M. Walczak (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2010); *Podstawy naukoznawstwa: Skrypt dla studentów studiów licencjackich*, vol. 1, ed. P. Kawalec, P. Lipski and R. Wodzis (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2011).

¹² A. Bronk, "Filozofia nauki i nauka w ujęciu Stanisława Kamińskiego," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 29, no. 1 (1993), p. 157.

¹³ S. Kamiński, "Autobiogram," *Ruch Filozoficzny* 42, no. 1–2 (1985), p. 106.

Kamiński described the philosophy of the KUL environment as “classical”. It is a philosophy that substantively refers to the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition while continuing to develop and improve methodologically.¹⁴ Thanks to Kamiński and his co-workers and successors, a rather unique work was undertaken. It aimed to characterize, in accordance with the rules of modern methodology, the most important cognitive activities used in metaphysics and other branches of philosophy (philosophy of God, philosophy of man, ethics, axiology, philosophy of history, etc.). The results of this effort were further publications on the methodology of classical philosophy, including a book written in cooperation by Kamiński and Krąpiec *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* (*From the theory and methodology of metaphysics*). Stępień writes of this that: “His book (part 1. authored by M.A. Krąpiec), *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* (1962), is a pioneering work, not only on the national scale, and constitutes an important stage of meta-philosophic research in Poland.”¹⁵ The most important works by Kamiński on the methodology of classical philosophy were collected in the first volume of his “Pisma wybrane” (*Collected papers*), entitled *Jak filozofować?* (*How to philosophize?*).¹⁶

Methodological reflection has already become a permanent element of the brand of philosophy developed in the KUL environment and beyond. In Polish Christian philosophy after Second World War, many years of discussions were focused on the concept of practicing particular branches of philosophy. To a large extent, they concerned the methodology of philosophy and Kamiński actively participated in these discussions, presenting his own thoughts and confronting them with other positions. In this way he influenced the development of metaphilosophical research in Poland. Metaphilosophy is an important component of the whole of Polish philosophy of the twentieth

¹⁴ S. Kamiński, “O metodzie filozofii klasycznej,” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 34, no. 1 (1986), pp. 5–6.

¹⁵ A.B. Stępień, “Charakterystyka dorobku naukowego i działalności naukowej księdza profesora Stanisława Kamińskiego,” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 35, no. 1 (1987), p. 7.

¹⁶ M.A. Krąpiec and S. Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1962; 1994²). See also S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować? Studia z metodologii filozofii klasycznej*, prepared for publication by T. Szubka (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1989).

century. Research in the field of classical philosophy methodology was undertaken and developed by Kamiński's collaborators and students such as: Zofia J. Zdybicka, Antoni B. Stępień, Stanisław Majdański, Józef Herbut (1933–2018), Leon Koj (1929–2006), Andrzej Bronk S.V.D., Urszula Żegleń, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, Tadeusz Szubka and Piotr Gutowski. In order to intensify research in the area of methodology of philosophy, in 1992 the Department of Methodology of Philosophy was separated from the Department of Methodology of Science of the Catholic University of Lublin, under the supervision by Józef Herbut, one of the first doctors promoted by Kamiński (in 2015 the Department of Methodology of Philosophy was again incorporated into the structure of the Department of Methodology of Sciences). It was then that *Studia metafizyczne* (*Studies in metaphilosophy*) began to be published, presenting works on the methodology of philosophy.¹⁷ These authors of the Polish younger generation in the field of methodology of philosophy, associated with the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Lublin, as well as with other environments, also refer to Kamiński. One example would be the work of Piotr Duchliński (Jesuit University Ignatianum in Krakow), which constituted an attempt to confront the metaphilosophical achievements of Kamiński and the Lublin philosophical community with studies developed in the field of phenomenology and philosophy practiced in the context of science.¹⁸

Kamiński's work on the methodological definition of classical philosophy has also been noticed by the theological community. In the multi-volume lectures on systematic theology (primarily dogmatic theology) the introductory volume was most often devoted to methodological issues.¹⁹ It was, however, a typically theological methodology, referring to the structure of scholastic textbooks, expressed in a specific language, not always consistent with the language of contemporary methodology. Kamiński, who was a member of the Polish

¹⁷ *Studia metafizyczne*, vol. 1: *Dyscypliny i metody filozoficzne*, ed. A.B. Stępień and T. Szubka (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1992); *Studia metafizyczne*, vol. 2: *Kategorie filozoficzne. Istnienie i sąd*, ed. A.B. Stępień and J. Wojtyśiak (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2002).

¹⁸ P. Duchliński, *W stronę aporetycznej filozofii klasycznej: Konfrontacja tomizmu egzystencjalnego z wybranymi koncepcjami filozofii współczesnej* (Kraków: Akademia Ignatianum; Wydawnictwo WAM, 2014), p. 10.

¹⁹ I. Różycki, *Dogmatyka*, vol. 1, part 1: *Metodologia teologii dogmatycznej* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Wydziału Teologicznego UJ, 1947).

Theological Society, created several works in the field of methodology of theology.²⁰

In the environment of Polish theology, an attempt was made to build a modern methodology of systematic theology. The leading dogmatist in the KUL milieu, Wincenty Granat (1900–1979), invited Kamiński to cooperate in preparing an introductory volume for the multi-volume *Dogmatyka katolicka* (*Catholic dogmatic theology*) textbook. Kamiński developed the section on the characteristics of the method in theology.²¹ This work has entered the canon of the Polish methodology of theology and is quoted, among others, by Stanisław Celestyn Napiórkowski, Jerzy Szymik and Józef Majewski.²² Theologians drew from Kamiński's book *Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk* (*Concept of science and classification of sciences*) and contacted him for information on ways of understanding and practicing science. They adapted the methodological terminology in their own research, especially the concept of science, the subject of science, the purpose, method, language, etc.

Among the particular ideas developed by Kamiński, a special resonance was given to the project of theology viewed as “revelationization” of natural knowledge about man and his life. This project was presented for the first time at the Fourth Congress of Polish Theologians in Krakow-Mogiła in 1976.²³ The “revelationization” neologism stems from the Latin word *revelatio* (revelation) or *revelationisatio* (discovering, uncovering). It expresses the process of building theological

²⁰ S. Kamiński, *Światopogląd, religia, teologia: Zagadnienia filozoficzne i metodologiczne*, prepared for publication by M. Walczak and A. Bronk (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1998).

²¹ S. Kamiński, “Metoda w teologii,” in W. Granat, *Dogmatyka katolicka*, tom wstępny (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1965), pp. 147–162.

²² S.C. Napiórkowski, *Jak uprawiać teologię* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Wrocławskiej Księgarni Archidiecezjalnej, 1991; 1994², 1996³; 2002⁴); J. Majewski, *Wprowadzenie do teologii dogmatycznej*, in *Dogmatyka katolicka*, vol. 1, ed. E. Adamiak, A. Czaja and J. Majewski (Warszawa: Towarzystwo Wiedzy, 2005), pp. 13–234; J. Szymik, *O teologii dzisiaj: Zadania, piękno, przyszłość* (Pelplin: Wydawnictwo Bernardinum, 2006).

²³ S. Kamiński, “Epistemologiczno-metodologiczne uwagi o teologii,” in *Teologia nauką o Bogu: IV Kongres Teologów Polskich. Kraków-Mogiła 14–16 IX 1976*, ed. M. Jaworski, A. Kubiś (Kraków: Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne, 1977), pp. 36–51, 178–181; S. Kamiński, “Podsumowanie dyskusji nad referatem ‘Epistemologiczno-metodologiczne uwagi o teologii’,” (1976), in S. Kamiński, *Światopogląd, religia, teologia*, pp. 135–137.

cognition based on the scientific and philosophical (natural) knowledge of Christian life. This knowledge is subjected to an interpretation referring to divine revelation. This proposal raised doubts in some methodologists who saw the incoherence of claims stemming from natural knowledge and revelation and there was even one opinion (Herbut) stating that this project cannot be implemented.²⁴ The theologian community, however, gave the idea a much warmer reception. It was seen as an opportunity to practice theology “from below”, as a complement to theology practiced “from above.” Napiórkowski wrote that both directions of theological reflection—the humanization of divine revelation and the revelationization of human experience—may coexist in one, rich Christian theology.²⁵

The influence of Kamiński’s considerations on the methodology of Polish theology can be demonstrated by the dedication received in the monograph by Napiórkowski *Jak uprawiać teologię* (*How to cultivate a theology*). It had four editions and is, today, the most popular lecture on theology methodology. The author of this work dedicated it to: “Wincenty Granat and Stanisław Kamiński, without whom this book would not exist.”²⁶ In the footnote to the fourth part “Poznanie teologiczne a poznanie naukowe” (*Theological knowledge and scientific knowledge*) we can read: “I owe very much in the development of this subject to the lectures, scripts, and publications of Fr. Prof. Stanisław Kamiński.”²⁷

THE SAPIENTIAL DIMENSION OF KNOWLEDGE

The third period in Kamiński’s work, following on from the non-metaphysical and pro-metaphysical, is referred to as the wisdom-oriented

²⁴ J. Herbut, “Problemy teologii pojętej jako rewelacjonizacja naturalnej wiedzy o życiu chrześcijańskim,” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 35, no. 1 (1987), pp. 293–307; J. Herbut, “Teologia rewelacjonizacją przyrodzonej wiedzy o życiu chrześcijańskim?,” in *Metodologia: tradycja i perspektywy*, pp. 35–44. See also A. Bronk and S. Majdański, “Teologia – próba metodologiczno-epistemologicznej charakterystyki,” *Nauka* 2 (2006), pp. 92–93.

²⁵ S.C. Napiórkowski, *Jak uprawiać teologię* (2002), pp. 82–83. See also J. Szymbik, *O teologii dzisiaj*, pp. 139–140.

²⁶ S.C. Napiórkowski, *Jak uprawiać teologię* (2002), p. 5.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 217.

stage.²⁸ The concept of wisdom appears much more frequently in Kamiński's works from this period. One of the articles "Nauka i filozofia a mądrość" (*Science, philosophy and wisdom*) was published in both Polish and Italian. The Italian language version was published in a monograph devoted to the philosophy of Jacques Maritain (1882–1973),²⁹ testament to the fact that Kamiński, in his reflections on wisdom, was inspired by the work of Maritain *Science et sagesse* (*Science and wisdom*) (1935), in which there is talk of mystical, theological and metaphysical wisdom.³⁰ By wisdom Kamiński meant the basic knowledge of reality, justified in a definitive way.³¹ The systematized form of natural wisdom is metaphysics, while the supernatural form is theology. Wisdom also has practical aspects; it creates the ability to apply knowledge in life-related attitudes. It arouses the axiological attitude, and evokes engagement on the side of values: "truths become a good (a value) to be realized."³²

Some contemporary Polish and foreign authors offer references to the concept of philosophy as wisdom. A group of current employees of the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Lublin (Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, Robert Ptaszek, Imelda Chłodna, Wojciech Daszkiewicz, Rafał Lizut), formed a project to develop the philosophy of wisdom. The authors write in their manifesto:

There is a philosophy that has not given up truthful and wisdom-oriented claims. ... This philosophy is the way to wisdom understood as the discovery of truth, goodness, and beauty, and taking their side. ... As philosophers and people of the university, we want

²⁸ A. Bronk, "Filozofia nauki i nauka w ujęciu Stanisława Kamińskiego," p. 157. See also K. Wolsza, "Idea filozofii mądrościowej w lubelskiej szkole filozoficznej," in *Figury i znaczenia mądrości: Studium interdyscyplinarne*, ed. M. Zajac (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2016), pp. 77–102.

²⁹ S. Kamiński, "La sapienza nella scienza e nella filosofia," in *Jacques Maritain oggi: Atti del Convegno internazionale di studio promosso dall'Università cattolica nel centenario della nascita. Milano 20–30 ottobre 1982*, ed. V. Possenti (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1983), pp. 507–513.

³⁰ J. Maritain, *Nauka i mądrość*, trans. M. Reutt (Warszawa: Fronda; Ząbki: Apostolicum, 2005²), pp. 32–36.

³¹ S. Kamiński, "Od spostrzeżeń do poglądu na świat," in S. Kamiński, *Światopogląd, religia, teologia*, pp. 25–26.

³² S. Kamiński, "Nauka i filozofia a mądrość," p. 61.

to take on ... responsibility and duty, following in the footsteps of our Masters.³³

Kamiński is one of those masters which the authors of the project wish to refer to. The most important of his texts on wisdom can be found on the project website (www.sapiencjokracja.pl).

Clear references to metaphysics being understood as wisdom-oriented knowledge can be found in some of the statements of Pope John Paul II (1920–2005) who, until his election as pope, was scientifically connected with the philosophical environment of the Catholic University of Lublin. In his book *Przekroczyć próg nadziei* (*Crossing the threshold of hope*) (1994) John Paul II expresses his conviction of the fundamental role of realistic metaphysics in the whole of philosophy. He mentions the Lublin school in which this type of metaphysics is developed.³⁴ The idea of wisdom philosophy is also present in the *Fides et ratio* encyclical (1998). John Paul II writes that there is a need for philosophy with a truly metaphysical range and wisdom-oriented character (No. 83). In the opinion of John Paul II, by developing such a philosophy, one can overcome the crisis that is affecting large areas of philosophy today and correct the wrong attitudes in society. The *Fides et ratio* encyclical has become an incentive for the Congregation for Catholic Education to develop the *Dekret o reformie kościelnych studiów w zakresie filozofii* (*Decree on the reform of ecclesiastical studies of philosophy*) (2011). It repeats the encyclical postulate of the wisdom-oriented character of metaphysical philosophy and even extends it. Thus, every area of philosophy and scientific cognition must have a wisdom-oriented character.³⁵

Kamiński also recognized that scientific cognition should lead to wisdom and he was the author of the postulate for sapiential leadership in science. The planning of scientific research is carried out today

³³ “Manifest: Filozofia jako samoświadomość kultury”, accessed September 30, 2017, <http://www.sapiencjokracja.pl>.

³⁴ Jan Paweł II, *Przekroczyć próg nadziei: Jan Paweł II odpowiada na pytania Vittoria Messori* (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictwa KUL, 1994), p. 46. See also K. Wolsza, “Problematyka filozoficzna w książce ‘Przekroczyć próg nadziei’ Jana Pawła II,” *Ruch Filozoficzny* 52, no. 2 (1995), pp. 225–231.

³⁵ Kongregacja Edukacji Katolickiej, *Dekret o reformie kościelnych studiów w zakresie filozofii*, trans. P. Burba, R. Charzyński, M. Maciołek (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2011), no. 4.

in terms of technical and economic efficiency and the postulates of the humanism of the entire culture are taken into account to a small extent; the goals and tasks of science should be determined so that it does not lead to dehumanization or conflict with the natural environment, but serves the integrally understood human needs.³⁶ Paweł Kawalec from the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Lublin, working in the field of analysis of science management processes, drew attention to the originality and timeliness of the idea of sapiential leadership in science. He presented Kamiński's idea for the first time in 2007 when developing the *Wisdom management of R&D activities* project at the University of Chicago. He also promotes this idea in Polish scientific circles.³⁷ Analyzing modern models of science management (including Philip Kitcher), Kawalec recognizes the original character of Kamiński's proposal, guarding the autonomy of science. Modern models of science management are often based on an instrumental approach and agree on its non-autonomy. It is difficult to say how Kamiński's idea is received and whether it can be developed so that, based on it, a specific model of science management can be created.

LOGICAL CULTURE

Didactic activity occupied an important place in Kamiński's work.³⁸ He conducted didactic classes in logic from 1947, later on taking classes in the theory of cognition and the methodology of sciences. From 1949 he was associated with the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Lublin. He was one of the organizers of the Faculty of Philosophy and the Department of Methodology of Sciences, both of which ascribe great value to logical culture. Edward Nieznański wrote that Kamiński "strongly encouraged philosophers to raise the

³⁶ S. Kamiński, "Nauka i filozofia a mądrość," p. 60.

³⁷ P. Kawalec, "Nauka, mądrość, autonomia," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 59, no. 2 (2011), pp. 131–139. See also S. Majdański and P. Kawalec, *Zarządzanie badaniami naukowymi i pracami rozwojowymi w jednostkach naukowych* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskiej Szkoły Biznesu, 2008); J. Herbut and P. Kawalec, ed., *Słownik terminów naukoznawczych: Teoretyczne podstawy naukoznawstwa* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskiej Szkoły Biznesu, 2009), s.v. "Autonomia badań naukowych", pp. 10–11.

³⁸ Z.J. Zdybicka, "Śp. ks. prof. Stanisław Kamiński. 40 lat ofiarnej służby Wydziałowi i Uniwersytetowi," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 40, no. 3–4 (1997), pp. 5–7.

general levels of logical culture.”³⁹ The “philosophers” mentioned by him may refer to two groups: Kamiński’s associates and his students.

Kamiński was erudite, systematically following logical and methodological literature. He shared his findings and thoughts with his department, faculty and university colleagues. Many of them drew from him information regarding the achievements of modern logic and methodology. No one was surprised by the fact that other lecturers from various faculties were attending Kamiński’s lectures. All the employees of the department participated in scientific seminars (this practice was continued after Kamiński’s death). Stępień writes about the influence of Kamiński on the environment of the Faculty of Philosophy: “It is mainly thanks to him that our environment has acquired knowledge of the achievements and tools of widely perceived elements of logic and methodology of science, as well as the output of neo-positivism and ... analytic philosophy.”⁴⁰

The second, much wider, group of people influenced by Kamiński’s didactics are his students from the Faculty of Philosophy and other faculties. Kamiński’s didactics included subjects from the fields of logic, methodology of sciences and theory of cognition. Using today’s concepts, it can be said that these classes were aimed at achieving learning outcomes in the field of knowledge (basic knowledge of logic and methodology of sciences) and skills (logical culture, methodological formation). Bronk and Majdański write: “Until now, the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Lublin has been perceived in Poland as a place where one could get a solid education not only in the field of systematic philosophy, not to mention its history, but above all from the general and detailed methodology of science together with a solid, practical methodological formation.”⁴¹

Knowledge in the field of logic and methodology and the skills required to apply it create the phenomenon of logical culture. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, one of the most important authors for Kamiński,

³⁹ E. Nieznański, “Stanisław Kamiński jako logik,” *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 29, no. 1 (1993), p. 166.

⁴⁰ A.B. Stępień, “Rola księdza profesora Stanisława Kamińskiego (1919–1986) w rozwoju środowiska filozoficznego KUL,” (1992), in A.B. Stępień, *Studia i szkice filozoficzne*, vol. 2, prepared for publication by A. Gut (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 2001), p. 191.

⁴¹ A. Bronk and S. Majdański, “Metodologia nauk: jej zadania i potrzeby wczoraj i dziś,” in *Metodologia: tradycja i perspektywy*, p. 10.

emphasized that logical culture is both skill and knowledge, it has both a practical and theoretical component. According to Ajdukiewicz, a man who possesses logical culture: (1) can think logically and express his thoughts; (2) knows basic logical concepts, and (3) basic theorems of logic.⁴² Kamiński's didactic activity was accompanied by the conviction that the practical component of logical culture (skill) can be achieved, among others, thanks to the theoretical component (a course in logic and methodology of sciences).⁴³

The idea of logical culture was developed and refined by Kamiński's students, including Tadeusz Kwiatkowski, Józef Herbut (1933–2018) and Andrzej Bronk S.V.D.⁴⁴ In 2016, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of Kamiński's death and the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Lublin, a conference was organized which was given the title "Kultura logiczna" (*Logical culture*). As part of this event the following papers were delivered: "Stanisław Kamiński as methodologist of philosophy and theology" (Stanisław Kiczuk), "Stanisław Kamiński as methodologist and philosopher of science" (Andrzej Bronk), "Stanisław Kamiński as epistemologist" (Antoni B. Stępień), "Stanisław Kamiński as logician and semiotician" (Stanisław Majdański), "Stanisław Kamiński as dean" (Zofia J. Zdybicka), "Stanisław Kamiński as professor" (Anna Buczek).⁴⁵ The *Stanisław Kamiński Memorial Lectures*, organized since 2001 at KUL, also refer to the idea of logical culture.

⁴² K. Ajdukiewicz, "Co może zrobić szkoła dla podniesienia kultury logicznej uczniów," (1959), in K. Ajdukiewicz, *Język i poznanie*, vol. 2: *Wybór pism z lat 1945–1963* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2006³), p. 322.

⁴³ S. Kamiński, "Ku uściśleniu filozofii. Kierunki badań ks. prof. dra Józefa Iwanickiego," (1973), in S. Kamiński, *Filozofia i metoda: Studia z dziejów metod filozofowania*, prepared for publication by J. Herbut (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993), p. 199.

⁴⁴ T. Kwiatkowski, "Pojęcie kultury logicznej," *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska* 17 (1962), pp. 1–16; J. Herbut, "Studia filozoficzne w wyższych seminariach duchownych w świetle soborowego dekretu 'O formacji kapłańskiej,'" *Rocznik Teologiczny Śląska Opolskiego* 1 (1968), pp. 75–86; A. Bronk, "Nauki humanistyczne i kultura logiczno-metodologiczna," *Edukacja Humanistyczna* no. 1–2 (2004), pp. 18–26.

⁴⁵ "Kultura logiczna – program", accessed September 30, 2017, http://www.kul.pl/kultura-logiczna-program,art_64987.html.

CODIFICATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL TERMINOLOGY

Kamiński devoted a lot of attention to precision of language in his publications. He also wanted the philosophical and methodological terminology used in the philosophical community of the Catholic University of Lublin to be correct and consistent. In many fragments of his writings, there are definitions of the basic concepts used by him and other representatives of the philosophical community of the Catholic University of Lublin. Moreover, the idea of codifying philosophical and methodological terminology was born.

The first venture to serve this idea, among others, was a project for a monumental *Encyklopedia katolicka* (*Catholic encyclopedia*), also containing entries in the field of philosophy. *Encyklopedia katolicka* was published by The Learned Society of the Catholic University in Lublin in the years 1973–2014 and its entirety consists of 20 volumes.⁴⁶ Kamiński was a member of the editorial team, and in the years 1982–1985 the editor-in-chief of the encyclopedia. He published approximately 50 philosophical entries in the first five volumes.

