Feliks

Koneczny

Publishing Series

THE POLISH CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE 20TH CENTURY

Mieczysław Gogacz

Stanisław Kamiński

Kazimierz Kloskowski

Kazimierz Kłósak

Feliks Koneczny

Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec

Piotr Lenartowicz

Tadeusz Styczeń

Tadeusz Ślipko

Józef Tischner

Karol Wojtyła

Jacek Woroniecki

Zofia Józefa Zdybicka

The Companion to the Polish Christian Philosophy in the 20th Century

Scientific Board

Artur Andrzejuk

Tadeusz Biesaga SDB

Józef Bremer SJ

Piotr Duchliński

Rev. Grzegorz Hołub

Rev. Jarosław Jagiełło

Adam Jonkisz

Rev. Jan Krokos

Anna Latawiec

Anna Lemańska

Damian Leszczyński

Rev. Ryszard Moń

Zbigniew Pańpuch

Ewa Podrez

Paweł Skrzydlewski

Rev. Jan Sochoń

Krzysztof Stachewicz

Rev. Kazimierz M. Wolsza

Rev. Władysław Zuziak

Editorial Board

Rev. Maciej Bała

Piotr Stanisław Mazur

https://pchph.ignatianum.edu.pl

Feliks

Koneczny

Edited by

Paweł Skrzydlewski

Ignatianum University Press

Krakow 2020

© Copyright by Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie, 2020

This publication was financed within the frame of the Minister of Science and Higher Education programme: “Monuments of Polish philosophical, theological and social thought

of the 20th and 21st century,” conducted in 2016–2020.

Project no. 0033/FIL/2016/90

Reviewers

Włodzimierz Franciszek Dłubacz

Maciej Janowski

Supervising editor

Roman Małecki

Proofreading

Anthony Wright

Lesław Sławiński

Typesetting

Lesław Sławiński

Cover design

PHOTO DESIGN – Lesław Sławiński

ISBN  978-83-7614-464-1

Ignatianum University Press

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I. FELIKS KONECZNY: PERSON AND WORK

Piotr Biliński

Jagiellonian University

1. FELIKS KONECZNY’S BIOGRAPHY AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE EPOCH

Family, childhood, school years

Feliks Karol Koneczny came from a Polish family settled in the Moravian town of Hranice. His ancestors came from Silesia with the army of Jan III Sobieski, who was heading to Vienna in 1683.¹ He was born on November 1, 1862 at 17 Kleparski Square in Krakow.² When he was 10 years old, Feliks started his education in the elite St Ann’s Gymnasium, known today as the Bartłomiej Nowodworski High School.³ In 1873, after passing the entrance examination and paying the appropriate fee, he was accepted to the first class. In May of 1876 he left school irrevocably with three failing grades: in Latin, Greek and History.⁴ Years later he maintained that “experience teaches that no one in school has ever learned to speak a language.”⁵ Having failed to receive promotion to the fifth class after a half-year break, in 1877 he repeated the fourth class in St. Hyacinth’s Gymnasium.

Feliks started learning in the new place very ambitiously, receiving perfect and high grades for his fourth class certificate and getting third place among 37 students and a high general note.⁶ As a 17-year-old boy, he fell into depression and began to play truant and run away from home. He was not able to finish the seventh class in the ordinary course due to progressive illness, so he had to withdraw from examinations in the winter of 1880.⁷ 

After a two and a half year break, in June 1883, he returned to the matriculation exam. He received six satisfactory marks, three C marks and one unsatisfactory mark—in Mathematics. On September 12, 1883, he entered for the resit examination, which ended successfully for him with a satisfactory result.⁸ After a number of years, he said deprecatingly about the subject of his failures: “In the distribution and system of knowledge, two factors entered, the least qualified: mathematics and literature—both similar in the fact that in their nature they can only determine forms.”⁹ 

In the autumn of 1883, Koneczny began his studies at the Faculty of Philosophy at the Jagiellonian University, where history was at that time a very important subject. Stanislaw Smolka was the director of the Department of the History of Poland, Wincenty Zakrzewski that of the Department of the History of Austria, and Anatol Lewicki that of the Department of History.

In the first year of his studies, Koneczny attended strictly historical lectures: Zakrzewski’s on Greek history, on the history of the eighteenth century and on the French Revolution; Smolka’s on the history of Poland and those about the reign of Sigismund II Augustus; and Lewicki’s on the history of Austria. A prominent representative of the conservative camp, Michael Bobrzyński was the lecturer in Polish law. He was regarded as the first Polish law historian. In addition, the beginner student took part in classes in Polish literature conducted by Stanisław Tarnowski, whose influence is found in Koneczny’s later works Życie i zasługi Adama Mickiewicza (1898) and Teatr krakowski (1905). In terms of aesthetics and pedagogy, he did his apprenticeship under the direction of Teofil Ziemba; he also learned geology from Władysław Szajnocha and geography and statistics under the direction of Francis Schwarzenberg-Czerny.¹⁰

In 1885, Koneczny, under the direction of Zakrzewski, wrote his first seminary paper entitled “An opportunity to create a modern administrative type in Royal Prussia in the second quarter of the 16th century.” It was probably then that he also wrote a dissertation entitled “Administration of the German Order until 1400” (unpublished).

Zakrzewski, a researcherof wide horizons, an excellent methodologist and a caretaker of young talents, had an indisputable influence on Koneczny’s development of his research profile and the development of his need for self-dependent creativity. Under his direction, Koneczny learned to deepen the critique of sources and to formulate judgments sine ira et studio. After a number of years, in one of his last books, he recalled the seminar as follows:

The beginning of my investigations into historical laws goes back to the years of my student life, when I scared the only professor I owe something to with issues of history, and thanks to him I learned something. The late Wincenty Zakrzewski, who is worthy of great reverence, was not at all delighted by these fondnesses, and he thought that they would pass away and be lost with my professional studies, which I did not avoid. Oh, My Master!¹¹ 

Under Zakrzewski’s direction, Koneczny prepared his first published scientific paper, Kazimierz the Great as the Protector of the Riga Church (1887).

The beginnings of scientific research

In 1888, Koneczny submitted a dissertation entitled “The oldest relations of Livonia with Poland until 1393” to the Council of the Faculty of Philosophy. He prepared it under the direction of Zakrzewski,and the reviewer was Lewicki.¹² The two critical comments by the reviewer were especially important: a too one-sided presentation of the problem and too far-reaching conclusions. The promoter’s opinion was the same. The professor pointed out that during the interpretation of the collected material, the author uses too bold combinations and misleadingly and problematically identifies certain historical processes. Over the years, the specifics of Koneczny’s scientific workshop have created a distance between him and the historical academe.

His official promotion took place on July 2, 1888. After graduating, Koneczny continued his research work by attending Smolka’s seminary classes. This resulted in three essays about Prussian matters. One of these essays—about the relations of Poland with Livonia during the times of Sigismund II Augustus—was awarded by the Academy of Skills with a scholarship from the foundation of Udalryk Heyzman. In the same year, Koneczny submitted another dissertation entitled The policy of the German Order in 1389 and 1390 (1889) for publication in the Academy. Koneczny received a prize from the Historical-Literary Society in Paris at the Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz Contest (1200 francs) for his next article entitled “Jogaila and Witold during the Union of Krewo.”¹³

In 1879, Pope Leo XIII made the Secret Archives of the Vatican available. Thanks to the efforts of Smolka and Zakrzewski, a group of researchers from the Academy of Learning went to Rome (1886). From January to August 1890, Koneczny participated in it, conducting inquiries in Rome, Florence and Venice. In Rome he collaborated with Stanislaw Windakiewicz and the Italian scholar Edoardo Soderini.¹⁴ From the Vatican he sent monthly reports to Smolka about his research, which primarily concerned the Polish and Swedish mission of Nuncio Antonio Possevino.¹⁵ His work in the Vatican over several years resulted in the following dissertations: Walter von Plettenberg, the Livonian Captain of the Order, Lithuania and Moscow (1891) and John III of Sweden and Possevino’s Mission (1900). In the first dissertation, contrary to the common opinion expressed by Western scholars about the outstanding virtues of Plettenberg, Koneczny showed the unfounded character of his legend based on false and biased research by German and Russian scholars. In the second one, there was good knowledge of universal history and Vatican sources.

Work at the Chancellery of the Academy of Learning:

studies and monographs on Silesia

After returning from Italy and the payment of the Barczewski scholarship ended, from September 1890 Smolka employed the young Dr Koneczny at the Academy of Learning. A year later, Koneczny was promoted to the position of adjunct. On November 27, 1891, he was chosen in an open vote to become a collaborator of the Historical Commission.

Koneczny worked at the Academy until September 30, 1897. Among the works published at this time, the following deserve special attention: Jogaila and Witold During the Union of Krewo (1893) and The History of Silesia (1897)—a monograph that was intended to be his habilitation. In the first of these dissertations, Koneczny, apart from the political side of the events, presented important legal and state issues. In 1921, the most prominent expert on the Polish system, Oswald Baltzer, when discussing some of the more important studies on history of the Polish-Lithuanian Union, wrote: “We owe the conclusion about the incorporation of Lithuania into Poland to Feliks Koneczny.”¹⁶

In his work about Silesia, he emphasized the close connection of this land to Poland, despite its separation from the Polish Republic in the fourteenth century. He returned to the issues of this land several times in political discourses concerning modern history, including in About Silesia (1905), Social and Economic Relations in Silesia (1905), German Oświęcim or Polish Cieszyn? (1917), Plebiscite in Cieszyn Silesia (1919), and Czech and Polish Historical Rights to Cieszyn (1919). He remained in constant and close contact with Silesians—during the period of Austrian rule he went to the Prussian partition, and after it regained independence he went to Katowice and Ruda Śląska, where his youngest son Stanisław settled. He also collaborated with such prominent Silesian politicians as Adam Napieralski, Wojciech Korfanty and the Michejda brothers. The door of his house was also open to the clergy: Bishop Stanisław Adamski, Fr. Ferdinand Machaya, Fr. Joseph Londzin and Fr. Stanisław Radziejewski.¹⁷ It is also significant that during the disputes over Silesian Cieszyn and the Silesian Uprisings, in spite of his kinship with the Czechs and his interest in the Slavic community, he stood firmly in the position that these lands belong to Poland. At home he used to say: “I would like to fight for Wroclaw.”¹⁸

Koneczny finished The History of Silesia in February 1896, and it was published the following year by the Katolika press, whose editor was then Adam Napieralski. In his work, the author expressed his joy at having the opportunity of writing for simple Polish people, because “other books written for scholars weigh much less in my eyes.”¹⁹ The aim of the publication was to teach Silesians the history of their own country, as well as to highlight their relationship with Poland. 

In unexplained circumstances, on July 10, 1897, Stanisław Smolka—General Secretary of the Academy of Learning—decided to transfer Koneczny to the National Archives of Land and Town in Krakow.²⁰ 

In the stifling atmosphere caused by the conflict with Smolka, Koneczny felt compelled to resign from his job at the Academy of Learning and move to a lower-paid job in the Jagiellonian Library.

Work at the Jagiellonian Library

He began his work at the Jagiellonian Library on May 27, 1897 as a trainee.²¹ In the public opinion of his time, work in the library was “an asylum for people unable to do other jobs and therefore [were] good for books.”²² This kind of work marked the professional degradation and collapse of Koneczny’s academic career. In the atmosphere of the “Stańczykowski Krakow,” he did not feel good; he felt rancour towards Smolka and Piekosiński. He broke off relations with Cracovian conservatives, blaming them for his failures in life.²³ In the autumn of 1897 he began looking for a better-paid job, competing with Wiktor Czermak and Jan Kozubski. His nomination for the new position did not solve Koneczny’s financial troubles, however.

He got his desired function of amanuensis only in 1906. This allowed him to take up his literary and political career. The advancement was related to the changes that took place in this scientific institution. In 1906, after Karol Estreicher, the well-known historian of the Jagiellonian times and prominent Lviv librarian Frederick Papée became the director of the library. Because he cooperated with a group of young and talented workers, including Koneczny, he could start the work of modernizing the library and adapting it for scientific purposes. After the death of Władysław Wisłocki, Koneczny took over the manuscript section. In the library, Koneczny also met Vladimir Lenin during his stay in Krakow.

Journalistic, educational and social activities

In 1897 Koneczny began publishing the biweekly illustrated magazine Światło. Because of a lack of money, only five issues of the magazine were printed. There was a lot about the folklore of the southern regions of Poland; in the literary supplements, publications by such writers as Zygmunt Sarnecki, Władysław Orkan, and Ignacy Sewer Maciejowski²⁴ were announced. In 1901, Koneczny was elected as a co-editor of the Literary Commission.²⁵ At the meeting on March 17, 1904, he informed his colleagues about the discovery of previously unknown reports of the first visit to the Krakow Academy by Hugo Kołłątaj in 1777.²⁶ From 1891 he also worked in the Krakow Literary Association, which mainly organized lectures, and he subscribed the press to the Association’s library.²⁷

Another important aspect of Koneczny’s journalistic activity was popularizing historical knowledge among people. He formulated his education program for the peasantry as a twenty-year-old man in a letter to Józef Ignacy Kraszewski.²⁸ Kraszewski helped him to establish contacts with the Folk School Society, where he made a speech about Silesia and Galicia. He also lectured for a short time at the Helena Kaplińska Feminine Gymnasium and, despite his conservative views, on the courses of the Adam Mickiewicz People’s University. In his youth he traveled around almost all of Lesser Poland and Silesia with lectures on historical and literary subjects. As a good lecturer, a keen observer of political and social life, and a polemicist, he was popular in the national camp, though formally he never belonged to it. In his lectures he told his audience, among other things, about the need to increase the number of public schools and public libraries. He postulated the creation of a company that would publish books on scientific themes for the general public and accessible historical syntheses, examples of which he gave thanks to his three famous works: The History of Poland (1902), The History of Poland During the Rule of the Piast Dynasty (1903) and The History of Poland During the Rule of the Jagiellonian Dynasty (1903). His theses caused a lot of opposition in the historical academe. As Tadeusz Stanisław Grabowski stated, the criticism mainly concerned “a fanatical love of certain principles, doctrines and beliefs, resulting from profound religiousness, traditionalism and dependence on Rome; and it was the reason for this almost fighting tone of Koneczny’s work; and it gave rise to frequent misunderstandings between him and the scientific academe.”²⁹ 

The achievement of his life’s stabilization allowed him to engage in Slavonic activities. These activities were supported by the Slavic Club and its press organ, the monthly magazine Świat Słowiański, edited by Koneczny, which were established in December 1901 on the initiative of Marian Zdziechowski and August Sokołowski.³⁰ The Slavic Club represented a Slavophile direction with a clear anti-German attitude; it was a rather peripheral political trend, however, as the majority of Galician politicians were more oriented towards cooperation with the central states than with the tsarist Russia.³¹

After the last publication of Świat Słowiański in the summer of 1914, Koneczny worked for more than a year at the editorial office of Głos Narodu.³² As a deputy editor-in-chief, he was known for his anti-German orientation and Slavophile views. His work was accepted by Polish bishops (including Adam Stefan Sapieha and Józef Sebastian Pelczar).³³ In his letter to Koneczny, Józef Sebastian Pelczar congratulated him:

I am very pleased that you are taking charge of Głos Narodu, because your character, your past activities and honesty for Catholic principles, besides excellent talents, are for me and other bishops a guarantee that this difficult case is in good hands. God bless you and your associates.³⁴

Koneczny had hard time during the First World War. The first months of the war were the hardest for him. Krakow, which was then a military fortress, was ruled by a commandant—unfriendly to the Polish general Karl von Kuk. For fear of the Russian invasion and because of the need to defend the Cracovian fortress for a longer time, in September 1914 the Austrian military authorities issued an order to evacuate the inhabitants of the town. Koneczny and his family took refuge in Staré Hamry in Moravia.³⁵ In the years of the First World War, he prepared three major works: Tadeusz Kościuszko (1917), The History of Russia (1917), and, as a co-author, Poland in the Universal Culture (1918), a particularly valuable work.

Work at Stefan Batory University in Vilnius

In July 1919, Koneczny was appointed as an assistant professor by Rector Michał Siedlecki at the re-activated Stefan Batory University in Vilnius.³⁶ Koneczny began lecturing in Vilnius in October 1919. At the same time, he began his habilitation process in Krakow on the basis of a published work entitled “History of Russia until 1449.”³⁷ On May 20, 1920, he gave a habilitation lecture, which the professors found to be quite sufficient. Two days later, the Faculty Council asked the Ministry of Education to award him a docent degree in the area of Eastern Europe. On June 20, 1920 the Ministry approved the habilitation.

The reviewers of Koneczny’s habilitation dissertation, Professors Władysław Konopczyński and Wacław Sobieski, emphasized that

… the work of Dr. Koneczny has a uniquely informative value; the author has covered all aspects of political, constitutional, economical and cultural life, interpreting events and their relationship in a very intelligent way. His book is read with interest, and even in places where it is doubtful whether all the author’s arguments and hypotheses remain strong in the forefront of criticism, it is hard to deny that the author teaches, stimulates, gives rise to thinking, and thus he advances knowledge. Because Dr. Koneczny is known as a qualified historian, well-known for his knowledge of sources, and as an author of not only popular works, but also valuable academic contributions, there is no obstacle to accepting History of Russia as a habilitation dissertation.³⁸ 

Shortly after the habilitation, Koneczny was nominated as an associate professor at the Stefan Batory University in Vilnius.³⁹ From March 1921 he conducted a seminar on Eastern European history.⁴⁰ In 1922 he was appointed as an ordinary professor by the Ministry.⁴¹ In their justification of the proposal, the Faculty Committee highly appreciated his academic achievements, emphasizing that his habilitation dissertation was the first full history of Russia written by a Polish researcher and that “this work will be considered not only in Poland, but also abroad.”⁴² In January 1921 he was elected as the associate dean of the Faculty of Humanities.⁴³

In his lectures at the Stefan Batory University of Vilnius, Koneczny focused primarily on Eastern issues, as well as on the philosophy of history, at the base of which was the view of the existence of many different civilizations fighting each other.

Koneczny prepared his lectures very scrupulously, basing them on extensive domestic and foreign sources and a thorough knowledge of Polish and foreign literature. He often quoted Russian, German, French and Latin texts. He consistently linked and compared the history of Poland with pan-European issues, passing from analytical to synthetic lectures.

A special place in his didactic activity was held by the seminar, in which, over eight and a half years, 12 people participated. At the seminars, students analyzed sources of the Lithuanian Tartars’ history and of the rule of Casimir IV Jagiellon. There was a lack of funding for the publication of the best works, while the historical journal Vilnius Ateneum was limited to printing dissertations strictly related to Lithuania.⁴⁴ 

In July 1929, after Koneczny retired, the Ministry planned to solve the problem by renaming the Chair of Eastern European History as the Chair of Polish and Lithuanian History and made Ludwik Kolankowski its director.⁴⁵ However, the proposal met with sharp opposition from the Council of the Faculty of Humanities, which at its meeting of September 26, 1929 decided to ask the Senate and the Rector “to take actions to defend the autonomy of the university.”⁴⁶ During the next session—October 3—the Faculty Council, standing on the position of its powers guaranteed by the law on academic schools, unanimously voted to declare to the Ministry that “they cannot agree to nominate L. Kolankowski as the professor, … they consider that the creation of the History of Poland and Lithuania Chair is inadequate, … they recognize that the deletion of the Eastern European History Chair is wrong, because this kind of research program should exist, in particular in Vilnius.”⁴⁷ The matter was not even closed by the nomination of the Director of the Vilnius Archives, Ryszard Mienicki, for the position of the Eastern European History Chair; Mienicki withdrew his application, threatened with dismissal from the archive.⁴⁸ It was only after a few years that one of Koneczny’s students, Henryk Łowmiański, became the Chair.

Disputes over Koneczny’s retirement

In 1927, Feliks Koneczny was 65 years old, and thus he reached retirement age. In consideration of his merits, the Council of the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Vilnius at the meeting of May 25, 1927, on the initiative of the Dean Jan Oko, submitted to the Ministry a proposal to extend his right to be a lecturer for another five years. The Faculty’s decision was unanimously approved by the Academic Senate, extending him the right to be a lecturer until the academic year 1931/32.⁴⁹ The Ministry responded favorably to the decision of the Faculty Council and the Senate.⁵⁰

The same situation was repeated in 1928 when the Dean Kazimierz Chodynicki submitted to the Faculty Council a proposal to extend Koneczny’s right to teach for longer, despite his reaching the retirement age. At the turn of May and June 1929, the Council of the Faculty of Humanities, taking the position of its original resolution of 1927, once again asked the Ministry to allow Koneczny to stay at the university.⁵¹ 

In reply, Minister Sławomir Czerwiński, on July 8, 1929, did not extend Koneczny’s employment for another year after nine years of professorship, as requested by the Faculty and Academic Senate, and transferred him to retirement. Ryszard Mienicki maintained that Koneczny’s departure was a disadvantage for the university, because “he had great erudition, he was extraordinary, he lectured well, he conducted the seminar in an engaging and useful way.” Stefan Ehrenkreutz, “well conversant with ministerial secrets,” said that Koneczny’s retirement was due to the decision of the head of the university department, Witold Suchodolski, who believed that in a situation when such an outstanding scholar as the philosopher Wincenty Lutoslawski retired, when it came to Koneczny, being a researcher of a smaller measure, “the more he must retire.” “In this way, a ministerial pawn was to decide about people and matters of science!” Mienicki stated indignantly.⁵²

It is difficult to find out today what the real reason for Koneczny’s retirement was. The keeper of official files does not fully explain this mystery. Józef Pawlak, who researched the Vilnius Archives, stated that the reasons for removing the scholar from the university are unclear and only speculations can be made on this matter.⁵³ According to Koneczny’s speculation—expressed in a letter to Teofil Emil Modelski—this happened after his public criticism of the administrative methods of the Sanation regime against science, expressed by him at the Vilnius National Club meeting. Moreover, he never hid that he considered Józef Piłsudski to be a mentally ill man.⁵⁴ However, it should be remembered that this opinion (nemo iudex in causa sua) is not confirmed by the source, and the only reason for his retirement—according to the Vilnius Archives—was Koneczny’s advanced age. Stefan Ehrenkreutz, who was working at the University of Vilnius at that time, believed that he unsuccessfully tried to convince Koneczny that his speculations were groundless.⁵⁵

It cannot be excluded that some personal conflicts in the Faculty of the Humanities and the desire of the Ministry to find a position for Ludwik Kolankowski, who was in favor of the Sanation authorities, influenced the decision to remove Koneczny from the group of active lecturers. It certainly did not help that Koneczny’s work about the history of Russia was criticized by his colleague Kazimierz Chodynicki in Kwartalnik Historyczny,⁵⁶ but he upheld his opinion despite the author’s robust response. The protocols of the Faculty Councils also show that Koneczny was not very popular with Vilnius scholars, and his nomination in 1919 was treated as a temporary one by the professors of the University of Vilnius. At a time when only three historians were lecturing at the Faculty, the presence of Koneczny was indispensable. In the following years, after the transfers of Jan Dąbrowski and Władysław Semkowicz to Krakow and the death of Witold Nowodworski, this need still existed. However, in 1929, the Faculty already had a sufficient number of independent academic workers; what is more, there were not enough chairs for young scientists. In this situation, Koneczny was useless.

The Vilnius academe was indignant about the removal of Koneczny. Wacław Komornicki wrote in a letter to Koneczny that

… the entire national camp in Vilnius felt pain hearing about your retirement. It is a great loss for the University, harm to young people, harm to Vilnius. Such an active and creative scholar has to leave in full strength, in the period of the most beautiful synthesis of his works and thoughts! It is really difficult to prove more clearly the thoughtlessness and blindness of today’s government; it is hard to find a more bright proof of blind factionalism!⁵⁷

Activities in the field of the theory of civilization and the philosophy of culture: religious culture

In the autumn of 1929, Koneczny returned to Krakow and settled on the Salwator Hill at 18 Saint Bronisława Street. In the 1930s, he essentially departed from historical subjects in his works. Their place was taken by the philosophy of history, ethics, and historical and religious issues. During this period, the following works were created: On the Plurality of Civilisations (1935), Extension of Morality (1938), Protestantism in the Collective Life (1938), Church as a Political Educator of the Nation (1938) and Saints in the History of the Polish Nation (1937).

The thirties, and then the Nazi occupation, became a very painful period in Koneczny’s life. In 1935, at the age of 76, his wife Marcela died. In 1942, the German Wohnungsamt deprived him of the upper part of the house where his workroom was located. In 1943, his younger son Stanisław was arrested in Krakow for conspiracy and killed by beheading on October 23, 1944 in Brandenburg an der Havel. Earlier, on August 15, 1944, during the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising, the Germans had killed his elder son Czesław and his wife Maria. Only the daughter of Bronisław, the owner of a jewelry store in Sukiennice, and two young grandsons, Jacek and Wiesław, remained alive.⁵⁸ 

After the Red Army entered Krakow, Koneczny reported to the Jagiellonian University in January 1945, offering them his services. However, due to the lack of a “proper occupation” for him, he was only registered by the Dean Zenon Klemensiewicz.⁵⁹ On this basis, from February 1945, he received a salary according to the pre-war IV group, which was paid to him until October 1947. In the last years of his life, Koneczny, constantly in need of money to support two orphaned grandchildren, devoted himself to journalistic activity. For profit, he wrote a lot of articles for Niedziela and Tygodnik Warszawski. His articles were very popular and were addressed to a wide range of readers. Unable to publish books, he worked intensively on the fuller shape of his historiosophic theory. Only a few friends knew about it, and because of the increasing pressure from communists, they preferred not to share this information. Only after many years, thanks to the efforts of Jędrzej Giertych, were the works of Koneczny that had been left in manuscript form published in London. The following works were published by the Roman Dmowski Society: On the Plurality of Civilisations (1962), The Byzantine Civilization (1973), The Jewish Civilization (1974), For Order in History (1977), State and Law in Latin Civilization (1981) and History Laws (1982).

When Dr Włodzimierz Baranowski, a friend of his family, said there was no chance for him to live much longer, on January 31, 1949, Koneczny received the last sacraments from Fr. Władysław Długosz. He died on February 10, 1949 at the age of 87. Two days later, he was placed in the family tomb, near the Salvator cemetery, next to the grave of the Franciscan fathers.⁶⁰ A small funeral procession was led by a long-time friend of Koneczny, the priest Ferdynand Machay. The representatives of the already terrorized University were absent from the funeral, and there was no delegation from the Jagiellonian Library, at which he had worked for almost a quarter of a century.⁶¹ 

In 1948, Koneczny summarized 60 years of his historiographic work, and his scientific achievements totaled 26 volumes, each of which had from 300 to 400 pages, not counting over 300 articles, brochures and prints. He divided his works into topics: history, civilization, philosophy and “various.”⁶² Although in terms of the number of his written works he was outmatched by Joachim Lelewel, Władysław Konopczyński, Stanisław Pigoń, Władysław Semkowicz, Stanisław Kutrzeba and Franciszek Bujak, no Polish historians could boast of such a wide area of ​​research interests, which included anthropology, sociology, philosophy, theology, psychology, economics, history and law.

This register, though substantial, does not reveal the most essential thing: the personal and moral dimension of his activity. It must be said that he was also a moralist; he was a rare example of a Catholic thinker. He was, in the most significant sense of the word, a humanist.