Kamiński was also the initiator of the development of a separate lexicon of the concepts of classical philosophy and the idea for the lexicon survived in the Department of Methodology of Sciences after his death. The preparation and editing of this work was entrusted to Józef Herbut—the then head of the Department of Methodology of Philosophy and the lexicon, numbering 331 entries, was completed in 1997.⁴⁷ It included the entries developed by Kamiński for the *Encyklopedia katolicka* (*Catholic encyclopedia*) as well as some excerpts from his writings. *Leksykon filozofii klasycznej* (*Lexicon of classical philosophy*) has been kindly received by the philosophical community in Poland and is used not only by the supporters of classical philosophy (as perceived by Kamiński).

In the years 2000–2009, the *Polish Society of Thomas Aquinas*, at the initiative of Mieczysław A. Krąpiec O.P. published the ten-volume

⁴⁶ *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 1–20, ed. F. Gryglewicz et al. (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1973–2014).

⁴⁷ J. Herbut, ed., *Leksykon filozofii klasycznej* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1997).

Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii (*Universal encyclopedia of philosophy*).⁴⁸ The philosophical passwords elaborated by Kamiński for the *Encyklopedia katolicka* (*Catholic encyclopedia*) were also included in this encyclopedia.

Kamiński's unfinished project was a dictionary of methodological terminology. In order to prepare such a dictionary, he created the Laboratory of Methodological Terminology at the Institute of Lexicography of the Catholic University of Lublin. In 2009 Józef Herbut and Paweł Kawalec, in cooperation with other authors such as Bronk and Majdański, published the *Słownik terminów naukoznawczych* (*Dictionary of terms in science studies*) containing over 80 entries, including numerous entries in the field of methodology of sciences.⁴⁹ The content of methodological entries and the bibliography contain references to Kamiński's works. This dictionary, more modest than the *Leksykon filozofii klasycznej* (*Lexicon of classical philosophy*), may be regarded as a partial implementation of the idea of a dictionary of methodological terms.

* * *

Monika Walczak, current dean of the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Lublin, wrote that the generation of direct students of Kamiński is gradually fading away, and the generation of his scientific "grandchildren" is replacing them.⁵⁰ This generation wants to continue to refer to Kamiński's achievements, which is evidenced by the monograph *Metodologia: tradycja i perspektywy* (*Methodology: Tradition and perspectives*), containing the following dedication: "Professor Stanisław Kamiński (1919–1986), head of the Department of Methodology of the Catholic University of Lublin, whose achievements lie at the basis of the texts published here."⁵¹

⁴⁸ *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 1–10, ed. A. Maryniarczyk et al. (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2000–2009).

⁴⁹ *Słownik terminów naukoznawczych: Teoretyczne podstawy naukoznawstwa*, ed. J. Herbut and P. Kawalec (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskiej Szkoły Biznesu, 2009).

⁵⁰ M. Walczak, "Od redaktorki," in *Metodologia: tradycja i perspektywy*, p. 8.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

DICTIONARY OF BASIC TERMS BY STANISŁAW KAMIŃSKI

Analysis: Dissection of a whole into its elements. This can be a purely mental activity or combined with physical activities (manipulative analysis). Thought analysis is a method by which a thought travels, among other things, from complex to simpler, from particular to general, from effect to cause, from conclusions to premises. Thought analysis may be divided into analysis of: concepts (division of the content of a concept into individual characteristics), truths (seeking reasons for theses), issues (breaking down problems into simple questions), and facts (studying phenomena with regard to their genesis). Manipulative analysis is used in natural sciences and includes, inter alia: chemical analysis (testing what substances form a compound), spectral analysis (determination of chemical composition based on the spectrum), physic-chemical analysis (determination of the relationship between chemical composition and physical properties), and biological analysis (examination of a body through examination of single organs).¹

Classical metaphysics → Metaphysic II

Classical philosophy: A variation of philosophy that substantively refers to tradition and is modified in terms of methodology.

¹ *Leksykon filozofii klasycznej*, ed. J. Herbut (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1997), s.v. "Analiza," pp. 37–40.

It developed on the basis of the Aristotelian tradition and was refined by medieval thinkers (Arab and Latin), mainly by Thomas Aquinas. It was continued by modern rationalists (F. Suarez, R. Descartes, G.W. Leibniz and Ch. Wolff), and today is being perfected according to different epistemological patterns. Formally, it is characterized by: minimalism (cognitive realism, ultimate explanations, necessity of basic theses) and methodological autonomy in relation to other types of knowledge. It accomplishes this by adopting the proper formal subject, → genetic empiricism and → methodological rationalism. In substance, classical philosophy is characterized by the position of ontological pluralism (the theory of matter and form), the substantialism and dynamism of reality (theory of potency and act), and theism (the theory of being and existence, the application of the metaphysical principle of causality).²

Cognition: The term *cognition* means both the activity (set of activities) and the product of the activities (result). The set of cognitive activities includes: perception, imagination, intellectual recognition, reminding yourself, judging, finding out, reflection and reasoning. The results of these activities can be: imagination, concept, judgment, question. Human cognition is of a conscious (sometimes even reflective) nature, assimilating (the subject familiarizes an object), intentional (subject refers to the object) and subjective (the subject views the object from a certain angle).³

Epistemological intellectualism: The view that, in addition to the senses and discursive reason, → intellectual intuition also participates in cognition. Epistemological intellectualism does not limit theoretical thinking to the application of the rules of deduction and induction but allows the acceptance in science and philosophy of statements based on intellectual insight and intellectual obviousness. Without the acceptance of intellectual intuition → metaphysics is

² S. Kamiński, "O metodzie filozofii klasycznej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 34, no. 1 (1986), pp. 5–6; *Leksykon filozofii klasycznej*, s.v. "Filozofia," pp. 198–202.

³ S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda: Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk*, prepared for publication by A. Bronk (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1992⁴), p. 13; S. Kamiński, "Typy ludzkiej wiedzy," (1978), in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować? Studia z metodologii filozofii klasycznej*, prepared for publication by T. Szubka (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1989), pp. 14–15.

impossible as autonomic knowledge, which provides → necessary truths about reality.⁴

Explanation I: Explanation, or moving from the data of experience to theory, is one of the main operations forming our → knowledge. Explanation answers the question: why is this? Explanation in the strict sense is a translation of facts, creating a series of proof-offering sentences, ending with the so-called explanandum (what needs to be explained). Explanation is divided into generalizing and theoretical. The generalizing explanation consists in subordinating homogeneous facts to a general regularity (generalizing observations) or the regularities themselves to more general regularities. Theoretical explanation is an inventive operation. It occurs when, for a given fact, we find relations with other facts.⁵

Explanation II (Metaphysical explanation): Metaphysical explanation consists of indicating the necessary factors of a particular mode of existence. It is based on reductive reasoning. It consists of creative (though using philosophical tradition) finding in the internal structure of being, the only reason that explains the definite state of being in a definitive way.⁶

Faith: The word *faith* has three different types of designates: (1) the act of belief, (2) the object of belief and (3) efficiency or the virtue of faith. The act of belief is the action of reason which, under the pressure of will, accepts a truth as a truth. This theorem or their collection is the object of faith. The act of will affects reason in a significant way, so that it can recognize a claim for which it has no proof

⁴ S. Kamiński, "O ostatecznych przesłankach w klasycznej filozofii bytu," (1959), in M.A. Krąpiec and S. Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1994³), pp. 336–339; S. Kamiński, "Racjonalizm we współczesnej metodologii nauk a intelektualizm w epistemologii Tomasza z Akwinu," (1974), in S. Kamiński, *Metoda i język: Studia z semiotyki i metodologii nauk*, prepared for publication by U.M. Żegleń (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1994), pp. 404–406.

⁵ S. Kamiński, "Wyjaśnianie w metafizyce," (1966/1980), in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, pp. 151, 153, 155; S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda*, pp. 198–200.

⁶ S. Kamiński, "Wyjaśnianie w metafizyce," p. 174; S. Kamiński, "Osobliwość metodologiczna teorii bytu," in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, p. 85.

or evidence. Religious faith refers to the supernatural. As a motif of credibility, it has the authority of God and divine revelation. In considering a doctrine, one thinks that it is credible to the right degree. Then one comes to the conviction that this doctrine should be considered true. The consequence of this is the acceptance of this doctrine, i.e. the act of faith.⁷

Genetic empiricism: The principle of genetic empiricism is the slogan: *Nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu* (there is nothing in the intellect that would not have been in the senses before). Genetic empiricism assumes that cognition begins with a sensual experience. This empiricism, however, is not contrasted with rationalism. In → classical philosophy genetic empiricism is combined with moderate → methodological rationalism. The intellect “reads” the general and necessary content in the state of affairs given in the experience.⁸

Intellectual intuition: Intuition is a variation of direct, empirical and intellectual cognition at the same time. This cognition is accompanied by a sense of certainty and obviousness. When something is stated with objective obviousness, it cannot be denied. Intellectual intuition is not a sudden revelation or a series of insights, but a properly prepared “reading” (*intus legere*) of a completely and directly captured situation with objective obviousness. Intellect in the act of such intuition perceives something sensual and thinks simultaneously. The act of intuition is empirical and intellectual cognition, i.e. an intellectual approach, is based on sensory experiences. Intellectual intuition can be supplemented with conceptual analysis and reasonings.⁹

Induction: In → logic two main groups of reasoning are distinguished: deductive and inductive. Among inductive reasonings, indefinite and complete induction is mentioned, which can occur either

⁷ S. Kamiński, “Od spostrzeżeń do poglądu na świat,” (1969), in S. Kamiński, *Światopogląd, religia, teologia: Zagadnienia filozoficzne i metodologiczne*, prepared for publication by M. Walczak and A. Bronk (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1998), p. 27.

⁸ S. Kamiński, “Czy możliwe są ogólne i konieczne związki rzeczowe?,” (1962), in M.A. Krąpiec and S. Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*, pp. 310–311.

⁹ S. Kamiński, “Osobliwość metodologiczna teorii bytu,” pp. 84–87.

by simple enumeration (*per enumerationem simplicem*) or by recursion (mathematical induction). In an inference called mathematical induction, there are two premises, the first of which states that formula $F(n)$, containing variable n , works for $n = k$ natural, then it works for $n = k + 1$, so the conclusion is drawn that formula $F(n)$ works for any natural n .¹⁰

Knowledge: Is the result of cognitive acts (\rightarrow cognition). It is a system of messages that we recognize and can justify in a certain way. Because of the acceptable sources of cognition, we distinguish rational knowledge (consistent with reason and experience) and irrational or non-rational knowledge (allowing for non-rational sources, e.g. emotional, volitional, supernatural faith). Due to the method of obtaining information, one can distinguish systematic (planned) knowledge and unsystematic (spontaneously acquired) knowledge, as well as deductive knowledge (derived from premises) and inductive knowledge (generalizing facts given from experience). Because of the subject of cognition, specialist (single-faceted) and general (multi-aspect) knowledge, as well as theoretical knowledge (explaining why it is so and not so) and practical knowledge (justifying why one should act in a certain way, and not in any different way) are distinguished. There are three basic forms of rational knowledge: colloquial knowledge, scientific knowledge (\rightarrow science) and wisdom-related knowledge (\rightarrow wisdom).¹¹

Logic: In the broader sense, includes: formal logic, semiotics (sometimes called logical semantics) and \rightarrow methodology and theory of science. Some textbooks also include the theory (philosophy) of logic and the theory of scientific cognition. In the strict sense formal logic deserves to be called logic. It is a deductive arrangement of systems composed of formal schemes of reliable inference. Semiotics is the logic of language. It deals with the semantic side of expressions in order to increase the precision of using them. It performs the classification of expressions, discusses their syntactic, semantic and pragmatic functions, and analyzes the logical structure of language. The

¹⁰ S. Kamiński, "Początki indukcji matematycznej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 5, no. 2 (1955–1957), pp. 171–172.

¹¹ S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda*, pp. 24–25.

methodology of sciences is a logical theory of the rational and efficient practicing of science.¹²

Metaphilosophy: Broadly understood, metaphilosophy means a humanistic, philosophical or formal knowledge of philosophy. In a narrower sense it means epistemological-methodological reflection on philosophical cognition. These considerations may be descriptive and explanatory or justifying and normative. In the latter case metaphilosophy tends to justify a certain system of rules for practicing philosophy.¹³

Metaphysics I (in a broad sense): The term metaphysics means not only the theory of being (→ metaphysics II) but also all theories regarding some fundamental reality, as well as theories of objects in a general or basic aspect (ontology in the wider sense of the word). Metaphysics is understood as “the first philosophy”, having primacy among other branches of philosophy.¹⁴

Metaphysic II (Classical metaphysics): As a theory derives from Aristotle (first philosophy). It contains basic philosophical principles about what exists. Thomistic metaphysics is considered the most faithful continuation of Aristotelian philosophy. It is the theory of real being (the philosophy of being). It exhausts the whole fundamental problem of → classical philosophy. Apart from general metaphysics, one can distinguish sections of particular metaphysics: natural philosophy, philosophy of man, philosophy of morality, philosophy of religion and philosophy of culture. They are independent at the starting point, however, they depend structurally on general metaphysics as they refer to its theses in their explanations. In all areas of philosophy, the same way of explaining is realized.¹⁵

¹² S. Kamiński, “O zastosowaniach logiki współczesnej do metafizyki klasycznej,” (1962), in M.A. Krąpiec and S. Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*, pp. 281–282.

¹³ S. Kamiński, “Pogląd na świat a wiara religijna,” (1986), in S. Kamiński, *Światopogląd, religia, teologia*, p. 33.

¹⁴ S. Kamiński, “Metody współczesnej metafizyki,” (1967/1978), in S. Kamiński, *Filozofia i metoda: Studia z dziejów metod filozofowania*, prepared for publication by J. Herbut (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993), pp. 43–44.

¹⁵ S. Kamiński, “O zastosowaniach logiki współczesnej do metafizyki klasycznej,” pp. 285–286; S. Kamiński, “O metodzie filozofii klasycznej,” p. 12;

Method: is a repetitive application of an action, increasing its efficiency. It is designated by a coherent set of rules. The method of operation is appropriate to the state of affairs and the shortest way to achieve the goal. It is a consciously and systematically used exemplary selection and arrangement of activities that allows effective and economical goal achievement (Tadeusz Kotarbiński). In the narrower sense the term *method* means ways to solve theoretical problems or practical tasks.¹⁶

Methodological rationalism: A position that ascribes an important role to theoretical thinking when practicing science and acquiring valuable knowledge. It consists in creatively establishing hypotheses and building explanatory models of the phenomena studied. In contemporary philosophy of science, one can distinguish: (1) dogmatic, skeptical and critical rationalism—due to the way of accepting theoretical elements; (2) deductive, inductive and intuitive-intellectual rationalism—due to the nature of theoretical thinking; (3) formal, instrumental and explanatory (model) rationalism—due to the function of theoretical thinking. The most justified approach is rationalism, which is critical, intuitive-intellectual and explanatory at the same time.¹⁷

Methodology of sciences: Is a section of widely understood → logic. As a rational reconstruction of scientific research activities, it deals with the functional aspect of science. Etymologically, it means the theory of methods of practicing science. In fact, however, it analyzes not only the research procedures but also their results (terms, theses, theories). The methodology of sciences includes such issues as: classification of reasoning (along with the most common mistakes), analysis of the main types of research methods, the nature of science and its types. Methodology is different from methodics; methodology of sciences always contains the theory of scientific methods, while methodics is solely a system of rules for the efficient practicing of science. Synonyms or names synonymous with the

S. Kamiński, "Osobliwość metodologiczna teorii bytu," pp. 76–77; S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda*, p. 314.

¹⁶ S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda*, p. 201; *Leksykon filozofii klasycznej*, s.v. "Metoda," p. 357.

¹⁷ S. Kamiński, "Racjonalizm we współczesnej metodologii nauk a intelektualizm w epistemologii Tomasz z Akwinu," pp. 398–400.

methodology of sciences are the terms: *theory of science*, → *philosophy of science* and *epistemology*.¹⁸

Necessary metaphysical truths: Metaphysical necessity concerns being. A necessary aspect of being is an aspect that cannot be denied without contradiction. In classical metaphysics (→ metaphysics II) it is assumed that some of its theses have the character of necessary truths. These include theses about the common properties of being and about the internal structure of being. Necessity may concern the aspect of the existence of a being or its essence (content). It can also be an absolute or relative necessity. The theses that characterize metaphysical necessity have the character of real sentences, i.e. they concern reality. They are irrevocably true. Getting to know the necessary states of affairs and formulating the necessary metaphysical assertions is possible thanks to → intellectual intuition.¹⁹

Philosophical methods: May not differ from other scientific methods or fundamentally differ from them—by selection and arrangement of individual treatments or their function in philosophy. The philosophical methods that do not differ significantly from the scientific methods include: objective syntheses (concerning reality) and meta-objective syntheses (concerning cognition) critical analyses. Methods specific to philosophy can be divided into: cognitive methods and methods of philosophizing understood as a way of life.²⁰

Philosophy of being → Metaphysics II

Philosophy of science: André Ampère coined this term but it is used in a broader sense (mainly in Anglo-Saxon literature) and a narrower sense (among supporters of → classical philosophy). In the first

¹⁸ S. Kamiński, "O zastosowaniach logiki współczesnej do metafizyki klasycznej," s. 282; S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda*, p. 42; *Leksykon filozofii klasycznej*, s.v. "Metodologia nauk," pp. 363–364.

¹⁹ S. Kamiński, "Czy możliwe są ogólne i konieczne twierdzenia rzeczowe?," p. 301; S. Kamiński, "Możliwość prawd koniecznych," (1968), in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, pp. 106–107.

²⁰ S. Kamiński, "Próba typologii metod filozofowania," (1975), in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, p. 63; *Leksykon filozofii klasycznej*, s.v. "Metody filozoficzne," pp. 367–368.

case, it includes various considerations belonging to the → methodology of sciences, the theory of scientific cognition, the ontology of the subject of science, the logic of the scientific language and the theory of culture. In the second case, the term philosophy of science means: (1) the theory of science as a being; (2) the theory of scientific cognition (sources, boundaries, and its values), and (3) the theory of science as a field of culture (the position of science in culture, the role of science in the modern world).²¹

Proof: In the strict sense, it is the reasoning justifying some statement in a reliable (deductive) manner. The proof of theorem p consists in creating a series of expressions the beginning of which is formed by assumptions, each subsequent expression is the result of their transformation, in accordance with accepted rules, and the last expression of sequence is theorem p . In a broader sense, evidence is also the thing, document or circumstance for something, pointing to something or being a testimony of something.²²

Revelationization → Theology

Science: The word *science* has many meanings. It refers to a specialized, theoretical and systematic knowledge that differs from the colloquial general, practical and unstructured cognition. In addition, the name *science* can also mean: formal elements of cognition, cognition as such and cognition as a field of culture. In the theory of science, it is assumed that science is the objective result of creative cognition. In the methodology of the sciences, attention is paid to planned obtainment of new cognition. In the history and sociology of science, science is looked upon as a field of culture.²³

Theology: Differs from other types of → *knowledge* because it also uses (but is not limited to) supernatural sources (revelation). It is associated with scientific knowledge because in the history of culture

²¹ S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda*, pp. 39–40; *Leksykon filozofii klasycznej*, s.v. “Filozofia nauki,” pp. 229–231.

²² *Leksykon filozofii klasycznej*, s.v. “Dowód,” pp. 124–127.

²³ S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda*, pp. 13–14; *Leksykon filozofii klasycznej*, s.v. “Nauka,” pp. 380–382.

it was associated with philosophy or humanities. Theological methods are also influenced by other sciences. Theology is usually the rationalization of the content of → faith (*intellectus fidei*). It can also be a revelationization, an interpretation that uses revelation, natural knowledge about Christian life. Theology is also supernatural knowledge (in terms of sources) and natural (in formal terms). According to Michael Schmaus, theology is the *fundamentaliter supranaturalis sed formaliter naturalis*.²⁴

Theory of being → Metaphysics II

Value: This is a significant quality or feature (set of features) of something. We say that *x* is a value because of these qualities or that quality. One can accept a different experience of value from the experience of being, but there is no world of values that is separate from beings.²⁵

Wisdom: Basic and ultimately grounded → knowledge and the ability to use it in action. The systematized form of wisdom is philosophy, understood as classical metaphysics (→ metaphysics II). Wisdom can come not only from natural cognition but also from the supernatural faith that refers to revelation. The systematized form of such wisdom is → theology. Wisdom can be of a theoretical or practical nature. Theoretical wisdom is ultimately a legitimate and comprehensive understanding of the world, its order and meaning. Practical wisdom is the ability to apply this knowledge in action and in life attitudes. It can also be natural and supernatural.²⁶

Worldview: (View of the world) is a set of beliefs that provide a holistic vision of reality, an order of values, and determine human behavior (judgments and norms). It has an objective aspect (a set of statements defining reality and the attitude of a person to it) and

²⁴ S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda*, pp. 315, 319; *Leksykon filozofii klasycznej*, s.v. "Teologia," pp. 507–510.

²⁵ S. Kamiński, "Jak uporządkować rozmaite koncepcje wartości?," (1986), in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, pp. 298–299; S. Kamiński, "Osobliwość metodologiczna teorii bytu," p. 77.

²⁶ S. Kamiński, "Od spostrzeżeń do poglądu na świat," pp. 25–26; S. Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda*, pp. 27–28.

a subjective one (attitudes through which a person accepts and implements a set of theorems). The worldview can be formed spontaneously—on the basis of colloquial and religious knowledge. It can also be built consciously—on the basis of philosophy, theology and science. It is then a coherent arrangement of views regarding human reality and behavior. Everyone has a worldview because everyone accepts some views that define their attitude to the world and life.²⁷

²⁷ S. Kamiński, “Od spostrzeżeń do poglądu na świat,” p. 29.

II.

STANISŁAW KAMIŃSKI:
SELECTED WRITINGS

Selected and edited by Rev. Kazimierz Marek Wolsza

Translated by Tomasz Kalaga

TYPES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

S. Kamiński, "Typy ludzkiej wiedzy," in *Na rzecz postawy chrześcijańskiej*, ed. B. Bejze (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sióstr Loretanek, 1978), pp. 9–30; reprinted in: S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować? Studia z metodologii filozofii klasycznej*, prepared for publication by T. Szubka (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL 1989), pp. 13–32.

Among the various forms of human activity, cognition, understood as the acquisition of knowledge, is a particularly important function. It is a way of human being, an important factor of self-assertion and an essential condition and mechanism of correct functioning.¹ Yet the problem of knowledge itself involves various epistemological issues. On the one hand, knowledge plays a distinguished role in human life, but on the other, however, it becomes a subject of various judgements, frequent modifications and re-evaluations. This state of affairs is complemented by the difficulty in acquiring reliable knowledge especially in the fields important to human existence. And finally, significant is the fact that the improvement, enrichment or deformation of knowledge arise in relation to other activities of individual human beings or social groups. It is thus of small wonder that many thinkers undertake knowledge itself as the main subject of their inquiries. Philosophy of knowledge (gnoseology, theory of knowledge) strives towards the ordering of various means of knowledge acquisition, precise determination of its nature and, above all, towards the conscientious examination of values, especially truth and certainty, of given kinds of knowledge. This is why the recent times have witnessed a passionate search for arguments which would convince us to

¹ See A.B. Stępień, *Wstęp do filozofii* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1976), p. 7 nn.

recognize such or other truth, and for particular criteria which would allow for a differentiation between reliable and illusory knowledge. Frequently, the zeal of such inquiries reduces all philosophy to the philosophy of knowledge.²

With regard to the acquisition of knowledge on a more detailed level, there have emerged the so-called meta-sciences, which analyze science itself or its particular types from various perspectives. In its logical aspect, science is examined by semiotics, methodology of science, logical theory of science; in its humanist aspect, it is scrutinized by history of science, psychology of science and sociology of science. Even practical meta-sciences are developing, such as linguistics (understood as a theory of optimal organization of science intended to increase its potential and accelerate the scientific and technical progress) and politics of science. These disciplines, which all concern knowledge, despite bearing fruitful results, have not reached commonly accepted conclusions, a state of affairs which becomes the more prominent, the more general and comprehensive the approaches become. The controversies arise on numerous grounds. The complexity of knowledge itself is already a sufficient reason for the multiplicity of perspectives. Philosophical determinants contribute the remainder. Not without significance is also the fact that a situation of a peculiar self-referencing arises: the acquisition of knowledge on the acquisition of knowledge conducted by the acquirers themselves. However, such state of affairs does not in any way reduce the burning demand for information on various types of knowledge, its cognitive and pragmatic functions in particular. Although there is no lack of separate disciplines which present textbook approaches to knowledge,³ there exists a shortage of elementary, concise, yet at the same

² One should distinguish between an objective way of philosophizing, where at the point of origin the object of cognition is the direct reality which exists independently of cognition and a meta-objective way of philosophizing, where we begin the investigations with an analysis and reflection over the content of our consciousness or with the analysis and interpretation of sign systems. In the second case, philosophy becomes mainly the philosophy of cognition or language.

³ Compare for instance A.B. Stepień, *Teoria poznania* (Lublin: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, 1971); R. Ingarden, *U podstaw teorii poznania*, part 1 (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1971) and A. Póltawski, *Świat – spostrzeżenie – świadomość* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1973). On meta-sciences compare S. Kamiński, *Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1961, 1983³); S. Amsterdamski, *Między*

time sufficiently general and comprehensive characterizations of various types of human knowledge. ...

In the discussed field of the acquisition of knowledge, the term “cognition” is the most semantically general one. This word may be used towards very different referents. First and foremost, it may designate the action of cognition or its cognitive result, both within the subject and objectively framed.⁴ Knowledge is the result of the process of cognition, but it already presupposes the working of memory. It is convenient therefore to assume that the word “cognition” signifies primarily the process, and in the secondary sense its result. To refer to the latter, the term “knowledge” is used instead, taking under consideration the fact that it most frequently designates the cognitive result which is more complex, better grounded and justified, and, at the same time, founded on empirical terms (usually in opposition to faith). ...

In order to better render the nature of cognition, it should be juxtaposed with such mental activities as striving, emotional experience, creating, etc. Although these frequently involve cognition, cognition by itself constitutes the acquisition of knowledge about something. It will therefore stand for observation, judgement, recollection, consideration, reasoning, etc. Cognition is a primal function, and thus remains difficult to define precisely. Within the action of cognition, one distinguishes the subject, the act and its content (that through which the act refers to the cognized) and its object. There are several distinct features which characterize cognition: (1) It is conscious (we are aware of the subject, object and the act) to the point of become reflexive, when the subject understands itself as cognizing objects (the possibility of meta-cognition); (2) It is assimilating (the subject

doświadczeniem a metafizyką (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1973); S. Amsterdamski, *Między historią a metodą* (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1983); J. Kmita, *Szkice z teorii poznania naukowego* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1976); J. Kmita, *Z problemów epistemologii historycznej* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1980); A. Motycka, *Relatywistyczna wizja nauki: Wprowadzenie: filozoficzny spór o naukę* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1983).

⁴ The cognitive result within a subject may either be a resource of consciousness or a faculty, i.e. a permanent mental disposition to perform cognitive acts. The objective cognitive result is, on the other hand, some doctrine or a system of knowledge, as long as they are expressed as an arrangement of judgements or (also) questions.

to some degree assimilates its object)⁵; (3) It is intentional (by referring to the object, the subject transcends itself)⁶; (4) It is aspectual (grasps reality only from a certain angle).

To fully characterize cognition, one needs to pay attention to its tasks and functions. In most general terms, it strives towards acquiring knowledge of the world. If it uncovers knowledge for humanity, cognition is creative (socially innovative), if it enriches only the subject, the cognition is formative. Cognition is not only private but also public and social. This is why in the second case, it should fulfil the prerequisite of intersubjectivity as to the means of its communication and for the purpose of enabling control. The language must be informative, so that its expressions are understood in the same way by all sufficiently proficient in the given discipline, and the justifications must be objective enough for anyone to verify them.

Knowledge plays an important role in both personal life and in the progress of culture. Above all, it caters to human intellectual interests. It allows man to describe in a systematic manner the world which surrounds him, explain given empirical phenomena, understand and assess humanist facts. Apart from these diagnostic and explanatory functions, it also plays prognostic roles, which enable to foresee events. All of this is of tremendous practical significance. Thanks to such knowledge, people can justify their actions and assume the best suited attitude towards their surroundings. Knowledge also plays an increasingly greater instrumental and technical role, providing man with directives, means and tools for upbringing, raising and producing goods. It allows societies to act in worthy ways; change the world for the better, more beautiful and more beneficial. It is thus a small wonder that being mindful of these virtues of knowledge, everyone strives towards its increase and betterment. Yet here multiple issues arise, which can be encapsulated within the question: how is this to be done?

This problem is not only of interest to logicians of knowledge, psychologists and sociologists of science, politicians and economists, but also to every man who desires to act in a reflexive and responsible

⁵ Epistemologists describe this in different ways when they speak of the reflection of reality in the consciousness and the intentional identity between the cognitive content and the object, etc. However, the passive absorption of the object or its constitution as the content of consciousness do not suffice here.

⁶ Idealists, who assume the principle of immanence, largely limit this property.

manner. This is why particular people are personally engaged in studying the pathways of acquiring knowledge and its betterment, orientation as to their various branches, their theoretical and practical value and their criteria of assessment. A rationally thinking man⁷ searches for the unquestionable foundations of these convictions, and in particular for the laboriously raised system of information which concerns the most profound truths of the world and the meaning of human life. Although man, under the influence of his upbringing and environment, acquires many—apparently—incontestable convictions, the critical turning points in his life are capable of undermining almost everything. Sometimes, he adopts certain fundamental truths on the basis of intuition (even without the fear of erring), but these also turn out to be inconstant. Every now and then, if he is honest to himself, he is ready to inspect anew the foundations of his knowledge. This happens especially when he encounters conflicting philosophies or worldviews, when he becomes interested—even if only briefly—in epistemological issues, or when he finds himself having to face the adversities of life. Let us remember, however, that the aforementioned circumstances encourage inquiries, but they most certainly do not make their process easier. This is why the reader must be warned not to prematurely make up his mind concerning these matters, not to limit himself to fragmentary literature, or to select the easiest (in the short run) solutions. The theoretical foundations which underlie this matter require an extensive and conscientious study, so that the acquired answers are sufficiently objective and encompassing. The comments below can only play the role of a stimulus, an introductory signpost for undertaking such study.

The distinguishing of types of human knowledge may be performed from various points of view. It seems that at least the following must be mentioned. From the perspective of acceptable sources and criteria of cognition, knowledge may be rational if it meets the standards of a critically oriented mind, or irrational if it acknowledges non-rational sources of cognition. In accordance with the origin and

⁷ Rational thinking—in general framework—is independent of beliefs, desires or feelings, and does not originate in a dogmatic stance. It cannot be concerned with something utterly inconceivable. It answers to the criteria dictated by a critically oriented mind, and should in particular fulfil the postulate of intersubjective communicability and controllability. A more detailed denotation of rational thinking is conditioned by the stance assumed in the philosophy of cognition.

thematic purpose of cognition, knowledge may be a priori-speculative or empirically-explanatory (though there may be different types of explanation). Depending on the general means of acquiring information, we distinguish systematic knowledge (acquired in a premeditated manner) from non-systematic (acquired sporadically). If one takes into consideration the relation of cognition to non-epistemological human activities, then we may distinguish pure and involved knowledge (connected for instance with religious or artistic activities) and applied knowledge (in technology, cultivation, upbringing). And finally, from the perspective of the subject of cognition, knowledge may be multi-faceted or specialist. In practical terms, throughout the centuries three main types of knowledge were shaped: common (commonsensical), scientific, and philosophical (in the broadest sense of the word).⁸ The so-called worldview is most frequently reduced to the final type. It is the kind of knowledge which actually constitutes the ultimate and the most complete foundation of justifiable behavior of man. It is reached (or possibly controlled) on the basis of all other kinds of knowledge, starting from the most elementary cognitive observations of the world. I will attempt to characterize the most fundamental types of human knowledge, taking into consideration on the one hand the aforementioned typological categories, and, on the other, the path that human cognition traverses to reach a reflexive perspective on the world.

Due to its point of origin, it has become customary to distinguish between direct, as if source cognition, and mediated cognition, where the object of cognition is not given directly and in its entirety (the so-called discursive thinking). The former one, due to the faculty involved, may be sensory-intellectual (a singular perception of a given fact) or intellectual (an intuition about something significant or a thematic relation). The latter one, although genetically connected with sensory cognition, transpires as a purely intellectual process. It is most frequently a spontaneous non-direct conceptualization of something general (producing in effect a concept), some state of affairs or a relation between states of affairs (producing in effect a non-individual and non-existential judgement).

⁸ This distinction is based upon three cognitive motivations: immediate life needs, theoretical interests and holistic and justified ordering of all behaviour and endowing the entire life with meaning.

Sensory-intellectual cognition constitutes the first element of our knowledge and it is called experience, perception, or a chain of perceptions.⁹ What is meant here is always a direct and immediate conceptualization of something existing and singular—in the case where the existing occurs as past, we are dealing with recollection. Perceiving conducted with attention and for a given purpose is called observation. Perception may be external, when a given object is cognized directly through senses, or internal, when we perceive the existence and condition of our body (for instance pain, or the sense of satiety) or of our mental experience. We are speaking here of introspection as a process of conscious tracking of the occurrences within our psyche.¹⁰

In the theory of cognition, perception is carefully analyzed together with the associated moments, such as experiencing impressions or being affected by perceiving. Various conceptions of perceiving itself have been formed (for instance intuitionist, or phenomenalist). We will not, however, be concerned with this matter, as it is not essential to our reflections. Nevertheless, it is worth paying attention to the cognitive value of judgements based on perceptions. In particular, the question is whether a perceptual statement contains something more than the content of experience which constitutes its basis, i.e. whether perceptions provide ready information about the world, or whether they contain only the raw material for the activities of intellect and reason, which process this information. This is followed by the question whether the assertion in a perceptual judgement is irrevocable. Since statements based on perception constitute a significant part of our knowledge base, the answers to the above questions are of tremendous importance for its value.

One could dogmatically rule out the concern for erring, at least with respect only to particular perceptual judgements (for instance, only to introspective ones) and then the statements about facts would be irrevocable; one could also approach all immediate cognition statistically

⁹ Perception is a sensory and intellectual conceptualization of a given fragment of reality. Experience is more than just perception. The term “experience” is used instead of the word “experiment” (an observation of a purposefully induced phenomenon in planned conditions). It is also used to refer to the entirety of data acquired through observation and living.

¹⁰ Some (e.g. R. Ingarden) also distinguish the perception of individual mental states of others through their expression (not the result, symptoms, or utterance of the person experiencing).

(the degree of probability of individual perceptual statements increases together with their number); and finally, one could assume the judgements based on experienced perception to be infallible (in this case, when for instance looking at a vase of flowers, one would not be able to revoke such judgement: I see a vase of flowers in front of me), or that all perceptual statements ought to be treated as hypotheses which need verification (in this case, previously accepted observational statements may be invalidated by new hypotheses concerning the same object). There also exists a conventionalist approach to the experiential data, where the acceptance of a perceptual sentence depends upon an agreement and the state of theoretical knowledge at that particular time.

Taking the stance of gnosiologic realism, presupposing the limited nature of human cognitive faculties, and taking into consideration the linguistic criteria, one must assume a judgement based on experience to be unfalsifiable, as long as it precisely renders that particular experience. All corrections which might prove to be necessary arise through the interventions of memory, modifications of terminology or the faulty nature of the cognitive process itself. However, all of this is uncovered through references to other perceptions.¹¹ The epistemological value of external perception is similarly assessed. Possible grounds for doubting this value are considered by inquiring into the value of consequences of the result of a given perception and the circumstances of the cognitive process itself. Such genetic analysis of error allows for eliminating false perceptual judgements. The role of language and memory in this process is analogous to the internal experience.

On the basis of the comments above, it is easy to conclude that the postulation of gnosiologic realism and irrevocability of perceptual judgements does not preclude their control. One cannot forget, however, that this control must also be based precisely on perceptions.¹² It includes in its process both the mediated (reasoning) and direct

¹¹ A perceptual sentence may be rejected from the resource base of knowledge only when it is shown to be significantly different from other sentences on that matter.

¹² The content of the cognitive experience is determined mainly through a particular cognitive act, conditioned by an appropriate object and taking place in ordinary circumstances. Intellect and reflection allow to control, justify and correct the content (the data of experience), but cannot change the evidence of our senses, or perform an interpretation which would negate the facts absolutely primal to the cognition.

intellectual cognition. Intellectual reflection which allows for self-reflective cognition plays here an extremely important role.

We thus arrive at a fundamental statement that our knowledge arises thanks to a very complex and difficult process, in which human senses and thought cooperate in a multitude of ways. Each of these cognitive faculties not only contributes in a positive way through its workings, but also liberates the content of cognition from possible deformations caused by the actions of another faculty. One must also add that the epistemological value of cognitive results is also influenced by other mental human activities, such as one's emotional or intentional life. They may sometimes prove to be propitious, but frequently lead to a distortion of cognitive conclusions. Hence, to assess the value of some knowledge, the process of its acquisition must be carefully examined from the angle of positive or negative influences which might be exerted by the remainder of human mental life.

Direct cognition is not entirely an ephemeral source of our knowledge. Mental life is characterized by continuity. Experiences remain in the subconscious and can always be used thanks to memory. It is a faculty which allows for renewing past mental states. It constitutes—in metaphorical terms—a repository of cognitive content. One can recollect spontaneously or purposefully (reflexively). The former way plays an important role in making judgements on the basis of perceptions. The intervention of memory proves helpful in such case, as it assists in controlling, correcting and supplementing the perceptual data. Simultaneously, however, memory becomes the source of deformation of this data, if its workings are not verified carefully enough by cognitive acts. Hence, caution is advisable in using memory for making perceptual judgements.

Our knowledge is shaped on the basis of direct cognition, with the assistance of mediated sources (reasoning, testimonies of other people). Its most widespread and life-significant kind is common or commonsensical knowledge.¹³ It encompasses data which result directly out of the needs of everyday life, and arise in a random, contingent manner. It is, therefore, small wonder that such information is characterized by utilitarianism, subjectivism and lack of precision.¹⁴

¹³ M. Scheler calls it a natural worldview.

¹⁴ This is the reason for the search for specialist theoretical, objective knowledge, expressed in precise language.

It constitutes an amalgamation of various perspectives and a blend of images, frequently received from quite distant viewpoints.¹⁵ Even though acquiring common knowledge is accompanied by common sense, without critical, controlling revisions, it is difficult to avoid errors and inconsistencies. The data is usually acquired in haste, without due caution and consideration which would answer to the criterion of rationality. Frequently of decisive significance are extra-cognitive motives and factors (emotionally-volitive). Most of all, however, the common data are not systematized. The deficiencies in systematization are sometimes so significant, that not only fundamental gaps and failures occur, but also the totality of such knowledge is frequently contradictory within itself.¹⁶

This kind of knowledge is, in fact, fundamental and commonplace. Its acquisition requires neither education nor special competencies. Every normal person acquires it accordingly with his needs, and, more importantly, it serves him on permanent basis. This permanence is particularly apparent in contrast with the functioning of science. An acute observer of various kinds of knowledge must be struck by the fact that many commonsensical concepts and statements have a greater stability than scientific theses and conceptual apparatus. This happens because the scientific language is more formalized than common speech, and its statements more frequently undergo falsification. It is far more difficult to construct an empirically verifiable theory, where a great degree of correspondence is required between the expected consequences postulated by that theory and experimental results, than to create a cluster of spontaneous data, which may be formulated by different ways of understanding.

Already many years ago it has been noted that common knowledge does not satisfy the human intellectual interests concerning the cosmos. Hence, people attempted to formulate in more general terms the conditions under all sorts of events occur. In order to do so, it was necessary to differentiate or separate certain properties of the inspected subject, and establish the repeatable relations between phenomena. Then, all statements had to be coordinated, showing their

¹⁵ The amount and the quality of information have been caused by the course of life itself.

¹⁶ The occurrence of conflict between common convictions is one of the stimuli for the creation and development of science.

logical relations. This is how scientific knowledge was created. Positivists believe that science is based on common cognition; it is its continuation, expansion and correct correlation. The difference in the degree of specialization and systematization is immaterial.

Science meticulously determines its field of research and considers itself to be specialized cognition. It also institutes order towards the statements which it accepts. Perhaps the most singular criterion of science is the informative character of language, and the capability to control the coherence and validity of theses. Despite these efforts in improving cognition, it is treated as provisional, uncertain, hypothetical. In contrast, common knowledge is irrefutable at a given moment.¹⁷

Despite the fact that the difference between common cognition (general, unordered, practical) and the scientific one is quite apparent, in reality it is frequently difficult to distinguish between the two, as there also exist intermediate types of cognition. It is, for instance, known that the knowledge concerning the inner sphere of human experience contains, apart from scientific constituents, also elements from common cognition, adopted without significant modifications (apart from the vocabulary). Quite troublesome for the researchers is the area of the so-called spiritual values, which successfully resists scientific treatment. On the way from commonsensical to strictly scientific cognition, one also always encounters two kinds of science which may prove to be obstructive. The first is some form of proto-science, i.e. science in its germinal, embryonic stage. The other is pseudo-science, which is concerned with elevated and epistemologically interesting matters, but does not, despite appearances, possess rational methods of sufficient empirical justification for its statements. Neither is it characterized by the ability to correct itself, nor does it display visible progress.

Thus far, the comments concerning scientific knowledge were quite general. This is because such knowledge is difficult to characterize without taking into consideration determinants which originate from assuming a particular stance within the philosophy of cognition. Without going into details, it must, above all, be stated that the

¹⁷ Hence this strange phenomenon: the less advanced one is in science, the more conviction is expressed in his theses, and the fewer doubts or objections he perceives.

perspective on the criteria of what is scientific has undergone various modifications. Firstly, science was primarily philosophy,¹⁸ be it as philosophy of nature, metaphysics, or, finally, in its entirety. In terms of the form, science was patterned on mathematics—a priori-speculative knowledge. Nevertheless, it was quite early that activities typical to science appeared in the broadly understood physics. Since the seventeenth century, there has appeared the concept of science as explanatory and devoted to the cognition of nature, which combined mathematical formulae with observation and experimentation. The reasoning of this kind of cognition is of cyclic character: its point of departure is constituted by the experimental data, which are then explained theoretically, to once again undergo a more or less direct empirical verification. The basic frameworks of such understanding of model science survived till today. The only improvements concerned the language of science, the methods of collecting and ordering experimental data and the means of validating a theory. Also, at given times, different types of explanation were given priority. ...

The main trend in the contemporary evolution of the concept of science can be described as the elevation of cognition to a higher level of theory and generality of explanation, more precise systematizing of theories and a more detailed determining of the aspect of the examined reality. Not all types of science submit to this rigor. This is the reason why hundred year old debates over equating the status of theoretical natural sciences and the humanities while preserving their specificity have not yet ceased. While appreciating the epistemological and methodological values implemented by science, it is difficult not to take into account the differences between the various kinds of scientific cognition. Pluralism of types of knowledge must be acknowledged. Without doubt, science is becoming more and more perfect means of cognition, yet it does not satisfy all human interests. For instance, it does not provide an answer to the profound question as to why something rather than nothing exists. What then are the consequences?