Paweł Skrzydlewski

The State School of Higher Education in Chełm

2. INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT OF THE IMPACT AND RECEPTION OF FELIKS KONECZNY’S THOUGHT

The analysis and presentation of Feliks Koneczny’s work in Polish and world literature requires many factors to be taken into account, first and foremost, knowledge of the essential context in which the Christian culture of Poland and of the world found itself in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. During this period, the development of Christian culture took place under the direction of the activities of eminent popes, above all Holy Father Leo XIII.¹ This Pope, in the face of numerous challenges and threats to the Christian world, urged all Catholics to respect the principles resulting from the knowledge of the natural truth about the world, as well as admonishing them to follow the rules of the Gospel in every area of ​​human life. At the same time, he warned against accepting disastrous ideologies, myths, fictions and utopias; he encouraged Catholics to boldly fight for full knowledge of the truth and respect for the entire heritage of Christianity; he justified the need for adhesion to the native cultural tradition that accompanied the Church from the beginning of its existence; and he pointed to universal models and examples of creating Christian culture and, above all, the universal value of the teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas and the entire Catholic tradition.²

Koneczny, as a Catholic, a Pole but also a scholar, created his works while bearing in mind the context and state of Christian culture, desiring with all his might its strengthening and development. However, a question arises here about the specificity of this state and the condition of Christian culture at that time.

Threats to the faith and order of social life in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries

The Magisterium of the Catholic Church justified its actions by the fact that in the late nineteenth century, the enormous evil that infiltrated human life, especially after the French Revolution, intensified. It opened the way not only to laicism and secularism, but also to atheism, godlessness, materialism, relativism and the abandonment of the proper form of life by many people in favor of attempts to build utopian structures guided by the principles of liberalism or collectivism.³ They carried a utopian program of the self-liberation (salvation) of people while negating the God of Revelation and His existence and action. It brought real evil; the ruin of human life in the economic, social and national spheres, numerous harms and even crimes (two World Wars, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, and totalitarian systems using genocide and other types of evil).⁴ These programs and their implementations struck the social order, shaped by the ages thanks to the Church. This order was based on Christian personalism and solidarism; principles of Roman law and Greek science.

Importantly, Pope Leo XIII showed that the threats were strengthened not only by human errors and bad will, but also by people of science, education and culture, people creating a system of upbringing, law, and public authority. A particularly bad role was played by various Masonic associations (Masonry), which in many ways tried to establish a culture of hatred for God and the revealed religion itself, carrying the naturalistic vision of man as the creation of the blind forces of nature.⁵ Their aim was to consolidate the alleged conflict between science and religion in the general awareness; between authentic progress and Christianity. It was claimed that it is impossible to know the existence of God, His presence in the history of man and the cosmos, and finally that the act of religious faith, which at most is an emotional, subjective experience, is irrational and never has a rational justification.

It was claimed that the fact of the presence of an act of religious faith in someone is evidence of a bad use of reason, and any relationship between Christianity and individual, family or social culture affects man and culture itself pejoratively. For this reason, the program of godlessness—the removal of religion and Christian heritage from human life—was proclaimed as a sine qua non condition of “a new, better world order.”⁶ The realization of these ideas was connected not only with the naturalistic concept of man and the reductionism of all areas of human life to finite goods, but also the elimination of the inseparable marriage of a woman and a man as the basis of the family and the family itself; removing justice from public life in favor of variable voluntary law based on strength and benefits; and the liquidation of private property.

In the name of the false meaning of freedom, the sense of the existence of an institution of public authority as well as private property, natural associations and forms of human life (family, local, national, state, and ecclesiastical communities) was undermined while propagating the ideology of struggle without moral principles, cosmopolitanism in different varieties, or various egoisms, trampling on the inherent rights of a person, the equality of the dignity of all people.⁷

All these acts posed numerous threats to the religious life of man and the social order. For this reason, eminent popes (Leo XIII, Pius XI, Pius XII) strongly urged the counteracting of the resulting evil also through scientific, educational, cultural and popularizing activities. As a Catholic and a scholar, Koneczny was involved in it, which inevitably put him at risk of the false accusation of being a confessional thinker, promulgating even some kind of fideism; he provoked many attacks and unfavorable opinions, which in fact were a form of attack on Christianity itself, on its defenders.

Defending the thesis that the West itself, as the Latin civilization, is a work of the Catholic Church’s educational activity and that this is the best existing (though imperfect!) method of the collective life system, Koneczny exposed himself to all those who wanted the world without God and His presence in the life of humanity. No wonder, then, that the perception of Koneczny’s achievements was difficult in the twentieth century, encountering various false accusations and misunderstandings, or even complete negation, because this age was strongly permeated with the ideologies of utopianism, atheism, materialism, and finally relativism, agnosticism, and evolutionism—this age saw, in Koneczny’s works, its denial and its natural opponent. And Koneczny, with his work, was in fact such an opponent. This work has always carried and will always bring hope, because

… evil in collective life is powerless until it creates an imitation of good in order to extort the cooperation of citizens who want good. Therefore, in the collective life, stupidity (and even naivety) is worse than evil itself, because there would be no evil in public life if it did not find support among good people, if it was not accepted in the best thought. … Bad people will never create anything without the help of good ones, so since [good ones] will retreat from the atria of evil, evil must fall.⁸

Paweł Skrzydlewski

The State School of Higher Education in Chełm

3. PHILOSOPHY AND ITS UNDERSTANDING IN FELIKS KONECZNY’S TERMS

Why does a historian need philosophy?

Koneczny’s philosophical interests arose primarily from the need to thoroughly understand history—the need to learn the ultimate truth and the need to gain understanding, so they arose not only from the knowledge of facts from the past.¹ Koneczny focused his attention on philosophical inquiries also because of the awareness of threats and errors that must appear in historiography because of its deformation with various apriorisms that have their origin in the errors of philosophy. Examples of these errors were the practices born in historical inquiries because of German idealism or positivist concepts, permeated with materialism, cognitive reductionism and minimalism.² According to Koneczny, it brought the a priori conception of science itself, the a priori theory of the scientific method, and finally a false vision of the subject as well as of the fundamental goal of science. It did not aim to learn the truth but to ideologically justify a concept, a doctrine.³ It resulted in the loss of the nature of scientific knowledge, valuable in general. It also posed a serious threat to the entirety of human culture as well as to social order, which because of the ideologization of science could harm the good of man.

When I was young [he wrote with irony—P.S.], I was warned against historiosophy as a plague that could fill up the brain with clichés and waste the historical sense in the historian. It was also pointed out that historiosophy is not a field for historians, but for various volunteers who do not know history. Historiosophy was also considered as philosophy of history, and in that sense any philosophical system could, if it wished, have its own historiosophy; if anyone invented a new system, then a new historiosophy came into being—and historians will not care about it anyway. For a historian, historiosophy was something that was below his scientific dignity; and he looked at these dilettantish games with an indulgent and slightly contemptuous smile. A historian had to limit himself to the investigation of the causal relationship of facts; so nobody would like to get historiosophy from the hands of philosophical dilettantes and try to find out what it would be if it were based on the historical method.⁴ 

In this context, we should perceive Koneczny’s philosophical considerations as work on the completion of strictly historical studies with philosophical investigations. Why, however, did he do it?

Koneczny pointed out that

… extensive studies would not give a historian the ability to synthesize if he was deprived of philosophical education … As long as he carries philosophical emptiness in himself, he will be incapable of synthesis in any science … A philosophical approach to matters is (apart from strong personalism) the condition of creative originality. Where there are no philosophical approaches to the subject, only casuistic incidence will develop there, but the general view will never be added, because there is no scientific perspective. The scholar’s work does not have a plan then, not caring about the questions “from where” and “to where” and in fact working incidentally, without knowing the aim. Such science is deprived of knowledge; because knowledge is the sum of the relationships that take place between sciences. Without realizing the whole, it is difficult to detect a synthesis, but it does not follow that it will not exist.⁵

It is important in this context to understand that the synthesis mentioned by Koneczny is not a combination of all the results of sciences into one system (a synthesis of knowledge about everything), but rather a certain intellectual perfection of a man which allows him to fully understand the phenomena, recognizing them from the perspective of knowing the ultimate truth about them. This perfection implies respect for the methodological order in science and respect for the differences that exist between disciplines. Historiography therefore has its own subject, methods, aspect and purpose. Analogously, there is philosophy, which cannot be reduced to historical reflection and retains its full autonomy.⁶ The deficiencies of philosophical education carry, in Koneczny’s opinion, catastrophic consequences for culture and nations. For this reason, weak philosophical education was, for the history of Poland, the cause of its weakness. “All our [Polish—P.S.] great philosophers could not give philosophical education to society—this is the secret of our failure.”⁷

Areas of Feliks Koneczny’s philosophical studies

Due to the criterion of the subject, Koneczny’s philosophical research can be divided into:

A. Philosophy of culture and civilization, where he presented his approach to understanding culture and civilization, mainly in the context of historical research.⁸ Examples of this are the following works: Polskie Logos a Ethos. Roztrząsania o znaczeniu i celu Polski, vols. 1–2 (Poznań 1921); O wielości cywilizacyj (Kraków 1935); Cywilizacja bizantyńska,vols. 1–2 (Londyn 1973); Cywilizacja żydowska, vols. 1–3 (Londyn 1974); “Napór Orientu na Zachód” in Kultura i cywilizacja (Lublin 1937); Prawa dziejowe (Komorów 1997); O ład w historii (Warszawa 1991), and other minor studies and articles.

Koneczny argued in them that human culture, as a work of intelligent and free human activity, is always connected with the human way of learning about the world and of materializing his experiences in the form of knowledge, moral action, art and technology, but also through social creations and the social order itself. Culture is also created by human religious acts that constitute the essential ground for the formation of the understanding of man, of human action, and of all reality as an effect of God’s action. According to Koneczny, human culture as it is embedded in social life creates a civilization or “method of the system of collective life.” Civilization as a permanent form of human co-existence as a work of man is also one of the main determinants of man.⁹ 

B. Philosophy of man and morality,in which he first and foremost analyzed human actions in terms of how they perfect man, while at the same time realizing the tasks that are right for them.¹⁰ This form of his philosophy can be found in all works dealing with civilization issues but also in the following: Rozwój moralności (Lublin 1938); Zwierzchnictwo moralności: Ekonomia i etyka (Warszawa 2006); O cywilizację łacińską (Lublin 1996); and Obronić cywilizację łacińską (Lublin 2002). We can also find these issues in the following works: Pajdokracja (Warszawa 1912); “Chrześcijaństwo wobec ustroju życia zbiorowego” in Ateneum Kapłańskie (1932); O sprawach ekonomicznych (Kraków 2000), as well as in his other dissertations and studies.

Koneczny argued that personalism is the only correct concept of man, because it is a vision of man affirming not only human dignity but, above all, rationality, freedom, and subjectivity in public and family life. He emphasized that behind the strengthening of this vision of man in Western culture stands Christianity above all and a realistic trend of classical philosophy (Greek and medieval). Personalism had a strong influence on pedagogy, as well as on economics and politics, where the respect of human dignity and the primacy of moral good (honesty) are required over useful and enjoyable goods. Koneczny emphasized the constant necessity of intellectual and moral work to deepen the knowledge of the moral life of man; he stood in the position of moral objectivity, while also emphasizing the necessity of progress in the field of moral life. This progress (the so-called development of morality) in his opinion is not so much connected with a change of moral principles but rather with the improvement of human actions, which, as human knowledge of the fuller truth about good develops, demand a better life and actions of people. The key to moral progress is, according to Koneczny, the “culture of action” by which he understands the development of human life in its authentic virtue. The meaning of all moral and educational activities, in Koneczny’s opinion, is connected with enabling man to achieve the goal of his life, i.e. the fulfillment of man in God. For this reason, Koneczny emphasized the need to combine educational, moral, economic and cognitive life with religious life. In theLatin civilization, the authentically personalistic one, all people should work for the common good with a responsibility for the realization of this good.

C. Philosophy of politics and law, in which he showed not only the sense of the public actions of man, but also their civilization and cultural determination.¹¹ This philosophy gave not only a general understanding of politics, law, social relations and the actions appearing in their context, but also outlined a specific program of social order, proper for Poland. In a way, it was connected with Koneczny’s political and social journalism.¹² This philosophy can be found in works dealing with civilization and historical issues, especially in the following: Państwo i prawo w cywilizacji łacińskiej (Komorów 1997); Protestantyzm w życiu zbiorowym (Lublin 1995); Polska między Wschodem i Zachodem (Lublin 1996); “‘Elephantiasis’ prawodawcza” in Myśl Narodowa (1932); “Tło polityczne renesansu włoskiego” in Myśl Narodowa (1930); Dzieje administracji w Polsce (Wilno 1924); “Czterdzieści tez zasadniczych” in Trybuna Narodu (1927), and others.

Koneczny shows that politics and law have their determination in the moral order of human affairs and in the way people understand this order, while the functioning of law and politics depends on the type of civilization.¹³ The principles of Latin civilization require the respect and primacy of the human person in the sphere of collective life, while the order of collective life must respect many related matters. Koneczny argued that “Poland will either be Catholic or it will not exist.” This position was connected with the thesis that unrighteousness is just as condemnable and despicable in public life as in private life.

The politics implemented according to the indicated rules allows the pillars of Western culture to be strengthened. These rules are:

(a) a family based on an inseparable and voluntary marriage of a man and a woman;

(b) justice in all areas of human life realized by public authority;

(c) respect for human (including physical) work; and

(d) the independence of religious life from political and temporal factors.¹⁴ 

Conclusion

Koneczny’s philosophy did not distance itself from personal human experiences related to religion and religious faith, aiming instead to provide an integral and universal understanding of the world. The basis of this philosophy was a human, natural experience of the world, and its guide was healthy human reason, ordering one to learn the truth to the end.

In the field of anthropology, Koneczny’s philosophy built a personalistic vision of man, emphasizing the affirmation of human subjectivity, rationality and freedom. He also did it in his philosophical inquiries about culture and civilization, politics and law. Here, the philosophical understanding of culture, civilization, and historical laws became an important complement to and deepening of historical studies, because, as Koneczny explained, the science of history

… is not just a collection of stories about kings and wars to satisfy curiosity. … History is simply an explanation and demonstration of why today we are what we are and why we are not others. … The present is a mystery to a thinking man, because every step of the way begs the question, why is it so, and not differently? This puzzle is developed by history. … Learning about the past is therefore a means and tool for working around the future; is necessary for progress. The content of it is the hope and disappointment of generations; the goal of modern people is to find a conclusion for themselves.¹⁵

Although Koneczny’s philosophy was not a systematic or academic philosophy, it was nevertheless created responsibly. It was guided by the value of truthful knowledge, aimed at obtaining ultimate and integral cognition. All this makes Koneczny’s philosophypossible to be defined as a realistic and, at the same time, Christian, original, universal and valid philosophy for the entirety of the world’s culture.

Piotr Biliński

Jagiellonian University

4. THE RELIGIOUS WORK OF FELIKS KONECZNY AND HIS CONCEPT OF SOCIAL ORDER IN POLAND

Saints in the history of the nation

In the autumn of 1929, Feliks Koneczny returned to Krakow and lived on the Salvator hill at 18 Bronisława Street. It was a period in Koneczny’s life in which his scientific work at Vilnius University ended and the period of his Catholic journalism, closely connected with the analysis and presentation of socio-political issues, began. In the 1930s, Koneczny departed from historical subjects in his works. Their place was taken over by journalism, the philosophy of history and theory of civilization, ethics and historical and religious issues. During this period, the following works were written: On the Plurality of Civilisations (1935), The Development of Morality (1938), Protestantism in the Collective Life (1938), The Church as the Political Educator of Nations (1938) and Saints in the History of the Polish Nation (1937). In that time, Koneczny wrote also the following works that were published after his death: The Byzantine Civilization (1973), TheJewish Civilization (1973), On Order in History (1977), The State and Law in Latin Civilization (1981), and The Laws of History (1982). In all of these works we can find analyses regarding religion and the defense of principles and heritage carried by the Catholic Church. They are also a space for reflection on the social, cultural and religious order; they are a form of researching the politics that best serves the good of man.

According to Jacek Barlik, Koneczny belonged to the intellectual elite of Polish Catholicism. In support of this opinion, one can mention the fact that as one of the few secular professors, besides Stanisław Kutrzeba, he was invited to give lectures organized by the Catholic University of Lublin for the Catholic clergy.¹ In 1932–1933, Koneczny also gave lectures on “Four civilizations” in Poland for students of the Faculty of Theology of the Jagiellonian University. He also collaborated with the editors of the Jesuit Przegląd Powszechny and of the Ateneum Kapłańskie, published in Włocławek by the then professor of the Diocesan Seminary, and the later Primate of Poland, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński.²

Reading Koneczny’s work tends to accept the thesis of his unbounded commitment to the Catholic Church and the deep faith in Christ the Lord, whom he tried to imitate in his personal life as best as he could. The pursuit of truth and charity were for him a source of literary inspiration. His works on religious matters had extraordinary popularity in the Catholic milieu of the interwar period. His work Saints in the History of the Polish Nation, in which he presented the fate of the Catholic Church and the saints throughout the thousand years of Polish history, brought him special recognition and publicity in the Catholic milieu. Over the seven hundred pages of the text, he placed detailed descriptions of the lives of little-known martyrs, paying attention to the urgent need for their beatification or canonization. These people, combining religious love for God and man, as well as love for the Homeland, became, in the history of Poland, the defenders of moral principles in public life and examples of how to understand the authentic personalism descending from the acceptance of the faith of the Catholic Church and of how to pursue patriotism. Koneczny showed that these people, in their own ways, carried out the ideal of human and Christian life, embedded in the national context, becoming a timeless model of Polishness.

The author of Saints in the History of the Polish Nation often referred to numerous printed and archive sources, and in the conclusion quoted the words of Cardinal August Hlond:

A Catholic citizen, a worker, an official, an officer, a soldier, a deputy, a senator, a member of the government, cannot have two consciences, a Catholic one for his private life, and a non-Catholic one for public affairs. The innate moral law and the Decalogue are binding for the state in the same measure as for the individual and family. The state, therefore, has no power to do unethical acts, that is, evil does not become moral and allowed when done by the state, or when it is committed in the interest of the state. There is no power under the sun that would be allowed to order subordinates to act against the Decalogue. The state does not stand outside of ethics, just as it does not stand above it. If it ordered evil acts, it must be drawn aside unconditionally. The Catholic should not be a tool of sin and harm under any circumstance.³

The work, impressive in its volume, the vastness of its research and the objectivity of its statements, became a monumental work of Polish historiography over the years, but also proved that the Catholic faith penetrated and co-created Polish essence and history from the very beginning of Poland. This work, especially after 1945, became one of the most important sources of knowledge of the history of the Polish nation and its religious life throughout its history for the younger generations of Poles; it played a great role in the formation of the intellectual elites of Poland during the communist period, strongly fighting with religion itself and with the Church.

Protestantism and Catholicism

Another book on religious issues that touched on one of the most painful issues of Christianity, that is, the Western schism, was a brochure entitled Protestantism in Collective Life. Koneczny gave in it the nine consequences of schisms that were destructive for Europe, contributing significantly to the weakening of the Latin civilization itself in the West and ultimately leading the West towards Neo-Paganism. He claimed that Protestantism brought

the acceptance of political independence to the Reich States and, consequently, the right to pursue a foreign policy without looking at the empire. Giving governments control over consciences; the strengthening of Byzantinism in Germany; an inclination to the mechanization of society; the contractedness of ethics; relieving the state from ethics; the introduction of absolutism and the tendency to supremacy of the state; the establishment of autonomous, non-religious ethics; religious indifferentism; neopaganism.⁴ 

To sum up, Koneczny stated that not one of the above-mentioned tendencies was derived from Catholicism. Eight of them were already widespread, whereas Neo-Paganism was struggling to make its way in Protestant Germany. According to Koneczny, the only possibility of a moral revival of Germany, and in a sense also of Europe and the Western world, was in a return to Catholicism and to the principles of individual and collective life carried by the Universal Church. In practice, this meant staying with the principles of the Latin civilization, which, according to Koneczny, was the work of the educational work of the Catholic Church. However, in order to make this possible, it is necessary to recognize the evil that fell with the arrival of Protestantism in the Western world and reject it in its entirety. In other words, one should immediately return to the Latin method of collective life, to Catholic ethics and to the personalistic anthropology connected with it.

In the publication entitled The Church as a Political Educator of the Nation, Koneczny argued that

The depth of Catholic ethics derives from a sense of a personal relationship with God, and this is where the greatest moral power of the Catholic is. Even if the association is committed to the most serious offenses, the relationship of an individual to God remains pure as long as no one approves of evil. But each one also has a personal responsibility for his thoughts, speeches and deeds, which is symbolized by personal confession. … Catholics in their conscience are responsible even for group acts, each one personally, as if each of them acted individually.⁵ 

Koneczny, therefore, showed that what is most important in Latin civilization is personalism, a personal form of life and human activity. It is connected with individual responsibility, with human dignity and rationality, with human freedom and subjectivity.

Personalism shapes the basic principles of the social order in the Latin civilization, while its source is essentially religious. Only this civilization is genuinely personalistic. For this reason, Koneczny explained, the deformation of human religiosity that occurred after the appearance of Protestantism and its variations had to result not only in a new vision of man, but also in a social order proportional to it, in which citizens depart from personalism in favor of individualism glorifying the individual and its powers, or collectivism in which man becomes only an element subordinate to the entire collective. In Koneczny’s opinion, the need to reflect on the social order, on the principles of politics that do not stem from the errors of individualism and collectivism, thus appeared.

Decalogue of social life

His cooperation with Trybuna Ludu, edited by Karol Hubert Rostworowski, resulted in the publication of a number of Koneczny’s articles on socio-political topics; among others, in 1927, he argued for the change of the electoral law in the Polish parliament. He proposed to reduce the number of deputies and senators by half, introducing a single-member system, limiting the electoral law to people able to read and write, and raising the age of majority to 24 years. He also believed that a double vote should be given to voters who are more than 45 years old because “a 24-year-old youth is not mentally equal to the experienced father of the family.” In addition, a double vote should be given to those who have obtained a high school diploma and triple to university graduates.⁶

Already in the 1920s, Koneczny presented in Trybuna Ludu his “Forty basic theses,” setting the direction of the behavior of the Polish society and state and constituting the spiritual foundation on which Poland should be based as part of its civilizational grounding. He presented these principles in the form of theses, arranged in ten groups. They are a kind of outlining of the foundations and the nature of social order, as well as an explanation of where the source, or the cause, of basic social order should be sought. This source is on the one hand in the nature of man as a person and on the other in the personal relationship of man with God.

The content of these principles is as follows:

I.

(1) Of all public matters, religion is the most public one.

(2) Poland either will be Catholic, or it will not exist.

(3) Whatever is aimed at harming the Catholic Church is also harmful to Poland.

(4) All unrighteousness in public life is also condemnable in private life.

II.

(1) From all prejudices that distort the social and state life, the worst opinion is that all should be equal in everything.

(2) The development of society requires hierarchical inequality, based on differences in the ableness and efficiency of work.

(3) Mental work is ceteris paribus hierarchically above manual work.

(4) The reduction of hierarchical differences cannot be done other than by the absorption of mental work by manual laborers, by the growing support of these works by the worker’s intelligence.

III.

(1) Private property is sacred and untouchable.

(2) Owners should not be proletarianized, but should let the diligent and governmental proletarian also be able to become the owner.

(3) Taxes and burdens on property cannot be so high that they discourage acquisition and maintenance.

(4) Taxes and burdens related to parental inheritance should be gradually reduced until they are completely abolished.

IV.

(1) The class struggle method is against our religion and civilization.

(2) It is foolish and dishonest to claim that the good of society requires the success of one single social layer, based on the oppression of others. No social layer belongs to hegemony, and all are historically in solidarity, that is, defeats falling on either of them bring common ruin. The general good requires not class struggle, but the mutual help and sharing of all social layers.

(3) It is not acceptable for anyone to create a monopoly from social institutions.

V.

(1) States are divided into bureaucratic and civic; they are mainly based on the self-government of citizens. There are also two methods of action: centralization and decentralization.

(2) Some state matters (e.g. the army) must be solved centrally, but generally the civic state requires decentralization.

(3) Too many offices put the state in the dependency of officials—and the opposite should be the case.

(4) The difference between a state and a social organization is that the latter is voluntary and the former is obligatory.

(5) According to the research and development of social forces, state interference should be limited.

(6) Matters of external and internal security are an adequate department of state competence.

(7) The state is neither “many-sided” nor can be free from ethics.

(8) The political equality of an illiterate with the president of the Polish Academy of Learning is an injustice and an evident misunderstanding.

VI.

(1) Unity does not mean one-sidedness. The extraordinary differences in the levels of Polish provinces mean that they cannot be governed equally.

(2) Administration must be adapted not to the rulers, but to the governed; it cannot be the same in the whole of Poland.

(3) The greater the population, the higher the education and the greater the prosperity of a province, the more local governments should have.

(4) Nations cannot be shaped from the outside, nor can their natural development be accelerated artificially from the outside.

(5) It is not correct to hamper minorities in the Polish state to produce their own separate nationalities—but it is also unacceptable for a Pole to avoid work for the good of the Polish nation in order to put his strength to work for another nation.

VII.

(1) The army must not deal with politics in any civilized state.

VIII.

(1) A poor society will not be able to bear the costs of maintaining a modern state.

(2) Continuous poverty must lead the Polish nation to the loss of independence.

(3) The property of the state is proportional to the work of its citizens. Work bans are contrary to reason.

(4) All matters of the nation and the state are connected with the fate of production. We will not keep our independence without increasing agricultural and industrial production.

(5) Because of the scarcity of Polish cities in Poland, we are a backward society compared to Europe and we will move back more and more if the country’s urbanization does not take place.

(6) The peasant issue will not be settled if the excess of the rural population does not find prosperity in its resettlement to cities.

IX.

(1) Pure science is a luxury, but it is an indispensable condition for the development of national culture and the power of the state.

(2) Without discoveries, there are no inventions, and therefore without pure science there are no applied sciences, needed for all departments of modern life.

(3) Universities are six centuries older than primary schools. There is no education without science, because education is a popularized science. The collapse of sciences must soon bring common darkness with all its terrible consequences.

X.

(1) The condition of the state is dependent on the condition of four fundamental factors: morality (law and order)—science—production—army.

(2) The period of revolution must finally be eradicated unless Europe wants to fall into total poverty and comprehensive depravity.⁷

The presented theses, in an elaborate and justified form, also appeared in one of his last works: State and Law in Latin Civilization (finished in 1941). These theses outline the need for Poland to respect the ways of human existence and action (personalism) in all areas of personal life and to respect the social order in which a family based on an indissoluble marriage becomes a place of education and human life, with support from the local community (commune) as well as from the nation and the state itself. This policy must, according to Koneczny, have a national character and must be morally correct, without losing anything from realism and its effectiveness. It cannot tolerate secularism, atheism, or godlessness in any form, but it also attempts to sacralize it because the state, law and social life are always directed towards achieving natural goals, not supernatural ones.