If only science in the strictest sense of the word achieves the best results, or more specifically, only the kind of science which examines reality in aspects and ways similar to theoretical natural sciences,

¹⁸ The Greek *episteme* (science) was identified with *philosophia*. It was A. Comte who finally separated science from philosophy.

then all sound knowledge should be reduced to the naturalist kind (scientism).¹⁹ That which does not submit to such reduction, is either of no significance, or should be included in the category of rational reflections which are unencumbered by any directives, or even in the category of irrational contemplation. In such situation, philosophy, which had always supplemented or preceded more or less autonomous scientific knowledge, had to choose between scientism and irrationalism. Since the former was usually the domain of different types of science, the latter one was most frequently opted for.²⁰ But the philosophical knowledge is a more complex phenomenon.

It is connected to the commonsensical and scientific cognition, and the so-called wisdom. It is supposed to provide answers to many questions important to the entirety of human activities, and, in particular, ultimately explain and justify the sense of human life. However, to a layman philosophy frequently appears as a battleground for many different trends, schools and orientations. It is also often vulnerable to the influence of extra-cognitive factors. All of this results in the concept of philosophy being a very complex nexus of all reflections upon knowledge. It is impossible to eliminate by removing philosophy from the register of the disciplines of contemporary knowledge. Positivism, or, as a matter of fact, its continuators from the so-called Vienna Circle, attempted to do so, disregarding both the centuries-old tradition and the human nature. The modern man, even though fascinated by the scientific and technological revolution and exhausted by the pace of life, does not nevertheless cease his interests in the existential aspect of reality and stop his search for the ultimate truths of the world and the understanding of the meaning of life. The only thing which changed today is the means of satisfying this curiosity. If it is improper to philosophize on the rational path, then one needs to relocate to the field of mysticism. The neopositivists themselves remain the best example of lack of consistency in this respect.

¹⁹ The natural aspect of the world is easiest to determine. When it comes to other aspects, statistical investigations are possible, because then the whole aggregate may be sufficiently determined (the approximate uniformity of reality from a given point of view).

²⁰ Sometimes a significant success may be achieved through a combination of scientism and irrationalism in philosophy. Then of course at least one of these perspectives turns out to be merely apparent. Nevertheless, such a combination—as the example of Teilhard de Chardin indicates—evokes great interest.

While throwing metaphysics out of the front gate, they were forced to let it in by the back door. Exempting it from critical control, they accept the fundamental philosophical premises in more or less veiled dogmas, which has been convincingly pointed out by W.V. Quine.

The relation of philosophical knowledge to common and scientific cognition is treated in various manners. The view that philosophy rests upon the data from everyday, commonsensical experience encounters firm opposition due to the epistemological and methodological imperfection of such data, when compared to the facts acquired by science. It seems that this should not constitute the reason for rejecting the idea of philosophy as a development and ordering of common knowledge. In accordance with human mental needs, autonomously treated philosophical cognition is, in opposition to commonsensical and similarly to scientific, a specialist one. Such is, for instance, cognition in its classical treatment, as it enquires into reality from the perspective of the structure of being and ultimate determinants. It has an empirical starting point, which fits into the framework of common observations, yet its initial facts are already determined by its own conceptual apparatus.²¹ Matters are different in scientific conceptions of philosophy. In such a perspective, philosophy meets science either preceding it (constituting as if proto-science), or complementing it (it takes the form of meta-science, or crowning superstructure raised on the pillars of scientific conclusions).²² Lastly, philosophical knowledge sometimes assumes the shape of world-view building cognition, trying to synthesize all human experience of the given epoch from one, single perspective. This is usually achieved by very creative individuals through intellectual intuition preceded by appropriate academic and life experience.

Philosophical knowledge, understood non-autonomously, benefits to a greater or lesser extent from scientific cognition. This, however, results in unintended consequences. The more philosophy becomes

²¹ As we know from the methodology of science, it is difficult to delineate the border between observational and theoretical terms in the language of a given knowledge. This is why already the empirical sentences of classical philosophy are not independent from a particular philosophical theory.

²² About the various kinds of this superstructure see: S. Kamiński, *Zagadnienie Absolutu w filozofii scjentystycznej*, in *Aby poznać Boga i człowieka*, part 1: *O Bogu dziś*, ed. B. Bejze (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sióstr Loretanek, 1974), pp. 107–119.

involved with the so-called specialist sciences, the less it fulfils those intellectual interests of man for whose existence it has been called in the first place.²³ Cognition of the scientific type provides little in terms of solutions or material which would assist in solving the ultimate existential truths of reality and the meaning of life. On the other hand, the epistemological and methodological value of scientific philosophy decreases the further it moves away from scientific knowledge. This is supplemented by the fact that the sciences presuppose in their external conceptual database theses originating in philosophy (ontological and epistemological). If philosophical cognition is reduced to meta-scientific sphere, it will not be able to solve questions pertinent to philosophy—explaining reality by indicating its ultimate ontic truths and the meaning of human life and the world. In order to realize this goal, philosophical cognition must: (1) represent a specialist approach, i.e. be thoroughly ontological, not just phenomenally-functional, and objective, not meta-objective, or theoretically cognitive; (2) systematically and rationally explore the general existential dimension of reality, and not only its thematic quantification. Only real existence constitutes that aspect of world which is adequately universal and, simultaneously, sufficiently analogically determined, so as not to be ambiguously rendered; (3) in an empirically-explanatory manner seek the ultimate (and, if necessary, even utterly transcendental to the reality given experientially) ontic truths, employing intellectual intuition towards the data to be explained.²⁴

Philosophical knowledge is frequently associated with wisdom. The antiquity established the foundations of such an approach and the continuators of classical conceptions gladly relate to it. In order to comprehend it properly, it needs to be remembered that wisdom

²³ This does not mean that irrational philosophy satisfies these aspirations. There are serious arguments which support the statement that there exists a possibility of an autonomous philosophical cognition which, without resorting to extra-rational sources, provides a sufficiently empirically justified solution to the problems of classical philosophy. It also seems that philosophical knowledge should in no case be a type or a result of extra-cognitive human activity. Hence the placement of philosophy at the crossroads of religion, art and science does not satisfy the mental needs of a rational man.

²⁴ Such philosophy, known as the theory of being, is presented by for instance M.A. Krąpiec. See M.A. Krąpiec, *Metafizyka* (Poznań: Pallottinum, 1966; Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1985⁴) and M.A. Krąpiec, *Ja – człowiek* (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1974, 1986³).

is a term understood in many ways. It is, however, univocally stressed that it does not refer solely to plenitude of information. It was already Heraclitus who warned that it is not sufficient to know a lot, to correctly assess people and things, or to possess numerous skills in order to be called wise. To reach that goal, one has to thoroughly, and in an engaged way (lived cognition, in some way connected to the person) know the significant and ultimate principles (reasons and goal) of all things and their systematization according to fundamental values (as it was frequently said—*sub specie aeternitatis*). Wisdom is the highest knowledge (J. Maritain), most fundamental and ultimately grounded. Its systematized version is to some extent constituted by philosophy, or, more specifically, classical metaphysics, which is located between science and wisdom.

Apart from this, there is also wisdom which originates in properly understood scientific erudition. Wisdom is then a concise system of multilateral, and yet essentially only probable information, which are grouped in relation to the general coordination of values. In this case, it constitutes an excellent keystone and a co-ordinator for the scientific disciplines.²⁵ Wisdom may also come from sources not typical to natural cognition, but from supernatural faith. Then the deepest understanding occurs in the light of the Revelation—*fides est initium sapientiae (sapientia divina)*. Its systematized form is usually theology.²⁶

Two main kinds of wisdom—which, in the history of this concept were most frequently the subject of modifications—are connected with theory and practice. As theoretical knowledge, wisdom is ultimately a founded and comprehensive understanding of the world, its deepest and most ultimate order, and the meaning of life. In the second instance, it is the ability to use that knowledge, and, thanks to this, to function efficiently, assuming the most proper attitude towards life. Practical wisdom does not have to rely on theoretical wisdom, which occurs in classical metaphysics. Analogically to

²⁵ See for instance the positivist arguments: J. Piaget, *Mądrość i złudzenia filozofii*, trans. M. Mikłasz (Warszawa: PAX 1967), p. 73. Compare S. Radhaktishnan, *Wissenschaft und Weisheit*, trans. R.H. Foerster (München: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1961).

²⁶ One distinguishes between acquired Godly wisdom, i.e. obtained through the cognitive effort of man, and infused wisdom, given by God as the gift of the Holy Spirit.

theoretical innate wisdom and “scientific” one, one can also speak of similar types of practical wisdom. One frequently encounters the concept of the so-called life wisdom, which is based solely on common cognition. It is not, however, wisdom in its proper sense. Nevertheless, the practical instance appears essential to wisdom. It is often stressed that in its fullest sense, wisdom is not merely theory. Only the fact that all wisdom needs to be experienced, personal cognition, and not just an arrangement of judgements, speaks for its partially practical character. This is why it is difficult to completely identify philosophy with wisdom, even if only theoretical.²⁷

In antiquity and the beginnings of the Middle Ages, philosophy was closer to wisdom as it contained a significant amount of practical elements. Being later united with theology, its character became in this respect even more pronounced. In any case, theology as engaged knowledge, and thanks to the Revelation capable of providing a fuller guarantee of deepest cognition and broadest horizons, is, above all, wisdom. Wisdom as a synthesis of natural and supernatural insight into everything allows fulfilling the human aspirations in a more adequate manner. This is worth paying attention to, as in the contemporary times, wisdom is ascribed a relatively low value. However, in reality it is an extremely significant component of a truly universal and harmonious view of the world. The cult of wisdom is deeply rooted in the Christian perspective. Here emerges a new kind of knowledge, one which originates from faith.

The word “faith” designates three essentially different concepts: the act of faith, its subject, and the virtue of faith. The first one is an act of reason (under the pressure of free will) which acknowledges some judgement as truth. This pressure of will is not limited to the encouragement to cognitively grasp some object (as it is the case in all cognition), but also significantly influences reason to acknowledge a judgement for which it possesses no kind of evidence or proof. In other words, faith is subjectively grounded in trusting someone

²⁷ Without doubt, however, the entirely developed metaphysical cognition constitutes the keystone of the palace of wisdom. Wisdom ideally understood is the necessary model, the beginning and the end of philosophizing. Compare S. Rosen, “Wisdom: The End of Philosophy,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 16 (1962), pp. 181–211. (Kamiński himself partially identifies philosophy with theoretical wisdom in a later article: “Nauka i filozofia a mądrość,” in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, pp. 51–66. Editor’s comment).

as to the absolute certainty of judgement.²⁸ A question arises here: why does will exert the aforementioned pressure on reason? In belief we are motivated by credibility, such as trust in the person whom we believe. These motives may be of theoretical nature, such as the expected rationality of assertion, or of pragmatic character, if they are reduced to the encouragement that it is worthwhile to believe. An extremely significant role is played here by feeling, and, through its mediation, by imagination. Yet they can be controlled by reason to some extent.

Religious faith is different from other convictions in the way that it concerns a supernatural subject, and that the acceptance of truth is made sublime by God's grace. The authority of the Creator himself establishes credibility and is the so-called argument of faith. Believing in God, man rests upon the truthfulness of God and simultaneously submits to the authority of God's word. The train of thought which leads us to this kind of faith proceeds in the following way: studying a particular doctrine we find it to be credible to some extent.²⁹ Then—under the influence of persuasion for instance—we arrive at the conclusion that this doctrine should be acknowledged as true. This results in our assertion of the doctrine, or the act of faith. That in which I believe constitutes the object of faith, i.e. a group of statements whose acknowledgement is justified by its revelation by God, and the criterion according to which this object is recognized is its being given to belief by the Church. Some truths of faith have the character of mystery—either because we would never be able to discover them by ourselves (yet knowing them, we need not perceive them as incomprehensible), or because their sense is never fully comprehensible, its content cannot be fathomed. Yet these truths provide explanations which become part of wisdom or a worldview.

What is the relation of knowledge acquired thanks to religious faith to natural knowledge? In antiquity, philosophical and scientific cognition remained in conflict with faith. In the Middle Ages, all kinds of knowledge were thematically united, although due to the sources

²⁸ Faith is always connected to the sphere of value, will and action, or even emotion. Compare H. Bouillard, *Logique de la foi* (Paris: Aubier, 1964) and R.J. Ackermann, *Belief and Knowledge* (New York: Macmillan, 1972).

²⁹ Here the existence of God and the possibility of the Revelation must be justified and the authenticity and the credibility of evidence must be examined.

the truths of faith were distinguished from natural cognition. The doctrine of double truth was born mainly thanks to external circumstances and an insufficient theoretically-cognitive reflection. In the modern times, cognition from faith was begun to be excluded from the range of credible knowledge. The nineteenth century was the renaissance of Christian philosophy, which treated faith as a criterion of negative cognition. Then the autonomous Christian philosophy begun to slowly approach faith, becoming a contemplation on the border of religion and morality, the defense of the truths of faith, and even “philosophical faith” (K. Jaspers). What is most frequently accentuated, however, is the autonomy of philosophy in relation to faith, which cannot constitute either the premises or the goal of philosophical cognition.

Nevertheless, the internal relation of faith to philosophical cognition was lively discussed. The most commonly encountered view was that theology is supposed to constitute the understanding (theoretical and practical) of faith, the wisdom originating in faith, or, finally, a rational and systematized cognition of Godly and human matters within a particular consent of a believer (M.-D. Chenu). There was no lack of opposing views, however, which are best described by the phrase: *credo quia impossibile*. This is connected with the question of the relation of faith to reason, or, more specifically, rationally acknowledged truths or the action of their acknowledging. Sentimentalist conceptions of faith, mistakenly taking them for emotional acts, resulted in the view that it is impossible to reconcile truths of reason with truths of faith. However, there is no contradiction between these truths, if they are properly comprehended. One could even state that they are complementary: the credibility of the Revelation has to be justified rationally (*scio cui credidi*) and reason constitutes the tool of a better (fuller and more systematized) cognition of the revealed truths. One cannot forget, however, that in the matters of contention, the believer is subjectively bound by the principle of the primacy of faith.

All of the kinds of knowledge analyzed so far serve man to build a worldview. This concept was formulated at the beginning of the nineteenth century, in the circle of the romantics (F.E.D. Schleiermacher). It designated a type of philosophizing where the cognitive frames are built through regarding the world as a certain unity, interpreted and ordered according to some idea. Such philosophy strived toward the acquisition of a uniform and operative picture of the universe and

the human being.³⁰ Later, philosophy and worldview were separated, which was the main achievement of Rickert, Husserl and Scheler. Philosophy was to be an in-depth cognition of reality, similar to the scientific one, while worldview was regarded as cognition which establishes a perspective upon the entirety of reality, closely connected to the religion and ideology of a given social group.

The term “ideology” comes from the late Enlightenment (A. Desutt de Tracy), while the concept itself only since K. Marks, M. Scheler, K. Mannheim and the positivist sociologists. The term “ideology” is much older than the concept which it designates at present. In the broad sense, an ideology of a given social group is the entirety of views and principles of evaluation and action, which explains the world or the historical and social situation (political, cultural, economic), as well as expresses the interests of this group. Thus, one could say that ideology is a broad and comprehensive justification of what a given group wants to achieve to further its development. In a narrower sense, ideology is a system of doctrinal views which determine the goals, directives and action slogans of a given social class. Some believe that there is a close connection between ideology and science in general (particularly the social sciences), and that it is impossible to separate philosophy from ideology. Other thinkers justify historically and systemically that philosophy and science defend themselves from being theoretically identified with ideology and from actual dependency on ideology. Ideology is not identified with a worldview either, as it only contains views connected with a particular social group (matters are probably different in the so-called holistic conception of ideology in Mannheim’s writings).³¹

³⁰ Theories of worldview were even created. Dilthey, for instance, believed that a worldview is composed of three layers: (1) views as to the role of phenomena in the entirety of the world; (2) formulating judgements on people and things on the basis of emotional life; (3) the vision of ideals and the means through which they can be realized.

³¹ Compare H.R. Schlette, *Philosophie – Theologie – Ideologie* (Köln: Verlag Bachem, 1968); J. Plamenatz, *Ideology* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970); J. Barion, *Was ist Ideologie?* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1971²); D. Böhler, *Metakritik der Marxschen Ideologiekritik* (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971); E. Lemberg, *Ideologie und Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart: Verlag Kohlhammer, 1971); S. Breton, *Théorie des idéologies* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1976); J. Larrain, *The Concept of Ideology* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1979); J.C. Greene, *Science, Ideology and World View* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981); N. Poelman,

Worldview is an anthropological and historical category. Speaking in most general terms, it constitutes a global interpretation and judgement of the world (K. Jaspers) or an ultimately justified self-assertion of man in the aspect of universal behavior. In a worldview, one can accentuate the subjective instance, i.e. the active cognitive, striving and emotional state, or the objective one, i.e. a worldview system. In the latter case, it is a system of convictions (mainly general ones) concerning the entire reality, and, in particular the place of man in the world and the meaning of his life, as well as the principle of evaluation and development of convictions which came into being and were validated upon that ground. A worldview may be shaped spontaneously on the basis of common and religious knowledge.³² In such a case, it is not particularly systematized (sometimes incoherent) and does not possess a deeper grounding. The emotional and praxiological elements are most visibly accentuated, at the cost of the theoretical and doctrinal ones. On the other hand, if it is raised on the foundation of philosophy and theology and takes advantage of the generalizations of the output of the specialist sciences, then it constitutes a system coherent in terms of content, one which provides a full and ultimately justified vision of the world and ideals. This dictates life attitudes and demarcates the path of human behavior. Every person possesses some (in reality one) worldview, if not entirely conscious then at least implicitly acknowledged.

When it comes to the genesis of a worldview, then hardly ever does it come about as a result of individual acquisition of knowledge. People adopt the views and attitudes from their environment, accepting them to a greater or lesser extent. Moreover, this personal acceptance happens because of a given historical and social situation.³³ More critical people make sure that their acceptance is not coincidental or unmotivated. Those who can make use of theology, philosophy or scientific synthesis acquire their worldview individually. They are

Panorama der ideologieën (Baarn: Nelissen, 1982); J.B. Thompson, *Studies in the Theory of Ideology* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984).

³² Faith, not necessarily religious, is the decisive factor here in determining the most fundamental truths. Everyone acknowledges the majority of truths on the basis of faith. Compare A.B. Stępień, *Wstęp do filozofii*, pp. 23–28.

³³ A worldview is common to people, as much as human nature and external life conditions are. Particularly visible is the interdependence between a worldview and an ideology of a given social group.

capable of using the emotional and volitive factors in a controlled manner. Wisdom-related knowledge is particularly connected to a worldview, if one turns attention to the most profound arguments, the purpose of reality and the ultimate criterion of the hierarchy of values. Some (for instance the positivists and Marxists) distinguish between a scientific (or rather scientistically-philosophical) and non-scientific (mainly fideistic, or religious) worldview on the basis of the acceptable sources. Thus, a scientific worldview would be an advanced synthesis of the sciences or a vision of the world adjusted to scientific conclusion, which would determine an active attitude toward the world and the meaning of life. On the other hand, every worldview which includes religious knowledge or any kind of extra-rational knowledge would be called non-scientific.

Yet strictly speaking, no worldview may be entirely scientific. Only on the basis of scientific knowledge, it is impossible to ontically explain what absolute goodness, evil, beauty and truth are, and unquestionably determine and justify the meaning of life and the existence of the Absolute. Only autonomous classical philosophy is open to an ultimate explanation of all the human experience (not only the quality, quantity, form, but also being itself and value). Despite the end of the nineteenth century scienticism, one has to acknowledge that scientific (more precisely: natural) cognition is neither the only kind of rational knowledge, nor does it suffice for building a full and well-grounded worldview. Epistemological monism which identifies science, philosophy, ideology and a worldview is a theoretically groundless and practically dysfunctional simplification.³⁴

We have already spoken of the necessity for autonomous philosophy and the lack of justification for connecting science with ideology. From the reflections so far, it also appears that worldview does not contain socio-political instances, which are particular to ideology. Philosophy constitutes the kernel and the essential foundation of worldview, but is not identical with it—especially in terms of subjectivity and functionality. If one were to juxtapose the history of philosophy and ideology as a modern social category, then one would easily see how autonomous philosophy becomes liberated from ideology, at the same time constituting some sort of a substructure for both ideology

³⁴ Different tasks for new knowledge posed by life require different types of cognition.

and worldview. The distinguishing of a fideistic (religious) worldview as encompassing every non-scientific perspective on the world stems from a misunderstanding. By its very nature, worldview inevitably contains extra-scientific, or even extra-rational elements, yet they do not need to stand thematically in contradiction with the scientific and rational ones. Mere knowledge (scientific and philosophical) is not sufficient to build a view on the world, and, in particular, to assume an active and engaged life attitude. Hence, the justification of worldview has not only a theoretical but also a practical character. Yet these extra-cognitive instances may be set in frames which are inscribed by the use of rational knowledge. The Christian faith for instance, should have rational *praeambula*.

Finally, it is worth to turn our attention to the typical characteristics of the worldview of the contemporary man.

Without doubt the most pronounced feature of this view is humanism. It is, however, sometimes understood improperly and in its extreme form. Man locates himself in the universe not in his right place, granting himself many attributes of the Absolute. Wanting to make man the measure of everything, we become entangled in serious conflicts, both inner and interpersonal. For man is not an ideal, not is he unconditionally independent. The basic questions concerning the human being thus remain open, particularly the problem of raising man in the spirit of respect towards the dignity of the human being.

The scientific and technical revolution exerted an immense influence over man. He has been utterly taken over by scientism and technological advance. He does not ask why something exists at all, if it does not have to exist. Neither does he ask what something is, only how to use it, what can be done with it, how to best utilize it. People do not want an ultimate explanation of the world, but want to know it just enough to dominate it.³⁵ This is why it is so difficult today to acknowledge the existence of the Absolute, completely independent, incapable of being dominated or processed. The Absolute created the world of nature, thus man eagerly takes on an analogical role as a re-creator—thanks to science and technology. But this is still not enough. Thus, he creates for himself pseudo-religions, absolutizing

³⁵ Not only does he desire to dominate the world of nature, but also another human being, or even other societies (an attitude of universal consumption).

such individual or social values as authenticity, heroism, the good of the community, etc.³⁶

Finally, the contemporary man, due to the worldview which he himself creates, oscillates alternatively between rationalism and irrationalism. Raising the criteria of validity and accurateness in certain kinds of knowledge, in others he prefers not to propose any postulates which would constrain volitive and emotional life. Meanwhile, philosophy of cognition and philosophical anthropology based on real principles suggest a more harmonious and mutually controlling unification of all areas of mental life, and, in particular, the different kinds of human cognition. Only thanks to the acceptance of rich, yet properly ordered complexity and interdependence of the variety of our knowledge, can that knowledge participate in the personal development of the human being and in the progress of culture. Radicalism, extremism, and the ignorance of certain important instances in the structure of knowledge cause losses and practical damage which cannot be quickly remedied. For knowledge and action are deeply and permanently connected.

³⁶ See E. Mascall, "Naukowy pogląd na świat a posłannictwo chrześcijańskie", trans. L. Bieńkowski, *Concilium* 1966–1967, pp. 307–312 and *Nauka i technika a wiara*, ed. A. Podsiad, Z. Więckowski (Warszawa: PAX, 1964, 1969²).

METHODOLOGICAL PECULIARITY OF THE THEORY OF BEING

S. Kamiński, "Osobliwość metodologiczna teorii bytu," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 27, no. 2 (1979), pp. 33–49; reprinted in: S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować? Studia z metodologii filozofii klasycznej*, prepared for publication by T. Szubka (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1989), pp. 71–87.

The variety of approaches to philosophy, styles of philosophizing or philosophical methods is responsible for the fact that today, more than ever, meta-philosophical debates have become very current. One of the values of contemporary philosophy is its self-consciousness. If one adds to this unity and progress of philosophy, a matter which has long been of concern to philosophers, as well as the current interest in meta-science, it is of small wonder that the method of practicing philosophy has become the number one problem for every philosopher.

The creators of the so-called theory of being answer this question in a particular way, combining tradition with modernity. Its ideas are mainly derived from the philosophical perspective of Thomas Aquinas (but they critically and selectively relate to the Thomist tradition) and from the attempt to develop this perspective on the basis of conclusions stemming from the entirety of the history of philosophy, with regard for the generally accepted directives of the theory of science, which acknowledge the pluralism of types of specialist rational knowledge.¹ The form of this theory presented here was mainly created

¹ This pluralism is supported by the aspectual nature of human cognition and the essential failures of the total epistemological reductionism. The tendency to reduce different kinds of human cognition to one type is born out of the affinity for more detailed and casual effects of cognition, rather than its adequacy and

thanks to the historical and speculative research of J. Maritain and E. Gilson, and further developed by their followers, M.A. Krapiec in particular. Yet it is not the authority of Aquinas, or any of his interpreters which is decisive in accepting this conception, but the arguments which stem from the epistemological and methodological analysis of the cognitive value of the proposed metaphysics and its function in the foundations of science, as well as the worldview, or even the whole philosophical theory.

It seems that the theory of being meets the current demand for autonomous philosophy; both in relation to faith (it rejects apologetic function and defends rationalism),² and in relation to natural or humanist cognition (it disavows scientific philosophy).³ It also answers the postulate of maximalism as to the tasks of philosophy. The minimalist philosophy of the first half of the twentieth century, despite its many taxonomizing and qualifying achievements, does not satisfy an inquisitive thinker, as it has not significantly contributed to solving problems which pertain to the mystery of being in general, and human in particular. Therefore, such philosophical investigations seem necessary which would not limit their cognitive goals along with

truth, and out of the disregard of certain universal human intellectual interests. Epistemological pluralism is, however, convincingly defended by J. Maritain in *Distinguer pour unir ou, Les degrés du savoir* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer 1932, 1963⁷), without the rejection of some sort of unity of human knowledge.

² Gilson believes that metaphysics is Christian at least in the genetic sense; hence "the most philosophical ideas of Thomas Aquinas can be understood only by the one who reads as a theologian." Maritain attributes the Christian character only to the philosophy of morality. However, the stance which proclaims that philosophy in its methodological aspect is neither Christian or non-Christian seems right. It explains and justifies its theses purely on the basis of natural cognition.

³ Scientific philosophy is significantly connected to the so-called specialist sciences, becoming either a meta-science (epistemology and the logic of science), or knowledge which takes as its object of explanation the commonly accepted scientific facts or general scientific theses, or, finally, refers in its own explanation to scientific statements. It is not difficult to see that many thinkers have turned towards scientific philosophizing, charmed by the scientific accomplishments. Today, there intensifies (in the spirit of anti-positivism) the longing for philosophy independent from science. Already in the time when neopositivists proclaimed the impossibility of metaphysics, K. Jaspers created a theory of connecting the human being with the ultimate and unconditional foundation of all meaning, which is the essence of metaphysics. The development of specialist sciences has not undermined metaphysics but purified it (F.C. Copleston).

the epistemological means available in specialist sciences, but instead would employ the best means which they may have at their disposal to fulfil the maximalist cognitive tasks dictated by life itself.

The concept of the theory of being presupposes the rational character of the world and the possibility of its ultimate theoretical explanation. In its point of departure, it highly values commonsensical experience expressed in vernacular language, being yet aware of the fact that it is not entirely untainted but entangled in certain theories, as it utilizes the entire tradition of knowledge. This is why it opposes quite frequent penchants for irrationalism in praxism, which are displayed by contemporary philosophers, perceiving them as an ungrounded resignation from the necessary values of philosophical thinking.⁴ After all, the task of philosophy is to undermine widespread opinions, to ask profound questions and to solve dilemmas through informative indication of ultimate arguments and their justification in an intersubjectively controlled manner. This clearly stands in contrast to the current fashion of meta-subjective practice of philosophy in the form of either a reflection over the content of consciousness or the analysis and interpretation of language. The theory of being does not believe that the subject and the object of cognition constitute a fused hermeneutic entirety or that through subjectivity one reaches objective cognition. It desires to be a philosophy which essentially employs the method of objective cognition, thus in the first place explores and explains the directly held objective reality, as only in this way one can avoid the danger of falling into idealism, subjectivism, or relativism, and acquire truly transcendental knowledge.

However, this does not mean that the theory of being entirely rejects meta-objective cognition. It simply does not make self-consciousness the sole "Archimedes' fulcrum" of philosophizing. For our

⁴ The twentieth century man gladly reflects upon significant matters outside of the rigors of rationality. In this he is encouraged by the easily observable absurdity of the current of events (particularly during wars or transitional epochs), as well as the insufficiency of science and technology for solving the most important problems of life. He eagerly adopts a praxist attitude, foregoing theoretical investigations and following only the postulates of practical life or axiological common experience. Yet the dominance of the pragmatic tradition and the dislike for theoretical sphere in philosophy ultimately results in its crisis. It is related to the systematic tendency to decrease the status of metaphysics or to its distortion (it is ascribed cognition that is remote from life: abstract, static, and contemptuous of man and his everyday matters).

knowledge is not, above all, self-knowledge. We know ourselves by simply living within the world and carefully observing it. Theoretically cognitive reflection is thus essentially placed in meta-philosophy. There, the history of philosophy should be extensively exploited. The history of philosophy simultaneously plays the role of meta-philosophy (a discipline of general history) and philosophy. Analyses and interpretations of language which function as a tool in cognition should constitute an initial stage of philosophical investigations. They should be accompanied by reflection which would complement them especially when the cognition of a human being and its activities is at stake. Phenomenological analyses are thus essential only in the form of internal experiences of man, the content of his consciousness. In short, the concept of the theory of being does not care to be faithful to the Thomist tradition or certain preferences of modern thinkers, but remains loyal to its own natural object—the existing reality.

The methodological peculiarity of the theory of being comes mainly from the difference (in relation to other kind of knowledge) of its formal object and cognitive tasks. The theory of being is supposed to be not so much a definitively complete theory (a set system of truths) to be dogmatically proposed (yet it is not anti-systemic!), but a cognition based on wisdom and open to new experiences and suggested solution (while maintaining its fundamental theme).⁵ Hence, theoretical style of philosophical thinking is valued, under the condition that it be authentic and rationally engaged. It must first fulfil the rigors of theoretical cognition, as engagement cannot replace the criterion of truth, but must constitute its consequence. In any case, it is better to speak of a philosopher engaged in the results of his reflections, rather than engaged philosophy, since for a metaphysical problem to have real meaning for me, I must first perceive my own problem in it. The goal is to indicate the necessary conditions and the deepest principles of existence of all kinds of beings. The naturally transcendental (innately employing universal principles) reason

⁵ For Thomas Aquinas, theoretical wisdom and metaphysics are sometimes synonymous (*In Met.* XI, 1,2146). However, one should rather assume that wisdom is the goal of the theory of being; an ability acquired as a result of practicing metaphysics (and beneficial for the practice of the theory of being). In the antiquity and the Middle Ages philosophy was closer to wisdom, as it accentuated the axiological moment and the depth and timeless perspective of cognition in a more pronounced manner.

needs to acquire knowledge which would explain reality in the ultimate manner in relation to the order of being. It would also explain that reality essentially, thus in principle irrefutably, first regarding it intellectually and through the senses from the perspective of a particular being, and then—thanks to appropriate cognitive acts—generally, yet in the analogical and transcendental aspect.⁶

The explanation of reality understood in such a manner is conducted through a certain system of mental operations, usually familiar from other areas of knowledge. Yet the system as a whole is unique. It is characterized by, above all, a constant sensory and intellectual contact with objective reality, as well as intellectualism and reductionist thinking. Intellectualism is primarily evidenced in the processes of comprehending the state of things in their being, i.e. in reaching theses which fundamentally explain reality in the general-existential aspect (i.e. in making the concept of being more visible). Reductionism, on the other hand, is typical to the action of discursive demonstration of ultimate (in the order of being) and necessary (as they are the only ones) ontic arguments about reality within the internal structure of beings. Such arguments do not stand in opposition to reality as a defined being. The theses of the theory of being are thus essentially statements which are both analytical and factual.

This analytical character is not grounded solely in the rules of language, or in special abilities of some cognitive faculty, or the a priori forms of the mind, but simultaneously in the object (statements concern particular structures of reality), in the capabilities of the cognitive faculty (intellectual intuition allows for the comprehension of such structures in the face of the evident nature of the object⁷), and in the conceptual apparatus (thanks to the analytical method of formulating concepts, the language of the theory of being becomes

⁶ The object of the theory of being is reality as existing. Although the primacy of existence is, after Thomas Aquinas, most visibly and consistently stressed, this does not mean that the theory of being is a theory of existence. It only means that reality is in existence, not outside of it (as J.P. Sartre believes, for instance). Being is at the same time a concrete content (*quidditas*) and the proportional existence. More will be said about analogy and transcendentalism later.

⁷ At stake here is not a clear cognition (Descartes), but the acknowledging of objective impossibility of negating that cognition. Speaking concisely, we regard something as objectively evident, if we realize that in this regard the object by necessity determines the cognitive result.

highly theoretical, i.e. analytical). The most essential foundation of the truth value of statements is constituted by the object of cognition. It is the ground for the argumentative nature of the repeated acts of intellectual intuition, which are controlled by conceptual analysis, and supplemented by reductionist or apagogic reflections, particularly on the basis of philosophical consequences of opposing perspectives.⁸

Thanks to this, the theory of being as knowledge significantly differs from formal disciplines (a priori and rational constructions of tautology within a deductive system), and from natural and humanist sciences (systematized, hypothetical universalizing, or theoretical explanations of observational data, or interpretations of sign systems). Yet it is not identical with irrational contemplation or judgmental experiencing of significant human matters, or with reflexive participation in existence. Finally, it does not replace all these types of cognition, nor does it want to become their subordinating program.⁹ This is not because, as it is frequently said, that philosophy concerns the essence of things and treats them holistically, while the sciences concern phenomena treated fragmentarily, but because it cognizes transcendently, not categorially. It is not concerned with the qualitative and quantitative, or formal aspect of reality, but—like no other science—with the generally existential one, the being in its factuality. It is this aspect which allows gaining cognition thanks to which we can rationally justify the deepest foundations of worldview, and rationally ground the presupposition implicitly present in the sciences. Thus the theory of being, with its distinct formal object and its own

⁸ Reductionist reasoning in the theory of being is most frequently based not on implication but on a factual relationship. Thus most of the time it is not a conceptual transition from the corollary to the argument, but a transition from the effect to its only cause, i.e. from a given state of being to the only ontic argument which does not negate it in the given aspect of being, i.e. demonstrating that a given state would not exist if the ontic argument did not exist.

⁹ The history of human knowledge records periods when metaphysics hampered the development of science, but beginning with the twentieth century, it is the sciences which devastate metaphysics—either by attempting to take on metaphysical problems, or authoritatively dismissing them as mythology. The smothering of metaphysics in the name of natural sciences is an expression of restricted pragmatism and originates in an unfounded belief that metaphysical problems may be postulated and solved only through the methods of natural sciences or dismissed as born out of linguistic errors or resolved by practical postulates.

cognitive tasks, cannot be replaced by specialist sciences, or generalizing syntheses of their results. No scientist discipline can, in an ultimate manner, answer the question why and what for something exists, if it does not have to, nor can it even formulate this question on the grounds of its discourse. And this question constantly bothers human minds, particularly in the instances of experiencing borderline situations in life, a matter quite rightly pointed out by the existentialists.

A theory of being so understood encompasses all disciplines of realistically grasped metaphysics and constitutes philosophical cognition which is holistic in the epistemological and methodological sense. This means that the theory of being exhausts all the fundamental problems of the so-called classical philosophy and solves them in an essentially same manner in all its disciplines. One does not therefore distinguish (due to the method of final explanation) the theory of cognition from metaphysics as two areas of philosophy. The theory of cognition as a separate philosophical discipline simply loses its right of existence, as a number of its main problems arose on the mistaken paths of metaphysics, hence its meta-philosophical character. The discussion with, for instance, different types of idealism may be conducted together with the meta-philosophical justification of the means of formulating the concept of being. The controversies as to the value of cognition may be considered in the history of philosophy (in the context of identifying errors and misrepresentations of metaphysical thinking). It is the history of philosophy which is supposed to provide the theory of being with actual historical experience in order to choose the right way of practicing metaphysics.

This unity of cognition in the theory of knowledge is achieved through the practice of object-oriented philosophizing and the ultimate explanation only on the basis of the internal structure of being. On the other hand, someone who presupposes that non-dogmatic philosophical explanation has to be meta-objective (of reflexive or interpretative kind), or that one can refer solely to qualitative structure of reality, establishes the theory of cognition as the fundamental (first) philosophical discipline, and breaks metaphysics into various methodological disciplines. In the theory of being, however, the metaphysical cognition breaks down into particular disciplines only due to a separate departure point (a different kind of an object of the data of experience), and not in the way of ultimate explanation (or the formal

object of the most theoretical theses).¹⁰ Even axiological disciplines are no exception here, as values are not a field separate from being, but beings which are the subjects of cognitive and volitive acts. Cultural values may be called qualities of being, which are the subject of our intentional acts. And so, for instance, moral obligations or judgments find their ultimate explanation within the inner structure of the being of human beings and the Absolute. For this reason, the cognition of God does not constitute (after Leibniz) a separate (in terms of the point of departure) discipline of the theory of being. There is no philosophy of God, since the metaphysician does not commence from the data acquired on the basis of experience, but postulates the thesis of the existence of the absolute as an answer to the fundamental question of general metaphysics: why—ultimately—do contingent beings exist, if they do not have to? The disciplines which can, on the other hand, be distinguished as separate areas of the theory of being (on the basis of their own departure points), apart from general metaphysics are: philosophy of nature, philosophy of man, philosophy of morality, and philosophy of other cultural disciplines. However, every discipline of the philosophy of culture (human actions and creations) is based on the philosophy of man and the previously enumerated disciplines of the theory of being. One can assume an experience of values different from the experience of being, but there is no world of values separate from beings, which would constitute the criterion of our judgments. The disciplines of specialist metaphysics, although autonomous in their points of departure, belong structurally to general metaphysics, as they refer in their ultimate judgments also to its theses. This is also relevant in terms of axiology and the philosophy of culture. Such stance allows for maintaining the unity of explanation in the entirety of the theory of being, without falling into philosophical naturalism (the subject of philosophy is only the natural being, being as being, thus the human being is not distinguished). Man and culture are regarded in the entirety of their special nature, but only at the departure point (the pluralism of being). The ultimate aspect of explanation is homogenous, although the internal structure does differentiate beings.

¹⁰ Particular disciplines are methodologically distinguished on the basis of the object of cognition at the point of departure (the range of investigations) or the object of the explanatory theory; a given system of problems particular to a given discipline is related to the object at the point of departure.

With regard to the relation of the specialist disciplines of metaphysics to the corresponding sciences, there is no methodological dependence. No metaphysical discipline takes as the object of its investigations the facts established by science, nor does it philosophically explain the conclusions which science reaches. Neither does it refer to scientific theses in the explanation or justification of its own statements. This approach does not stem from the contempt for science, but from the fundamental difference in the formal subjects of both kinds of knowledge. This is why the relinquishment of the data acquired by specialist sciences does not result in the loss of knowledge significant for metaphysical explanation. The practitioner of specialist metaphysics should, however, take advantage of the conclusions of corresponding sciences, but only as the initial erudite foundation, particularly in the negative manner i.e., to determine his own academic subject matter. Such a stance does not negate the need for (as, for instance, an inspiration for new scientific subject matter), or the cognitive value of (in, for instance, overcoming partial agnosticism) scientific philosophy, i.e. a philosophy of an epistemological or ontologically-critical kind, apart from the theory of being as metaphysical philosophy. It does, nevertheless, reject the methodological combination of these philosophical practices, as well as the necessity of extra-metaphysical philosophies for natural and non-dogmatic philosophizing (after all, this is what meta-philosophy is for). It also rejects the ultimate grounding of rational basis of a worldview and the philosophical premises of scientific cognition. And in particular, it excludes the possibility of replacing the theory of being with scientific kinds of philosophy in the aforementioned roles.¹¹

Following this general characteristic of the theory of being, it is also worth paying some attention to certain meta-philosophical problems widely discussed in relation to the practice of this theory. They include, among others:

- 1° The establishing of the most primordial experience and the proper object of the theory of being,
- 2° The nature of language of the theory of being,

¹¹ This is in accordance with epistemologically-methodological pluralism, which allows for different types of knowledge which are mutually irreducible and irreplaceable, as well as for different complex methods of rational theoretical cognition.

3° The procedures of explanation and justification in the theory of being.

Ad 1°. All reality can be cognitively regarded in the immediate manner only in an aspect which can be abstracted (qualitatively or quantitatively) and objectified, through the use of concepts, or in such form in which it gives itself to cognition. Such cognition would not exclude aspects which do not lend themselves to abstraction, but are expressed in directly existential judgements. To phrase this concisely, reality can be directly cognized in its qualitative, quantitative, or existential aspect. Yet only in the second case, cognition will be truly unmediated, radically realist, i.e., will concern reality as existent. Such must be the fundamental cognition in the theory of being at its departure point, so as to lead to formulating the concept of being as being and indicate ultimate arguments and the ontic structure of reality. The affirmation of the existence of concrete content, expressed in direct existential judgements will therefore constitute the most primordial form of experience.¹² The affirmation in question arises as a result of the working of the so-called *ratio particularis*, which simultaneously (or as Krapiec metaphorically states—in pincers) regards existence and particular content. A functional unity of sensory and intellectual cognition occurs here, as well as the objective unity of the categorical moment (concrete content) and the transcendental moment (existence). Once in possession of several direct conceptualizations of this kind, expressed in direct existential judgements, one needs to neutralize, as much as possible, the categorical limitation of being by essence, i.e. to arrive at formulating the transcendental conception of being.¹³ This is done by reflecting on the

¹² Primary experience cannot be axiological—as Kant suggests, having separated the sphere of being from the sphere of values, and having acknowledged the former as philosophically inaccessible. This is because, on the one hand, the transition from the world of values to the essence of things presupposes an inverse relation (an object must first reveal itself in its peculiarity, so it can become the object of striving or desire [a value]—*nihil volitum nisi cognitum*), and on the other hand, axiology without the support of the sphere of reality easily submits to ideological influences.

¹³ The foundation of the transcendental of the concept of being is existence (*ipsum esse quod est communissimum*). It is the reason for the fact that the so-called transcendental idea presents content of an unlimited range, i.e. encompasses everything, transgressing all categories as it concerns every being. When within it a certain content is accentuated (becomes more apparent), its range remains

cognitive content of existential judgement through predicative negative judgements. As a result, it becomes apparent that a given concrete content is not essentially related to existence (the so-called separation),¹⁴ thus being as being is any sort of content (cognitively undetermined), but concrete (determined in itself) as existing (*essential ut sub actuali existentia*). The accent is placed here on the transcendental aspect (instance) of being, and not upon the categorial one (primacy of being).

Such cognitive regard of reality is utterly commonplace, i.e. the range of the concept of being as being reaches to every place where something exists. It is also neutral in terms of content, i.e. regards the very fact of the existence of something, without enforcing upon the mind some preconception as to the nature of reality (e.g. whether it exists as matter or as spirit), since something is a being because it exists, not because of what exists. However, the content should be concretized, although not necessarily recognized as such, and being should be commensurate to concrete content (essence). The concept of being formulated in this way contains in itself (denotes) all kinds of real beings, and is, in consequence, an analogically common term for everything (*ens commune*) discussed by particular theories of being. It thus becomes understandable, that formulating the concept of being as being also constitutes the determination of the proper object of the entire theory of being.¹⁵ It only needs to be remembered that when we speak of being

the same. The transcendental conception of being lies at the foundations of every other metaphysical concept, hence all other concepts are secondary to it. Such an interpretation of “being” has already been given by Thomas Aquinas (E. Gilson regards it as the most profound one in philosophy ever).

¹⁴ The term separation is used to designate (*a potiori parte*) the entire process of the creation of the concept of being. In its proper sense, it is only that stage of the process which is based on the operations on existential judgements in form of a negative predication about the relations between content and existence. Thus, we conceptualize the structure of reality, extract that relation and make it more apparent as a certain type of (relational) identity.