Personal testimony

Koneczny’s work devoted to religious and social issues also reveals another aspect of his life and views, testifying that his personal life was full of dramatic decisions and sensations. A lot about the traumatic experiences of this period of his life, the disputes which he had to have, is said by his words when he wrote that

Is it not contrary to reason—I will ask myself in November 1943—to start a new book, not knowing where I should look for accommodation for the next night, in constant uncertainty about water, fire and a roof over my head? During the time when the Decalogue was suspended, and all private property was actually abolished, when only lawlessness was being made into legal forms? And manuscripts, going from hideout to hideout, can be found unexpectedly somewhere in a place that the author himself will never know? Of course, starting this book is against reason, but reason does not mean reasonable only. And can one even live only by reason? As a rule, you have to be guided by it, but sometimes a certain deviation may even be a duty.⁸

The year 1944 was an important caesurain Koneczny’s life, marking his further life with the stigma of great suffering. He met a distressing fate. He stopped leaving the house, reading newspapers and contacting people. He had a spiritual breakdown during this period. This is evidenced by the fact that he did not attend Sunday Masses, and he drove away the priest who tried to intervene, Fr. Władysław Długosz. The reason for the conflict was a dispute regarding the understanding of the presence of the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament. Koneczny was to advocate the thesis that the Old Testament is unnecessary due to civilizational reasons. His nervous breakdown of 1944 was preceded by family dramas and personal catastrophes. In 1942, the German occupiers took a significant part of the house from him by putting a German family in it and depriving Koneczny of his own home, his place of work, everything that served him in his everyday and scientific life. He was already eighty years old. His property was not returned to him after the January 1945 invasion of Krakow by the Soviets, who put forced tenants in his house. His son, Stanisław, was arrested and then sentenced to death on August 22, 1943. He died by beheading on October 23 in Brandenburg an der Havel. On August 15, during the Warsaw Uprising, the Germans killed his second son Czesław together with his wife. To make matters worse, the only daughter of Koneczny from the pre-war period still suffered from serious heart disease and rheumatism, which was associated with many limitations and was a constant threat to her life.

Difficulties in his life even seemed to intensify after the Germans were expelled from Poland. There was a necessity to care for and bring up the two orphaned children of Stanisław (Jacek and Wiesław), which in the absence of means of living and the professor’s advanced age seemed to be an impossible task to overcome. To make matters worse, the new socialist state, installed in Poland by the Soviets after 1945, aimed to annihilate people like him, pushing aside his entire scientific and journalistic activity. However, he did not lose spirit and constantly worked, which allowed him to finish and take several of his important works from Poland to London, which appeared posthumously owing to the efforts of the Roman Dmowski Society in London.

However, despite all these difficulties, Koneczny was still working and going to “ever harder difficulties.” After the war, he published many short articles in Niedziela and in Tygodnik Warszawski.⁹ They were his main and, in time, only sources of income, which was so needed for the upbringing of his two orphaned grandchildren.

On August 20, 1948, Wanda—his daughter-in-law, the wife of his murdered son Stanisław—died of a heart attack. From then on, he was left alone with all his problems. He began to suffer from numerous illnesses that finally led to his death. Even when his diseases got worse and made eating impossible, he continued to work, and he finished the last pages of his books.

Just before his death, Koneczny was reconciled with God, and received the sacraments from the hands of the parish priest, Fr. Władysław Długosz. He died on February 10, 1949, and his funeral took place on February 12 in Krakow in the Salvatorian cemetery.

Piety and commitment

This brief review of the work of Feliks Koneczny does not reflect the most important thing, namely his personal relationship with the Creator-God. It was always alive and at the same time human, not free from difficulties, struggles, and even traumatic experiences. It was the thing which always gave him strength in his tireless work, which lasted until the final days of his life, despite blows, deaths of his loved ones, diseases, shameful injustice and painful poverty. That relationship with God gave him a sense of authentic happiness and joy, although, like a human being, he had a hard and even tragic life. He wrote just before the Second World War:

Hits and internal cheerfulness! They possessed this high quality of the soul that Catholic ethics in our days called the joyful fidelity of life. To feel it, you have to stay young, i.e. work as a young person. Can you think of something better than these good things! … For happiness is based on joyful fidelity and the culture of an act consistent with Catholic ethics, happiness consists of going to greater problems, and thus of the education of all higher abilities—when pursuing happiness is simply a duty, because it is approaching the ideal of similarity in the image and likeness of God. Under such slogans, purposeful life is created.¹⁰

This purposeful life, to the full extent, to the last moments of his earthly existence he created, was lived in the conviction that “Man cannot be limited by the shortness of his life, and in a collective life he must act as if death did not exist. Collective life consists in transmitting the (spiritual and material) achievements to the next generation, and thus on the moral (not only physical!) continuity of generations. You have to think till death and leave something to your successors, otherwise our life would be worth little. It is necessary to work sub specie aeternitatis.”¹¹

Paweł Skrzydlewski

The State School of Higher Education in Chełm

5. FELIKS KONECZNY’S STUDY OF HISTORY AND THE LAWS OF HISTORY

The present is a mystery to a thinking man, because every step of the way begs the question, why is it so, and not differently? This puzzle is being developed by history. … Studying the past is therefore a means and tool for working around the future; it is necessary for progress. The content of it is the hope and disappointment of generations; the goal of modern people is to find a conclusion for themselves.¹

Introduction

In culture, the past associated with man has always been and will always be the subject of many scientific disciplines.² Koneczny crowned his studies of history with the theory of rival civilizations, showing historical laws that can be seen after one is familiarized with the past.³ Civilizations understood as methods of collective life systems were, according to Koneczny, the basic groundwork (niche) of the cultural and historical reality created by man, and their correct cognitive approach brings to the modern man an understanding not only of the past, but also of what arises in it in all human culture.⁴

Koneczny’s understanding of history resulted in an extremely valuable cognitive approach to the so-called historical laws, i.e. certain general principles, that determine the existence and development of civilizations and the structures and actions created within them.⁵ These rules were discovered by Koneczny and showed the basis of his reflections on the past, which combined historical studies with philosophical investigations. They have a universal, common sensical and analogical character, and their understanding, in Koneczny’s opinion, allows us not only to understand the human past, but also gives us an opportunity for effective and fruitful cultural work in the future for entire generations.

Studying the past

The aforementioned historical laws were presented in Koneczny’s investigations about the past in his studies on history.⁶ These studies were not the result of an artificial transfer to the field of historiography of elements of the philosophy of history (historiosophy). It is rather the fruit of sapiential cognition. The concept of studying history is extremely cognitively fascinating and worthy of closer examination, if only to overcome many harmful expressions that attribute apriorism and “religious thinking” to Koneczny.⁷ There is no lack of opinions in which Koneczny’s approach “presents itself as an impeccable discipline,”⁸ i.e. free from apriorisms present in the reflections of other authors.

The reading of Koneczny’s works leads to the conviction that the history of human associations existing in the past is the subject of his own investigations.⁹ He believed that these associations had their own history, which is a sequence of changes taking place in time and in a specific space. Historiography tries to show and understand these events. Knowledge about them and clarification of them is the main goal of historiography.¹⁰

We can see, therefore, that the subject of research (the history of human associations) characterized in this manner allows us to include Koneczny’s research in the fields of humanistic and social research.¹¹ They are realistic and rational, free from the reductionism that is so widespread in the Hegelian historiosophies, or in considerations that assimilated the studying of history to the investigations created by supporters of positivist concepts. It is difficult to find a monistic position¹² or a monistic or holistic approach to the problem of history in Koneczny’s works and in their understanding of history. On the contrary. Following his criticism of the biologistical position (materialistic naturalism) in the matter of understanding the past, one can see that this position is definitely foreign to him.¹³ Why? Because it is in contradiction with the colloquial experience of man, where man himself appears as the creator of the past, who, by virtue of his voluntary and intelligent actions, performs activities that transcend the natural world.¹⁴

Civilization as an object of cognition

Koneczny, analyzing the history of human associations, noticed that there are relatively stable methods in them, ways of organizing social affairs, embracing individual, family and public life. He called these methods of organizing collective life “civilizations.” He believed that during history there were at least eighteen great methods of organizing a collective life, of which seven have survived to this day.¹⁵ They include the spiritual and material achievements of man. They differentiate human associations; they affect the fact that the history of human associations explored by historiography has a specific shape. Historiography reveals the process of formation over the centuries of methods of organizing collective life, pointing to their genesis and development. According to Koneczny, the process was influenced by such factors as fire control, breeding and taming animals, having children, language and tradition, the sense and awareness of death, religion and its principles, and understanding moral matters and the law based on them.

Civilization is not for Koneczny, as it was for O. Spengler, the last stage of development of culture.¹⁶ Koneczny does not associate only the idea of ​​material and spiritual progress with the notion of civilization, as Condorcet did. The term civilization does not mean for him—as, for example, it did for R. Merton—a field for the improvement of nature and biology. It is not limited to the description of social phenomena (H. Marrou), nor to everything that makes it easier for man to control himself (E. Barth).¹⁷ On the other hand, the history of civilization—changes taking place in the way of organizing collective life—are not (as A. Toynbee wanted) determined by the response of the association to the challenges of the natural environment.¹⁸ Civilization, or a specific method of organizing collective life, will become the subject of historiographic knowledge as a kind of socially organized human culture. For this reason, Koneczny wrote that “the science of civilization is the highest stage of history.”¹⁹ In his opinion, “a methodical science about civilization is a science … to be created.”²⁰

Negation of apriorial historiosophies and historiographies and the proper method of history

Koneczny did not understand his science of civilizations as a philosophy of history or historiosophy as speculative sciences (like Hegelian ones).²¹ He wanted to create historiography—a history from which “rationalist philosophizing must be excluded with all categoricalness,”²² because

History does not need any kind of philosophy of history; but historians need philosophy to be able to climb the third level of their science, where nihil humani a se alienum putans can embrace everything human, in all civilizations and compare them, and vice versa to mark the place and the degree of a given society in a given civilization.²³ 

Even if Koneczny somewhere called his reflections historiosophy, he always understood this term in a specific sense of studying history.²⁴ 

Koneczny also wrote in the context of the criticized German method of historical science, which, in his opinion, is only an exhaustive description of selected events from the past.²⁵ Historiography based on the method of German historians ultimately proved, according to Koneczny, “the most mistaken and, above all, insufficient method, and already for this reason [is] leading [us] astray.”²⁶ Koneczny accused this method of being one-sided and not allowing us to fully understand the human past, i.e. to discover the laws governing it. He remarked: “If harmony has long been discovered in nature, will not we be able to find it in history?”²⁷ 

Historical laws read in the field of historiography therefore show those factors that make this order in history. The cognitive goal which was set for the science of history seems to be justified in the common sense understanding of science, which, by its nature, in Koneczny’s opinion, is to discover regularities, to serve the understanding of the world and, above all, to aim for the truth.²⁸

The new method of historiographic work comes from stating and describing facts.²⁹ In this way, Koneczny wanted to avoid the apriorisms and anti-realism that appeared in all historiosophies and historiographies built on idealistic philosophies, where human history is interpreted through the prism of previously adopted systemic principles and is actually deduced from them, without looking at the facts.³⁰ Starting from stating the existence of facts was to be the basis for the realism of the new science. Thanks to facing realities and starting from facts, Koneczny called his method an inductive one.³¹ However, he did not specify what the inductive nature of the method he used is based on. It can be assumed that induction was, for him, a synonym of facing reality, facing what reality is like, facing the fact that reality does exist, and facing how it is experienced by man.³² The first stage of stating and describing facts he also called a seminar degree of historical science.³³

“The second degree of historiography is about looking for a causal relationship of facts, which may include larger areas and longer times. This requires a deep understanding of the subject, which is multilaterally understood.”³⁴ Koneczny explained that if the science of history had omitted this research stage, it would only be able to superficially describe history; it would not have reached the factors that are essential in history.³⁵ In his opinion, German science, built on positivist ideas, stopped without reaching this level of method.³⁶ This degree is present “in the works of Italian, French and English historians, and in German ones that did not get inspiration from the German method.”³⁷ 

The second level of the method supposes an interrelation of historical facts, and assumes and actually discovers causal relations between facts from the past. The main goal of the second stage of the method proposed by Koneczny is a cognitive view that understands events from the past. It is done by describing the relationship between facts, with particular emphasis on causal relations, along with finding the reasons (rationales) of these relations.

After passing these two stages, the historian may cross the third level of the method of historical sciences, in which the universal history

… may be explored against the background of civilizational trials and attempts of civilization syntheses. Only then will it be possible to talk about the skills of historical research (and not about the art of narrative); there will be a certain comparative basis and it will be known what the purpose of these investigations is at lower levels, for what all the material that was the goal may be useful.³⁸ 

According to Koneczny, this third level of the historical method has to replace the so-called history of culture, which exists alongside historiography.³⁹ At this stage, the history of human associations is analyzed, taking into account different methods of the system of collective life.⁴⁰ 

Laws of history

According to Koneczny, the first law of history says that civilizations always strive for expansion and development, for multiplying their existence and power, because this is in accordance with the nature of man himself and flows directly from it. For this reason, in history we will always be the witnesses of a certain spiritual and material struggle, led by people in their own associations by fighting with other people and their development. This is not the result of any natural hostility of man against man, but the effect of affection and affirmation of what is one’s own, native, created by himself and thus constituting his own identity. The law of expansion and struggle is, therefore, a certain law of all human life, the right to implement inclination to love oneself, to defend oneself and one’s heritage.⁴¹

According to Koneczny, the second historical law expresses the necessity of maintaining proportionality, a certain proportion in human life, without which nothing human can last and develop. It is about the proportion and adequacy between numerous constitutive elements of human life such as knowledge, health, wealth, and level and type of education, and others that must constitute a certain unity and a coherent whole in one and all human life. The lack of this proportion leads to ineffectiveness and weakness, and finally to a fall which, according to Koneczny, is always the result of a failure to respect the principle of commensurability. Sometimes the loss of commensurability occurs by accepting extraneous civilizational elements, sometimes by neglecting one’s own development in some field, but often through intense and one-sided partial development, neglecting the need to maintain proportional order in its entirety.

Finally, there is a third law, an extremely important one, according to which history will never respect the pursuit of mechanical forms of the synthesis of various civilizations. Civilizations in fact differ significantly in their goals, means and methods of operation, having different patterns and formal reasons. For this reason, it is not possible to create a permanent synthesis of civilizations that is forms of existence, which give birth to some new and organically alive form of civilization. Attempts to synthesize civilizations have always been, according to Koneczny, a source of many disasters in the reality of social life. They cannot be confused with cultural syntheses that are always and naturally occurring where there is one civilizational ground. Cultural syntheses are and always will be something refreshing and good for a human being, whereas attempts to synthesize civilizations will never be such.

Studying history also shows, according to Koneczny, the fourth historical law, which says that in the case of the permanent conflict of equally strong civilizations, the lower, more primitive civilization (worsening human potentiality) prevails, because in the cultural space (human life) it is easier to do evil than good, it is easier to depravate a man than to ennoble him through truth, goodness, beauty and holiness. Primitivism and the strength of lower civilizations are not absolute and deterministic. Due to the nature of man himself, it is possible in the historical process to lead people to reject lower forms of civilization for the benefit of higher ones. It is the essence of every human being by its nature, and we have to find the fundamental reasons for genuine progress in the human past.

It is worth emphasizing in this context that this whole distinction of historical laws was made in Koneczny’s thought in the context of accepting the thesis of inequality as to the perfecting power of various types of civilizations. In other words, Koneczny claimed that civilizations do not represent the same value with regard to the possibility of the development of a human person (of a man); that there are better and worse civilizations, and from currently existing civilizations, only one civilization—Latin—is free from significant defects. For this reason, respect for general historical laws by this civilization is a condition for its continuation and development. Therefore, everything that arises on the basis of the Latin civilization must not only get stronger thanks to the principles of the Latin civilization (personalism, science, Roman law), but must respect universal historical laws.

For this reason, the general conclusion is the following: all cultural, social, historical and political crises arise mainly through not respecting historical laws and through actions against historical laws.

Ryszard Polak

The Józef Piłsudski University of Physical Education in Warsaw

6. LOGOS AND ETHOS IN THE LATIN CIVILIZATION ACCORDING TO FELIKS KONECZNY

Introduction

Koneczny emphasized that the authentic development of man as well as of people’s associations is connected with the cognitive activity of man and its effects in the form of knowledge and understanding (logos).¹ However, these are not the only elements of human development. Knowledge is one of the categories of the human quincunx, or five fields of human life, along with the fields of good, beauty, health and well-being. Ethos, understood as the field of moral life, is therefore necessarily connected with logos, appearing in normal and everyday human life.² “The science of morality, called ethics, can be practiced like any other science; from a small school catechism to philosophy. Ethics will also be an adoption of morality to life, of course not only to private but also public life.”³

According to Koneczny, experience teaches that in the life of individuals and societies, the use of reason and the results of this process in the form of intellectual culture and science (knowledge) must complement each other and support each other with constant improvement of the will and character of man, that is, ethos.⁴ “Ethos cannot be equally active for a long time if it does not rely on logos. Logos is strengthened by action, and ethos is depleted in this way. But let us remember that, on the other hand, logos is depleted if it cannot complement itself with ethos.”⁵ Thus, according to Koneczny, logos and ethos are the two pillars of man’s spiritual life, and the perception of the relations that connect them can be made in the field of science about civilizations and their history.⁶ Understanding the logos and ethos of a given civilization, understanding loyalty to it—these are the conditions necessary for authentic progress in culture.⁷

Science as a manifestation and center of logos in the Latin civilization

For a human being, learning and then understanding are something natural and at the same time necessary, permeating all human culture.⁸ From logos, therefore, human culture begins, which also includes man’s deeds, his production and his religious life. According to Koneczny, it is particularly important to notice the connection of logos with ethos, because without knowing the truth about what is genuinely good, there is no genuinely morally good life, no morally good culture, and no human happiness at all.⁹ Koneczny emphasized that intellectual activity can be improved by creating a set of virtues that will become a part of human character; one can build cognitive communities, can establish institutions that promote knowledge.¹⁰ Therefore, the virtues that constitute the culture of logos have an impact on the entire moral culture of man, both in individual and collective life.¹¹

A special opportunity and means for improving human cognition is learning, which allows us, according to Koneczny, to avoid many mistakes and even moral evil.

The progress of science can even relatively decrease the amount of acts, because it decreases inclination to unprepared, rash acts … but there are more and more new types of acts. There are acts which are impossible in a society deprived of education; they are inaccessible for this society because of the lack of appropriate concepts. The more science enters into the life of society, the lesser is the domination of feelings, and the stronger is the domination of concepts [reason—R.P.]. The actions of a normal man become dependent on thoughts.¹²

Thanks to the acquisition of science from the Greeks and popularization through the Catholic Church, this is primarily the case in the Latin civilization, in which science has become the basis of the logos of Westerners.¹³ 

Koneczny argued that most of the important decisions for societies, both good and bad ones, were developed theoretically by various scholars, and this proves that logos is before ethos and that it determines the course of its actions and goals.¹⁴ The development of science, which originally took place at universities associated with the Church, brought changes in many areas of life.¹⁵ 

Koneczny emphasized that for many centuries in the Latin civilization, priests were involved in science and taught the European nations to respect the truth, including the truth that served practical, technical and productive activity, not only the one that enables salvation.¹⁶ We also owe these priests many inventions and rationalizing ideas used later in agricultural, building, medical and other works.¹⁷ Therefore, knowledge developed thanks to medieval universities, supported by the Church organizationally and personally; this proves, above all, the love of truth and respect for it, but also proves a deep personalism that commands us to recognize the truth for the good of man with inventiveness, firmness and ingenuity.¹⁸ It must be remembered here that, according to Koneczny, there are three basic activities (conditions) that must be fulfilled if science in the Latin civilization is to be able to develop properly in the service of logos. These are: research, popularization and criticism.

The first condition is fulfilled, according to Koneczny, when scholars selflessly seek to discover and learn the truth about the world, when they direct their cognitive attention towards reality, not towards any concepts or ideas. It is the study of the world, and not the analysis of thoughts and positions—that is, the basic, first and only source of truth in science. People who do not accept this postulate are exposed to the danger of constructing theories which are a priori, detached from reality. Koneczny emphasized that science should be well organized in the institutional and social aspects, because “organized science is an organized logos; organizational sense gives logos the power of its effectiveness. The harmony between the scientific world and the political world is an exponent of the desired harmony of logos with ethos that should also be organized.”¹⁹ 

Knowledge, which is used by scholars, should be popularized and spread not only in the selected social groups, but through the whole of society.

Education did not create science, but, on the contrary, science created education, if—of course—science was practiced publicly. In ancient Egypt, science was not popularized, science did not create education, and therefore the Egyptian civilization collapsed with the fall of the learned priesthood. Education is a condition for prolonging the existence of science, but science must create this auxiliary element by itself. Science comes from creation, it spontaneously appears, and it is a queen for itself and the goal to itself.²⁰

According to Koneczny, in the normal course of human life, scientific knowledge should have a theoretical nature and not be closed to the practical side of life.²¹ The omission of the practical side of practicing and applying science may lead to extreme intellectualism, the consequence of which is excessive theorization, devoid of real foundations and experience. Some civilizations, especially the Jewish one, promote these types of negative phenomena in a special way.²² The practical aspect of theoretical knowledge is revealed when, along with the popularization of knowledge, many prejudices that exist among people are rejected. This applies not only to natural and empirical sciences, but to all scientific cognition, including ethics. It refers to moral life in a special way, because it is always the result of prior knowledge and understanding of what is good, right and due. The influence of logos on ethos is visible even in the field of theological education. “It was finally realized that the saints were very hard-working, and not necessarily poor people; they were even kings, ministers or generals.”²³ The common image of the saint, as an individual isolated from the world and ascetic, was modified in Catholic societies under the influence of the development of theology, and every contemporary Catholic can now find among the numerous saints his patron cultivating a similar profession, who he can imitate in some way. 

Koneczny justified the thesis that Poland developed its power in Central and Eastern Europe thanks to practicing many fields of knowledge, both practical and theoretical ones.²⁴ University knowledge was popularized in society thanks to the constantly developing network of secondary and general education. Thanks to teachers who were well prepared for their professional work, both theoretical and technical sciences developed because the school, which properly performs its functions, can teach good and creative thinking in both the former and the latter field. For this reason, the conclusion is that “Closure of schools would hinder production more than shutting down factories.”²⁵

It should therefore be emphasized that there is some regularity, according to which the more authentic the education of people in the fields of science, the higher is the level of human life in a given civilization. The ethos of the Latin civilization requires one to acquire knowledge widely and to use theoretical knowledge practically in their experiences of everyday life and work with other people. This is valid, for example, in the case of justice. “Justice must take into account many circumstances of life; that is a man with ethical education cannot use it conventionally … The judgment of a man who does not have the proper degree of education could rarely and only accidentally be just.”²⁶

Well-established logos and ethos give man freedom, sovereignty, independence and maturity in his moral life, and its manifestation in mature people is the epikeia virtue, allowing them to be guided not by the letter of the law but by its intent.²⁷ For this reason, the logos of the Latin civilization requires one to refer critically to the ideology of legal positivism, all ideologies of morality, which artificially separate the fields of law and politics from the moral good and the principles of ethics.²⁸ Koneczny noticed regretfully that “we come to such barbarism that the judge is not for doing justice. It does not belong to him, he is not to do this. His duty is to guard the law—and whether it is right or wrong, the judge does not care.”²⁹

Realism and criticism, not just utilitarianism in the field of science

Knowledge develops and is the sole cause of progress. However, one should remember here what should guide the scientific criticism itself, namely, assigning it to a fuller and better knowledge of the truth about reality. For this reason, according to Koneczny, all debates of scholars and researchers should take place mainly at universities, because there exist appropriate conditions and an intellectual climate to make disputes between specialists in various fields and settle reliably on the basis of the truth of the world, not on its appearance. Criticism is not a tool for demagogy, populism or cheap attractions, but an expression of love for truth. The scholar is responsible for the truth but also for whether it is known and understood in the community; the scholar is responsible for his work not only before other scholars but also before the community he should serve with the truth he has learned. The community also has a duty to respect the work of the scholar and support him; this is a moral requirement of justice. Progress in knowledge is possible thanks to the freedom of science and the opportunities that the involvement in studies of possibly the greatest number of researchers coming from various social ranks and states give to people in the Latin civilization.

Reductionism in the field of logos in oriental civilizations

In many non-personalist civilizations, the intellectual abilities of many people are not used, nor are the minds commonly trained to overcome more difficult tasks. For example, in the Brahmin civilization, speculative thinking is the privilege of priests.³⁰ In non-personalist civilizations, knowledge and its popularization are also not public. In the sacral methods of the collective life system, not all people have the opportunity to learn the truth about the world. Knowledge is in fact reserved for people who are strictly called to have it. Even by the time of the ancient Egyptian civilization, it was reserved for priests; the same is the case in the Jewish civilization.³¹

In the Byzantine civilization, practicing science is bureaucratic and subject to strict control by the government. The authorities, through the mediation of officials, decide what area of ​​human intellectual activity is to be allowed and subsidized by the state. Since the governing party has no direct contact with society and its real needs, they are not interested in the development of sciences to satisfy the real spiritual and material needs of people.³² Therefore, neither philosophy nor theology, or a number of technical sciences, have found recognition and support in bureaucratic societies that prefer the Byzantine method of the collective life system. Attempts of the top authorities deciding on the development or liquidation of individual disciplines and cognitive interests came to nothing. This was the case in Byzantium, where the emperors tried to influence the direction of theology (e.g. by prohibiting the cult of images), and in Germany, where the social and political philosophy of G.W. Hegel and Protestant theology got the support of state authorities.³³ In the Byzantine method of the collective life system, Neo-Platonism is preferred, and in general idealism with its apriorism. We can also find a collective view of human existence, which, combined with idealism, often gives utopian action in politics, far from realizing the common good. Byzantinism is also a ground for many forms of totalitarianism, in which the state overpowers man with all his intellectual and moral life.³⁴

The Turanian method of the collective life system (existing mainly in the former Mongolian state, and then in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe) does not pay much attention to cultivating science. It is true that some of the skills (e.g. military tactics) stand there on a high level, but they do not result from the unselfish desire to learn about the world. Knowledge develops there for fighting and gaining. In the Turanian civilization, the infiltration of society is very important, and the authorities are very suspicious of any intellectual activity of their citizens. This is accompanied by the oriental sophism that all evil is born from thinking, and evil must be fought, and therefore one must also fight with human thinking. This error is also supported by a certain trend of religious thinking, which sees in the devil (Satan) primarily an intellectually developed creature; for this reason a man who develops his intellect is rather an imitator of the devil, whereas a good person is someone simple, unlearned, not devoted to intellectual activities. All this leads to a great impoverishment of ethos and to basing it on emotions, myths, fictions and subjective feelings that do not have the value of truth.³⁵

In other civilizations, such as the Brahmin one and the Chinese one, neither theoretical nor technical sciences are developed at all. There are many reasons for this. In China, the barrier to the development of knowledge is the structure of the language, making it impossible to transmit—especially in the written form—theoretical content and concepts in the field of philosophy, which is a good basis for any scientific knowledge.³⁶ Non-religiousness and a hierarchical social structure that does not motivate people to mental and professional activity, even a slavish attitude to tradition that forms human consciences, are also very important.

In India, the development of science is stopped by ambiguous language³⁷ and also by a contemplative system of local religious beliefs, a caste system related to it, and the overly dreamy temperament of the local population, as well as the lack of attaching due importance to the chronology of events and causal explanations of facts and events taking place in nature and in the human world.³⁸ The real technical and mental progress of India and China in Koneczny’s opinion is the result of the influence of the Latin civilization.