¹⁵ It is not necessary to become familiar with all kinds of beings in particular metaphysical disciplines to create such a universal idea of being, as it is not by abstraction that the idea of being as being is created, but as, first and foremost, the result of separation (abstractionism in its most radical form leads to idealism, which can be clearly seen in case of Hegel, who deprived the abstracted being of all determination and identified it with nothingness). A quasi-inductive process of conceptualizing concrete (but unrecognized as such) content of being is here secondary in relation to separation, which results in the cognitive content of direct existential judgements to be formed into the idea of being as being.

as the object of the entire theory of being, then we accentuate the essential aspect of the concept of being (naturally not separate from existence!). This happens because in metaphysical theories occur these whose objects refer in a specific way to the thematic aspect of reality. Yet making statements about the reality becomes possible only as far as we cognize the existent (*unumquodque est cognoscibile in quantum est ens actu*). Being as being constitutes a relational identity of the concrete content of essence and being, united according to the analogy of proper proportion. The theory of being is sometimes accused that its assumed concept of being and aspect of cognition lead to a static treatment of reality. But the concept of actualization, present in all contingent world (from creating to improving), allows in the theory of being to express and to explain the entire dynamics of the world and the human being. This is naturally done in metaphysical categories, acknowledging in particular the cognitive activity of man and his self-determination (free will).

Being as the subject of metaphysics may be made apparent by parallel concepts: the so-called strict transcendentals, which at the same time constitute the transcendental properties of being. They are the result of cognitive revealing of the thematic content of being, by regarding it in particular relations. When we regard being in itself in an absolute and positive manner, then a “thing” arises, or, negatively, “oneness.” When we regard it in relation to another being—“separate,” in relation to the act of cognition—“truth,” and in relation to an act of will—“good.” The acquisition of these transcendentals is not limited only to operations on the content of the concept of being; it is also connected to the constant cognitive returning to reality. One could, therefore, say that the entire process of acquiring strictly transcendental concept is mainly the analysis of data contained in judgements concerning reality, in the aspect of being as being. This is why creating strict transcendentals simultaneously constitutes the acquisition of the so-called first principles of being, and in the phenomenological aspect—first principles of thought.

If one distinguishes the object of the theory of being at the point of departure (the area of inquiry) from the object of the already constructed explanatory theory, then the formal object remains the same for the entire theory of being—being as being.¹⁶ On the other hand,

¹⁶ Long ago the phrase *ens in communi* was used. Some, referring to Aristotle, perceive the absence of unity in the conceptualization of general metaphysics.

the object given to explanation in general metaphysics is any being accessible to internal or external experience, and in other discipline of the theory of being—particular types of being.¹⁷ One, first of all, distinguishes material beings in the aspect of change, material-spiritual beings (rational) in the social and culture formative aspect, as well as human actions or human artefacts in the axiological aspect. All types of being can be reduced to four: persons, substances, characteristics and purely relational beings—cognition, love, morality (assuming the acts of cognition and will), as well as the society. Another kind of relational beings are intentional ones, i.e. originally subjectified in acts of cognition. The first two kinds of beings (substantial) exist as the subject, while the others (accidental) only within the subject. Therefore, the proper object of the theory of being is not constituted by objectified abstractions, idealizations and constructs.

Ad 2°. From what has been said so far, it is already apparent that the language of the theory of being differs in character from the language of other kinds of knowledge. Furthermore, it is difficult to fully determine semiotically. Although in terms of its analytic properties it is close to the language of formal sciences, it is, at the same time, characterized by an integral and almost extreme realism. It concerns the qualitative side of reality, but simultaneously it grants the ontic and cognitive priority to the general-existential aspect. It genetically

It is at the same time etiology, or a wisdom-based theory of the ultimate causes of being, ontology, a theory of being in general or the first principles (properties) of being, or finally theology, or the theory of the Absolute. Yet despite the fact that one can distinguish in metaphysics groups of etiological, ontological and theological theses, they all concern being as being in general. They indicate at different stages of explanation (in different but analogical orders) that thanks to which reality is being as being: in the order of existence (internal complexity of essence and existence), in the order of changeable essences (the complexity of form and matter, or the complexity of substance and accidents) and in the order of the changes themselves (the complexity of acts and possibility). The Absolute as such is not the object of general metaphysics, but the ultimate external argument (the efficient, pattern and purposeful cause) of reality in the order of being.

¹⁷ In the internal experience we conceptualize only our own acts and the “personal-I,” i.e. the self which subjectifies “my” acts in the aspect of existence, not of content (nature). I therefore conceptualize that I am, not who I am: “... *experitur enim unusquisque seipsum esse qui intelligit; ... ipse idem homo est, qui percipit se et intelligere et sentire ...*” (S. Th. I, 76, 1).

originates from and is based upon common language, yet at the same time it employs terminology with highly specialist semiotic functions.¹⁸ And finally, it uses terms of broadest range, and simultaneously endows them with rich content. In order to reconcile these oppositions and to solve associated problems, a doctrine adequate to the language of the theory of being has been developed: of analogy and participation, of transcendentals and necessary truths.

What is first and foremost analogical in the theory of being is the inner state of concrete being (to put it simply: analogical, or similar in some real proportion, despite a fundamental difference. Hence the name—analogy of appropriate proportionality). There, in an essential manner, the elements—factors of being are assigned to one another according to appropriate proportions, essentially different, yet in some sense identical as constituting a “relational” ontic unity. In every being, concrete content and existence (the non-identical elements) unite in an essential manner. All such pairs of content and existence, though unique, are in a certain sense identical, since existence always plays the same role in relation to content (actualizes, or realizes it) and content in relation to existence (limits and multiplies it). Thus being regarded in itself is analogical, which constitutes the basis of inter-being analogy (the participation of some beings within others). In consequence, all of the reality constitutes a system of analogical necessary relation, or an analogical unity, ultimately based on identical function (towards one another) of existence and essence in every being.¹⁹

The analogical structure of all reality, or, more precisely, the analogical manner of being of everything, also creates a unified hierarchy of beings, based on the relation of participation of every partial existence in the Absolute Existence. This is called the transcendental participation of all beings in the Absolute, or their dependence upon It as the Efficient, Pattern and Purposeful Cause. In this way, analogy and participation in being are a differently regarded, yet identical system of ontic relations.

¹⁸ Herein lies the reason that some may think that they can understand the theses of the theory of being without suitable preparation. To the contrary, a lot of effort in the study of the history of metaphysical concepts and the theory of being is required to use its language with correct understanding.

¹⁹ Of course, not only of this premise, but all the other premises, such as, for instance, possibility and act, matter and form, substance and accident.

Ontic analogies are possible which are based on necessary relations different than the relation of essence and existence. It even became apparent that the fundamental form of the necessary relation of being which gives a foundation for analogy is the composition of possibility and act, as all other forms of ontic composition (e.g. essence and existence, matter and form, substance and accidents) can be regarded as a relation of possibility and an act.

A type of analogy of appropriate proportionality is the transcendental analogy which relates, without limits, to the entirety of the range of being. It is based purely on transcendental relations, i.e. necessary relations which constitute being itself. Hence, they reach as far as something is a being.²⁰ The identification of these relations with being leads to extremely important consequences. Since the transcendentals encompass in their sense transcendental necessary determinations and the instance of existence, they “imply” the most general realist judgements, which state the principles of being, i.e.: identity, non-contradiction, determination, rationality and purpose. The principle of the transcendental analogy or the participation of being turns out to be just another formulation of the principle of (sufficient) reason of being. Thus to adequately explain reality in the metaphysical aspect, one needs to employ transcendental analogy, i.e. to use terminology which expresses analogical information. The analogy of being must be the basis for the analogy of cognition (not only philosophical) and the analogy of linguistic expression. Thus in the theory of being, the analogical terms must be understood in such a way so that they reflect the ontic analogy. Within the analogical concept, there must occur necessary relational unity of what is common and fundamental for all the designata (source) and that which is realized in particular designata (targets).²¹

Thus from the semantic side, the language of the theory of being is mostly analogical-transcendental. The most fundamental terms

²⁰ It is said (L. Wittgenstein) that the limits of language we use determine the limits of the world we speak of. It seems that a mutual co-dependence occurs here—a realist philosopher should, above all, adjust his language to the aspect and range of reality he speaks of.

²¹ The analogy of attribution, which can be regarded as an amalgamation of many concepts (including one which is proper and the other remaining in some relation with it) in one universal term, is not being discussed here. Such an analogy is not really used in metaphysical cognition.

encompass in their range all of reality, i.e. all beings, but regarded in necessary, inner-being and inter-being analogical relations. This does not happen only to the transcendentals. In the theory of being, the universals also become somehow analogical-transcendental, as they pertain to concrete beings with all their qualities, not merely in some respect. Therefore, one can distinguish as if three groups of designata: elements-factors of being, particular beings and the system of relations between all of these designata. The reference to the second group occurs through regarding the analogical relations which take place between the elements of the first group. The reference of the terms to the inter-being relations occurs on the basis of analogical regarding of the designate of the first two groups. The designata of the theory of being do not therefore constitute a multiple-theory array of beings, but a particular two-level structure of analogically assigned pairs. In consequence, all the transcendentals are semantically connected to such an extent that not only is it difficult to perform terminological deduction, but it is also impossible to establish the absolute succession of their creation (without the necessity of revision and supplementation). Building a conceptual apparatus most frequently involves a multi-aspectual development (enriching clarification) of the content of terms, not only by the way of analysis, but also in the light of the data of metaphysical experience. For this reason, definitions—particularly in metaphysics—do not fulfil the criterion of translatability. They are partial terms, deictic (in the broad sense) and operations based on differentiations and comparisons of the sense of metaphysical terminology to the terminology of common or scientific language.

To supplement the comments so far concerning the object and the language of the theory of being, several explanations in the matter of necessary truths are presented below. General theses of the theory of being possess the characteristics of analytical, and at the same time concrete statements, thus they concern the real world and are irrefutable. This comes from the fact that they refer above all to necessary aspects of being (on the plane of existence or essence). These aspects may be general, adequate and regarded by the intellect in an apodictic manner (indubitable). The acts of intellectual intuition (particularly the repeatable ones) concerning the simple necessary relations are neither a sudden revelation (stumbling upon an idea, a flash of inspiration), nor an agglomeration of contingent, disconnected

observations, but a suitably prepared (particularly through a precise indication of the object of cognition and well-defined abstractions) reading (*intus legere*) of the holistically and directly regarded situation with objective obviousness. In this act of intuition, the intellect as if simultaneously thinks and perceives in a sensory manner. Therefore, this is not an *a priori* or primordial, thus unreflective cognition, but an empirically-intellectual one, which is based on the observations of the intellectual conceptualization.²² In order to eliminate potential mistakes, a control procedure is employed in relation to the linguistic formulation of the effect of this intuition. This procedure may be concisely termed as the demonstration of the analytical character of the statement. One should also add that not only such necessary truths appear in the theory of being. One can also acquire necessary truths through deducing them from necessary truths on the basis of formal-logical relations or object relations (for instance, the only cause of a given state of affairs).

Ad 3^o. Within the theory of being, the establishing of the object of investigations and the assumed aim of cognition set the procedure of explanation and justification. The world or its typical fragments, regarded intellectually, undergoes a reductive analysis on the generally-existential plane, which constitutes, at the same time, an aspect which unified cognition acquired in the entirety of the theory of being. Such analysis aims towards the ultimate (in the aspect of being) explanation of reality. The reasoning employed here is, most of the time, of an intuitive-reductive character.²³ It is a variety of theoretical explanation: to analyze the state of objects, one searches for the ultimate

²² The linguistic formulations of the results of these acts have the character of real definitions. They are similar to what Czeżowski calls an analytical description. See T. Czeżowski, "O metodzie opisu analitycznego," in T. Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne* (Toruń: Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1958), pp. 187–207 (or Toruń: Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1969², pp. 136–142).

²³ Intellectual intuition is above all necessary in conceptualizing the state of things which undergo explanation. But the reasoning itself, is based on necessary material relations, uses this intuition. The intellect convinces the reason (or itself as reason) to seek the premises and states that the found premises are the right ones. Only the intellect may solve the question which it itself formulated. Hence the statement of Thomas Aquinas that in metaphysics "... *maxime observatur modus intellectus*," and that "... *ratio cinatio est intellectuali considerationi proponquissima ...*" (*In Boeth. De Trinit. VI, 1*).

and irrefutable arguments in the inner structure of being as being. This procedure is remote from rationalist speculation or extra-rational contemplation. It is yet different from the traditional intuitive-deductive procedure, according to which the most general principles are discovered through intuition (as a result of an analysis and intellectual reading of the nature of reality), and the remaining philosophical statements are deduced from them. Despite appearances the intuitive-reductive method does not become similar to the modern types of philosophical reflection, where one reductively searches for the necessary transcendental (but a priori and subjective) conditions of the possibility of such intentional acts (given in consciousness), to then deduce statements about the structural features of the objects of these acts. Realist philosophy is not about explaining the results of cognition according to the conditions of the subject, but of the object.

The explanatory operations in the theory of being amount mainly to clarifying the inspected aspect of being of reality, indicating the only arguments which do not contradict given states of being and presenting negative arguments as the support of the statements. The clarification of the aspect of being of reality is conducted through the analysis of the data of the sensory-intellectual conceptualization of the world, in light of being as being. In this way, the informative content of the concept of being is explicated and enriched in various statements which express the properties of being as such, or its particular types. The laws of being acquired in this way designate as if the deepest nature of being and its dynamics.

The most characteristic metaphysical explanation is the indication of the only argument which would represent the given state of being as ontically non-contradictory, on the basis of the inner complexity of that being. One assumes the ontological intelligibility of reality, yet this is not a hypothesis, but the necessary condition of the theoretical, metaphysical cognition. This manner of explanation is used particularly in relation to causality. Thus to ultimately explain reality conceptualized as contingent existence of analogical (participating) beings, one has to assume (as the only ontic argument) the existence of the Absolute, i.e. being existing by necessity. Within such being, there is no real compound of essence and existence, as existence itself is its essence and other, partial beings exists with it, and there the analogy of being finds its crowning. In any other case, the

fact of unnecessary existence of various contents would not be comprehensible.

The negative arguments in support of the statements demonstrate that the given statement cannot be refuted, as its negation is either an evident absurdity, or leads to contradiction, or bears consequences which do not correspond to metaphysical facts.²⁴ Such justifications of the indicated arguments which explain the states of being are not always irrefutable. This happens not for formal reasons (in this respect non-direct evidence are just as correct as direct ones), but because reality may sometimes be difficult to determine ontologically, in a way clear in relation to content. In the field of analogical cognition, there is no deduction in the strict sense of the world. Then the use of negation does not clearly enough indicate the range of opposed terms (hence, despite the use of negation, they can only remain contrary, not contradictory). This is one of the reasons for the occurrence of hypotheses in the theory of being. Moreover, it sometimes happens that certain metaphysical facts cannot be explained in an irrefutable manner. This is why hypotheses are sometimes postulated, which, of course, need to be coherent in light of other theses of the theory of being and have an appropriate justification.

The criterion of common sense also plays an important role in refuting statements, yet it has to be supported by suitable experience in the historical-philosophical field (*historia philosophiae est ancilla philosophiae*). Sometimes the history of a given philosophical thesis best illustrates its epistemological value, particularly when one considers the consequences to which it had led. Already the ancients used this method for refuting statements, and today we have much a richer history of philosophy and methodology of science. Moreover, one can also rely on the data from the history of philosophical doctrines in the positive validation of a thesis. This peculiar historicism, already

²⁴ Reduction to contradiction does not always derive two contradictory statements from the negation of the proven thesis. It may constitute a reduction of this negation to a contradiction with some already-existing thesis of the system, or a demonstration in a discussion with an adversary, that its consequence is being rejected by him. It is more difficult, however, to affirm the inconsistency of the consequence with metaphysical facts, as an extended and complex inference frequently occurs between the theses of metaphysics and the data of metaphysical experience. Philosophical statements are most frequently refuted through a contrary exemplification.

practiced by Aristotle, is sometimes called doxographic induction. It is based on reaching an acceptance of a given statement as a result of a critical comparison of the views on the matter so far.²⁵

The aforementioned methods of explanation and argumentation frequently occur together, or are supplemented by a coordinating reflection which controls all discursive operations. This is also accompanied by analytic and explicatory procedures on language. Independently of the stance one takes towards the role of common language in metaphysics, one needs to extrapolate from such language everything which can be useful in proper postulating and solving of metaphysical problems. Moreover, reduction of statement of the theory of being to strictly analytical sentences has an important controlling function in the process of their justification. This allows demonstrating the highly analytic character of language of the theory of being and it makes its structure more compact. Although particular disciplines of the theory of being do not assume the form of deductive systems, the order of the justification of statements is not voluntary. Frequently, evidential or explicative dependencies occur between statements.

²⁵ This historicism is used not only for the acceptance or rejection of theses, but also for formulating problems. The aporetic way of thinking is also appreciated in the theory of being. It is based on postulating a problem on the grounds of its history, in an honest discussion with the prior stances. E. Gilson particularly strongly stresses that the history of philosophy should be inspected in a way which distances the contingent moments in philosophizing (opportunistic temporal, personal), and discovers the deeper current of single impersonal and timeless philosophy.

SCIENTIFIC, PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL VISIONS OF MAN

S. Kamiński, "Naukowa, filozoficzna i teologiczna wizja człowieka," in Jan Paweł II, *Redemptor hominis: Tekst i komentarze*, ed. Z.J. Zdybicka (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1982), pp. 75–87; reprinted in: S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować? Studia z metodologii filozofii klasycznej*, prepared for publication by T. Szubka (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1989), pp. 279–291.

Not without reason it is said that we live in times when, despite the messages of humanism, the superiority of the knowledge about world over the knowledge about man is apparent more starkly than ever before. However, the dichotomy "world-man" is not as precise and radical as it would seem at a first glance, as the world also encompasses man, who is sometimes called a microcosm. Moreover, the world is cognized—at least according to some philosophers—always from the perspective of man, who decides what form it will assume. But it is man, though fundamentally recognized as greatly dignified and the subject of so many books, who is the least explained element of the universe, and in consequence constitutes a mystery. He is somewhat underspecified, as not sufficiently distinguished from the rest of the world, or too weakly connected to it. Related only to his immediate surroundings, he has not been explained in a sufficiently unified manner and from the most universal perspective.

It is thus difficult not to admit that the vision of man most frequently proposed by general theories seems incomplete or not sufficiently integrated. Instead it constitutes a fragmentary and contingent agglomerate of aspectual perspectives presented by: pluralist theology, differentiated philosophy and specialist sciences. Now without reason

does M. Heidegger complain that never so often and never so much has been said about man, but never has our knowledge been more limited as to what man is. At the same time, the growing difficulties of everyday human life require a fuller and more unified knowledge about man and his place in the universe of existence. Otherwise he will not be able to overcome the difficulties that modern civilization brings and bear the constantly growing responsibility for the reality he shapes.

Stating the burning need to construct a fuller, more universal and at the same time an integrated theory of man, one cannot negate that he is being investigated through many methods and, in consequence, is the subject of many types of knowledge. Such a state of affairs creates numerous problems. We are, above all, interested in the way to combine the scientific, philosophical and theological visions of man, in order to explain him holistically, in a unified manner, and in the way sufficient for validation of the foundations of a worldview. To solve this dilemma, it first seems essential to establish the relation in which the different kinds of knowledge about man remain with one another. This is where we begin our reflections.

The different types of theoretical cognition concerning man are usually reduced to three types: scientific, philosophical and theological. This does not mean that knowledge within these particular types is homogeneous enough to constitute well founded cognitive categories. Yet the traditional differentiation into natural sciences, philosophy and theology seems sufficiently convenient to perform a methodological characterization of the basic theories of man and to make an attempt at defining the principles for their theoretical and practical unification.

There are two types of scientific explanation of who man is—a biological and a humanist one. The former case involves a synthetic description of the natural equipment of man and the laws of his behavior against the background of the environment, yet in distinction from the world of plants and animals. Of particular focus become the physical and organic structure, as well as the functioning of the organism in life environment and personal development and evolution of man.¹ Through the use of this knowledge and additional assisting

¹ Here one also distinguishes the so-called natural anthropology, which treats of the changeability of man as a biological species in time and space, and

data—both scientific and humanist—medicine is created, the science concerned with health and illness of man.

The humanist theories of man fit mainly into the frames of psychology, sociology, ethnology and the history of culture. They regard man not as a special organism, but as a conscious (personal) subject of culture-producing activities. Psychology involves investigating principles of the system of dispositions and spiritual processes (directly unobservable from the outside), i.e. cognition, drives, emotions, and the self-conscious “I”. Sociology describes laws which govern people who participate in community life, i.e. the laws of forming social organizations and culture within a given socio-cultural environment. Ethnology (in the Anglo-Saxon world called social or cultural anthropology, or even simply anthropology) strives toward capturing cultural and social manifestations of peoples and tribes who usually remain at a low level of civilizational development.² And finally, historians of culture or its particular fields recreate the history (especially fundamental changes) of culture-forming activities of particular individuals and social groups. Here, the acquired knowledge presupposes the abstract understanding of man, so that the actual human actions, artefacts and their relations in the course of the changes are recreated as faithfully as possible. History is extremely important for the knowledge of man, as the historical timeline of the cultural life of particular people and groups co-forms the human individuality.³

In describing the mutual relation of biological and humanist knowledge about man one needs to consider that not every psychology, or even sociology or ethnology is a strictly humanist disciple. The so-called physiological psychology or the naturalist trends in psychology reduce (partially or completely) psychological structures and functions to the structures and functions of the body (ontological reduction) or, at least explain the mental life according to biological life

in particular, of the racial differences. An approach closer to the humanities is represented by the idea of anthropology as a science about man constituting a biological ground for social phenomena (J. Czekanowski).

² Compare, for instance, R. Girtler, *Kulturanthropologie* (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1979).