When the cult of truth is abandoned in the Latin civilization, there must be a breakdown of the society, a fall of the nation, the powerlessness of the state outside, and civic indifference within, because essentially all creative forces will be broken. Thus, the fall of sciences happens during the domination of lies by the first involuntary harbinger of threatening evil, entailing the disappearance of higher-order truths and the ruin of higher ethical education.³⁹ 

Ryszard Polak

The Józef Piłsudski University of Physical Education in Warsaw

7. FELIKS KONECZNY’S ANTHROPOLOGY, ETHICS AND SOCIAL THOUGHT

Man as a spiritual and physical subject of moral and social life

Feliks Koneczny believed that human nature and its understanding are the basis for a proper cognitive view of human activities, social life and the order in them. Anthropology was therefore an important element of his civilizational investigations.¹

In his understanding of man, Koneczny emphasized the need for integral understanding where “Everything, whatever is human, and which remains in any relation with the human being, always has two sides, physical and spiritual, because in this world soul cannot exist without body. Each case has an internal and external side, content and form.”² Koneczny explained that the spiritual forces that a human possesses thanks to the immortal soul give him great, unlimited possibilities of development and the chance to overcome various difficulties; everything he meets on his life path. We do not find this in a material and animal world that is determined by strictly defined laws.³

Koneczny explained that people can change the conditions of their existence for better ones thanks to reason and will, that is, through the personal way of being and acting.⁴ Their proper use of reason and will is provided to them by the Latin civilization, thanks to Greek philosophy, Roman law and Christian religion, which confirmed the personalist view of human and moral principles of the individual, family and social life.⁵

Law: rational order of social life for the good of man

Greek philosophy and science opened a chance for Westerners to build culture on the ground of truth. Roman law grounded politics and human social activity on the foundation of justice; it also carried the dualism of public and private law thanks to the principle that it was necessary to separate the spheres of private and public life. This made it possible to secure the subjective rights of the human individual in the state against the possible interference of state authorities in private and family life.⁶ The main principle was that morality is the same in private and public life, and obliges everyone to do the same, because every man is equal in his dignity to others and has equal rights to others.⁷ 

The great achievement of the Roman legal culture was the establishment of an independent and sovereign judiciary, whose task was to be an impartial and fair resolver of mutual disputes between citizens, as well as between citizens and the state.⁸ This element became an integral component of public life in the Latin civilization.

Christian religion also caused major changes in the mentality of societies in the area of public life.⁹ Statute law in Christian societies started taking into account the moral goals and aspirations of people. The principles of social justice were complemented by the principles of mercy and love, whose effects of practicing are visible in Christian customs and everyday practice. Koneczny emphasized that Christians (especially Catholics) in the Latin civilization are morally obliged to care for both their spiritual and physical existence, which is why there is an obligation to work, both physically and spiritually.¹⁰

Politics in the Latin civilization: the subjectivity of the citizen¹¹

In social relations in the Latin civilization, the principle of social solidarism and mutual cooperation in realizing the common good is valid. Local governments should play a large role in social life. Local governments should be of two types: professional and territorial. Justifying the need and principles of public life, Koneczny wrote:

Self-government according to professions is a necessity, but woe if everything was to be contained in it. Its shortcomings must be supplemented by the territorial government. There are great public affairs that are common to the general community, not by professional camaraderie, but by the neighborhood, as people live in an area: in a commune, a district, a voivodship.¹²

In international politics, people ruling states should adhere to moral principles and the Decalogue, and should not violate the rights of other states to decide their own destiny. There is one more important principle, namely, one should not use force to convert to Christianity those who do not express their will and intention to change their lives. Therefore, every Christian should respect the sovereign moral decisions of followers of other religions, and at the same time, with his own life and rational argumentation, convince them of the superiority of the religion of Christ over other religious systems and beliefs.¹³

In Koneczny’s opinion, social life includes many spheres: family, broadened communities like nations, professional, territorial and neighborhood communities, as well as national and international life, the sphere of relations between various types of civilizations, and others.¹⁴ Participation in political and social life is not servile subordination to the decisions of the authorities, but common decision-making and working for the common good in accordance with one’s social status, education, profession and skills.¹⁵ 

By taking part in social and political life, each citizen has the right to have subjective rights and obligations.¹⁶ Violation of the balance between law and duty results either in anarchy and the decay of the social community, or in the formation of communities and states ruled in a tyrannical manner. Citizens can be protected from this type of pathology, first of all, by propriety and the education of the whole society, as well as by a system of law that protects against tyranny and guarantees freedom of thinking and acting.¹⁷ An important component of the Latin civilization is religion, and the Catholic Church is, according to Koneczny, the most important factor in the upbringing of people into a responsible life and a responsible way of acting in social life.¹⁸ 

Integral human development in the Latin civilization

Human development in the Latin civilization takes various forms and depends on many factors. Koneczny indicated especially the importance of truth, goodness, beauty, health and proper well-being.

However, the most important element that enables a human person to come to a higher level is his or her good moral life. Without it, both the material and the spiritual side of life will be defective. As Koneczny wrote: “There is no progress without ethical progress. This feature of the Polish mentality should be passed down from generation to generation without any compromise. Let it be for us forever.”¹⁹ Therefore, both the individual and the state have a duty to care for individual morality as well as its social dimension and meaning. Of course, we should also take into account other necessary conditions for good human existence, because, as Koneczny wrote, “the fight for existence has three aspects: material, moral and intellectual.”²⁰

Koneczny argued that a man, as a spiritual and physical being, should use his reason and will in his actions. Unfortunately, in the history of mankind, especially in the Oriental civilizations, it often happened that people were not guided by the truth they learned but were subjected to the suggestions of others, especially of physically or militarily stronger individuals treating myths, sacred law or family traditions, often a priori and far from the truth, as the basis of spiritual life.²¹

Threat coming from the collectiveness of civilizations

In different methods of the collective life system, according to Koneczny, different moral systems are preferred.

In the Byzantine civilization, due to the bureaucratic rules of the functioning of education and the inability to articulate one’s views without the state’s approval, human development was severely limited. Public morality was constrained by a network of regulations restricting freedom of thought and action. The rules and order of the proceedings of individuals in public life were limited by statute law. Even religious life was subjected to formalism and the far-reaching standardization of the state.²² 

The Byzantine civilization bases its functioning on the assumption that human decisions in matters concerning the political community should be significantly limited. Political authority, as authorized to give orders to its citizens, has the right and the obligation to give such regulations that would enable it to decide on the public and private life of all citizens. The ruler has both political and religious power over society (caesaropapism).²³ Thus, he has the power to interfere in the life of churches and religious communities, he has the power to establish dogmas in which believers have to believe, and he has the right to “create” and administer clerical groups.²⁴ It is assumed that the ruler always keeps in his mind the good of the community, and hence his actions are always good and they should always be accepted by citizens.

Moreover, it is believed that the ruler’s “wisdom” usually flows from the extraordinary “gift” God gave him when he took power over the state. At the same time, it is assumed that the citizens are not inclined to submit to the legal and moral order established in the state. Therefore, individual and public life is subordinated to a system of bureaucratic control, which limits the possibilities of the free action and work of individuals in various areas of their lives. Assessing this type of system of control in the Byzantine civilization, Koneczny wrote that 

It is dangerous to have one such center. It is bad when the official capital of the country is the central point, and therefore in the spirit spheres one that is the most agile for everything, for the government, and for science and for fine arts and for social life. If in such a comprehensive center something breaks down, the whole country breaks down. The good of the nation requires that the country should have a few spiritual centers, even a dozen or so, independent of the official capital.²⁵

The limitation of human freedom through bureaucracy in the Byzantine civilization concerns, in particular, economic activity (fiscalism, bureaucratism, invigilation). Holding offices and state positions often becomes hereditary, and nepotism and corruption impede the natural human striving to work in accordance with one’s interests and qualifications. In the Byzantine civilization, the omnipotence of the state assumes gigantic proportions and overcomes almost all areas of human life.²⁶ It also causes, in confrontations with other countries, its strength to diminish, and it is not able to compete with them, neither economically nor militarily nor intellectually. Koneczny argued that Byzantinism leads all public life astray, including in Germany and other European countries, where the Latin civilization is fighting with the Byzantine one.²⁷ 

In the Turanian civilization there is no personal vision of the human being in the general consciousness.²⁸ The state is treated as a means mechanically and is strictly subordinated to the ruler. The inhabitants of the Turanian state are treated as the personal property of the leader (slaves). This has serious social and political consequences. The economy stops developing, and the source of the ruler’s income is the conquest of neighboring states and the plunder of the fruit of their work. All agricultural and industrial production is unprofitable in the Turanian civilization, and people do not have respect for the effects of work. The state does not guarantee the inviolability of the right to hold immovable and movable property by its citizens, which means that they often change their place of residence, without being attached to the place where they currently reside. The result of this is the depopulation of larger cities, and this contributes to the fact that they cease to be centers of cultural life and education. The state, moreover, does not care about the development of these areas of life, recognizing them as not bringing material benefits to citizens, and therefore as unnecessary and even, in the long term, dangerous for the ruling despots.

Countries governed by Turanian methods are aggressive and dangerous. The motor force of their expansion is conquest, and they fail when they do not wage war. A lack of external military expansion means that the material resources of Turanian states rapidly get smaller, and internal conflicts cause their decay. The leader’s death (natural or as a result of a power grab) often causes the state’s collapse, or at least its weakening. Because in a Turanian state, the citizens do not identify themselves with the authorities, which sometimes they hate or despise, and thus the existence of the state itself and its institutions are still threatened and uncertain. Koneczny wrote that “Turanian states are soldiers’ rule. In case of a long peace, the Turanian state is in decline, and finally it falls apart. Some kind of the healthful elemental power could manifest only in the desire to annexation under a new commander and in the happiness of war; if this does not happen, the rebirth of the state will be impossible.”²⁹

Religion in the national and private life of people living in a Turanian state has little moral significance and has no impact on the behavior of both individuals and rulers who are characterized by religious and moral indifferentism, and sometimes mindlessly strive to syncretically combine different religions and beliefs.

In the Jewish civilization, that is sacral civilization, religion plays a significant role in shaping the moral attitude of humans as a certain legal attitude. Jewish law itself was significantly formalized, and the number of provisions obliging believers was significantly expanded. The right to interpret law is granted to wise men, to chosen persons (rabbis). They also set the rules of social life. There are usually so many of them that their even superficial learning requires many years of study. Moral life, as well as religious life, is the implementation of the precepts of law, and the law is applied selectively and sometimes variously, which results in a variety of ethics (double morality). It allows you to deal differently with your fellow believers compared to people who do not confess Judaism.³⁰ It should be remembered that the Jewish civilization permits divorce, and thus, according to Koneczny, its moral principles are primarily harmful to women, who are discriminated against by different legal interpretations. The ideology of Jewish Messianism, which presupposes the supremacy of a nation elected over other nations, also has a bad influence on morality, which also introduces a kind of distinction in the human race between the chosen nation and those that do not belong to it.³¹ According to Koneczny, history teaches that the messianic ideology of many Jews does not go hand in hand with their private and public morality; they often treat other non-Jewish nations in a cruel way, committing many abuses, especially economic ones. In turn, this results in chauvinistic, anti-Jewish attitudes among the non-Jewish population, which sometimes lead to criminal activities. Koneczny, as a strong opponent of all forms of racism and chauvinism, explained that the West faces the need of rational and decent morality.

Unconditionally, anti-Semitism with its motto “Beat the Jew!” causes great damage. Morality is imperative, even in anti-Semitism. Everything that comes out of immoral assumptions ultimately turns against its creators. Let us reject any “racism” as a view that is an affront to both morality and reason. Let us not blame anyone for being born a Jew. What is his fault, and what is the merit of whoever was born as a non-Jew? Justice requires equal measure and mutuality.³² 

Koneczny argued that the moral development of man is also difficult in the Arab, Brahmin and Chinese civilizations. Polygamy present there discredits women (the Arab civilization); the absolutized family tradition and areligiousness contribute to the violation of natural human rights (the Chinese civilization); and the caste system and worldview based on emanation distort freedom, equality and human rationality (the Brahmin civilization).

Paweł Skrzydlewski

The State School of Higher Education in Chełm

8. PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION IN THE TEACHING OF FELIKS KONECZNY

Culture as a form of human cultivation

The philosophy of F. Koneczny’s culture and civilization deserves attention due to many reasons, first and foremost because of its anthropological ground and metaphysical realism, where cultural and civilizational reality are captured on the basis of human nature and from the perspective of how it perfects man to the fullness of his existence. In Koneczny’s understanding of culture and civilization, he was not influenced by idealistic concepts, which were mainly related to the German (subjectivist) tradition, where culture is understood as the field of human values (postulates).¹ He perceived man himself as a subject of culture and civilization in terms of a personal being.²

Koneczny, following the Graeco-Roman philosophical tradition, assumed that culture in the proper sense is not only a product of man, but it is all that improves and brings man closer to the achievement of his full existence.³ According to this theory, man, in order to achieve the fullness of humanity, requires “cultivation, care and support”; he achieves a beautiful and good life (kalokagathia).⁴ However, this can only happen where culture is built on knowing and respecting the truth about the human being, where it is actually matched to human nature and embraces it properly, in what is essentially human for the human being. Culture, as the complement of human nature, finds a specific order of nature, which it must serve and for which it must make allowances.

It must be remembered that culture for Koneczny—if it is an element of social life—becomes a civilization, and in his doctrine we will not find the opposition “culture–civilization.” Culture is everything that man creates, and civilization is a social culture that exists in some sort of social totality.⁵ Civilizations having one basic fundament, which consists of triple-law and quincunx, can be the backwoods of different cultures, because they come from man.⁶ Thus, civilizations as well as the cultural realities created in them are not directly determined by the human race, climate, language or religion.⁷Behind the existence of cultures and civilizations, there is human activity materializing human decision-making acts, not cosmic laws or other determinants.⁸

Civilization as an organized social culture

Man is by his nature a social being, and is involved in various interpersonal relationships. Social life is a means and a “driving force” of human development, but to be such, it must be properly organized.⁹ Thus, one can ask the question: what causes a given form of social life organization to have an ancillary and perfecting character for people?

Koneczny followed the philosophical tradition of the West, according to which the true cognition (truth) must exist at the basis of human culture and civilization, because without it culture loses its sense and its real ability to improve man.¹⁰ In order to qualify the culture and civilization as genuinely good, it is first necessary to recognize the structure of human nature and its laws; it is necessary to notice its actual, and not imaginary faults; it is necessary to notice what is truly human, what is necessary to be a man, distinguishing it from what is inhuman, unnecessary, shameful.

Knowledge of the philosophical and historical inquiries of the West made Koneczny realize that by having an image and understanding of human nature, knowing the purpose of a human being, we gain a basis for assessing culture itself, and we have a chance to criticize it, to assess its validity and value, i.e. the extent to which it perfects man.¹¹ In other words, human perfection is the goal and meaning of all human culture, and it should also be a principle for every civilization.¹² But do civilizations equally fulfill the good of man? The answer must be negative; there is no equality of cultures and civilizations. In other words, Koneczny understood the truth that there can and actually do exist barbaric, anti-human cultures which not only rape the natural rights of the human person, but above all they mutilate the person and increase his faults.

Using historical cognition and the achievements of realistic philosophy, he explained that behind the rise of anti-cultures there can be many different factors (myths, sacralisms, the a priori tradition, unreasonable law, people’s ordinary laziness and negligence, etc.), but most of all there is a lack of truth about man, a lack of understanding of who a person is, what his goal in life is, and what the right way is to achieve it.¹³ A man is a person, a special being, having reason, free will, and above all dignity and the assignment of all his life to one goal, which is God.¹⁴ 

Europe and the Latin civilization

In Koneczny’s opinion, Europe is represented by many different cultures and traditions—however, it has its unity because of the general civilizational base on which individual national cultures develop. This base is only the Latin civilization of the West. Koneczny’s studies of the past made him realize that there is no single European civilization. Taking into account the geography of this continent, there are at least four civilizations that still compete with each other: Latin-Western; Byzantine; Jewish; and Moscow-Cossack (Turanian).¹⁵ Within their framework, appropriate educational, economical, legal and political systems are developed.¹⁶ It should be mentioned here that civilizational pluralism in any place is not something good and it is not a reason for joy, but rather for worries and fears. Why?

According to Koneczny, for many centuries in Europe and Poland,

there [has been] a disastrous multitude of civilizations (Latin, Byzantine, Turanian, Jewish). The state, as such, cannot be civilized in four ways. If it becomes a mixture, it can only become acivilizational, and then it is threatened with disintegration from all four sides. Polish statehood must, first of all, arrange its attitude to society according to the requirements of the Latin civilization; even opposition from the populations of other civilizations should not be against it. Nobody is harmed if they are given something! … Whoever would like to change the principles of our marital, property and inheritance law would soon find himself on the same path as Bolshevism. If anyone does not want such a result, let him not touch anything that does not belong to the whole of the Latin method of collective life, and may it help to base the Polish State on the Latin civilization.¹⁷

The specificity of the Latin civilization is based on the personalistic vision of man, on the presence of science as a free and culturally significant type of cognition and on the existence of established law, which is an expression of goodness and fairness.¹⁸ The essence of the personalism of the Latin civilization is therefore the affirmation of the human right to recognize and then to love and choose the real good that will be implemented in life. Both the knowledge of good and its choice are not carried out without the help of others—hence, solidarity is inseparably entwined with personalism in the Latin civilization, rooted in the social way of human existence and action. It is one of the most important sources of the nation’s existence and of the culture it carries.¹⁹ It is co-created by education and the educational system; every educator, politician, scholar, every person aware of his civilizational and national identity works for its existence.

Culture of the Latin civilization and its dependence on the Gospel: the social mission of the Catholic Church

Koneczny emphasized very strongly that the Latin (Western) civilization was created mainly due to the evangelizing mission of the Catholic Church, which, at the same time as bringing the Gospel to man, brought a treasure of rational cognition (science born in the Greek culture) and good order (law from the Roman tradition). The Catholic Church, not without difficulties, realized the culture of human life based on truth and good, on the intelligent order of law, and on personalism. Koneczny constantly emphasized that the Catholic Church has great merits in the formation of Western civilization, for the reason that in all its activities it perceived a man as a person. The religion brought by the Church formed all the culture created within the Latin civilization, but it did not make it ideologically sacred. In a special way it contributed to the formation of human moral life. The Catholic Church influenced the social life of a human being—according to Koneczny—in four important ways:²⁰

(1) By the affirmation of an indissoluble monogamy, which strengthened the dignity of the woman and thus her freedom in a decisive way. The indissolubility of marriage not only protected and supported the woman, but strengthened the family home itself—the environment for the birth and upbringing of a human being; above all, it served children, who in the course of their difficult and long-term education, need stability and support from both parents.

(2) By the aspiration to abolish slavery. The real abolition of slavery became possible due to respect for manual work. This kind of work for a number of centuries in antiquity was considered a job not worthy of a real and normal man. It was, therefore, intended for “defective” people, for slaves; and contempt for manual work was the basis for the existence of slavery that was a social institution. Since, however, work became a necessary moral imperative of every human being, since it stopped to “morally” defile him, there was a chance to combine it with education and upbringing to make a man who is a subject of work not only wise and wealthy, but also beautiful, wise and saintly, a morally good person.²¹ Physical work stopped being something that diminishes people. This is the principle of the Latin civilization.²²

(3) By the liquidation of family revenge. In the Latin civilization, revenge was transformed thanks to the Church into justice meted out by state courts (public authorities), thanks to which one of the state-creating factors emerged. That is why Koneczny saw in the Church a state-building factor, though it did not sacralize the state and politics. The existence of a stable state became an important support for the functioning of high culture.

(4) By introducing the Church’s independence from secular and political power. It turned out to be one more reinforcement of man, flowing out from the conviction about the superiority of spiritual life over the biological and material spheres. It is proof of the conviction that human life does not end and cannot be reduced to only a temporal, biological-sensual existence understood as a temporary and finite consumption of temporal goods. The independence of religion from politics, of the Church from the state, has its justification in noticing the fact that the ultimate goal of human life, which is God, is a transcendent and supernatural goal, and, for this reason, requires supernatural means to achieve it. These means are not at the disposal of natural associations (like the state or the nation), but they are the means in the power of God Himself and the association He calls, i.e. the Church.²³ Finally, religion—even by constantly directing man to his goal of life—is also a foundation for discovering and experiencing his own and personal dignity; it is an irreplaceable “guardian” of freedom and “shield” protecting man from a variety of various reductionisms.

In Koneczny’s opinion, the four postulates brought by Catholic missions not only shaped the personalistic way of understanding man, but also contributed to the existence of a specific association existing only in the Latin civilization, which is the nation.²⁴

Dr Joanna Kiereś-Łach

The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin

9. THEATER, ART, LITERATURE AND HUMAN UPBRINGING ACCORDING TO FELIKS KONECZNY

Introduction

Feliks Koneczny was mainly a historian and historiosopher, a theorist of civilization, but also an assertor of the Latin civilization and Polish culture. His theoreticians and commentators omit or even marginalize his activities in the field of art theory, especially theater theory and art criticism, but his contributions to explaining the essence of these fields of culture and their role in shaping mankind are significant.¹ According to Koneczny, there is no reason for Polish culture, which has lasted for so long and yet has remained so rich, to have an inferiority complex in comparison to other European cultures.²

Historical conditions of cultural development in Poland

Poland lost its independence due to the three partitions made by Prussia, Russia and Austria (1772–1795). The consequence of this situation was the loss of Poland’s own government (statehood). Moreover, as Koneczny points out, it was difficult to maintain links between the states and social layers and also to maintain the spiritual communion of generations, which—in effect—disturbed the national tradition and led to the loss of the spiritual heritage of the ancestors. The invaders not only took over the administration, but they also planned to denationalize the Polish people, leading them, as Koneczny indicates, to general retrogression.³

As Stanisław Jojczyk emphasized, despite such unfavorable conditions, the Polish national culture retained its identity. The people subjected to political oppression, who were infiltrated by foreign civilization patterns, could find in themselves some kind of “incredible cultural momentum” which allowed the Polish culture to survive and which confirmed the strength of its civilizational roots.⁴ However, more than a century of turmoil in the history of Poland, the loss of statehood, deportations and persecutions left behind many negative consequences that arose after Poland regained its independence.⁵ According to Koneczny, the greatest damage was brought by civilizational changes, or more precisely speaking, the replacement of the state system by democracy, whose result was political chaos, putting power in the hands—as Koneczny determined—of the so-called exalted heads, that is, people who are ignorant but “strong in phrases.” To all this was joined bureaucracy, which was previously unknown in Poland and—what is more important—even unintelligible, because the existing art of governance was based on customs and public spirit.⁶

Another negative consequence was the love of conspiracy, which during the partitions had a real justification, but after the recovery of statehood became something destructive.⁷ However, in spite of the civil and cultural damage that Poland suffered under its partitions—the striking of Polish traditions, the decimation of intelligence, political retrogression, widespread bureaucracy and oppressive law—the love of civil liberties and the aspirations for national independence survived in the Polish people.⁸ 

What has always distinguished the Polish nation and what is one of the most important elements of the national ethos of Poles is honesty. Kings, leaders and poets who are considered great were characterized by great character, honesty and a clear conscience. “In our history, there is no single example for us to admire a scoundrel only because he was a great scoundrel. In this respect we are different from other nations. … Only this one is great for us, who makes us not only adore, but also honor his glorious soul, his great heart.”⁹ 

The role of national education

In his diagnosis of the situation of Poland after it regained its independence, Koneczny points out the necessity of returning to tradition, in which the great national education, art and pedagogical system must play a leading role. They should prepare a young man for practical life by adapting him to a specific profession and thereby allowing him to gain the material means necessary to preserve his life, but also, and even above all, by awakening in him and cultivating a love for the homeland. Models and authorities also play an important role in this educational system.

Koneczny emphasizes that Adam Mickiewicz—alongside Tomasz Zan—is such an authority, not only in terms of his achievements in the field of literature but also in the ethical aspect, because he was a great patriot and a person with a deep moral ethos. Therefore, reading Mickiewicz’s works is necessary not only due to their artistic craftsmanship, but above all because of the message that he put in them. According to Koneczny, education itself will not create a brave young man if it does not shape his heart and character. That is why teachers should arouse in their pupils a duty towards their homeland. The more talented and educated one is, the greater is his duty. Both a lack of urgency, perseverance and scrupulousness in gaining knowledge and developing one’s talent as well as the situation in which a talented person does not use his skills at all are bad. The knowledge and the talent that a young man possesses is therefore a certain deposit that must be returned to his homeland.¹⁰ An educational and pedagogical system, correlated with the principles of Latin civilization and the education system functioning in the state, is also necessary.¹¹

The understanding of culture

Koneczny emphasizes that culture should be created but also skilfully disseminated, while its assessment should not be restricted to one of its fields; the question of which of the fields of cultural life is the most important is a barren question, and “where all areas of public life flourish, there is no question of the precedence of someover others.”¹²

The belief which dominated in Poland was that culture consists only of literature, art and science. As a consequence, the Polish intelligentsia, which had a much better education than the intelligentsia of other countries, was not an all-rounder. Precisely speaking, the result wasthe negligence of material culture and its economic principles. Indeed, true political independence also depends on the state’s economic independence. It is wrong to absolutize the economy, but there is no such sphere of culture which does not remain in relation to the economic side of life. Culture embraces all the manifestations of human life, and its effect consists of “uniformity without monotonousness, the free development of each cultural field on its own, but at the same time of a continuous mutual relationship of these fields.”¹³ This proportionality of the factors of life is a condition for the healthy development of culture and its unity.

The understanding of art

According to Koneczny, human life is directed by three complex tendencies: the tendency to maintain a life in which man needs income and material means, the tendency to seek the truth, from which all science has grown, and the tendency to commune with beauty.¹⁴ These needs arise from human nature. This does not mean, however, that it is impossible for human nature to separate one of these tendencies.¹⁵ Thus, one of the spiritual defects is manifested in the preference for material life and in the lack of understanding for artists and people who practice fine arts; even educated people succumb to this weakness.

The lack of understanding for the need to commune with beauty comes from the fact that such art does not bring immediate, measurable and tangible material benefits, and furthermore it requires from the artist and his recipient a great effort to overcome their own weaknesses in order to clearly define what artistic activity is supposed to convey. The greatest difficulties are experienced by poets. However, they have natural endowments, which, as Koneczny emphasizes, must be supported by education, knowledge of the poetic art itself, and, above all, knowledge of the goal of art as art. There is no such thing as “art for art’s sake.” Why?

Art belongs to life even more than science, because it is born only from life. Abstract art is doomed to failure, because art requires arousing tangible impulses …, because its method speaks to the mind through the mediation of the senses. Any reasoning about one of the symptoms of life in isolation from other parts of life has value in so far as it relates to something in particular, which in science is called “causality”; in this kind of investigation every science often recourses to the method of intentionally detaching something from the whole, but the result of such proceedings is subject to revision by taking into account the whole anyway, and when it does not manage, it is rejected.¹⁶ 

Thus, abstract causality or individual expression does not have a raison d’être in art, because art cannot escape from life, from which it derives its content. Artistic form must be subordinate to this content. The art of poetry, as well as all the visual arts, has to make its audience perfect, to show what is not directly manifested but what exists as real, possible and probable, and thus related to human life. The term “art for art’s sake” is comfortable for those artists who have a narrow understanding of art and a poor artistic range.

From this critique, the following message for artists appears: “art research is not an art but science; artists who deliberate about art must subject themselves to a scientific method.” Koneczny concludes this thought as follows: “science could live on its own, but art by no means could, because art would die due to the lack of subject matter; painting mathematical forms will not release Raphael or Matejko.”¹⁷ Art speaks to the mind, but it does so through the senses: first it delights, and in turn, it inclines one to reflect.¹⁸

The essence of national poetry

According to Koneczny, each nation has a distinct character and spirit, its own tastes, its own customs and habits, and finally its own goals toward which it is headed. One of these aims is the progress of civilization, which is the improvement of the method of community life. The measure of this national mission and the measure of the progress of civilization is good (especially common good), which has to be recognized and socially accepted as a common goal. The value of a nation manifests itself in whether its work remains in harmony with that good, or whether it is rejected because of the purposes harmful to its being or even purposes deserving moral condemnation.¹⁹ 

The earliest mentioned aspirations are most easily learned from the writings of poets, which is why recognition of the character of another nation is made by a study of its literature, and mainly its poetry. Poets glorify their nation and are most able to express what is in the minds and hearts of their compatriots.²⁰ Many experts in Polish culture say that the exemplary relationship of art with the ethos of the Latin civilization tradition is the art of the Polish nation: it is patriotic and didactic, and is also full of universal philosophical thought. As Koneczny observes, “from the quotations of poets, we could compose a detailed history of Poland.”²¹ When Polish art was concerned with national issues, it had great cognitive importance for Poland and Polish people, but when it avoided the national ethos, it went downhill.