³ Compare, for instance, *Historische Prozesse*, ed. K.G. Faber, Ch. Meuer (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1979). The problem of man cannot be solved without the knowledge of history, but one must not treat the human personality only as a result of historical condition.

(methodological reduction). Similar biologism may occur in social sciences. This is related to a more general principle of naturalism which states that there is not (or there should not be) a significant difference between natural sciences and the humanities with regard to the object of investigation or the method of explanation. On the other hand, the anti-naturalists believe that especially in history, but also in other areas of the humanities, it is rare to reach sufficiently validated and non-trivial general conclusions, and that there is a significant difference between humanist interpretation and natural sciences' explanation. The difference derives from the fact that interpretation involves introspection, understanding and value judgements—hence the difference does not merely reside in the degree of accuracy, but is qualitative. Man as the object of the humanities is characterized by the conscious and not entirely determined by inner factors (freedom) choice of purpose and means of action. Moreover, human behavior is a complex event, influenced by an enormous number of factors, none of which can be a priori omitted as insignificant.

Therefore, it seems that the irreplaceable theoretical and practical value of the biological sciences in creating a full vision of man must be appreciated, yet there is no ground for reducing the humanities only to their naturalist forms. A human person may and should be treated not only as an organism but also as a conscious and free subject who creates culture. We are most convinced here by history. But even the fullest scientific vision of man is not sufficient for his adequate cognition.⁴ Life poses questions concerning the ultimate arguments for human being or its existential position and sense in the entirety of the reality. Philosophical anthropologies are the disciplines which desire to solve this problem in the deepest, fullest and sometimes irrefutable way. Let us now inquire into the foundations of their aims and inspect whether it is justifiable.

First of all, philosophical anthropologies do not form a single type of philosophical cognition. They can be reduced to two most basic categories: the crowning supplementation of natural sciences concerning man and the autonomous philosophical discipline based either on the analysis and description of human content (thus self-experience and

⁴ Already L. Wittgenstein (*Philosophical Investigations*, II, 14) noted that the experimental method was supposed to free us from tormenting problems, but the problem and the method develop in the likeness of two twisted lines.

self-understanding), or on the interpretation of his semiotic artefacts, or, finally, constituting the so-called classical specialist metaphysics. Based on the methods employed, it is convenient to refer to the former type as scientific, and the two variations of the latter as subjectively-epistemological and objectively-metaphysical.⁵

In the latter case, anthropology is practiced on the basis of objective perception of the human being (and its significant existential properties) and from the experience of one's own "self" as a directly given subject which reveals from oneself the so-called "my" acts, which it then explains metaphysically, i.e. through the reductive indication of ultimate (in the ontic order) arguments. The subjective-epistemological type of anthropology is based on such a concept of philosophy where the most fundamental and original cognition consists of the result of the analysis of content or a stream of consciousness. This result takes the form of eidetic overviews of what is given, or the realization of one's being in the world; sometimes hidden deeper sense is sought in what is given directly, or encoded by us in sign systems. Finally, the scientific anthropology encompasses many models of philosophizing. Some limit their investigations to a critical analysis of the natural sciences about man, trying to determine their cognitive value (this is some kind of epistemological meta-anthropology). Most frequently, however, scientific anthropology generalizes, synthesizes or ontologically interprets various kinds of scientific knowledge of human matters. This is done on the level of one principal discipline (for instance psychology), yet in a meta-disciplinary manner, according to an a priori accepted leading or keystone idea.⁶ Let us first attempt to establish mutual relations between the three philosophical anthropologies characterized above, in order to assess

⁵ For a broader discussion of the different types of philosophical anthropology, see the study S. Kamiński, "Z metafizologii człowieka," in S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować? Studia z metodologii filozofii klasycznej*, prepared for publication by T. Szubka (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1989), pp. 249–262.

⁶ Out of the most recent works which contain plenty of anthropological data, the following could be mentioned as examples: J. Agassi, *Towards a Rational Philosophical Anthropology* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1977); L. Bogliolo, *Antropologia filosofica*, vol. 1–2 (Roma: Città Nuova, 1971–1972; 1974⁴); J. Szaskiewicz, *Filosofia dell'uomo* (Roma: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1981); J.A. Merino *Antropologia filosófica* (Madrid: Editorial Reus, 1982); B. Mondin, *Antropologia filosofica* (Roma: Pontificia Università Urbaniana, 1983); M. Landmann, *Fundamental-Anthropologie* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag H. Grundmann, 1979, 1984²).

their value as tools for the acquisition of the fullest possible natural vision of man.

Scientific philosophy does not really reach beyond the cognition of specialist sciences. Assuming the form of meta-scientific investigations upon the form and the conclusions of the sciences of man, it is not capable of solving, in an ontically grounded way, the problems concerning human nature, the existential position of man in the universe, or the meaning of life. Yet these are the problems which life poses for philosophy.

Philosophical anthropology, treated as a generalizing and synthesizing supplement of the humanist and biological science of man, is similarly inefficient. It was conceived out of the enormous appreciation for scientific achievements and the tacit acceptance of epistemological monism, which states that only rational knowledge patterned on natural theory deserves recognition. Yet this kind of cognition is unable to provide an ultimate answer to the persistent question: why does man exist, if he does not have to exist, while his life frequently seems tragic, or even senseless. To be more specific, it is even impossible to formulate philosophically important questions in the language of natural sciences. For this, a particular conceptual apparatus is necessary, which does not arise as a result of a higher degree of universalization of scientific terminology. A special (in its entirety) method of solving these problems is also essential, which can be fragmentarily encountered in other kinds of knowledge.⁷

In any case, the cognition of man in his different aspects does not immediately result in knowledge which would holistically, deeply, and from the ontic perspective explain the existential identity and the position of a human person. Polyscientific theory of man cannot possess either a uniform master language or a method which would allow for a unification of various methods of specialist sciences. Therefore, it is not adequate for solving objective problems which overstep the boundaries of these sciences. This does not, of course, negate the possibility and the need for interdisciplinary research, or forming

⁷ The language and the method of knowledge must be adjusted to its determined formal object and objective purpose. If it is to solve its particular problems, philosophical cognition must concern man in an aspect different than in the natural sciences, i.e. the existential one. It is not sufficient—as some philosophers of consciousness claim—for anthropology to be a synthesis of scientific visions of the world in the horizon of subjectivity.

comprehensive sciences of man. But anthropology as a purely scientific comprehensive knowledge can only demonstrate, in an ordered and well-organized manner, solutions which undoubtedly reach beyond these disciplines, and which are frequently, *explicite* or *implicite*, assumed in their external database.

And finally, even if philosophical anthropology were to draw only generally accepted facts from the specialist disciplines and try to explain them by seeking their ontological interpretations, it would not be able to reach a uniform epistemological and methodological character, and as such solve strictly philosophical problems. There are no theoretically neutral facts, able to be given to explanation in different types of knowledge. Speaking more precisely, facts are described and problems solved in language already dependent on the language of a theory wherein one attempts to explain these facts and solve these problems. To do things differently means to break methodological rules and reach illusory solutions.

Meta-objective ways of practicing philosophy of man defend its autonomous status and individual character, yet do not guarantee cognition sufficient objective, actual and transcendental nature.

This happens, among others, in a kind of philosophy which involves a deep and multilateral interpretation of human artefacts, fixed in sign systems. Anthropocentrism (and frequently also irrationalism) of these conceptions suits the mentality of many contemporary philosophers, but narrowing the experience only to self-experience, self-understanding or an understanding intuition of sign systems, one receives an interesting, yet incomplete theory of man, or falls into subjectivism or relativism. One acquires a vision a particular "self" only from the perspective of the "self," while a human being is also a part of the universe of being, which exists not only because it has been realized or to supplement our experience or fulfil desires.⁸

The situation is not remedied through the employment of the transcendental method (appropriately modified to guarantee realism). It asks to search for the necessary conditionings of the subjective human experience, which only allows for finding the subjective horizon which makes this experience possible and for demonstrating

⁸ One must not also forget about the tendency of man towards a projection of ideas and instinctual reflexes, or about the fact that everyone perceives and determines himself through one's own reflection in another person (S. Freud).

the impossibility of negating the aforementioned conditions (as they are guaranteed by the very structure of the cognitive act). It does not, however, allow for ultimate objective explanation of human reality.

There is a lack of sufficient arguments to acknowledge sign systems as fundamental reality, which could become the object of original philosophical experience. Signs are first and foremost a cognitive tool or a trace of human activity (something is a sign always for someone). Their interpretation is, therefore, conditioned by so many factors that it is difficult to avoid relativism and being fragmentary and temporal (hence, the “hermeneutic circle”). And finally, one cannot acknowledge as correct and adequate such an explanation of ontic aspects of human being which fundamentally originates in the so-called axiological experience. There, the dualism of beings and the world of values (or obligations) is presupposed. Yet more convincing arguments speak for the qualitatively-relational character of values rather than their ontic autonomy. This does not mean that axiological experience should be entirely rejected. It seems parental for ethics, which methodologically presupposes anthropology.⁹

For solving the problems posed by life, philosophy of man treated as explanation based on objective experience seems more adequate than the scientific and meta-objective one. Such philosophy would reach into the inner-ontic structure of man to fundamentally determine him and situate within the universe of being. This is not a particularization of general metaphysics, i.e. deducing anthropological

⁹ The axiological and ontological aspects are united in the philosophy of John Paul II. There, in order to perform a metaphysical analysis of man's morality, he analyses such deeds (human actions, not merely events) of man in which the human person finds fulfilment. [Concerning the latter, compare Kamiński's methodological comments formulated in the discussion of the book *Osoba i czyn*: S. Kamiński, “Jak filozofować o człowieku?,” *Analecta Cracoviensia* 5–6 (1973–1974), pp. 73–79 – Editor's comment]. The meta-subjective conceptualizations of the philosophy of man are presented by, for instance: A.C. van Peursen, *Antropologia filozoficzna*, trans. T. Mieszkowski, T. Zembrzuski (Warszawa: PAX, 1971); M Holz, *Mensch und Menschheit* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag H. Grundmann, 1973); M. Fleischer, *Hermeneutische Anthropologie* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1976); A. Diemer, *Philosophische Anthropologie* (Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1978); A. Ignatow, *Heidegger und die philosophische Anthropologie* (Hanstein: Forum Academicum in d. Verlagsgruppe Athenäum, Hain, Scriptor, 1979); E. Coreth, *Was ist der Mensch?* (Innsbruck: Tyrolia Verlagsanstalt Gm, 1973, 1980³); *The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condition*, ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka and D. Reidel (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983).

statements from metaphysical theses. Neither does it employ (at least as typical) explanation through an ordinary subsumption of the observed anthropological data to the laws of the theory of being. In this type of the philosophy of man, the foundations are the observation data which ought to be constitutive and typical only to the human being and its relations with other beings, as well as framed within an ontic horizon. This will be constituted by, above all, human cognitive, experiential behavior and strives, as well as the artefacts produced by such actions. They would also include the situations related to the “self,” or what originates from it as a subject and is given in self-experience.

This “self” given to me from the existential side is immanent and, at the same time, transcends the acts subjected to metaphysical explanation which reveals the human nature. Moreover, the existential philosophers have correctly accentuated the importance of experiencing fear and various inner conflicts (for instance between authenticity and freedom on the one hand and the need for self-improvement and happiness on the other) for the deeper knowledge of man. Ultimate explanation is also called for in case of the processes of ontic formation of the human being and its relation to the past and the future, and in particular its existence in the perspective of death. Finally, the duality of man’s actions (spiritual and bodily), which transcend the categories of time and history, gives birth to particularly profound problems of the unity of a person, fundamentally unchanging human nature and the paths of self-realization of man.¹⁰

All this data serves as a basis for solving metaphysical problems and creating a metaphysical theory of the genesis, structure and dynamics (the existential position in the universe of beings and the ultimate meaning) of the human being. The most theoretical explanation also requires references to general metaphysics or natural philosophy. Anthropology is not the first philosophical discipline, as it is, for instance, regarded by certain existentialists, for whom it is,

¹⁰ An attempt at a Thomist treatment of the philosophy of man is contained in, for instance, *De homine: Studia hodiernae anthropologiae: Acta VII Congressus Thomistici Internationalis*, vol. 1–2 (Romae: Officium Libri Catholici, 1970–1972); *L’anthropologie di Saint Thomas*, ed. N.A. Luyten (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1974); “The Human Person,” *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 53 (1979) and M.A. Krąpiec, *Ja – człowiek* (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1974, 1986³).

first and foremost, the analysis and the description of human subjectivity in its particular way of existing and understanding experience. Such a path will not lead to the realistic and ultimate explanation of man, and thus will not solve the problems posed by life.

In order to completely fulfil the human intellectual interests, philosophy of man had to acquire transcendental knowledge, which would overcome all categories (of quality and quantity), and be, at least in some cases, irrefutable.¹¹ To reach this goal, an appropriate aspect of the investigations into the object and the adequate method needs to be selected. The human facts may be the point of origin for this type of anthropology, as long as they are framed in an ontic perspective, and, in some cases, transcendently or by the way of necessity. Only then, problems significant for anthropology may be solved. This is done through the use of intellectual intuition, which can conceptualize, in an evident manner, the simple states of being (a particular analytical description) and correctly pose the question about the ontic arguments of those beings. Explanation itself is based on reductive reasoning, which is based not on logical relation of result, but on necessary ontic relations established in the theory of being. Unquestionable facts are explained by such factors of being which cannot be negated without falling into nonsense or contradiction with the theses of the theory of being accepted so far. Sometimes this demonstration requires extended reasoning, as we are dealing here with highly abstract and analogical concepts. For this reason, negation should be used very carefully here.¹²

The only sought-for ontic arguments are usually the inner-being arguments, and the inter-being relations which are based on them. In this way, anthropology unites with general metaphysics, integrating philosophical thinking and allowing for the cognition of essentially unchangeable ontic (metaphysical) structure of man, which is independent of circumstances (absolute). It also allows for the cognition of the hierarchical system of values, whose violation would

¹¹ The necessity of theses is not therefore purely linguistic, or reached only through a special cognitive faculty. It is of material-analytical character, as its basis is constituted by the necessity of the state of things, conceptualized irrefutably by intellectual intuition and regarded as analytic through language.

¹² The negation of analogical concepts does not always provide clear-cut concepts. For this reason, in philosophy statements are frequently refuted though a contradictive exemplification.

strike directly at the human dignity. Speaking concisely, the human person is ontically complex, i.e. potentialized, reasonable and free, and thus capable of development (particularly in the context of social life), self-aware, self-establishing and responsible. Such determination reconciles ontic unity and the unchanging nature of man with the changing adaptation to the conditions of life and the duality of the struggles and actions of man. And finally, placing man (contingent, but free) in the ontic perspective of the Absolute, allows to establish the principles of self-actualization and self-improvement of the human person (its moral and religious dimension) and indicate to man the only path which leads to his happiness and involves, above all, respecting the dignity of a human person and abiding by the proper hierarchy of humanist values.

Despite such a far reaching explanation, thanks to which both the anthropological foundations of a worldview and the external base for the humanities can be rationally justified, no philosophy of man fully solves all the problems posed by the reflection over the data acquired from ordinary, common observation. In the aspect of innate wisdom, which *nota bene* usually assimilates the paradigms of religious thinking, the mysteries concerning the relation between man and God become clearly apparent. Why do people, with the pettiness, or even meanness of some of their actions, possess such great aspirations and enormous dignity? Why are they so internally torn and suffer so greatly in a physical and mental manner (because of, for instance, unfulfilled sense of justice), while God is at the same time omnipotent and good? For the explanation of such facts, theological anthropology is necessary. Only the Revelation teaches us of the ultimate arguments about the discord, as well as the corruption of human nature and the role that befalls man in God's plans—"the secret of man is only truly revealed in the mystery of the Incarnate Word" (Vatican Council II).

Theological anthropology is a disciple strictly connected with Christology (they mutually condition one another), and is concerned with man in his historio-saving aspect from the perspective of (in the light of) Revelation.¹³ It shows the position of man in the world which

¹³ "The anthropological turn" in theology may also become apparent in the more anthropological treatment of the entire theology ("there is no theology which would not be anthropology"—K. Rahner), or even in the use of methodological

is not only created but directed by God, and explains that man—being the likeness and image of the One God in the Trinity—should answer God’s love with an attempt at uniting with Him (without the hope for the unification with God, man’s dignity would suffer). Human tragedies began with the original sin. Hence the inner contradiction of man, tragedies and so much evil in the world. But regarding the earthly life as a period of trial of one’s own vocation and the period of compensation for the committed wrongs, and perceiving the meaning of life to reside in salvation (the fullest development of man), we more adequately understand our existential role both in the ontological aspect and in the economy of God (the identity of human strivings and actions, fates of the world and the history of salvation). Comfort and help in reaching this difficult purpose of the human being is offered by God’s grace, especially realized through the community which is the Church.

The explications so far reject the possibility of logical contradictions between any types of true knowledge. Its different varieties seem to say different things about man, only because they consider his different aspects and make use of different sources. The argumentative explanatory statements are complementary, creating a system which can be homogenous in terms of a doctrine, but epistemologically and methodologically different. In order to make this more apparent, one should indicate the ordering arguments and the principles of making the different theories of man more harmonious and symbiotic.

It seems that the coherent unification of the different types of anthropological knowledge can be performed through a three-dimensional ordering. Such hierarchization takes place upon three axes: the permissible sources of knowledge, the indicated purpose, and the range of the formal object.

The first axis acknowledges theories which allow only the natural sources of cognition (starting from the external sensory experience,

anthropocentrism, typical to the philosophy of the subject (meta-objective philosophizing). For this reason, it is said that in theology there combines “anthropology related to God” with the “theology related to man”. It is also said that if the Bible is most of all “a Godly vision of man, not a human vision of God,” then theology which speaks of God and His saving work necessarily treats of man saved by God. Compare, for instance, *Anthropologie als Thema der Theologie*, ed. H. Fischer (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978); J. Auer, *Person* (Regensburg: Pustet Friedrich KG, 1979).

though inner experience, to the different kinds of intellectual intuition), or—to an increasingly greater degree—accommodate also supernatural sources (the Revelation).¹⁴ Accepting the thesis that supernatural cognition does not negate the natural one, but complements or improves it, there should be no logical contradiction between reliable natural knowledge and the supernatural or theological one. Theological anthropology can play the role of the negative standard for all the natural knowledge about man, or can adequately direct its use in life. However, in practice—philosophical perhaps, not scientific—one can accept theses (most frequently implicit in the presuppositions) whose consequences are directly opposed to knowledge which originates from the Revelation. Strictly speaking, there is no logical contradiction here, as the languages employed are different, yet there is most certainly psychological contradiction, i.e. in the stances assumed by the cognizing people, in one way or the other. Radically scientific or practical stance cannot be truly reconciled with a stance which acknowledges the cognitive value of the Revelation.

The range of the formal subject constitutes the foundation of locating the theory of man on the second axis. On the one end we find the theory which regards man in the most general manner and is most impoverished in terms of content. On the other end there is the most restrictive theory, yet richest in content. Undoubtedly, the most universalist explanation is given by the metaphysics of man, followed by the natural sciences, humanist sciences (together with scientific and meta-objective philosophy) and theology. The last one is differentiated in terms of its object on the basis of the kind of knowledge that it is based upon. It is necessary to know that theological anthropology can constitute a theory built over different kinds of philosophy, or even humanist disciplines.

This is also a good opportunity to turn attention to the methodological dependence of the sciences of man. Every less general anthropological theory explicitly or implicitly adopts certain theoretical premises from more universal theories. Simply speaking, every more detailed theory includes in its explanation the more general theories. This thesis is the basis for reductionist attempts in science,

¹⁴ The dichotomous division of sources into natural and supernatural is accentuated, as this dichotomy is particularly apparent and influences further hierarchizations.

i.e. operations which aim towards reducing fragments of a theory with a more complex object (with a more limited range, but with richer content) to a theory with a simpler object (taken in a more universal aspect). Thus, for instance, psychological theories are reduced to biological, and these, in turn, are reduced to physicochemical. However, the reduction of natural science to classical metaphysics is impossible, as the latter one investigates its object not only in the most general aspect, but also essentially different from the one practiced in the former (generally-existential).

The third axis accommodates different types of knowledge about man differentiated on the basis of their objective aim (*finis operis*). Such aim may for instance be: ordering description, explanation (universalization, theoretical explanation and ultimate explanation) and justification. Sometimes, aside from explanation, humanist interpretation and anticipation are also included, as well as understanding and evaluation. Justification may be further broken down, depending on the statements that it concerns. Simply speaking, anthropological theories are classified beginning from descriptive ones, through explanatory, to principally normative. Of course, methodological dependence may occur here as well, as human behavior is anticipated and normalized always according to already possessed descriptions and explanations.

The ordering of the different types of knowledge about man proposed above allows the perception of a certain unity in their variety, as well as mutual interdependencies. This determines the conditions for pluralism and symbiosis, and the proper epistemological functioning of particular theories of man. Thus the entirety of the anthropological cognition does not constitute the sum of individual theories. This does not rule out incompatibility between individual theories, but does not imply their logical contradiction.¹⁵ Harmonizing different types of knowledge seems possible on at least three aforementioned planes. Thus natural knowledge should be combined with the

¹⁵ Incompatibility may sometimes reveal itself only in certain fragments, as entire doctrines are not always sufficiently coherent. Thus, for instance, the descriptions of man presented by the philosophies of the subject are not fundamentally different from a theological characterization of a human person, but the theological explanations and the principles of human behavior are at an utter discord with the explanations and the principles proposed by those philosophies.

supernatural, descriptive with explanatory, and then with normative, scientific and philosophical. One must not, however (under the threat of a significant impoverishment of knowledge) reduce different formal objects, objective aims, or sources of knowledge. Under the threat of diminishing epistemological value, one also must not mix different types of knowledge about man, or change their epistemological and methodological categories.