According to Koneczny:

… Polish society has got its philosophical thought not from philosophers, but from the greatest poets, who were granted the position of seers. No nation knows such a vocation, such an artistic talent associated with a certain kind of priesthood; it is not easy for a foreigner to even explain what the word poet means. This is a sign of immense Polish originality. Polish poetry has the civic duties to which it looks at sub specie aeternitatis, thus elevating the ethics of public life …; Polish artistry is not limited to the cult of beauty itself, but combines it with the cult of the Truth and the Good …; Polish beauty is the servant of Truth and Good, it is the means to the goal.²²

One has to be born as a poet. Because although one can learn well to be a great scholar, can learn enough to understand poetry, to be a poet one needs a great inner force—inspiration, talent. Mickiewicz, who made Poland famous, who showed the world the value of Polish culture and proved that we have no reason to be ashamed of our own national literature, had such a force. Although he experienced great fame during his life, he was not interested in honors and glory; he did not demand anything because of his talent. In his poetry, he emphasized that the life of the nation is organic, that social classes help one another to achieve the fruits of their work, and his poetry was connected with folk art.²³ 

Both in poetry and in social speech he emphasized the link between national tradition and the Christian religion. He believed in rebuilding the Polish state through the moral rebirth of society. His poetry is thus more than a collection of literary masterpieces; it is a source of lofty principles, a forge of character, and a sign that in a nation which is seemingly weak and oppressed, people can still produce great works. The only condition that must be fulfilled by the nation is to return to its civilizational roots; it has to remember such virtues as unbreakableness and honesty, that is, virtues which are so important in difficult times.²⁴

The role of theater and theater criticism

Koneczny claimed that the place where national poetry should be cultivated and propagated is the theater. He expressed it in numerous reflections on the essence of the theater in his critical literary activity.²⁵ “Among contemporary theater historians, there is an almost universal agreement that he is one of the most outstanding theater critics of his time …”²⁶ This activity took place during a particularly important time in the history of the Krakow theater scene. The fruit of Koneczny’s cooperation with the Przegląd Polski, lasting from 1896 to 1905, is several dozen articles of theatrical reviews. These reviews dissect and evaluate both the literary aspect of the drama and its theatrical interpretation and dramatization.²⁷ His reviews are therefore an excellent source of knowledge of dramatic literary works, knowledge of theater, and art canons of theatrical spectacle.²⁸

As a critic, Koneczny was fairly rigid in his evaluations, but honest and fair at the same time. He believed that theater criticism is not a form of art, but a science from which authors, actors, and viewers can take advantages. As he writes: “Criticism … does not rely on impressions but on arguments, and beyond them, it should not take into consideration anything else.”²⁹ A critic who describes his impressions and feelings cannot answer the simple question “why?” The task of criticism is therefore “to translate art in a rational way,” while taking into account and appreciating the aesthetic qualities. In evaluating theatrical spectacle, one must beat away the personal “impressions of the critic, the regiment of his thoughts and feelings, experienced during reading or watching.”³⁰

According to Koneczny, criticism requires the ability to classify human affairs. As he writes: “Criticism is supposed to be, for the work of art, some kind of illumination in which the works of art can show the merits of their shapes so that not one detail of their beauty is lost. … Unfortunately, such criticism has less and less to do in our theater.”³¹

He argued that “criticism must fulfill its purpose, i.e. it must subject the issue to absolute scientific analysis, regardless of benefits or harms.”³² His evaluation of the spectacle was harsh, but he always evaluated performances in view of the accompanying circumstances. In his reviews he repeatedly stressed that the theater exists for drama, not drama for the theater; poets exist not for theaters, but theaters for poetry.³³

In the works analyzed by Koneczny we can see his dramatocentric view of theatrical performance.³⁴ The theater should supplythe place for dramatic poetry, the aim of which is to eulogize human deeds.³⁵ The theater should awaken the passion for poetry in the audience, because it will not only contribute to their aesthetic education, but above all it will show them, in a very eloquent and artistic way, the right behavior; it will praise virtues, blame defects, and expose the consequences of immoral practices. Therefore, the criterion of a good repertoire is whether it is based on an intelligent audience and whether it devotes a scene for culturally significant dramatic literature.³⁶

Although the theater itself is not strictly educational, because only someone who is already educated can benefit from the spectacle that he sees; it is a multilateral institution and therefore a cognitively important one. The viewer is not obliged to have proper preparation, and the dramatist should not demand that people in the theater be thinking and considering. It is difficult, even, because with the multiplicity of impressions provided by a theatrical spectacle, there is generally no time for reflection. However, it must be remembered that the primary function of the theater is its artistic function. The author must remember that he is dealing with art, not with learning. Thanks to this, he can avoid the accusation that he presents his own philosophy instead of art, and what is worse, he does so in the poetic language. What is more, a theater that does not serve art is unnecessary and can even be harmful.³⁷

On the basis of these observations, Koneczny says that it is better to underact a play that is artistically outstanding than to present in a correct way a work that is worthless. The same belief applies to acting—it is better for the actor to fall flat in a difficult and demanding role than compare favorably in a role that does not require outstanding stage skills. Acting is not just about playing the role, but makes the actor identify himself with the fictional character, taking over his attributes and taking responsibility for his words and actions. The actor makes his character become real and because of this he can affect his audience.³⁸ In this way, the theatrical spectacle gains an educational dimension, showing that it is impossible to set poetry outside of ethics and morality.³⁹ 

Ryszard Polak

The Józef Piłsudski University of Physical Education in Warsaw

10. RECEPTION AND INTERACTION OF FELIKS KONECZNY’S THOUGHT

During communism in Poland, Koneczny’s works were read secretly, analyzed by few, and his works in the public arena were treated by the authorities of the PRL as “forbidden work.” The communist ideology and its representatives wished to annihilate the memory of Koneczny, mainly due to the message conveyed by his work, which proclaimed personalism, the affirmation of the Catholic religion in human life, and the necessity of following the principles of morality always and everywhere.

Before 1989, Koneczny’s theory of civilization was the inspiration for Kazimierz Janusz, the author of the book Konfrontacje [Confrontations], which appeared as a Samizdat book.¹ Zbigniew Pucek published valuable works on Koneczny, presenting his threads of sociological thought.² The idea of the Polish scholar was also promoted in exile by, among others, Jędrzej Giertych, who contributed greatly to the publication of Koneczny’s previously unpublished scientific achievements at the Roman Dmowski Institute in London. Outside Poland, Koneczny’s main theses were the inspiration for the writer and social activist Michał Pawlikowski.³ In exile, Fr. Michał Poradowski, among others, also got his inspiration from Koneczny’s works when he discussed the problems of the influence of the Jewish civilization on the formation of communist ideology and the emergence of Protestantism.⁴

After the Second World War in Western Europe, and especially in Germany, Koneczny’s thought was popularized by a university professor in Mainz, Anton Hilckman, who called himself a student of Koneczny and considered him one of the greatest scholars of the twentieth century.⁵ He had the opportunity to meet Koneczny before the Second World War, visiting him in Krakow. He should be credited with making the greatest contribution to the popularization and development of Koneczny’s main theories in Western Europe. But it was not only him. 

The British historian and theoretician of civilization Arnold Toynbee also appreciated Koneczny’s contribution to global research on social life and civilizations.⁶ He wrote a short introduction to the English translation of Koneczny’s On the Plurality of Civilisations (London, 1962), in which he described Koneczny’s work as one of the leading and independent large-scale studies on the topic.⁷ Walentyna M. Dianowa emphasizes that “Toynbee stated the lack of any racist elements in the concept of F. Koneczny.”⁸ The work On the Plurality of Civilisations was reviewed by Jean Floud, in which it was contrasted with theories of C. Quigley about the evolution of civilization.⁹ Roger W. Wescott also discussed Koneczny’s views on the history of civilization and the basis for their distinction.¹⁰ He rated Koneczny’s theory of civilization among the ten most important scientific theories of civilization.

It should be noted that it was only after 1990 in Poland, as a result of political changes, that there was a significant level of interest in Koneczny’s thought in science and journalism. A valuable insight into Koneczny’s work is provided by Leszek Gawor’s works.¹¹ There is also a very important work by Jan Skoczyński presenting Koneczny’s reflections on the background of the history of Polish philosophy and historiosophic thought itself.¹² Skoczyński also took up the problem of the theoretical borrowings of Koneczny’s main theses, which S.P. Huntington was to do.¹³ There were even suspicions that the American political scientist plagiarized the main ideas of Koneczny;¹⁴ Alfred Skorupka gave some insight into this issue.¹⁵ Koneczny’s civilization theories were also contrasted with Oswald Spengler’s speculations.¹⁶

The most crucial and irreplaceable work about Koneczny is the work of Piotr Biliński, Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949). Życie i twórczość. This is the most valuable source of information about Koneczny’s life and works, richly illustrating Koneczny’s struggles through his entire life.¹⁷ Biliński, as an extremely scrupulous and acute historian, based his research on many unpublished sources, such as his first one in the field of science; he showed and discussed the main works of Koneczny in chronological order, discussions of which were conducted mainly among historians of the interwar period, as well as his complicated scientific and life path. He also analyzed Koneczny’s activities and vicissitudes during his studies at the Jagiellonian University; his work at the Academy of Learning; his cooperation with Karol Estreicher; his activities focused on theatrical criticism; his works around peasanteducation; the Slavic Club and Slavic Society; his work at the University of Vilnius; his popularizing work in the interwar period; and his war years and post-war fate.

Many researchers attempting to describe Koneczny’s views try to find in his works a recipe for healing the Western European civilization and Polish culture, first of all seeing him as a social thinker (Jurata B. Serafińska).¹⁸ Issues in the field of social philosophy and the history of civilizations undertaken in Koneczny’s works were also followed by numerous contributions and research, and by attempts to develop, deepen and popularize them among the wider public.

It is also worth mentioning the following works: Andrzej Marek Nowik on Koneczny’s understanding of the genesis of states;¹⁹ Marta Czyżkiewicz on the ethics and purpose of law in the Latin civilization;²⁰ Piotr Grabowiec on his social and political proposals;²¹ Wojciech Szurgot on the meaning of law in the Latin civilization;²² and Ewa Olszówka on the importance of human work for human development and civilizational progress.²³ Koneczny’s anthropology and social ethics were described by Paweł Skrzydlewski,²⁴ Marta Czyżkiewicz,²⁵ and Ewa Olszówka,²⁶ and religious issues in the works of Koneczny were analyzed by Paweł Gondek,²⁷ Anna Tylki-Szymańska,²⁸ Romuald Piekarski,²⁹ Marian Szczęsny,³⁰ Mieczysław Kuriański,³¹ Paweł Milcarek,³² and Tomasz Łysiak.³³ Anna Wybraniec dealt with the issue of revenge and the related issue of settling disputes and conflicts between people.³⁴ Issues of morality in Koneczny’s writings were developed by Ryszard Polak.³⁵ The functioning of the Latin state administration was discussed by Krzysztof Pol.³⁶ Issues concerning the political and civilizational identity of Europe and Poland were addressed by Arkadiusz Maślach,³⁷ Józef Kossecki,³⁸ Ireneusz Białkowski,³⁹ Sławomir Lisiecki,⁴⁰ Ryszard Polak,⁴¹ Jurata B. Serafińska,⁴² Michał Węcławski,⁴³ Michał Wałach,⁴⁴ Alfred Skurupka,⁴⁵ Sławomir Chrost,⁴⁶ and Barbara Wiśniewska-Paź.⁴⁷

Koneczny’s journalistic activity as a literary critic and theoretician of the theater and art were discussed in detail and insightfully by Kazimierz Gajda.⁴⁸ The political commitment and journalism of Koneczny from the period before the First World War, especially concerning his attitude towards the Slavic and Russian problem, was the subject of research conducted by Antoni Giza,⁴⁹ Piotr Biliński,⁵⁰ Ryszard Polak,⁵¹ Alfred Skorupka,⁵² Aleksander Ćuk,⁵³ and Katarzyna Błachowska.⁵⁴ Koneczny’s contribution to the historiography of Russia was the subject of research by Mirosław Filipowicz, who emphasized the difficulties associated with the evaluation of Koneczny’s literary achievements.⁵⁵The history of Germany and various aspects of the internal and international politics of that country were analyzed by Piotr Szczudłowski,⁵⁶ Paweł Skibiński,⁵⁷ Paweł Schuppe,⁵⁸ and Mieczysław Kuriański.⁵⁹ The history of Poland as interpreted by Koneczny was analyzed by Ryszard Polak⁶⁰ and Adam Dworczyk.⁶¹

An extremely important role in the study of Koneczny’s intellectual achievement was played by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, who pointed out the philosophical realism of Koneczny and objectivism in explaining the causes of threats to human rights created by civilizations. Krąpiec inspired many representatives of the Lublin School of Philosophy and people associated with this school to study Koneczny’s writings (e.g. Piotr Jaroszyński,⁶² Henryk Kiereś,⁶³ and Andrzej Maryniarczyk⁶⁴). As Jurata B. Serafińska wrote, “In the analysis of types of civilizations, [Krąpiec] referred to Koneczny’s findings and stated that only the Latin civilization creates real conditions for safeguarding and realizing the natural rights of the human person. Only in this type of civilization is the human person protected from usurpation or domination by state structures.”⁶⁵

Conclusion

As J. Sośnicka noted, Koneczny, writing about European civilizations, “separated them on the basis of insightful research, not only historical and anthropological, but also methodological. In his theses he refuted the contemporary scientific ‘myths’ about the belief that there is only one civilization—the European one—and everything else is its lower levels and mutations.”⁶⁶ One should accept the assessment of Krąpiec that Koneczny belonged to a small group of scholars who have a realistic approach to culture and human nature, while “his views on civilization and its various types make an extremely important contribution to the understanding of civilization … All this helps basically to understand a human being too…”⁶⁷

Joanna Kiereś-Łach

The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin

11. GLOSSARY

Arab civilization: This is a semi-sacral civilization and has acollectivist nature; it evolved in the Middle Ages from an ancestral system with a large Islamic influence. There was no emancipation of the family from the power of ancestry. Although its representatives are aware of the passage of time, they do not know the ideas of historicism and the nation. Polygamy is allowed in this civilization, with the right to divorce primarily for men; the relationship between a woman and a man is a contract that a man can dissolve at any time. This civilization is characterized by: the despotic concept of the power of the head of the family and the state; the supremacy of religion and religious law (the Koran, Islam) over statute law and public life; and attempts to sacralize power (the authorities). In the Arab civilization there is a strong tendency to treat power as a form of fulfilling “God’s will”; there is also a tendency to nomadism and to accept someone as a fellow being only if he is a fellow believer. There are strong ancestral ties and a strong belief in the imperativeness of familial revenge. The theological thought tends to the absolutization of Divine Providence and the negation of individual freedom; God himself is understood in a voluntarist way and his actions in the world and in human life are perceived as such. The fundamentalist version of this civilization uses violence for converting to Islam. The non-fundamental version allows everything that is not in contradiction with the Koran. It was—in the Middle Ages in particular—the basis of rich culture in many parts of the world.

Brahmin civilization: This is a sacral and polytheistic civilization, referring to the principles of emanationism and its consequences. It developed inthe ancestral system in India, in which the caste is a form of social organization, and occurs mainly in Asia. In the field of matrimonial law, it is a polygamous civilization, and in its worldview it refers to the concepts of reincarnation and nirvana, proclaims the need for “freeing” from the world, perceiving it as a reality hostile to man and deprived of truth, good and beauty, and finally is unrealistic. This approach makes affirmation of acts of human cognition, the creation of science, art, and authentic religious life difficult; generally it is not friendly to the existence of a rational human culture or care for the physical and spiritual health of man. The culture created in this civilization is rooted in sacral myths. The concept of karma present in this civilization sanctions not only the existence of castes and their segregation (segregation of people), but also the ideology of “indifference to the world, good and evil.” In state affairs, it accepts despotic and at the same time unethical power, and therefore power which is not subject to moral evaluation both in matters concerning the individual deeds of the ruler and in his way of managing the state.

Bureaucracy: This is a degenerated form of state administration; it was created mainly as a result of misunderstanding public life and misunderstanding man and his freedom, in which the role of the sovereign is fulfilled by the state by means of a governing body and a written law system. Bureaucracy is the effect of apriorism in the collective life sphere, and it is found mainly in the Byzantine civilization (also Turanian, Arabic, Chinese), where the officials “can do anything.” It is favored by legal voluntarism, the belief in the omnipotence of power and law, and in general by idealism and utopianism in the approach to collective life. Bureaucracy requires a collectivist vision of a human being and often promotes totalism (totalitarianism) of the state. There are four historical cradles of bureaucracy: the Egyptian, Byzantine, and Chinese civilizations and the French Revolution. The characteristic features of the bureaucratic mechanism are legal formalism detached from real social life, centralism and monotonousness (uniformity). Bureaucracy leads to the depersonalization of public life and a crisis of states that lead to revolutionary events. The only way to overcome bureaucracy is to liquidate it and replace it with administration.

Byzantine civilization: This has a collectivist and a priori nature; it contributes to the depersonalization of man, because it makes the state sovereign (public authority is often sacralized). It was formed at the turn of antiquity and the Middle Ages in the Roman Empire, then in the Byzantine Empire, and then in a large part of Germany and the Balkans; it plays an important role in Europe mainly in the field of public life. Although it took its name from the Byzantine state, many of its features were already visible in the late Roman Empire in its expansion of statehood, the pursuit of the sacralization of public power, legal voluntarism, and in general in apriorism and in the desire to absolutize the state independently of the public welfare. It took over public law from its Roman heritage; however, contrary to Roman tradition, it put public law above private law. The characteristics of the Byzantine civilization are: the supremacy of political power over spiritual power (caesaropapism); the independence of politics from moral principles; predominance of the mechanic aspects of life over its organicity; bureaucracy; and the omnipotence of law and state. It results in the growth of the state apparatus, the underdevelopment of society, the collapse of science, art and literature, the elimination of ethics and its principles from collective life, and the militarization and fiscalism of public life. In the Byzantine civilization, the idea of ​​the omnipotence of the state dominates; sometimes there is the pursuit of imperialism, which turns to various kinds of socialism, which makes a human being totally subordinate to the state. The Byzantine civilization in Europe was strengthened significantly by Protestantism and numerous ideological trends referring to laicism, atheism, and secularism. The Byzantine civilization often uses utopia in politics, subordinating religion and the institutions associated with it; it also disregards and often violates innate human rights.

Chinese civilization: This is not limited to the territory of China; it is based on the ancestral system and assimilates many of the principles of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. It was created in antiquity and has constantly expanded since. However, this is a non-religious civilization, because it is dominated by an atheistic worldview, and religiosity is reduced to art (ethics). The lack of religiosity is connected with the lack of the concept of the individual immortality of a human being, which is manifested in the desire to “persist” in the memory of one’s children and descendants and in the fact that a significant number of children are perceived as being subjects of their father’s ownership (his property). It is admitted that children cannot gain full maturity during the life of the father. In this civilization a great role is played by tradition, which becomes the main reference point for the human spirit and the criterion of evaluation. In the Chinese civilization polygamy is allowed; collective life, correlated with the ancestral life system, is subordinated to the main headman of all families, i.e. the emperor. An alphabet consisting of over 50,000 symbols and a very complicated group of languages are largely responsible for the difficulties in the manifestation of human personal experiences and in communication, as well as in education, and more generally in the development of cognition and science and in the creation of culture. Its non-religious character does not make the perception and affirmation of human dignity easy; it creates a social order where there is a lack of respect for elementary human rights. The Chinese civilization has an a priori character; it keeps its identity and, thanks to this, it is still capable of expansion. In marriage law, polygamy was primarily preferred, but over time, monogamy began to prevail, and from the thirteenth century it became the only acceptable form of marriage. The guiding principle of the whole Jewish civilization is the idea of their being the chosen people, the conviction of its their own uniqueness and the resulting conviction that it is necessary to fulfill a contract (law), the fruit of which will be the rule of the chosen people over the world. In the formation of a human being, first of all, a man agrees with the content of the law and its interpretation, and not with the recognized real state. This results in the fact that the knowledge of man seeks the truth in religious law; similarly, morality is governed by law, not by moral good or by human action, which is bound by religious commands.

Civilization: This is a method of a collective life system; both the sum of everything that is common to a certain human community in the field of culture, and the sum of everything that this community differs in from other ones. Civilization can be defined as a human culture existing in a society. Civilization occurs everywhere where there is a more permanent form of collective life (at least at the family level), which is organized according to three basic fields of law: family law, property law and inheritance law. The measure and determinant of the assessment of each civilization is its relation to the so-called quincunx (five categories of being).

Particular civilizations are governed by specific laws, but their essential character is in the effects of their interpreting human nature and in their ways of updating it. There is therefore no equality of civilizations because of the varying degrees of updating human nature. Within the framework of every civilization, many varieties (cultures) can arise, which are linked by a common civilizational denominator. In the past there were many civilizations, but today there are only seven vital ones: Brahmin, Jewish, Chinese, Turanian, Byzantine, Latin, and Arab. The existence of a civilization depends primarily on cultural factors, not racial factors, language, form of religion, or environmental or other conditions. No civilization necessarily collapses, but similarly there is no guarantee that it will last forever, because its source is human decisions and their implementation. All civilizations are subject to the general laws (principles) of history.

Ethos: A group of moral norms and customs; a code of behavior of a certain community; a practical side of life including all human activities in particular epochs and civilizations, based on a sense of duty and obligation towards oneself, other human beings and the whole community, the nation. Ethos illustrates and materializes moral life in a given civilization.

Familial ethics: This is a set of moral principles and practices occurring in the family—one of the first forms of collective life—informing on what is good and what is bad, what is dutiful or not. It is the main factor that affects which order (system) is created in an association. At the beginning of the genus of humankind, familial ethics was so-called natural ethics, i.e. it was based on real, vital relations existing in the association, which were to be preserved thanks to familial ethics. It is also the theoretical basis for the law and its principles, and in particular for familial law (family, matrimonial), property law, and inheritance law. The goal of familial ethics is to form a hierarchy of duties in people and to create zeal in their behavior. Changes in familial ethics followed the emancipation of the family from the power of ancestry.

Historiography (or history): This is a form of science about the past, about the history of man and his culture. Its meaning lies in the explanation of facts by pointing to past factors that explain them. History, by its cognitive range, should include as wide an area of human culture as possible, describing and explaining the changes taking place in the past that had an impact on the present. Historical cognition has a sapiencial character (historia magistra vitae) and is necessary for authentic progress in every field of culture. Truth is the goal of history. History plays a fundamental role in reading, strengthening and developing the identity of individual communities as well as cultures and civilizations. History takes place against the background of rival civilizations, and that is why history has its regularities (laws of history).

Historiosophy: This is the field of most often a priori, unascertainable speculations concerning the past and laws determining it. Historiosophy, sometimes denominated as philosophy of history, is the result of an idealistic, a priori philosophy, often claiming the pretension of prophetism and domination in the creation of culture, politics and social order. Due to its questionable methodological status (a priori assumptions, the questionable and undefined subjects of study, its arbitrariness and the a priori methods used in it, the supposed goal of all activities, etc.), historiosophy cannot be included in the sciences (a valuable type of cognition, reflection). Its impact on culture is pejorative; it does not give either understanding or wisdom, but it joins historical cognition and philosophy itself with Gnostic speculations. The opposite of historiosophy is the philosophy and theory of civilization as the highest and most general type of reflection on the past. It is created by taking facts into account, establishing causal connections between past events and showing their civilizational grounding.

Jewish civilization: This is a sacral civilization (i.e. dominated by religious law), in which all human life and the community itself are religiously grounded. This civilization has a dynamic character; its basic shape was created before the birth of Christ. Its main currents have a strong oppositional character to Christianity and the Latin (Western) civilization itself. In the Jewish civilization, man’s religiousness and religion itself are based on the law (Torah), contracted between God and the chosen people. So, religion itself is a form of contract that God has made with his chosen people (Jews). The God of the chosen people, although he is the Only God, is friendly only to the chosen people (the so-called monolatry). The chosen people in the Jewish civilization have a historical mission to fulfill (messianism), and its realization has to finish with the domination of the chosen people over the world. The Jewish civilization has many varieties, often combating each other (Talmudism, Cabala, Hasidism, Karaites, and others). Unlike the Arab civilization, in which the basis of the unchanging law is the Koran, in the Jewish one the law underwent modifications under the influence of comments adapting them to the changing historical circumstances. The most important elements of economics in the Jewish civilization are the superiority of movable property over immovable property and the use of credit as the basis of activity. The key distinction of Jewish morality is its duality, i.e. the different principles that apply in relations between Jews and in the relations of Jews with non-Jews (goys). The Jews recognized the necessity of respecting the rights of the nations among whom they lived, but they justified it only with the desire to preserve peace. In marriage law, polygamy was primarily preferred, but over time, monogamy began to prevail, and from the thirteenth century it became the only acceptable form of marriage. The guiding principles of the whole Jewish civilization is the idea of their being the chosen people, the conviction of their own uniqueness and the resulting conviction that it is necessary to fulfill a contract (law), the fruit of which will be the rule of the chosen people over the world. In the formation of a human being, first of all, a man agrees with the content of the law and its interpretation, and not with the recognized real state. This results in the fact that the knowledge of man seeks the truth in religious law; similarly, morality is governed by law, not by moral good or by human action, which is bound by religious commands.

Latin civilization: The only one that is personalistic; it was formed in the Middle Ages thanks to the educational activity of the Catholic Church. Another term for it is Western civilization. Its range covers the societies of Western and Central Europe and the society of America; it is present wherever the Catholic (Christian) worldview is formed and where the principles resulting from it are respected in both individual and collective life. The foundations of the Latin civilization are the following: ethics (the good of the human person), Christian (personalistic) anthropology, principles of Roman law, and love of and respect for the truth (science, knowledge per se). Its characteristic features are the superiority of morality over the law (the law is not only to be derived from morality and its principles, but also to be subject to moral evaluation), a strong self-government implementing the common good, a real impact of society and the nation on the state, the dualism of law (private and public law), lifelong monogamy as the basis of the family and the emancipation of the family from the power of ancestry, the supremacy of spiritual over physical strength, and a dependence on tradition and historicism. The Latin civilization is the only one in which the national sense and the nation itself were created, because it is an authentically personalistic civilization. Only in this civilization can we find a respect for physical work; a lack of the institution of familial revenge, because justice is delivered by the state authority; and the autonomy of the Church and the religious life of man in relation to the state and politics. The Latin civilization has an a posteriori character; it gives the best conditions for human development.

Laws of history: Analogous regulations (principles) appearing in history, interpreted on the basis of knowledge of the past, accepted as general regularities regarding individual civilizations as well as associations formed in them. The first historical law says that there can be no lasting syntheses between different civilizations, because civilizations as systems of collective life are mutually exclusive in the most important aspects of human beings. The second law manifests itself in a constant tendency (vital civilizations) to fight and to expand its area of occurrence. The war of civilizations takes place with various means and includes the intellectual, moral, economic, and military spheres. The third law deals with the causes of a civilization’s fall and is associated with the loss of the principle of commensurability (harmony, proportions in integral development and actions) by the civilization. This law says that if there is no commensurability somewhere, social life breaks down and ultimately there is a collapse of the entire community, the loss of its identity and, finally, the loss of its existence. The fourth law shows that in the case of a permanent civilizational conflict, victory usually belongs to a lower civilization (a more primitive one, which is worse for man’s development), because the higher the civilizational goods, the harder it is to work out, preserve and improve the civilization; it is easy to destroy and degrade it. The victory of higher civilizations is always associated with perceptions about and the abandonment by people of what is worse in favor of living in what is considered to be better and what is realistically better.

Logos: Internal rationality aimed at organizing the world by seeking its causality and purposefulness and establishing a connection between them. Logos is a materialization and an expression of the intellectual culture present in a given civilization, and it decides about the creative forces. Logos can be defined as a form of purposeful thinking, which is a bridge from reason to will.

Nation: A civilizational association of related people created for the purposes of the supra-material battle for existence and to have a homeland and a mother (native) tongue; it is an association that is unconditionally voluntary, which cannot arise from coercion, but from completely related peoples. Nationality is not something given in advance, it is not something innate to man and society. Nations are created by history; they were created only within the Latin civilization. It is a heritage of the ancient Roman civilization, and resumed when the Latin civilization reached a high level of development (personalism). A nation cannot accept anything as a virtue that does not serve the public or the state. It cannot be something omnipotent which is not subject to ethical assessment (moral principles). The whole nation must belong to the same civilization without any reservations. Nations are never hostile to each other; all antagonisms between nations are always the result of egoism and mistakes, the result of moral evil.

Political elephantiasis: The weakness of the bureaucratic state consisting of the notorious, almost pathological enlargement (particularization) of subsequent branches of law and of the establishment of new regulations every now and again and their absolute enforcement regardless of their real usefulness. As a consequence, the more laws and regulations there are, the easier it is for so-called legal tricks to exist; the more laws there are, the less righteousness there is. The source of political elephantiasis is the Jewish civilization, whose characteristic feature is its set of rules covering all areas of human life in detail, as well as the Byzantine civilization. Political elephantiasis leads to amorality in public life and destroys personalism.

Quincunx: This is a pattern including five categories (fields) of human life; it consists of: 1. truth (the field of science, broadly understood innate and supernatural knowledge), 2. good (the field of ethics, understanding moral matters and morally good behavior), 3. prosperity (the field of economic life, property, and possessions), 4. health (physical and spiritual with its understanding and forms of care for them), and 5. beauty (the field of art and the proportion of the above-mentioned elements in human life, the so-called hierarchy of good and the order in it). Each civilization has its own quincunx which illustrates what is most important in this civilization.

Turanian civilization: This was formed in ancient times in the area of ​​the Eurasian Steppe. It has a collectivist nature, where the leader has a strong position, being the master of everything and everyone. Due to its martial characterand the primacy of physical strength, the Turanian civilization did not develop strong social ties, and it does not allow for the existence of society and the nation, but only for ancestral ties and for what is connected with the biological life of man. The population in this civilization is connected only for war (material) purposes in so-called hordes. If armed hostilities are successful, the horde transforms into a massive state. Hordes are not permanent and break up with the commander’s death or in a situation when he is defeated. To date, the largest hordes were created by the Huns, Turks, Mongols and other Asian nations, including a vast number of the Russian and Cossack population. It can be said that all political activity in this civilization is strictly military. The ruler is beyond the principles of morality; his actions are always evaluated in the perspective of conquests and military development. Monogamy is not the dominant type of marriage; it functions as one of the possibilities of polygamy and concubinage. Although religion does not play a fundamental role in the structure of this civilization, it has repeatedly been a contributing factor to wars and conquests. The Turanian civilization has played a dominant role in the history of Russia and many communities in Asia and Eastern Europe. As a result of coming into contact with the Latin civilization, it leads to nihilism. It can tolerate Christianity as well as Islam, but it has a tendency to the instrumentalization of religion, apriorism and to the eradication of native human rights.

Triple law: A group of norms guiding family and collective life, based on the ability of a given society to evolve in a legal, systemic, organizational and material way. These norms occur where there is a permanent community of collective life; they differentiate one community from another, causing the existence of a multitude of methods of the collective life system (civilization). The triple law consists of:

(a) Family law—norms regulating relations between family members; family law is based on marital law, the relation-ship of parents to their children, the distribution of power at home, the unilateralism or bilateralism of rights and obligations, and the extent and grading of blood relationships.

(b) Inheritance law—norms regulating who, what, and after whom one inherits.

(c) Property law—norms regulating who and what one has.

II. FELIKS KONECZNY: SELECTED WRITINGS

Selected and edited by

Paweł Skrzydlewski

Translated by

Joanna Kiereś-Łach

THE PRESSURE OF THE ORIENT ON THE WEST

F. Koneczny, “Napór Orientu na Zachód,” in Kultura i cywilizacja, vol. 5 (Lublin: Towarzystwo Wiedzy Chrześcijańskiej, 1937), pp. 177–196.

When enumerating the main moments of the pressure of the Orient on the West, I cannot get past the determination of the conditions and circumstances of these pressures as pressures of civilization, where you will find some historical laws deduced from studies in science of civilizations.

Not long ago (1917), Spengler announced in his famous work “Der Untergang des Abendlandes” that every civilization is tied to a certain area, and, as he put it, “pflanzenhaft gebunden.” This is not the only lapsus in his work, and not the only proof that his general scientific preparation was insufficient. Each plant alone is combined with a land and it cannot leave this land, but it does not refer to a species which, by means of highly mobile seeds, wanders around the world, so much so that a botanist has formed a separate place for this in the geography of plants (phytogeography), and in it a separate place for study on the migration of plants—a very instructive science.

Now, if civilizations have some analogy in the plant community, it is not about the property planted in the ground but on its movables in the seed state; civilizations are movables, their terrain is variable. The masterpiece in this respect is the Jewish civilization; it surpasses all other civilizations in mobility—although they also have mobility as long as they are in a normal state of vitality. The first law of civilization states that each of them, as long as they are alive, until they die, strives to expand. If it did not, there would never have been any civilization that was more significant in the swarms of minor associations, or full of diversity in the triple law.

When one civilization’s expansion succeeds at the expense of its neighbors, this civilization will become larger and more significant as long as its expansions continue. And when it hits another strong one, there is a fight. The fight had already begun when victorious ones absorbed other minor ones, and the one that it encountered later in its march was also stronger, as it had fought with its own neighbors before and also became more significant. When two strong civilizations come into contact, the fight will be longer and more multifaceted and conducted with the most diverse, spiritual and physical weapons.

Can two major civilizations, meeting in the same neighborhood, exist in peace? History teaches that they cannot, because here is the second historical law: two civilizations, having found themselves in the same territory, must fight each other. The borderlands of living civilizations are always an audience of their struggles. There is no other advice than this: we should try to make the struggle of civilizations civilized. This is the only possible positive symptom.

With many of these movements and the impact of one civilization on another, they obviously affect each other. Influences can be positive and negative, there may be many or few. But it is wrong to think that a synthesis of civilizations can come from a continuous mutual influence. Never! There is no synthesis between civilizations—and this is the third historical law.

Let us consider the possibility of synthesis: for example, every civilization has its ethics, therefore how can a synthesis of various ethical systems be possible? Turkish and Arab ethics treated insane people like holy ones, as “haunted by God,” i.e. as people who had been chosen by Him. This passed into Slavo-Turanian culture, that is, to Moscow, where the “jurodiwyj” occupies a sacred position; it even passed extensively into the Russian Orthodox Church. Where is there a place for reason and what kind of place is it? We do not have to go too far to see the consequences of such thinking. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, during the reign of Vasily Ivanovitch (1505–1533), the principle of the so-called “Josiflony” prevailed,  included in the formula “naczało zła mniemanie”—which means “thinking is the beginning of evil.” And this principle has become extremely popular. The lower clergy even went against the printing of art, and in 1564 they arranged civil commotions in Moscow. Aprint shop was demolished and the people who worked there were killed unless they managed to escape. Ignorance triumphed and Moscow became an ethical postulate. Reaction to education reached the top in the second half of the seventeenth century. The critical moment was the introduction of Latin to the academy in Moscow during the reign of Fedor Alekseyevich (1682–1689), but this “Western wind” did not spread too much and the Russian people still shared the view of josiflons, expressed with a stronger formula: dołoj gramotnyje! In other Turanian civilizations as well, writing and reading have remained mysterious, even astonishing, and available to very few people.

Meanwhile, the Catholic Church practiced arts and sciences. Printing art was accepted everywhere in the countries of the Latin civilization with enthusiasm. Illiteracy was treated as a disease and people fought it until it was rooted out. Catholic ethics, the ethics of the Latin civilization, regards the practice of science and art as a duty of collective life. How can a synthesis be made between the Latin sapientis est ordinare and naczało zła mniemanie? Who can make a synthesis here?

The economic situation was similar. White people in Africa give everyone a profit from work, believing that it is good to work as hard as possible, while the Negroes consider that it is unreasonable to work and harvest (bananas) beyond the “need.” Who then has the right to decide what the “need” is? In practice, there is a combination of laziness and a lack of need, and therefore there is eternal misery, which is untenable, as long as this principle of Negro ethics prevails. Where is the way to a synthesis of Negro views and European colonists’ ones? How can we come to a synthesis with the Yakutia view that if someone sells hay, it means that he possesses more than he needs, and therefore he should give back some of what he has? The impossibility of synthesis was evident in the wars of native Indians and Anglo-Saxon settlers in North America. Settlers bought the land, paid—and suffered bloody attacks from the “perfidious” Indians. The misunderstanding was because the Indians did not understand that land could be bought and sold. What the settlers thought was the purchase price, already paid, the natives considered a gift of mutual kindness for allowing the strangers to stay for a while among them.

And so are things in every field of life, everywhere, where two distinct civilizations come into contact. Synthesis is absolutely impossible, since comparability is impossible. Synthesis is possible only when similar views meet, when the views are commensurate. That means that it is only possible between cultures of the same civilization. Syntheses of this kind are even very beneficial. Outside the boundaries of cultures, which are divisions of the same civilization, only mechanical mixtures are possible, which are very dangerous, usually disrupting both civilizations and leading to acivilization, to wilderness.

This kind of civilization mix is currently being experienced throughout Europe, and especially in Poland. This mixture is the cause of all crises and the source of destruction, about which people from all over Europe complain, but which is most common in Poland.

There is no synthesis, and what is more, there is the necessity to fight and the inevitability of the tendency to expand—this is the tragedy of history.

Considering the pressure of the Orient on the West, as far as it appeared in a series of oriental civilizations’ moves, these circumstances must be remembered. Disputes are a part of universal history. Universal history is nothing more than the history of civilizational struggles, the history of useless efforts at civilizational synthesis, the history of expansion and the disappearance of expansion, the history of the formation of cultures and their interactions in the middle of their own civilization, or the history of the subjection of a foreign civilization and a continuation of mutual—good or bad—influences. Universal history is a history of methods of shaping collective life. The overview of the expansive movements of civilizations from the East to the West, although very comprehensive, is full of important and scientifically interesting questions—sociologically, ethically, economically, even in the field of art and literature—and for us it is even more interesting that this invasion repeatedly occurred in the Polish lands.

Let us start from the pressure of the Byzantine civilization, because it has had the most influential impact on the West. Thebelief according to which Byzantinism was less developed in all than Latin culture is wrong. Paris was a poor settlement when Byzantium was not only glittering with gold and mosaics, astonishing the Western newcomer with its buildings, but it also set the tone, spread good manners, and shaped the minds of the Western barbarians. Each of the rulers of the West considered that the greatest possible honor is to receive his official title from the emperor and dreamed about decorating his mansion so that it reminded him of (and even caricatured) the Byzantine mansion. The Byzantines were always presented with books in their hands. Their scientific methods can be debated, but in the West there was not much to argue about for a long time! We must confess that we spent too short a time in the Byzantines’ school.

For this reason, the expansion of the Byzantine civilization spread all over Europe. It was invited from everywhere. For Liutprand, King of the Lombards, one of the most intelligent writers and politicians of the tenth century (c. 922–c. 972), the Byzantine emperor was an example of the rightful ruler of the whole world. At Boleslaw I’s great throne stood a copy of St. Maurice’s spear, the Byzantine symbol of power. The richest kings of the West dreamed of the Byzantine riches as something inaccessible but still present in their minds. Byzantine people fell in love with wealth, because it gave them rich beauty, because they did not understand life without exquisite material welfare.

Western Europe was influenced by Byzantium just after the fall of the old Rome, when it was turning into the new Rome, in the fourth to the sixth centuries. By the tenth century, the wave of this expansion was truly great. From Illyricum and Dalmatia, Byzantinism went through central Italy and further to the north. It has never disappeared in the south since the old times. It never crossed the Alps from the Italian side, however. To get to the north of the Alps, it went by a different way. Byzantine artists got to Spain by sea, and they also brought some of Byzantium’s science.

The magnificence of this form of civilization boggles the mind. The Papacy, however, soon saw that there was a fundamental difference in the content and even in the form of Byzantine views because Byzantium wanted uniformity and considered that unification is a precondition for progress, while Rome sought the unity above variety, and that variety is even often deliberately cultivated.

Unity is unattainable without coercion, so Byzantium did not hesitate and used violence with the conviction that it was the only way to do it well. In the fight for form, it spread and overwhelmed. Thus there is a straight path from the granting of supremacy to physical force and putting it before spiritual force. Here is the punctum saliens, and it was no longer possible. Poor Monte Casino faced the rich Byzantium for many centuries, won the war after a few centuries, and from the eleventh century, the Byzantine wave retreated once again.

This wave never spreadall across Europe. Free from Byzantine influence were Scandinavia and countries in the Norman expansion in the northwest; Poland was barely touched by it in the second half of the eleventh century, and it came in an indirect way from the German side.

Most of Byzantinism was absorbed into Germany, and its influence there was strongest and came directly from Byzantium itself. This case is related to the history of the new empire proclaimed in Western Europe. The proclamation of the imperial title itself was an act of hostility or at least aversion to the Byzantine Empire, which considered itself the universal authority of the Christian world and the heir of the ancient Roman Empire. Meanwhile, Pope Leo III resumed this Roman Empire, crowning Charlemagne in Rome in 800. This is the same pope who was fiercely struggling with the Byzantines and established the Catholic school of filioque.

The new western empire soon dissipated, and the Carolingians were weakened by a relationship with the Germans, who did not contribute anything to their civilization. The imperial crown was not taken seriously; it wandered across the heads of the secondary princes of Upper Burgundy and the Ligurian coast; the title became vain and eventually stopped existing altogether. Not only all had the hopes of the Papacy failed, but by that time, Byzantinism had strengthened and made a triumphant march across Western Europe. And finally, the Pope had to give up: the empire was reinstated in 962, the coronation of Otto I took place during the fighting with the Papacy, and his coronation was forced. This second empire even took the Byzantine name of “Qajar.”

The Byzantine court wanted to find a new ally in Germany and therefore decided that one of the princes of Germany should get the imperial title, and even pushed for it.

Otto’s son married Theophanu. As Otto II’s spouse, being in power during the minority of her son Otto III, she had great political influence and her court was famous all over the world, and not only because of the glamor that had never been seen in these parts of Europe. There was always a group of Byzantine scholars creating a new environment for the Byzantine political idea, the Byzantine state—as opposed to the Latin notions of the state. A Byzantine political school was established in Germany and was an outstanding cultural center which would never weaken. It must be admitted that it represented, beyond compare, a higher level of civilization than could be achieved by its relationship with Rome, but it was a different kind of civilization.

After that, Germany was divided into two civilizations: Latin and Byzantine. In the middle of Europe there was a double civilization. A great part of Germany remained under the influence of the Latin civilization, but in the other part the power of the Byzantine civilization grew so much that a new Byzantine culture was born, a new variant of Byzantinism, namely the strong and multifaceted Byzantine-German culture that survived for centuries and has flourished to this day. From then, the history of Germany presents a continual clash of Byzantine concepts with Latin ones.

Because there is no synthesis between civilizations, because one cannot be civilized in two ways, the Germans, simultaneously moving in two divergent directions, were often subjected to periods of cultural inactivity and their empire soon became impotent. The lighter periods in German history were when one of these civilizations succeeded, when the rudder of the state was dominated by people firmly committed to one civilization and firmly opposed to the other. There were times when this or that civilization lost its influence in Germany, and then Germany gained strength. Never were any of these civilizations so disturbed that it had not been able to rise again from its fall and stand again in the everlasting competition. If a synthesis of Byzantinism with Latinism was possible, then it would have occurred in Germany long ago; however, both camps still exist and are still struggling with variable success.

The Byzantine influence quickly swept through the German Empire. Otto III (983–1002), condemned by German historians, was an exception, but shortly thereafter his successors appointed and defeated popes, introduced secular investiture, demoralized the Church, and subjected it to the secular authority. Europe was threatened with the loss of the seriousness of the spiritual force, independent from physical force; there was a threat that the ideals of the supremacy of the spirit, the ideals of our civilization and of Catholicism, would be lost.

If Byzantine-German civilization had been victorious in Europe, the Latin civilization would have been threatened with annihilation, and Christianity would have become a collection of liturgies, celebrated under the protectorate of Byzantine absolutism, considered as a legitimate state.

In Germany there was never a lack of opposition, but at the time of the Salician dynasty (1024–1125), it had greatly weakened, and all historical circumstances testify that the German society would no longer have been able to sustain Latin ideas. Help came from France. France has the merit that it had long resisted German Byzantinism and thus saved the Latin civilization. The Benedictine Abbey of Cluny and the so-called Cluniac Reforms have in this sense a great merit. Also of significance is the work of Pope Gregory VII (1073–1010) and then of the long struggle of the Papacy in Germany and Italy. If this battle had really been over, then one of the civilizations fighting in Germany would have had to disappear. But the fight ended with a compromise (the Concordat of Worms in 1122).

The Byzantine principle, according to which the Church is to be a tool of state power and which was never eradicated in Germany, reappeared in Protestantism. The Landeskirchen, whose head is the Landesfuerst, is pure Byzantinism. But it went even further: the secular authority can decide on the confession of the inhabitants, and after the Thirty Years’ War, it was announced to the world that cuius regio, illius religio. The same thing had been obtained long ago in Byzantium, where the emperors held the councils and set the whole state apparatus for that theological direction, which seemed real to them and served them.

Worst of all, Catholicism in Germany lost its moral autonomy and did not stand against the Catholic rulers of Germany using it again in their own right, in the reverse direction, as an instrumentum. The consequence of this state of mind was the Josephine colonization. German science also fell into Byzantinism, and philosophy was subject to Prussian traits. The Catholic reaction, re-awakening the Latin-German culture, dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century.

Byzantinism, represented by the Prussian state, became more and more eminent politically, winning predominance by violence. It became popular because it popularized the principle of the omnipotence of the state, the principles of unification and centralization, which are Byzantine principles. About Prussia we can safely say that as a social organization it suffered from underdevelopment, and as a state organization from overgrowth. This illness was accepted with enthusiasm by the area of philosophy, then from others also, and then generally began to be considered just as a sign of the best health. At this point, however, the Latin and Byzantine civilizations were diametrically opposed.

In the history of Germany there is one more great manifestation of belonging to Byzantine civilization. This civilization does not know the notion of the national idea. The national idea in Germany appeared strangely late in the early years of the nineteenth century. The oldest German patriotic song appeared in 1812 (Moritz Arndt: Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?). Lessing said in 1759 that love of the homeland was an unknown “weakness”; Herder considered national pride as conceitedness; Goethe did not distinguish between Germans and Frenchmen other than as “culture and barbarism”; Schiller’s ideal was to “not belong to any nation or to any time”; and Humboldt and Stein wanted the independence of Germany based on the strength guarantees of Russia or England. Fichte wasreally the first German patriot, and, as a matter of fact, he immediately fell in love with his own nation as “the hope of the whole human race.” At some point, everything merged with the statolatry of German philosophy and the deification of Prussia.

Byzantine-German culture is theprime example ofByzantinism; this civilization reached a significantly higher point in Germany than it did at its best time in Byzantium itself. Prussia is a Byzantine masterpiece. And this direction gained new power due to mistakes made by the authors of the Treaty of Versailles—from this treatise dates a new and great era of the flowering of Byzantinism. By trampling all the Germans and not crushing Prussia, the authors of the Treaty of Versailles harmed themselves and made Prussia the defender of Germany—and from then the Latin civilization in Germany remained almost entirely in the private sphere and had to be hidden in the face of state sovereignty. For now, the triumph of Byzantinism in Germany was even greater than in the Balkans and Romania, and it was victorious not only in Zagreb but even in Ljubljana.

 What a power there is in Byzantinism!Nearly five centuries have passed since the fall of the Byzantine state (1453), and its spirit not only lives on but still develops and creates. Today it is an extremely creative civilization, vital and ready for new expansion.

Poland was not influenced by Byzantinism from Byzantium, but by Byzantine-German culture. The baptism of Mieszko I took place during the strong expansion of Byzantinism, but Poland, unlike Czechia, shook off these influences and devoted itself entirely to the Papacy and the Latin civilization. In Czechia, these two civilizations fought the same way as in Germany, throughout history, with Moravia as the main focus of the Latin civilization. It is particularly puzzling that even the strongest need for independence, even the war with Germany, did not defeat the Byzantine influence, manifested in disinclination to Catholicism. Czech history is the most tragic tangle of misunderstandings, confusion and knots which could have been undone but were unnecessarily cut.

Nothing is known about German Byzantinism, but everybody seeks Byzantinism in the Eastern Slavs, where it was almost never present. Although Christianity was accepted by Russia, the Catholic and Bulgarian influences and influences from the “holy mountain of Afon” (Athos) were long in the balance. In the end, the Latin influence was rejected, but the Byzantine influences were eradicated from the Orthodox Church by ignorance, and there are only a few remaining. The Orthodox Church of “Kiev and all Russia” was more influenced by Nestorianism than by Byzantinism; at least then the Tatars did not distinguish between these confessions, and the Orthodox Church leaders did not disabuse the khans. Only the Byzantine hatred for Catholicism remained, but even the formal associations of the Orthodox Church with the tsar’s patriarchate were loose and not continuous. However, the influence of Turanian civilization did appear.

Attila’s momentum left no civilizational signs in Europe, and the Magyars accepted the Byzantine civilization and then the Latin civilization. Then the Turks conquered several European countries, half of Hungary, and took Podolia, but these conquests did not contain the expansion of civilization. After a long period of Turkish rule, only the Turkish homo faber remained in wefts and embroideries; nowhere was the notion of the system of collective life retained.

The Turanian civilization’s influences were limited to Eastern Slavs.

It bordered on the Turkish-Mongolian population from the north, east and southeast. Right in the early history of Novgorod we can see the influence of the “Multiplaug Yugra,” then all of Rostov, Zalesye, and Muscovite Russia grew out of the settlement of Yugra, and all of these tribes had not yet been Russianized. There were even religious influences from Yugra to Russia (“volkhvs,” etc).

In the south, the Chazar regime brought the organization of sotnias. Then the Pechenegs and the Cumans burst into Russia, sometimes even reaching the north, and over the south they gained actual hegemony. They joined Russia and Russia joined them. They resolved the conflicts of the Rurik dynasty, and Russian princesmarried the Cumans’ princesses, and by their example mixed marriages became commonplace among the upper classes. Under these influences, twelfth-century Russia apparently grew wild. And we can see the roots of some Mongolian-Slavic culture with its love for destruction, for kidnapping women and children to trade them, etc. The Byzantine influence is no longer visible.

And when in 1224 the Cumans were threatened by the expedition of Temüjin, the creator of the universal state of the “heavenly” Mongols, they tried to anticipate the invasion and went off east to meet the Tatars and to south Russia in defense of the Cumans by the Kalka River. The Rurikovichs provoked the Tatars and brought the Tatars’ vengeance back to Russia, which turned into the hegemony of the Tatars over the Kipchaks. The Turanian influence continued uninterruptedly: the Khazars, the Pechenegs, the Cumans, the Tatars. And, during the Cumans’ time, Russia civilizationally belonged to the Turanian civilization.

Russia herself narrowed the tiesof her captivity, because its princes competed for the Hańsk “jarlig,” and choosing the Tatars’ tribute was a great deal. Poland and Lithuania took away from the khans all their Russian provinces, but no Russian country disyoked itself. Moscow paid “wychod,” i.e. the Tatars’ tribute, until 1492, and the defeat of the “bisurman” hegemony was not related to any warfare: the release was possible because the Golden Horde fell. Still, in 1503 Ivan III issued a decree in his testament in case he had to pay tribute.

Karamzin was already making sure that Moscow grew under the care of the Horde. It grew stronger in the north, and its statehood was strictly Turanian. Turanian legal monism dominated. The ruler tried to have as many people dependent on him as possible. He also arranged to take so-called “hostages” from the neighboring duchies. Lastly, Ivan Kalita (1325–1341) began to give monetary loans to the lesser princes. We are not looking at any title coming under public law. Even the Turanian way of remunerating officials was accepted, giving them the so-called “kormlenie,” i.e. allowing them to collect fiscal payments directly from the parties. Each of them was a collector in his field—they were not very strictly appointed! There was no sign of Byzantinism in that statehood; the law of the “emperor” was the orthodox canon law, which, however, was rarely resorted to, and one who was at least familiar with the law was some kind of phenomenon.

The great princes of Moscow recognized not the Byzantine khazar but the Sarai Khan as the “tsar.” Ivan III thought that after the fall of the Great Horde he could proclaim himself as tsar instead of Khan Kipczak, and that was the significance of the “coronation” of 1498. But when he noticed that Khan Perekopski had a tsarist title, he did not use it himself, and he devised a plan according to which the coronation ceremony could allow him to slink away from the Crimean Giray’s influences. Mengli-Giray gave him the duchies of Lithuanian Russia (Rusne), which formerly paid tribute to the Tatars, but Moscow made such claims only in 1504, treating it as a “patrimony,” so again coming from the area of private law. Russia did not know the right of pre-emption. The view according to which the rights of the original owners (former Rurikovichs) are imprescriptible, as long as there are even the furthest descendants, the furthest relatives, was Oriental (it was directly admitted from Wallachia).

In this way, the dynastic law also became Tatar. Ivan III announced that this person would be the successor to the throne, who would be appointed to it, regardless of seniority. The regency was held by a widow and the mother of a juvenile son, but she could entrust the power to her favorite, even if he was low-born. The first such case occurred in 1533–1538, when Obolenski knyaz and then Tielepniew (no longer the knyaz) ruled the state instead of Helena Wasylewna Glinska. From these favorites and their families, a new aristocracy arose.

Even in the Orthodox Church, there is no trace of Byzantine civilization. The vast majority of the clergy could not read, and when the learned Greek Maximus was brought from Italy to mark which “holy scriptures” were apocryphal and to translate the true psalter (until then, the psalms of the Jewish prayer book had been sung), the Byzantine humanist scholar was condemned for heresy and for a false translation. The same was also said about the destruction of the printing house in Moscow (1564).

The Eastern Slavic prawowierie was completely different from the confession of the faith of the Constantinople Fanar. There were even doubts as to whether or not there was real faith in Constantinople. But the fact that the most powerful Orthodox ruler was Ivan—even after the fall of Constantinople, Moscow was the only serious schismatic state—gave rise to thinking. The Tver monk Philotheus, in hisletters to Vasily Ivanovitch (1505–1533), deliberated about it and proclaimed that true faith had moved to Moscow. “Holy Byzantium did not perish, but it was transferred to Moscow,” leaving in “third Rome, and there will be no fourth place left.” On this basis Philotheus greets Vasily as “the head of Christianity and the master of the future of the world.” It was initially ignored, as it was supposed to be considered in the future, but in the end the Byzantine civilization was not assimilated.