The pluralism of anthropological methods and statements does not therefore imply that we have the right to arbitrarily choose methods and theses to suit a given cognitive operation. Every method should be suitably selected for the formal object of cognition and its objective aim, and every theory of man should function according to its designation. Different types of descriptive knowledge about man cannot thus serve as a deeper explanation, nor do they provide an adequate base for the justification of the norms for the upbringing of people. Statistically determined regularities in behavior cannot constitute the answer to the question why do people behave in that particular way, or, even more so, become the only argument for the axiological norm of proper behavior. The patterns of behavior of people require further theoretical explanations, which ultimately reach towards the ontic nature and dynamics of man. Only on this ground can one justify the correctness of axiological norms, and the norms of upbringing in particular. For instance, if lying is a statistically proven regularity, does this imply that lying should be accepted in the determined percentage? To the contrary, with regard for human dignity, one should be truthful.

Incorrectly understood pluralism of the knowledge about man becomes the cause for the errors in its functioning. This is why, if pluralism is to be understood correctly, one needs to distinguish the existence of various anthropological theories from their different cognitive roles. The harmonization and symbiosis concern not so much the existence of all sorts of different data about man, thus the connections between scientific, philosophical and theological knowledge, but the determination of how to employ different anthropologies and how to unite different kinds of anthropological cognition in their use and especially in the justifications of the foundations of a worldview. For instance, which kind of knowledge about man is epistemologically and methodologically suitable for a given situation? The presented panoramic view of anthropologies with regard to their tasks, origins,

dependencies and hierarchy allows proper understanding of the pluralism of the kinds of knowledge about man in its functioning.

It is worthwhile to caution, however, that today the fundamental cognition of man is frequently limited to generalizations, ordinary observations or self-reflection, i.e. to how everyday people act or how they envision acting (personality patterns may also be formed according to the practical needs of a social group). This would be proper only in the case of man being entirely determined in his behavior (would not possess will that would be free and at the same time undisturbed by the inner conflict or supported by the grace of God). Yet this is not how the matters stand, as evidenced by philosophical and theological anthropologies. For this reason, neither the typical behavior of man, nor the commonly accepted patterns should be the only base for all kinds of explanation as to who he is, or, in particular, who he should be.

DOES PHILOSOPHY SERVE THEOLOGY?

S. Kamiński, "Czy filozofia służy teologii?," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 33–34, no. 2 (1985–1986), pp. 2, s. 57–67; reprinted in: S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować? Studia z metodologii filozofii klasycznej*, prepared for publication by T. Szubka (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1989, pp. 373–380.

An affirmative albeit vague answer for the above question has already been given after a discussion in the patristic tradition (Clement of Alexandria, Hieronymus). But in the eleventh century, the debate was started anew as to whether philosophy (or more precisely, dialectics) constitutes the main tool of explanation and justification of the truths of faith. Peter Damian, in opposition to Berengar of Tours, believed that dialectics should be entirely submitted theological thinking—*philosophia est ancilla theologiae*. But the creators of scholasticism understood the function of philosophy in theology in a different way. Anselm of Canterbury wanted to use dialectics for the justification and understanding of truths of faith (as theology is *intellectus fidei*); he added, however, that understanding is reached also through faith (*fides quaerens intellectum*).¹ Yet it was commonly repeated after Saint Augustine: *intellige ut credas*, but simultaneously *crede ut intelligas*. When Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas theoretically differentiated natural cognition from the cognition from faith, thus autonomizing philosophy in relation to theology, then the service of the former towards the latter was more precisely defined. Philosophy ought to infallibly prepare to faith (supply the so-called *praeambula fidei*), provide verisimilitude for the revealed truths (give the so-called *rationes*

¹ Compare R. Campbell, "Anselm's Theological Method," *The Scottish Journal of Theology* 32 (1979), pp. 541–562, and K. Kienzler, *Glauben und Denken bei Anselm von Canterbury* (Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 1981).

convenientiae, but not *rationes necessariae* of dogmas), and grant the cognitive tools for formulating and ordering of theological cognition. This was the background of the thirteenth century apogee of speculative theology, i.e. theology mainly as philosophical explication and speculation on the content of the Revelation. Such a function of philosophy in theology was favored by the structure of the university studies at that time. The *atrium* (philosophical) faculty was the introductory stage for every faculty, and functioned in a particular servitude to the theological one.

The ancillary role of philosophy was diminished with the end of the Middle Ages and the increase in its autonomy and its internal breakage. The most influential theologian (and philosopher) of that time, J. Gerson was against the overuse of philosophical methods in theology. He believed that (Scotian) scholasticism sterilizes and formalizes theological cognition, which in its final phase should be of mystical character. In the modern times, philosophy's role in theology became even more unclear and unambiguous (apart from the period of modernization of scholasticism in the sixteenth and the beginning of seventeenth century, when Cajetan provided inducement for the rationalization of the mysteries of faith). This was due to the fact that, apart from philosophy, the natural sciences also begun to serve theology. Moreover, beginning with the eighteenth century, theology became differentiated, assuming the form of many disciplines, where, due to their nature, philosophical cognition played different roles. Only in the systematic and doctrinal theological disciplines, particularly in dogmatics, the superior status of philosophy remained apparent. Others made a more direct use of the methodology of natural sciences. But when directions foreign to the catholic doctrine begun to dominate in philosophy, their servile function in theology had to raise questions. It was even necessary to counteract against the influence of current philosophical systems in theology. This is why the renaissance of scholasticism was so eagerly welcomed, and attempts were made to recreate the speculative and philosophical character of dogmatics, analogously to the thirteenth century. It was already said, however, that (neo-Thomist) philosophy is a wise sister of theology, though it remains instrumental in this relation.² However, in fundamental terms,

² Compare M. Nédoncelle, "Teologia a filozofia, czyli o metamorfozach służebnicy," trans. K. Dombińska, *Concilium* 1965–1966, pp. 449–455, and T.S. Alvarez,

beginning from the second half of the nineteenth century, theology became not speculative but positive, thus significantly based on the methods of the humanities. Theological cognition was based on philological and historical criticism of the interpretation of the text of the Bible and the analysis of the history of church doctrine and liturgy. What became problematic was the harmonious unification in theological cognition of the philological, historical and speculative method with the functioning of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church. The difficulties in this matter are evidenced, on the one hand, by fideism and modernism, and on the other by the different varieties of theological rationalism.

In the twentieth century, the practice of the systematic theology led mainly towards a rational interpretation of the Revelation. This was performed in three phases: (1) the gathering and the philosophical criticism of the data of the Revelation (*an sit revelatum?*); (2) doctrinal and historical investigations into the truths of faith (*quomodo sit revelatum?*) and (3) explanation, justification and systematization of the Revelation through the use of the peripatetic (in principle) philosophy (*quid sit, quod revelatum?*). *Magisterium Ecclesiae* oversaw (protecting from errors) the entire investigative proceedings. Yet, the accents were already differently placed in theological cognition.³ Catholic “new theology” begun in the French speaking region before World War II through the debate of Dominican theologians (M. Labourdette, M.-D. Chenu, L. Chalier, Y. Congar, M.J. Nicolas) with Jesuitic ones (J. Daniélou, H. de Lubac, H. Bouillard). The debate’s subjects were the question whether theology should be freed from peripatetic philosophy, if so, then how should this be done, how to relate it to the modern directions in philosophy, and how to return in a more pronounced manner to the sources, i.e. to accentuate theology’s biblical and patristic (against the overly anti-protestant)

“Révélation, raison et ‘Philosophia perennis,’” *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 64 (1980), pp. 333–348, and J. Stöhr, *Theologie als ‘sacra doctrina’ bei Thomas von Aquin und in neueren Auffassungen*, in *Veritati catholicae: Festschrift für Leo Scheffczyk zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. A. Ziegenaus, F. Courth and Ph. Schäfer (Aschaffenburg: Paul Pattloch Verlag, 1985), pp. 672–696.

³ First the biblical, liturgic, ecclesiological and patristically-historical movement was formed. Moreover, the development of the catholic social science and the missionary and ecumenical interests intensified the care for adjusting theology to the intellectual requirements on every contemporary man.

character. This involved symbolism (against scholastic abstractionism) and historicism (“the Revelation is not a catalogue of truths but a history of salvation”). At stake was also a broader inclusion of the practice of Christian life in theological interpretation, so that truths of faith could become closer to the current mentality of the faithful (the priestly orientation of theology).

However, the “new theology,” having rejected the servitude of the peripatetic philosophy, was not able to replace it with anything else but the various kinds of existential thinking. Thus in many of its aspects, it fell, more or less apparently, into relativism. The encyclical *Humani generis* (1950) warned against such modernization of theology. Then, the renovation of the theological cognition—with the limited use of philosophy—was directed at its more adequate (for the mentality of the middle of the twentieth century) systematization, seeking a unifying keystone, and at the practical instance. This was tied to a belief that the practice of theology is not based on drawing new conclusions from the content of the Revelation, but on new (in accordance with the contemporary culture and actual Christian life) formulation of the revealed truths, hence pluralism of cultures results in the pluralism of theology (K. Rahner). This taxonomy was marked by protestant influences (and, indirectly, still existentialist).⁴ The pastoral branches were, on the other hand, dominated by psychologism, sociologism, and radical praxism. Therefore, the servile role of philosophy was not diminished; it only became more mediated, as it was to be found in the so-called external base of the natural sciences, whose methods were employed and in the worldview, to which the theological enunciations were adjusted. The worst in this situation was the fact that the main, if not the only criterion of the selection of philosophy was its immediate value.

During the times of the Council, the atmosphere of practicing theology and its fundamental theme changed. The problems related to the functioning of the Church in the world were mapped out with greater freedom and from a greater number of perspectives. And the Church itself had greatly metamorphosed. It used to be relatively

⁴ It was not by accident that the Christocentric taxonomy had the advantage over the theocentric one. The very popular idea of theological anthropology was more associated with the former than the latter. Moreover, there is a close connection between existentialist thinking and evangelical theology—without Lutheranism, existentialism would remain unexplained in its essence (M. Sciacca).

homogenous (to a large extent inspired by the principles of Christianity) and encompassed with its reach primarily Europe. At the present moment, it has greatly expanded, proving to be culturally differentiated and in reality remote from life which would abide by Christian values. Europe has secularized, and the Christianisation of the rest of the world was most of the time superficial and its process too slow. Even if many people search for Transcendence and acknowledge It, in real life they do not put the principles of the Gospel into practice. Hence, theology seemed to want to meet these expectations. Not only did it accentuate far reaching ecumenism, but also, in zeal of pastoral accommodation, wanted to root the Church in the world, in a sometimes too conformist manner. It rightly indicated the relevance of Christianity for the modern man and the fact that in his experience the need and the desire for salvation are revealed (E. Schillebeeckx). However, it went too far in the drive to adapt the truths and principles of the Christian faith to the typical human behaviour. It is not difficult to see here the influence of existential phenomenology or certain tendencies in the philosophy of the humanities.⁵

Around 1970, a great differentiation and broad diffusion (*d'éclatement*—W.A. Van Roo) of the conceptualizations of theology took place, as it tried to realize the identified “signs of times”. This involved not so much different kinds of theology, as its various angles, ways of investigation or preferences as to a given type of theological cognition, or, finally, a particular system of knowledge built around a central theme. Regarding the method, it could be said that its main characteristic is the partial approach (also frequently essayistic), as well as analytically-critical, reflexive, or historical.⁶ In terms of the subject, it is

⁵ E. Schillebeeckx, discussing the articles in the nineteen volume of *Concilium*, writes “generally, one can state that beginning with 1968, the dogmatic problems were treated more in the spirit of existentialism and phenomenology ...” E. Schillebeeckx, “Aus dem Evangelium kann man nicht machen, was man will. Die Arbeit der Sektion Dogmatik,” *Concilium* 19, no. 12 (1983), p. 756.

⁶ Methodological, or even theological pluralism was visibly proclaimed, due to, on the one hand, the complexity of the subject of theology and the variety of its tasks, and on the other, cultural pluralism. In order to communicate the truths of faith to the people and conduct further missionary activity, different conceptualizations of theology seemed necessary. See S. Moysa, “Źródła i warunki pluralizmu teologicznego,” *Collectanea Theologica* 47, no. 2 (1977), pp. 5–20 and the collection *Die Einheit des Glaubens unter der theologische Pluralismus*, ed. Internationale Theologische Kommission (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1973).

primarily ecclesiological, Christological, religiological, anthropological, or even socio-political. The varied combination of methods and subjects is in its details immensely complex, since directed by different styles of philosophical thinking, or frequently some ideology. Theologians do not directly assimilate the new directions in philosophy, but, in a manner which is hardly reflexive, appropriate their thought paradigms or investigative principles of the humanities upon which they are based.

The brief survey of the various connections of philosophy and theology proves that, apart from radically fideist stances (whose aphilo-sophical approach usually turns out to be only apparent), theology had always to some extent employed philosophy. In this sense, one can speak of the dependence of theology upon philosophical cognition. This dependence is not purely psychological (motivational), as philosophy constitutes a stimulus for practicing theology (so that the latter is not limited only to catechismal representation of faith and does not lose the intellectual contact with the modern man), or for the preparation to faith (the so-called *praeambula fidei*).⁷ At stake is the objective dependence, as it conditions the form, and partially also the content of the philosophical doctrine. Such servitude of philosophy can be direct, if it renders the practice of theology easier (providing presumptions, enriching the conceptual apparatus, assisting in the gathering and ordering of knowledge), or mediated, if philosophy is not employed directly, but one only adopts the methodological premises of the specialist sciences (which, after all, do possess their philosophical implications) and the paradigms of scientific practice (usually entangled in particular ideologies). Moreover, theology as a search for the understanding of faith, encounters minds which are already philosophized in some way (everyone—consciously or not—already has a habit of a certain manner of philosophizing, or lives in a culture which is raised upon a given philosophy). It is thus impossible to practice theology in an entirely aphilo-sophical manner. Naturally it can be practiced in an unreflexive manner, yet this would not speak well of theology.

The solution to the problem whether theology uses philosophy does not yet provide an answer for the question posed in the title of this article, at least not in one particular of its senses. Philosophy

⁷ It was already Saint Augustine who noted that faith does not forbid the search for a rational explanation of why we believe, and D. von Hildebrand states concisely: "Philosophie ist Wegbereiterin der Religion."

used in theology may, after all, sometimes serve it badly, or merely “be of service” to the theological cognition. The crisis (sometimes euphemistically called the crisis of growth) of theology experienced for the last half a century clearly indicates that this servitude is not going well. Having rejected the peripatetic philosophy, a worthy, commonly accepted replacement has not been found. It seems that the source of this situation is the overly hasty use of the various modern philosophical directions, without preceding epistemological and ontological critical analyses which would examine their instrumental value. For not every philosophy used in theology leads to the “understanding of faith.” It may actually falsify it. This happens when the philosophical tools and means used in this understanding are not adjusted to the primary purpose, which is the understanding of the deposit of faith accompanied by its integral preservation. Theologians have forgotten that, foregrounding the adaptation of theological knowledge to the contemporary mentality.⁸ Attempting this at all costs, they have gone as far as adjusting the truths of faith to the current philosophical views, or dominant ideologies. The idea of theology as the philosophical rationalization of faith has been understood too unilaterally.

To support my statements, I am going to provide several examples of how different styles of philosophizing used in theology directly, or indirectly modify theological thesis though the use of particular methods of the humanities.

The phenomenological methods consistently used in theology cannot guarantee realism and objectivity. For instance, the question whether God really exists is invalidated here, as God is an intentional object. The role of experience is, on the other hand, overaccentuated.⁹ The acceptance of many types of existentialism as means of theological interpretation lead to anthropocentrism (the negation of transcendence), irrationalism, rejection of the classical definition of truth (in favor of subjectivist one), battle against the institutional character of religious life (freedom from institutions), the priority of experience

⁸ And what is worse, they believe that they realize the postulates of *Vaticanum II*. The Council recommends not reckoning with the current philosophies of individual nations but their unconditional acceptance.

⁹ Compare, for instance, G. Keil, *Philosophische Grundlegung zu einer Enzyklopädie des Glaubens* (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Haim, 1975) and the interesting comments in M. Jaworski, “Prądy filozoficzne u podstaw nowej teologii,” *Analecta Cracoviensia* 7 (1975), pp. 521–536

over cognition.¹⁰ Sometimes relativism reaches so far that the task of theology is perceived to lie in the dialogue of the Revelation with the contemporary man and culture (P. Tillich) or in the mediation between a certain cultural model and the role which religion plays within that model (J.F. Lonergan). All the semiotic methods employed in principle in theology replace the appropriate problems of theology with linguistic ones (transubstantiation is, for instance, reduced to *transsignificatio*) or limit it to the purification of religious language from false conceptualizations.¹¹ And finally the application of evolutionist philosophy (e.g. A.N. Whitehead) to theology, instead of an answer concordant with the deposit of faith as to what Jesus means for the contemporary humanity, leads to speculations concerning the necessity of a new concept of God as a becoming being (“the most perfect self-creation”), wherein one needs to “recognize development and change” and a “certain dependence” upon the world. It is thus of small wonder that Ch. Hartshorne proclaims that classical atheism and classical theism are two aspects of the same error.¹²

How then should one solve the problem of proper servitude of philosophy in theological cognition in the face of the above difficulties and the need for modernizing theology?

Above all, theology must not be limited to: (1) philosophical speculation, pious contemplation, erudite criticism of the deposit of faith or its correlation with the current culture and civilization; (2) the defense of the proclamations of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church; (3) humanist or political interpretation of the Christian life; (4) semiotic and epistemological analysis of the religious language, and finally (5) the reflection over the inner Christian experience. Theology should constitute heuristics and hermeneutics practiced in light of

¹⁰ Compare, for instance, *Theologie wohin? Auf dem Weg zu einem Paradigma*, part 1, ed. H. Küng and D. Tracy (Zürich: Benzinger; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus G. Mohn, 1984); K.H. Neufeld, *La relation entre philosophie et théologie selon Karl Rahner*, in *Pour une philosophie chrétienne: Philosophie et théologie*, ed. P.-Ph. Druet (Paris: Namur; Lethielleux: Le Sycomore, 1983), pp. 85–108.

¹¹ Compare J.A. Martin, *Philosophische Sprachprüfung der Theologie*, trans. G. Memmert (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1974); A. Grabner-Heider, *Glaubenssprache* (Wien: Herder Verlag, 1975); H. Hempelmann, *Kritischer Rationalismus und Theologie als Wissenschaft* (Wuppertal: Verlag Brockhaus, 1980).

¹² Compare, for instance, N.M. Wildiers, *Obraz świata a teologia*, trans. J. Doktor (Warszawa: PAX 1985), p. 236; S.M. Phillipson, *A Metaphysics for Theology* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1982).

the Revelation and Tradition, yet by means and methods whose philosophical presuppositions correspond to the deposit of faith and with the aim of solving the religious and moral problems of man living in a given society and culture. The adaptation of the Church to the world should not constitute a governing idea—instead, the didactic and salvational function of the Church, in accordance with the deposit of faith, should remain the priority.

In light of the above supposition, it becomes easier to delineate the servile function of philosophy for theology.¹³ Let us first recall that philosophy serves theology in at least a three-fold manner: as the most general and most deeply (ultimately in the ontic order) justified theory of reality, as a certain kind of language and style of thinking, and as an implication of the scientific methods.

In order to understand the deepest objective truths about man, and his position within the world and in relation to God, a theologian must employ a metaphysical (and realist) theory of reality. This is why philosophies only of epistemological, analytical, reflexive or scientific type must be excluded. Natural sciences do not suffice either, as they do not provide a transcendental and wisdom-oriented cognition; they regard the typical behavior of man in given socio-cultural conditions, and their methods more or less apparently imply autonomous philosophy. Not every metaphysical philosophy serves theology—only one which on many levels remains in harmony with the deposit of faith, so that they create a doctrinally unified system (philosophy and theology become complementary in their content), yet remain differentiated methodologically and epistemologically.¹⁴ “Theologians ...

¹³ The normative determination of this relation would be rather improbable. Compare the investigations in R Schaeffler, *Die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Philosophie und katholischer Theologie* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980).

¹⁴ This unification does not have to be a complete uniformity. At stake is a connection which orders and hierarchically justifies theses. Of course, the truths of faith play the controlling and supplementing function. And so, for instance, in the conceptualization of man what is natural is united with what is supernatural, as they are two aspects of the same man. A theologian is concerned with the entirety of man, but in a way where the integral truth of man does not constitute the sum of partial truths, but is a supernatural truth which contains and permeates all others, in this sense, one could say that theology is not a rationalization of the Revelation, but a revelationization of the knowledge about man, his place in the world and in relation to God.

are today called to unite faith with learning and wisdom, in order to help them to combine with each other" (John Paul II, *Redemptor hominis*, 19).

Philosophy as a certain conceptual apparatus and style of thinking serves theology if it does not cause the violation of the deposit of faith. The usage of these means by a theologian has a servile character, thus it should always serve faith, and not vice versa, or become its correction with regard to the current paradigms of philosophical thinking.¹⁵ Finally, one must not use the conceptual apparatus or methods which are entangled in ideologies contrary to the Christian faith. Similarly, the employment of the methods of natural sciences should be preceded by a critical analysis of their philosophical presuppositions in relation to their correspondence with the truths of faith.¹⁶

Theology cannot also become a prisoner of any philosophy of science, it cannot adopt a conformist attitude, reduce itself to that philosophy or merge with it, otherwise it will remain unable to perform its main task—the understanding of the deposit of faith (without its violation). Theology adjusting its understanding of faith to the typical human thinking and behavior would be an axiological mistake. Theology must acquire such understanding of faith which would become the basis for the didactic and appropriating activity of the Church, and not for the sanctioning of typical Christian life.

¹⁵ See *Instrukcja o niektórych aspektach "teologii wyzwolenia"* from 06.08.1984 published by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (trans. M. Radwan, Roma 1985).

¹⁶ Such a task could be fulfilled by appropriate introductions to theology, which would contain critical introduction to philosophical thinking, philosophical concepts and theses necessary for a theologian. Unfortunately, such publications are not sufficiently in accordance with the deposit of faith. Compare V. Brümmer, *Theology and Philosophical Inquiry* (London: Macmillan, 1981); D. Allen, *Philosophy for Understanding Theology* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1985).

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