The Turanian civilization became more and more popular. Everything with Tatar origin was considered as fashionable. Ivan III’s son married a Tatar woman. The most beautiful women were searched for throughout the country and sent to Moscow. Ivan the Terrible acted as a matchmaker seven times. After the Kazan occupation (1552), the Tatar custom was even more widespread; the chosen women were kidnapped and imprisoned. The so-called Czins, who were once prescribed by Tamerlane, came and settled in Kazan, and this extended to the entire state administration. From the hierarchy was removed the old native Moscow, which was preserved to rodosłowie.

After the Occupation of Kazan, people tried to escape to the vast lands of the Volga Region (Povolzhye), and this was the beginning of the characteristic dispersal of the population. The acceptance of the old Kazan law in 1607, namely forced tillage, was a kind of prevention of this dispersal. In the mid-seventeenth century, the Siberian “mir” was introduced. This was a forced association of the population of a given village, the collective communal land ownership, with a periodic division of land use. This institution is known in Turanian civilization and was applied throughout the then Muscovy state for fiscal reasons, imposing several liabilities for fiscal services to the “mir.”

A still more important Turanian influence were the Cossacks. They were famous in Asia even before “Genghis Khan”; Temüjin went to Kipczak following the kazach. The Muscovite dukes kept Ryazan Cossacks on their soldier’s pay. This strictly camp-related organization pervaded down the Don River, and its second focal point was on the Dnieper. The Cossacks were not an ethnic or religious product, but a military-profit product; people were waiting for a great leader to conquer and plunder, and in the meanwhile soldier’s pay was looked for in Moscow and Poland. When the pay was over, they took what they wanted themselves. Then, they were used by the Crimean khan and sultan to paralyze Poland and prevent an anti-Turkish coalition. The Brest Union was a convenient pretext, but although the Cossack wars—long-lasting and dangerous—also occurred in Moscow, they were not carried out in defense of the Orthodox faith.

But where is the place for the Byzantine civilization? It can be seen in Russia when it was under Polish rule. Peter Mohyla was undoubtedly a mighty Byzantine, although he studied in Paris, but he remained alone in his views. A significant intellectual movement in Russia renounced Orthodoxy and went to Protestantism, largely to Arianism (which was hosted by the Ostroh Academy), and these dissenters did not return to Orthodoxy but generally accepted Latin Catholicism.

The fact is that in the Ukrainian provinces at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the sense of nationality that appeared was not the work of the Byzantine civilization. Byzantinism does not know nations; this new movement came from the influences of the Latin civilization and Polish culture. Following the example of Konstanty Ostrogski, Moscow was firmly cut off. The contemptuous word “Muscovite” passed on from Russian to Polish. But the arising Russian nationality developed in the circumstances of the terrible Cossack wars. At that time, because of their disgust at the atrocities and lechery, all high-educated Russian people tried to protect their cultural sense under the wings of Polish culture and kept away from Russia. Only simple people, who could exist without nationality and who belonged to the Turanian civilization, not to Byzantinism, stayed close to the Orthodox Church.

Byzantinism, however, entered the Muscovite lands at the beginning of the eighteenth century. It was Peter I (1689–1725) who introduced the trend of Byzantine-German culture to his state. It is not enough to point out that his reforms were exclusively from Protestant Germany. The Orthodox Church was modeled on the Landeskirche example; he forced the secular clergy to learn the alphabet, and he extended the state’s control to guard the orthodoxy of the citizens. The names of new offices were not even translated into Russian; German names were preserved until recent times. However, all this “Europeanization” did not change the Turanian view, according to which the throne can be shared with adventurers. Then the plan of establishing relations with Protestantism came: the ius connubii with princesses of Protestant Germany. There was a real Germanization of formal Russia.

But, as it turned out, the transfer of the German bureaucracy was an illusion. Russia was too large to be arranged like a small country but with an enlightened and prosperous population. So the “reforms” led to chaos and anarchy. The worst thing is that, since the days of Peter, religious indifferentism has taken hold in the ranks of the bureaucracy and even the clergy. This was combined with the hypocrisy of adherence to the liturgy. Sectarianism also began to grow. All this was in line with the spirit of Byzantine-German culture, all along the lines of Protestantism.

The education of the higher classes was rising significantly, and after the partitions of Poland, the influence of the Latin civilization began to become visible. Under Polish influence, the Russian national feeling was created, and under French influence, the tendency to changes also appeared. There were four civilizations in Russia—Turanian, Byzantine, Latin and Jewish—and they produced nihilism from a mechanical mixture, the fruit of which is Bolshevism. This acivilizational state has been visible in Russia since the Eastern War of 1877.

Nowadays Turanian specificity has been turned away, namely, Turanian legal monism has been turned into reverse monism, so that private law is abolished and all life is governed by public law. Because of the overthrow of public law in Byzantinism, one might have seen some kind of arch-Byzantinism in Bolshevism. Indeed, there is no lack of this element, but without comparison, there are more, so to speak, Turanian elements. Fragments of the Latin civilization have been eliminated, but it has taken on a lot of the Jewish civilization, even the whole of its apriorism, which has never been as advanced outside of Jewish society as in Bolshevism. Russia’s worst disaster is the fact that, since the appearance of nihilism, its national feeling has shrunk and it has probably been crushed for several generations.

The pressure of Bolshevism on the West is the total destruction of the Latin civilization; it has a lot of Jewish attributes, but they are distorted. It is a mixture of the Byzantine and Turanian civilizations, strong enough to enforce some kind of acivilization. Unfortunately, such a state of affairs threatens Europe even without a communist revolution, because acivilization may be the only result of civilizational mixtures that are nowadays being cultivated so eagerly.

It is here that slogans about racial purity appear. But in the oldest textbooks of anthropology one can read that even the Troglodytes were already a mixed race. It is time to assert the slogan that race need not be pure, but civilization should be pure. The most important thing is commensurability, the commensurability of norms and of living conditions.

I have only talked about two Eastern civilizations. About the others, just a few words will be enough. The Chinese expansion to the west ended where the phonetic alphabet or even the syllabic one (like Turanian or Turkish writings) are found. The Chinese civilization is associated with its universal writings, conceived for all languages but which demand that one devote one’s entire life to the study of writing.

On the other hand, the pressure of the Arab civilization was strong. It is known that it got through to Spain, where it was mixed with the Jewish civilization, and finally also with the Latin one. So far, in Spain there was no lack of the forepast customs, and thanks to Spanish some of them have come to the South American lands. There are, for example, a number of gender customs: the ladies of Spanish America are very limited in their public life and can, for example, only sit in a café in a separate room, the so-called “familial” one.

What the Arabs did in Sicily is commonly known: Emperor Frederick II (1212–1250), born in Sicily, was influenced by Arabic, and he formed a political and anti-religious school at his mansion. This is probably the first example of removing ethics from public life. Hermann von Salza, who would later become Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights and creator of the Teutonic State on the Baltic, was the oldest pupil and then the most trusted assistant of Frederick II. The Teutonic system of state administration, especially the tax system (in modern terms), aroused admiration. It had a Sicilian origin. When the idea of the knightly order in Germany came to an end, the Teutonic Knights first made the state a servant of religion. This was not the case in Byzantinism, but it came from German Byzantinism, and took place precisely in the days of Sigmund of Luxembourg (1410–1437), the archetypal Byzantine on the German throne. From the second half of the fifteenth century, the Teutonic Knights became powerful supporters of Byzantine-German culture until they finally realized what they meant by “Prussianism.”

Currently in Germany there is legal monism and—what is more important—it is going in the same direction as in Russia: the monism of public law. This means that Byzantinism has already evolved to the last possible consequence: it is more developed than it was in Byzantium.

Let us not assume that this Byzantinism does not affect Poland. It does. The supremacy of physical force over the spiritual, the elimination of ethics from the collective life, the control of society by bureaucracy—these features of Byzantinism have come to us strongly, which is because they are also a part of the expansion of the Turanian civilization.

On the other hand, the eternal collectiveness of the Turanian civilization came into Poland from the collapse of Tsarism. Let us remember that the Jewish civilization in Poland has reached its height and that it is currently the most vital civilization in our land, the most capable of expansion, and that it is penetrating us and our Polishness. In fourth place stands the Polish civilization, the Polish-Latin culture, enormously practicing the virtue of modesty. Let us remember that these three civilizations are willing to form an alliance against the fourth.

Who will save the Latin civilization? There is only one power available for this and called to it: the Church. Here, in Europe in general, it is its civilization, its daughter, and it has to defend its property, its element. But success depends on whether the lovers of this civilization understand that they will not defend it unless they are at the same time in the ranks of the Church. In this fight you must be a Catholic, otherwise the fight will be in vain. One could even say that it is enough to fight for Polish Catholicism, and when we defend the Church, Latin civilization will be useful to us, it will be saved.

THE CHURCH AS THE POLITICAL EDUCATOR OF NATIONS

F. Koneczny, Kościół jako polityczny wychowawca narodów (Warszawa: Katolickie Towarzystwo Wydawnicze “Kronika Rodzinna”, 1938), pp. 9–42 (excerpts).

II. Four postulates of the Catholic mission

In order not to fail chronological primness, we will start our considerations on the topic concerning the Church’s attitude towards public life from the beginning; if not from Adam and Eve, then at least from somewhere close to them, as close as possible. Let us begin with the situation of primitive people, even those in protohistory. You do not have to “imagine” something; imagination cannot prove anything in this field of science! You do not have to “think back” to the times of our ancestors, because primitive people, even extremely primitive people, still exist, and missionaries go to them and send reports from there.

Surprisingly, it turns out that the genesis of statehood is in the Church. Through its own missionaries the Church produces state apparatus, that is, statehood, and disseminates the embryos of the state. There are no rules in the New Testament as to how to set up the state; there is no private or public law in the Gospel, and the Church has never chosen certain forms to be associated with states, and others to be condemned by them; but the Gospel is all about GOOD, MORALITY, and ETHICS, and it is enough to produce clear signposts in everything, including the state.

Each Catholic mission carries four postulates: perpetual monogamy, the abolition of slavery, the abolition of revenge, and finally the independence of the Church from the state power, in the name of the independence of the spiritual factor from physical strength. These four requirements from the very beginning have been the same and unchanging for all types and levels of civilization, for all countries and all people.

The foundation of upbringing to the higher level of collective life, the cornerstone of state organization, lies in the abolition of the vendetta. It is a kind of moral obligation that must be taken from the family and fulfilled with the help of the public administration of justice and public measures of punishment. The political superior that was the ruler (from the cacique to the emperor) became a general avenger for all the families, the masters of all revenge. This was the beginning of the state judiciary.

At even the lowest levels, among the most primitive peoples, the missionary instills—even unconsciously—statehood, because, in order to endure the vendetta, he must prepare supreme judicial authority, and the leader of the converted people becomes not only a warlord, but also a judge. This is the first peaceful state function.

It is not easy to do this. Often, the head of the state is unwilling to be a judge, because he or she does not want to cut off the customary ancestral law. When the bishops demanded that Vladimir of Kiev take the office of criminal justice, the prince opposed it and proceeded “according to his father’s and grandfather’s instructions.”

In Western Europe, the vendetta complicated social relations to such an extent that the constant state of society became “a war of all against all.” Centuries passed until the vendetta was limited gradually by treuga Dei; over the course of these generations, a ruling by a court was only made at the request of a party in litigation. One who went to his prince to help him out with his revenge and punish the abuser exposed not only himself to shame but his entire family, because he was freeing himself of his personal duties and finding himself weak. For a long time, women asked the princely judiciary for help only when they did not have a male avenger. Finally, treuga Dei started working, expanding more and more, but how slowly and under such pressure of punishment from the Church and unrelenting curses! In Poland, during the reign of the first Piasts, monetary fines were imposed for murder, but bloody races between families continued to occur in the fourteenth century. In Germany, it was only at the end of the fifteenth century that Landfrieden was proclaimed as a prohibition of vendettas and also as means of coercion of transferring bloody disputes to the state power. However, it took some time before the law gained widespread recognition.

The act of revenge, handed down from generation to generation, led to a long series of frauds and crimes; the vendetta was abused to cover numerous crimes—including robbery. Until the prince ruling in the name of all the people of his country declared war on the prince of the neighboring country, stating the fact of harm and resentment committed against all, fights were waged between families in all neighborhoods. Wars were born not only from vendettas on a large scale, but most of them even had this kind of genesis, and therefore they were considered as legitimate. Criminality and war became a side product of vendettas. When, after a few generations, no one was able to judge which side was originally to blame and whether both parties remained within the limits of customary law, even when the memory of the original object of the quarrel died out and even when the families that had begun the vendetta died out, dangers still remained. At every turn, it became increasingly evident that it was no longer a matter of the vendetta but of open disorderliness. As the first was mixed with the second, it was seen in Corsica even beyond the middle of the nineteenth century.

By eradicating revenge, the Church became a political educator of societies in a double way: it gave people a public judiciary and at the same time it increased the security of life and property. By putting these two domains into the hands of secular authority, it produced the same, and then extended and strengthened state power.

It was said long ago about the Church that it had become a parent and a teacher of nations, and it was already accepted universally. This should be further extended, as it was also the creator of a state power that also had the power to act, apart from in wars. Stability and continuity of statehood in the state is the work of the Church (the words “state” and “statehood” are not synonymous, statehood means state apparatus).

Let us move on to further postulates always and invariably put forth by the Church to each and every converted community. The issue of lifelong monogamy is already sufficiently developed in terms of the Church’s attitude to collective life. It is widely known that respect for women, granting their rights, and moral and property equality emerged from this attitude. Monogamy makes women a creative factor in collective life, doubling the number of a civilization’s workers. It is less well known that monogamy is the basis of personal property, that one is inextricably linked with the other. The utopians who claim it is possible to bring communism together with Catholicism are very mistaken. You cannot accept communism, because monogamy and soon after also the family would disappear.

The postulate of the abolishment of slavery also determines the quality of social life. Slave workers were, in a vast majority, physical workers, while free men were involved in mental work. The Apostle Paul’s declaration that “If any would not work, neither should he eat” contains a moral coercion of work which is included in Catholic ethics. Whoever cannot afford mental work will fulfill this physical order. Since manual workbecomes an ethical necessity, in this way it is worthy of human respect, and therefore such work of a free man is not to be disparaged. There is a whole social revolution which has been gradual, evolutional, and finally done. Against this background, there has been a huge development of handicrafts, from which everything we call technical has emerged. The classical world did not lack scientific discoveries, but no adequate inventions arose from them, because manual work, remaining in contempt, remained at too low a level. The abolishment of slavery and equality in the freedom of manual and mental work meant that mental work also included craftsmanship, and that is the secret about why the period of antiquity was not so inventive, and why inventions are a privilege of the Christian world.

Let us move on to the fourth postulate of Catholic collective life, to the question of the Church’s independence from secular authority. As is well known, neither the Eastern Church nor the Protestant denominationwill accept this postulate. Catholicism has its own concept of the state and of collective life in general and cannot depart from that concept. There is Catholic teaching about the state. There is an ideal of the Civitas Dei, which was given by St. Augustine one and a half thousand years ago. Christians in those days were accused of being unwilling to work in the Roman state, or in today’s language, they boycotted Roman statehood. It was so frequent (though not always and not everywhere) because statehood was of such a kind that it did not deserve the respect of even honest pagans.

In the Christian mentality, through the ages and up to now, the following exclamation has been made: Quid sunt regna remonta justitia, nisi magna latrocinia? The Christians did not want to serve and help that latrocinium, but they treated their duties to the state positively, and they always performed them unrepiningly. However, from the beginning, they were distinguished by the fact that they knew not only the obligations towards the state, but also the obligations of the state towards the citizen. The union of the individual with the state in Catholic ethics was a weave of mutual rights and obligations from the beginning; the state should be subject to ethics in the same way as an individual. Whenever the statehood of some state was not in line with this postulate, it could not have the support of the Church. The postulate of the independence of the Church from secular authority is a part of the general thesis: the superiority of spiritual elements above material ones.

The ideal—the Civitas Dei—was a success over the centuries, but (like every ideal) as it progressed, it grew and took on new divisions, new detailed postulates, according to the complexity of collective life. The idea of the divine state on earth, that is, the state organized by God, is not indestructible, but we require more and more from it. As soon as what was expected becomes true, there are already more requirements! There was a time when people wanted treuga Dei to come true, today we require disparately more, and, God willing, let our descendants have even bigger demands!

III. The principles of public life in nations

The methods of collective life are shaped in Catholicism; they evolve when they approach the ideal of Civitas Dei, and when they deviate from it, their standards are lowered and spoiled. In any case, they are invariable. As we know, the Church is not identified with any special form of government; it only requires everyone to have morals according to Catholic ethics. But among the many different modes of government, there are some basic guidelines that the Church follows in its great mission as a political educator.

The depth of Catholic ethics derives from a sense of a personal relationship with God, and this is where the greatest moral power of the Catholic is. Even if the association is committed to the most serious offenses, the relationship of an individual to God remains pure as long as no one approves of evil. But everyone also has a personal responsibility for his thoughts, speeches and deeds, which is symbolized by personal confession, while Protestantism, Judaism and Buddhism know only collective confessions. Collective responsibility is generally not sufficient responsibility to establish a relationship with God. Whoever wants to settle for collective responsibility sooner or later will break the rules of ethics. This attitude is most prominent in Jewishness, because a Jew does not stand before God as a human being, but always as a Jew. In the face of Jehovah, he is either a Jew or a non-Jew: according to Jewish conviction, the relationship with God is determined first of all by belonging to a certain group or to the rest of mankind that is outside of this association. But that is not all, because all people belong to associations, including Catholics, but even though people in the association often operate collectively, Catholics in their conscience are responsible even for group acts, each one personally, as if each of them acted individually. The relationship between an association and a member of an association can be double, and the associations are also double in this respect; some suppress personality and form collectiveness, others not only do not disturb personality, but even care for it. Such an opposite of collectiveness is called personalism. When individuals associate with this feature of the spirit, the unification of personalism arises; the most durable, the strongest and the most civilized one.

The whole religious philosophy of Catholicism and the whole of Latin civilization are based on personalism. The Church clearly teaches that every human soul forms a separate whole and is endowed with free will. Individuals, uniting themselves in public life, are only doing it truly if their activity is voluntary. Only then are the forms of this life the true expressions of the will of a given association. And the association has to be so organized as not to discourage personalism and therefore it cannot rely on monotonousness, but must possess a difficult art to maintain unity in diversity. The Catholic state differs from all other ones, especially from the Byzantine one, in this way. In the Byzantine civilization, unity is not understood in a different way than in total monotonousness. This contrasts with human nature so much that it can only be carried out by coercion, sometimes only by terror. Monotonousness is artificial; diversity is natural. Everything that is natural grows out of itself as an organism and transforms itself into new organisms, whose common feature is voluntariness. In the diversity of public life, everyone uses the means that suit his or her personality and chooses the way of cooperation that allows him or her to develop maximum strength, ableness and efficiency. Only in this way are the following things possible: love, vocation, a love of work whose aim is the common good, enthusiasm, a willingness to sacrifice, faith in the cause, and the belief that the efforts will not be empty and that the grain will eventually reach the proper soil. It all provides a joy of life that becomes creative, and this is possible only in organic public life.

Only the organism can be creative; the mechanism, which is the opposite of the organism, does not have this feature.

Public life must be organic or mechanical. Unlike an organism’s abiogenesis, a mechanism must be artificially designed. We encounter here the two methods of thinking that were mentioned at the beginning: induction and meditation, whose consequences in collective life are a posteriori and a priori. The “mechanics” of public life are satisfied when they find something that they dream up and recognize as a certainty to draw conclusions from and apply to all aspects of life. These conclusions are more dangerous the more consequent they are; for example, all the conclusions from the materialistic view of history with socialism at the head, trying to turn the whole world into a mechanism.

Mechanism cannot be reconciled with personalism. The arrangement of mechanisms is designed in advance of the means of damaging any personalism. Whatever opposes the a priori relationship must be destroyed in the name of monotony.

So it goes from personalism through aposteriorism to organism, from collectiveness through apriorism to mechanism. Organisms and mechanisms arise from different methods, and the conditions of their success are different. The more developed an organism is, the more complicated it is in its diversity, while a monolithic mechanism strives for the greatest simplification. Universal history provides us with interesting experiences. All the revolutions thought a priori, and they acted mechanically. There are revolutions caused by the disappearance of personalism in collectiveness. Collectiveness cannot keep on even a superficial, external order in a different waythan mechanically. It therefore tries its best to simplify everything and fiercely opposes the variety of parallel signs of public life.

What is more, the ethics of organisms and ethics of mechanisms are totally different. What can we say about morality where it is a merit to oppress and break, to terrorize and receive personal dignity that is inseparable from freedom of beliefs? Also, personal dignity is born of personalism alone.

From all this it follows that there is a simple and absolute “either-or” between the organism and the mechanism. It is impossible to link them: they cannot be applied simultaneously in the same matter. If in an association such as a state, in a certain state department, there is a mechanism (for example, in the army), such a division is usually separated with great assurance from others, and is treatedwith exclusivity.

A state as such must also be either an organism or a mechanism. It depends on its civilization. For example, the Turanian civilization is a mechanism, and if someone tried to transform it into an organism, the Turanian civilization would collapse for sure. In the Latin civilization, the state can only be an organism.

This is connected with a particular characteristic of this civilization. In every other one, political power can be generated regardless of the condition of the society. The Mongols created an enormous and powerful universal state, although the social forces in it can hardly be perceived; similarly, in Turkey under the Byzantine Empire, society was hardly tolerated by the state, but that state had periods of strength. In these places there was a political force outside the society, creating itself, acting spontaneously. But in the history of the Latin civilization, it has never happened that the state was strong when the society was weak. Here the political force is born of social forces. With regard to the Latin civilization, we would rather say that its political power—the power of the state—does not have to be cultivated directly, but the whole care of public life has to be turned to the promotion of social forces. These extremely easily, and if necessary automatically, change into political power, while even the greatest political power does not contain social power. In the Latin civilization, the state must be based on the society, otherwise it will remain weak, and the more it wants to dominate the society, the weaker it will be. From a strong society emerges a strong state by itself. In our civilization, there is no fear that the social power might not have a political force, but any desire for the power of the state is in vain where the society is weakened. The state in the Latin civilization is an organism, so it is naturally born from social grounds. Any attempt to emancipate the state from the society will disorganize the society and disturb and depress the civilizational condition.

The state, leaving out the civilizational community with the society belonging to the Latin civilization, must become more and more involved in the fight against personalism. So there would be a split between the state and society, which would be the worst for both of them.

The most important cause (cause of causes) of such a relationship in our civilization is very simple. One cannot do the same thing at the same time in two ways: this law goes from the thickest and easiest works to the heights of the state’s creativity. It would be a mistake, however, if one wanted to embed a mechanical state on an organic basis, where the society (the nation) flourishes owing to the unity of its various social organisms. It is impossible to create an association that is both an organism and a mechanism at the same time because the mixture of one with the other has toxic properties; it is a poison both for the state and for the society. If there was a widespread mixture of organic and mechanical methods, if all the fields of collective life were gradually put into this mixture, the result would be absurd and terrible. The common civilization is the union of associations: the violation of civilizational coherency is destructive work; it is a devastation of the link between the nation and the state. It is like chasing a zero. Let us add that the mechanism will not produce morality, education or prosperity.

So if we want to keep up with the Latin civilization, we must stick to personalism, to the principle of diversity, to aposteriorism and to the organism with its principle of the supremacy of spiritual forces.

This is how it should remain in all societies that were “educated by the Church,” the Church whose work is the Latin civilization.

The characteristics of the Latin state include a separate state law, and the separation of public law in general. Private law is something different from public law. This legal duality is one of the cornerstones of our civilization and is therefore also the cornerstone of our political concepts.

The opposite of our concepts in this area is legal monism, knowing only one law, private or public. This monism comes from the Turanian civilization. There the ruler owns the entire state and its entire population. These legal manifestations, which we call public law, are derived there from the amplified private property of the head of state, resulting in the abolition of public law by private law. In the Turanian civilization, in turn, the private law of the ruler becomes public law for the public, which is not separate from private law but rather is an extension of private law for the ruler’s interests.

Currently, legal monism is created in Europe in a completely different way. It is committed to the destruction of private law by the public, namely by state law, which is unethical, and created in the name of state omnipotence. It is determined a priori what statehood is, and personalism is oppressed in the name of collectiveness in order to force one to accept the artificial and aprioristic conceptions formulated by violence.

At present legal monism dominates, resulting in the exclusivity of public law. The brute force fist has to decide what is legal. When the omnipotence of the state takes over all matters of the existing private law, it has to be left to the discretion of the ruler (and his bureaucracy), who are given the right to freely dispose of all. So eventually it will turn into a Turanian civilization, even though it started from the opposite direction.

The ethics of the Latin civilization cannot be reconciled with the developmental line of the state’s sovereignty, neither with etatism nor with bureaucratism nor with legislative elephantiasis nor with ex lex in peace. Our ethics must go to a state based on society, that is, to the local government. And every step that moves the state away from omnipotence will at the same time be a step forward in the progress of ethics, education and prosperity.

Maintaining personalism is fundamental. Thus the individual person must be respected in the social life.

Our Cardinal and Primate of Gniezno exclaimed loudly to the whole of Poland that “the human individual existed firstly before the state and has his own natural laws” … and therefore “it is impossible to bring together natural law with modern aspirations for the complete subordination of citizens to state objectives, to designate a servile role to citizens, and to extend state supremacy to all spheres of life. Regulating every citizen’s movement, packing the movement into the state laws, mechanizing them in some global and nameless mass is contrary to human dignity and the interest of the state, because it kills in the citizen a healthy sense of state … The state is not an antithesis of the individual but complements its individual being” (Cardinal August Hlond, “About the Christian Principles of State Life 1934”). 

Therefore, private law should not be immersed in the public one; legal monism does not fit Catholicism.

Catholicism requires monism in another field. Contrary to popular belief, according to which there are two ethics, one for private and another for public life, the Church stands on the position of ethical monism. Morality must be the same in public and private life, not excluding politics. We, Catholics, want total ethics.

IV. Universalism and the national idea

Since we are talking about political education and about the state, it is impossible to overlook the question of the universal state.

The ideal of political universalism will always be in the heads of Catholic philosophers, but it does not depend on partitions, on the union of the yoke. The ideology of such a universal state is Oriental, Asian: Babylon, Assyria, the Parthians, Persians, Alexander the Great, and finally Rome also turned to the Orient. In the Middle Ages, Turanian universalism arose when Genghis Khan’s state stretched from the Polish-Romanian border to Korea.

Catholic political universalism does not rely on annexation or captivity, because in this field it holds the principle that the road to unity follows from accepting diversity. In fact, the Church itself contributed directly to the creation of a universal state once in history, namely when Pope Leo III established the Western Roman Empire (the empire of Charles the Great) against the Byzantine Empire. It did not have to be one state, extending the annexations to other ones, but it had to be some kind of unification under the guidance of the emperor of states that preserved their independence for a common purpose, so that the states’ forces were used to bring religious principles into public life and were not wasted on wars between Christian states.

It was an ideal that is still too high even for our times, so how was it supposed to come true then? Let us mention that no one country of the West was united into one state. There were wars and battles between local dynasties everywhere. All the higher minds thought of how to remove this state of affairs. In this chaos, the dynastic idea itself was a way to create larger states embracing entire countries. Which dynasty proved to be stronger and defended a number of weaker ones thus contributed to the idea of universalism.

The next empire, the “Holy Roman Empire” (which had nothing to do with the tradition of Charles the Great), was created against the Papacy as the conduplication of the Byzantine Empire. It was created during the overt battle with the Church, and later the majority of its history is filled with the “battle of the Empire against the Papacy.” However, Catholic scholars, that is, Catholic priests, were often confused. Not all realized what the essence of the German Empire was; some of them accepted it because they were convinced that this was the resurrection of Charles the Great’s idea, others simply because the German king, in becoming the emperor, had the greatest power, sufficient to join Germany with Italy under one scepter. The more invasive a dynasty was, the more sympathetic it was to dreamers of political universalism, but on one condition: the pursuit of invasion had to be accompanied by happiness.

And there, against the background of the universalist ideology, a foundling appears: the cult of the stronger dynasty, from which a cult of power emerged. Idolaters of the force parasitized on universalism.

Thus, through the dynastic idea, the ideal of political universalism was finally brought to the absurd and became unworkable for many generations.

For example, let us go to the history of the extreme West, between England and France. 114 years ago there was a war between these countries. About what? This was a purely dynastic war. The law in France removed women from the throne, but nevertheless in 1328, the English king made a claim that the French throne belonged to him on the distaff side. Let us keep in mind that, according to contemporary dynastic legitimacy, the ruler had the right to trade, sell or exchange his country, as dozens of examples show. Populations were not usually asked about their will, and nations did not exist, because the national idea did not exist yet.

The national idea formed the earliest in Poland. It germinated at the Kalisz court in the second half of the thirteenth century, and Premyslas II and Ladislaus I became its performers. When Casimir III the Great was forced by fatal circumstances to recognize the successor of Louis I of Hungary, he presented this dynastic system for approval to the Polish Estates. Ladislaus Jagiello (Jogaila) became king, because he was called to the throne by the Polish society. The political activity of the society in the name of the national idea began early in Poland.

Meanwhile, in France and England, a division into French and English camps had not yet been introduced. The mightiest of the French dukes, the Burgundian duke, fought on the English side, and the city of Paris surrendered to the English dynasty. Many French Church dignitaries were opposed to Charles VII. Most of the intelligentsia of both countries, the mostmodern theologians, did not ask a simple question: England or France, in the national sense. This was not felt. People paid attention only to the war for the French throne of the two dynasties and they were considering which of them had a greater right to the throne. Genealogies, arrangements, documents, chronicles, and English and French law were studied, but nobody dreamed that it would be possible to judge according to the rule that England was for the English and France was for the French. Nobody came up with the idea that there could be a national criterion.

This was only said in the first speech by St. Jeanne d’Arc. She called for fighting not for the dynasty but for France, and that in the name of France one must stand with the king who could become the French national king. The entire tragedy of the Maid of Orleans was the result of this slogan. She brought a new slogan to public life in the West, which was unknown to learned theologians and lawyers, and even hateful. Defend Charles VII regardless of whether the legitimacy of the dynastic law was in favor of him, do not take into account legal considerations. Can this be done, is it right, and therefore is it consistent with the religious point of view, with public morality? Is it maybe heresy? In the end, the new ideal brought by the Maid of Orleans was not understood.

The Church proclaimed her a saint, and at the same time sanctified her slogan: the concept of the nation and the concept of the nation state.

The national idea also centered on a certain dynasty, but provided that this dynasty served the nation, not in reverse. Thus the national dynasty opposed any other dynasties in a given area, and trade agreements concerning the country were excluded. It was to be the end of dynastic politics. There was a struggle between national and the dynastic ideas.

Simultaneously with the actions of St. Jeanne d’Arc, there was a war in Poland and Lithuania against the “whole German nation,” i.e. against the concepts of international dynastic law based on the system of the German Empire. This heavy battle, which began in 1410, ended four years after the stake in Rouen was set fire to with the victory at Wilkomierz (1435), which the modernists combined with the victory of Grunwald.

But the struggle of thetwo ideas continued throughout Europe, with varying degrees of happiness, until the dynastic idea was victorious and had a strong influence on the history of Europe. It had the worst effect on Poland (partitions were made by the neighboring great dynasties) and on Italy (the fragmentation of states ruled by small foreign dynasties). The union of Italy was the beginning of the triumph of the national idea, and the reinstitution of Poland’s independence was the crowning of this triumph.

V. The Presence of the Church in history (recounted in two sentences)

Let us move onto Polish affairs. First and foremost, it must be realized that there can be no special historical rights for a single nation, and only the exercise and verification of universal rights can take place. In order to clearly see what the political education of our nation by the Church was, we must keep in mind what the universal characteristics of the Church’s work in this area are. Let us first summarize what we have done so far. This can be done in two sentences:

(1) The Church organizes the public life of nations by cultivating personalism, aposteriorism, unity in diversity, nationality, legal duality, and ethical monism;

(2) The Church requires that collective life must be based on monogamy, on the respect of manual work, that there should be no slavery or family revenge (vendetta), and that the Church must be independent of secular authority.

These two sentences contain the presence of the Church in universal history—and thus also in Polish history.

VI. Applying the rules of the Church in Polish history

It seems that there was no need to introduce monogamy into the Polish lands, since the Church had already found it here. It is certain that our elders were working with their own hands, so it was not necessary to increase respect for physical work. Slaves in Poland were rarely bought (from the Jews) but were not sold; once bought, a slave became a member of the household. At the end of the twelfth century, there were no slaves.

On the other hand, it was necessary to introduce a factor of personalism into the social system. The collectiveness of the familial organization with its own triple-law, that is, family law, property law, and inheritance law, gave way slowly and in a very difficult manner to family emancipation, with which personal ownership and thus a personalist factor was linked. In connection with this, the Church propagated the law of the testament, the most profound gap in family property, and inheritance law. The transition from the ancestral system to the family one could not take place without battle and sacrifice. Examples of this are the dispute of Bolesław II the Generous with St. Stanislaus of Szczepanów, then the stubborn attempts of Mieszko III the Old. The whole course of these struggles was linked at the same time with the question of the Church’s independence from the secular authority, which in principle was settled in favor of the Church at the first synod of Łęczyca.

In view of the problems of the state system, the Church wanted Polish statehood to be based on the society from the beginning: the Church, being opposed to the ducal lawlessness based on the coercion of physical force, was on the side of the self-government of social organisms. This direction was heavily adopted in Poland, and then “freedom” was understood as nothing more than self-government; this brings decentralization with it.

Taking into consideration allthe diversities in Polish lands did not, of course, interfere with the unity of the state.

The Church vigorously defended this unity. The popes themselves defended Vladislaus II’s authority; unfortunately, the Polish bishops (at one time) did not listen to the instructions from Rome and helped to create small independent states from the districts. But later, their successors opted for the tendency to unification. We owe the restoration of the kingdom to Pope Boniface VIII and to the Primate of Gniezno, Archbishop Świnka. The clergy also influenced the shaping of the national idea from Boleslaw the Pious to Premyslas II and Ladislaus I.

In the struggle with the Teutonic Order, the Church took over the leadership of Polish minds and the Church itself unmasked the “cunning enemies of Christ.” The Church also disproved claims which were directed to Poland by some neighboring dynasties. The Church took Ladislaus Jagiello in her care, supported the Jagiellonian dynasty and contributed to producing what we call the Jagiellonian idea. The so-called “union” was a kind of new formula for universalism, and the formula “Free among the free and equal among the equal” expressed the Catholic understanding of universalism in the best way. The Polish Church always guarded Lithuanian and Prussian autonomy. Was “union” not a political extension of self-government to intergovernmental relations? Never would a centralist state ever get a political idea of ​​this kind! The adjacent states cuddled up with Poland; they wished to have a legal relationship with Polandbecause they were attracted by Polish statehood, i.e. self-governmental decentralization.

The Church defended self-government of course, which once again happened under Casimir IV Jagiellon; in addition, Polish governments always recognized the independence of the Church as the Church was also one of the pillars of the state, and does reading the books of Dlugosz, Skarga, Starowolski, and Konarski not constitute a perfect schooling in Polish patriotism? Skarga put together Polishness with Catholicism when he said, with great voice, that Poland is “God’s decree.”

In the history of Poland there were of course certain bands of perpetual groundwork of “De Civitate Dei.” Let us unearth them and let us try to make sure that these factors are not lacking in the renewed Republic, whose statehood might as quickly as possible be based on Catholic ethics. We have to say that, according to Mickiewicz and Krasinski, “Poland’s historical mission is to bring the Christian spirit to politics.”

NIHILISM AND RUSSIFICATION

F. Koneczny, “Nihilizm i rusyfikacja (1855–1897),” in F. Koneczny, Dzieje Rosji od najdawniejszych do najnowszych czasów (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997), pp. 251–271 (excerpts).

After the fall of Sebastopol, one of the main pillars of “Slavophilia,” Chomiakov, expressed mirth in a certain Moscow social group, and when somebody asked him about the reason, he said: “For 30 years I cried in silence, now I can enjoy looking at the tears of salvation.” This military disaster was universally welcomed as being able to force the government into state and social reforms if the state did not want to lose all its military power for the future. Everyone demanded two reforms: the emancipation of the peasants and the creation of local self-government. Even opponents of constitutionalism demanded this, believing that these reforms, giving the public contentment, would block the “revolutionary” movement. Even at the tsarist court, it was assumed that “revolutionaries should get something” to shake them off, to make them harmless.

In 1858, the freedom of the peasants was recognized and the government granted them the right to acquire land. Three years later, the decision of March 3, 1861 announced that every patriarchal household, within a two-year period, should receive a house with a yard, and the land could be bought up from the nobility over 12 years, using financial help from the state.

The agrarian reform got bogged down in the middle of the process. In 1858, in a presentation to the government, the Tver Gubernatorial Committee stated that in order to abolish the heirship of peasants who “limited the arbitrariness of officials,” a self-government would have to be created, while at the same time the division of the population into states would also have to be abolished.

There was no need to hear about it in the courtier sphere. The peasant state, and therefore the whole state system, was maintained by law, with the privileges of the nobility and bourgeoisie, with the heredity of statehood, so that neither wealth nor education absolved the peasant son from the fact that he is a peasant according to the law. It is possible therefore to impose upon him judicial corporal punishment, which was abolished for other states.

A number of similar restrictions on rights were maintained. Also the “mir,” that is, the municipality community of peasant land, was maintained, which confirmed the doctrine of the “Slavophiles” that the “mir” was the core of the social force, the fundament of the “Slavic” culture, the palladium of Russianness.

In practice, the peasants’ property rights changed to the right to use under the supervision of the bureaucracy, which from that time captured the “mir” arbitrarily. A “peasant mass, closed in class-diversity,” dark and passive, was created. “The peasantry was separated from the rest of the world by a wall of separate statutes; it gave it a shadow of a state government; no clerical educated-head had admittance; it was limited by statutes of special character; it was given separate civil law and, in some cases, separate criminal and state courts.”

The reform of the judiciary was advanced during the reign of Alexander II (transparency of trial, courts of assize), but the establishment of the separate peasant court was no such progress.

In spite of all the police efforts under Nicholas’ rule, Western influences were acting on Russia—and the more Russia was not allowed to meet Europe in a normal way, the easier it was to make an abnormal path of cultural misunderstandings. Western criticism arose in Russia from hatred, and Russian “thinkers” vied with each other with real critical obstinacy that led to the negation of everything. Western European concepts were accepted without the intermediation ofSouth Russia, and even without Poland, and moved the minds and caused disorganization.

At the end of Nicholas’ rule, Dobrolubov—the publicist—stated that “apart from government autocracy there are lots of despotisms: familial, caste, social”—so should one fight not only with the autocracy of the Tsar, but with all of these despotisms? Some tendencies were to be observed that were not concentrated on constitutions, because they were a minor product, but on the destruction of any arrangement of collective life; those tendencies were concentrated on the building of a new world formed on the ruins of the old one. What would the new world be? That will be the next generations’ problem; all that is known is that we need to destroy the present world, because thanks to it, our successors will no longer be restricted.

The Russian specialty—nihilism—thus began. The successor of Dobrolubov, Pisarev, whose doctrine overwhelmingly dominated an enormous part of the Russian intelligentsia in the years 1860–1877, overturned “the authority of tradition” in the name of “liberating the human personality from all its fetters” because he wanted “individuality, not to be blamed for serving some ideals.” He negated everything and categorically stood against “the pursuit of common ideals.” In his “Scholastica of the Nineteenth Century” (1861), he even declared he was against disseminating the teaching of reading among the people. He discredited all European science and art, and all philosophy; he tolerated only natural sciences, according to the naive view that “sciences have not built anything, but have destroyed so many things!”

The proponents and followers of Pisarev were not interested in the constitution! This stopped the flow of constitutionalism in Russia; the last effort at this for a long time was Pyotr Valuyev’s project from 1863, with a humble demand made of parliament with an advisory tone, and from then until 1880 nobody spoke about the constitution. The “Liberals” of this generation, such as Suvorin and Katkov, restricted themselves to the slogan of enfranchisement and to local government; they demanded reforms, but they did not touch the “autocracy.” In that respect, they were similar to the “Slavophiles,” who had already subscribed the autocratic Tsarism to the basic conditions of culture, and they liked to determine it as “Slavic.”

Soon after the enfranchisement decree (1861), just three years later (1864), the establishment of self-governing “districts” was to take place. During this time there were events that had a profound effect on the Russian psyche, binding Russia’s external and internal policies in many respects in unity.

At the beginning, Alexander II practiced only foreign policy in Asia; Russia felt quite strong there, even after the weakening caused by the Crimean War. Shamil, the leader of the Caucasian uprising, deluded himself that it was possible to defeat the Russian conquerors. He was indeed successful at first, but in the end he was forced to surrender by Aleksandr Baryatinsky in 1859. From that time, Russian rule continued to expand further into Central Asia. Persia sought help from England and France, but although those states wished to exclude Russia from Central Asia, Russia’s diplomacy turned out to be incomparably better, and Tehran was falling into closer dependency with St. Petersburg. The Cherkess’ resistance was also defeated in those years. Russia’s extraordinary diplomacy was evident in the Chinese issue: without Russia’s involvement and without its attention to it, England and France had a trade war with China in the years 1857–1906, and after the war Russia received preferential trading conditions and a substantial part of Manchuria.

In Europe, relations had completely changed. The power of the Habsburgs, who from 1861 had had only one province in the Italian Peninsula, became weaker. Italy was rapidly striving to unite under the care of again-imperialistic France. In 1852, France abandoned a Republican form of government and was again an empire under the rule of Napoleon III, taking over Russia’s lost hegemony over Europe. The Emperor of France had ambitious plans to re-occupy the Rhine countries—granted in 1815 to Prussia—and for this reason he tried to get the approval of Russia. Alexander II, however, had other sympathies, and because of his wavering over the “ungrateful” Austria he got increasingly close to Prussia, taking care of the country as much as his father had looked after Austria.

Prussia had its own politics in its relationships with Russia, and intended to “repay” it by causing the uprising in Poland. Bismarck diligently kept watch on his plans, conceived on the eve of the Crimean War, in the name of which he got Frederick William IV out of the anti-Russian coalition and out of the plans to reinstitute the Polish state in order to turn Prussia against Austria and France. In the name of these plans, he strove for the closest relations between Wilhelm I (1861–1888) and Russia, and for this reason he tried to sink Poland, above all, to secure a guarantee that Russia would not reconcile its interestswith Poland. In turn, the consequences of history were to emerge as further consequences of the partitions of Poland: the falls of Austria and France.

Alexander II was brutally sincere towards Poland. When, two months after the Treaty of Paris of 1856, he arrived in Warsaw, he spoke provocatively to the welcoming deputy with a harsh and sharp voice: “Down with dreams, gentlemen! What my father did, he did well!” He publicly stated that he did not intend to return to the Polish-Russian relations before 1832 and praised all that “Nicholas' system” had used against Poland—the system of the oppression of Polishness and Catholicism—and that under his rule we should not expect to improve the situation at all.

The personal disposition of the tsar was in line with Bismarck’s expectations, but Bismarck knew that many of Russia’s interests required reconciliation with Poland, which could prove to be more powerful than the will or arbitrariness of the most powerful individual. He then resolved to deepen the gap between Poland and Russia. On his initiative, in 1860, Polish appeals calling for rebellion against Russia were printed in the Prussian government’s printing house and spread by the Poznan police chief, Bärensprung. A deputy to the Prussian parliament, Ladislaus Niegolewski, detected this plot and unmasked it, but to the great surprise of the inhabitants of Greater Poland, it prompted a few months of demonstrations in Warsaw and the rule of secret organizations. As it turned out later, the origins of the insurgent movement and the first secret government came from young people unable to be awakened to their deeds. The open government, under the Wielopolski government, soon appeared, and it was almost completely independent of the tsarist opposition of the Poles—a secret government won, and in January 1863 there was an uprising, which aimed to “chain Russia to Prussia.”

The Russian Chancellor, Gorczakov, influenced by Bismarck, unconsciously served Prussia. In Berlin it was realized that “perhaps it will not be necessary to defeat the rebuilding of Poland,” but at the time it was considered that “putting down the uprising was a matter of life or death” for Prussia, as Bismarck said in a conversation with the English ambassador. Bernhardi, a Prussian historian and academic advisor on Eastern affairs, declared that if “the liberation of Poland under Russian rule is dangerous to Prussia,” it could not take place before the Germans united under Prussian hegemony and before the Wielkopolska was properly Germanized. Captain Alvensleben was sent to St. Petersburg with a “convention” that no one in St. Petersburg had asked for but which was signed by Gorczakov on February 8, 1863. Prussia undertook to help Russia with all its armed forces if other states wanted to help the Polish uprising. They ensured Russia’s neutrality in every war that the Prussian king would lead in the future.

The profits of the convention tempted Prussia at once: due to a sharp conflict with Denmark over the Schleswig-Holstein Duchy, Prussia was in danger because the St. Petersburg court supported the Danes; Alexander II suddenly changed direction, which led to the occupation of the principality by Prussia and Austria, and then the elimination of Austria came, also with the support of Russian diplomacy.

The uprising greatly hampered Napoleon III, because the Alvensleben Convention had ruled out the hope of setting Russia against the Prussians in their intended expedition to the Rhine countries. The intention had to be abandoned, but Napoleon did not give up immediately. Concerned with the situation, he conducted a diplomatic campaign against the Prussians, trying to disunite them from Austria and England—he tried to overpower Russia for the longest possible time just with the help of this uprising. To this end, he promised to “intervene,” calling on the Poles to “persevere” until his plans were ready. He preferred to turn the Polish case against Prussia rather than against Russia. He urged the Habsburgs to take action in order to regain Silesia and in order to retake a lost position in the Reich, for which he would demand Galicia for Poland. Napoleon III would take up the Polish question if he could succeed in combining such a thing so that he could weaken Prussia at that moment and break the Prussians’ relationship with Russia. Basically, England opposed the rebuilding of Poland, fearing that the Polish state would contribute even more to reaffirming French hegemony in Europe. England had an influence on Austria that was anti-Polish.

Nobody was openly against Napoleon III, considering this to be dangerous. Some countries tried to be diplomatic, and when Napoleon III wrote a diplomatic note on the Polish issue to St. Petersburg, some of them joined him on April 17, 1863: France, England, and Austria. Thoroughly taught about the relationship between these three states by the English ambassador in Petersburg, Lord Napier, the Tsar replied sharply that he would not allow anyone to interfere in internal Russian affairs.

Napoleon was not going to bring  the matter to a head. In vain, the Swedish king Charles XV (1859–1872), seeing rightly in the rebuilding of Poland the good of his homeland and even the indispensable condition of its free development among European countries, committed himself to sending 100,000 soldiers, irrespective of the positions of Austria or England, if France sent transport vessels; Napoleon did not even take the project into consideration. Despite this, he encouraged the insurgents to “persevere” and in that way Poland “persevered” until June 1864. The effect was that the whole of Poland and Lithuania turned into ruins in every way, Russification spilled through the whole country, culture was stopped, and what is more, the rule of Muravyov came together with his special tax on Poles: the “contribution,” amounting to a tenth part of the income from the land, remained until 1905.

The increasing unfriendliness towards Poland, as a representative of the Latin civilization, became particularly powerful among Russians after 1863, which became an essential dogma of Russian patriotism, and has never weakened. There were of course more intelligent and more ethical people, such as Alexander Pypin (“The Polish case in Russian literature”) or the famous Moscow law professor Boris Chicherin, but they were exceptions. The Liberals, who had previously supported Poland’s autonomy, such as Suvorin (Nowoje Wremia) or Katkov (Moskowskija Wiedomosti), became fervent spokesmen for the worst of the oppression, and if anything was in contradiction with their prevailing principles, they called them back and turned to the other side. It was dangerous to show direct support for Poland, so the Russian people tried anything to avoid such an accusation. Only Herzen, the editor of Kolokol who was staying in London, supported Poland, and that circumstance added fuel to the fire of general hatred. Loyalty to the Tsar was measured by the degree of aversion toward Poland.

Older “Slavophilia,” which at first glorified the theory of the apotheosis of the “mir,” gradually transformed into the political doctrine of pan-Slavism. The essence of Russia is represented by three slogans: “Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Narodnost.” Aksakov saw a religious mission in the expansion of the Russian state, which translated into the language of action, meaning that the Orthodoxy should be spread by violence, and above all, that the Orthodox union should be exterminated. In 1864, the Basilian Order of Chełmszczyzna was also abolished and the “converting” began, in which popes, volunteering from the neighboring Galicia, were very active. There had been “Moscophilia” since 1848, in spite of the Austrian government seeking to increase the sense of national separateness of Ruthenians from Russianness. The hatred of Catholicism had become a doctrine of “true” Slavs and of “deviations”: true Slavs could only be Orthodox, and one who was non-Orthodox was treated as a “betrayer of the Slavic cause.” Hence, it was an easy step to conclude that the defender of the Orthodox faith, Russia, was at the same time a guardian of the Slavs with the right, or rather even the duty, to punish “betrayers,” among whom in the first place were the Polish people, of course. Other Catholic Slavic nations were still so ignorant of themselves that in each of them there was a considerable number of “representatives” ready to accept Orthodoxy, and even the Russian language was recognized as the universal Slavic one, the only legitimate literary language of all the Slavic languages. And they were also ready to recognize other languages as “local dialects” including the “dialect” of Polish “rebels and defectors.”

Against the background of such superficial, almost infantile doctrines, in 1867, the famous “pilgrimage to Moscow” and the “Slavic Congress” were organized, which were directed against Poland and indirectly against Austria, while Prussia enjoyed greater governmental favors. It was only two years after the failure of the Polish uprising that Austria was defeated by Prussia in the war of 1866. Bismarck was absolutely sure about the Russian power.

Among such relationships, the local self-government in Russia and also the “land” of the powiat and gubernances started to be created, which were made up of representatives of all three states of Russia: landowners, peasants-owners and cities-owners. They were introduced by the order of January 1, 1864, but only in 33 gubernances east of the Dnieper, excluding the Polish lands “as a punishment.” The order was issued because the case had already been prepared and delayed for too long, and people were afraid of the “Liberals” because of it. After the Polish uprising, liberalism was very much inclined to agree with the government, and at the court of Alexander II it was regretted that the order was issued; the authorities dealt with the damaging activity of the land, which had only recently been called into existence.

During the celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the lands, someone called it the “Cape of Good Hope,” but  the cape “froze more and more.” Already in 1866, the land of St. Petersburg was closed due to a dispute with activists; in 1870, Szczedrin—the writer—expressed that the demonstration of an aversion for self-government is in the official spheres some kind of “letter of recommendation.” The struggle of the bureaucracy with self-government had increasingly shown unequal strength to the disadvantage of the land; its educational activity was especially restricted.

In the meantime Bismarck took a further step: in 1870 he waged war with France. Thiers traveled to St. Petersburg in vain in September 1870. Russia was in a friendly relationship with Prussia, and using the confusion of the West, it declared the Paris Treaty in 1856, which prohibited the French from keeping their battle fleet on the Black Sea. Russia’s position in the French-Prussian War was such that it forced Austria, Italy and Denmark into neutrality, intending to intervene in favor of France. Thanks to Russian help, Prussian hegemony arrived in Europe. On September 2, 1870, Napoleon III became a Prussian prisoner, in France a “Third” Republic was formed, and in May 1871, the new German Empire captured Alsace-Lorraine, which was only in the background of the Prussian hegemony.

In 1872, Bismarck reinstated the former “Holy Alliance,” the alliance of the partitioning states, as the “union of the three emperors.” For the Polish cause the worst times began, but they were the best for the Russians’ reaction. Bismarck was working on preventing the revival of Russia, and the influence of the Germans was tremendously shaken by the internal relations of Russia, devoted entirely to the services of activists.

It was hoped that the opposition would be able to join the government. Among the “Slavophiles” there was no opposition. In 1871, Nikolay Danilevskiy published a book, Russia and Europe, whose content was admired by Russian society. Danilevskiy proclaimed that Russia is not Europe, but it does not need to be Europe, being itself superior and better than the “rotten West.” As a political goal, Danilevskiy pointed to Russia’s capture of Constantinople and the establishment of the “Alliance of Pan-Slavism” under Russian rule. According to him, Polish people were destined for destruction. But Konstantin Leontiev, who was sneering at the Slavophile and who was close to nihilism in many ways, was harmonious with the government and he turned out to be a true philosopher of political reaction. He made the discovery that “the search for universal human equality and the universal truth is a terrible poison that spreads its European philosophies through its philosophical stages.” In his work “The East, Russia and Slavs,” Leontiev competed with Pisarev in his theory by denying the individual good, and dreaming of “defiling the ugly ideal of universal equality and idiotic universal progression,” he proclaimed his hatred of “the ideals of universal well-being and happiness.” He announced that Western Europe would soon be destroyed by anarchism and socialism, so Russia, in the face of the “mad rush of international Europe,” must seek salvation in Byzantinism. Because “true Christianity teaches that every earthly hierarchy is a reflection of heaven,” but on the other hand, “great social injustices, such as despotism, danger, strong passions, superstitions, fanaticism, etc., that is, all things which [people of] the nineteenth century tried to fight down, are all needed in the upbringing of great characters.” In his opinion, “the state must always be threatening, sometimes cruel and compassionless, because society is always and everywhere too active, poor in thought and too passionate.” Leontiev began with nihilism, and came to the true mysticism of despots. Even for Katkov it seemed to be too extreme, but only because he expressed it in too extreme a way; the thought itself was completely absorbed by a great part of society. More than one nihilist reconciled with the “autocracy” and glorified it as salvation from “rotten constitutionalism.”

The opposition was expressed more clearly through sectarianism. There had always been sectarian movements, and the position of the government was varied: sometimes it was aggressive and persecutive, and sometimes it was indifferent and tolerant. It was mainly about razkoł, which was constantly spread, and the right to celebrate “old” services in public and private places was finally granted. Other sects did not matter much. This was changing at that time. The minds of all Russian people were increasingly absorbed by the sectarian movement as the only way in which, in the absence of education, one could lift spirits, rise to the ideals. According to universal ignorance, disgusting, anti-social sects were also formed; the true second arm of nihilism, possessed by negation, infiltrated into religious madness. It started around 1866 and has been spreading ever since until our days. Regardless of the revolutionary sectarianism, the “Stundist,” a rationalistic sect established under the influence of Protestant German colonists (named after Zschocki’s book Stunden der Andacht), was established in Ukraine in 1868. That interesting peasant rationalism spread with unstoppable strength on the western side of the Dnieper.

The official Orthodox Church turned out to be too incompetent to fight the sects. The “religious mission of tsarism” was limited to persecution, and the “missionary” attitude was spread with the police apparatus from 1875 among the Uniats from Podlachia, with the help of the Uniat popes from Galicia. These were the last monuments of the Orthodox Church under Russian rule. The Union remained only in eastern Galicia, supported eagerly by the Polish people. Since we had obtained autonomy in Galicia, Poland began to share its national laws with the Russians, wanting to make an alliance with them to fight against Moscow. The genesis of the “Ukrainian camp,” then the “Ukrainian nationality,” which in the fight against Polishness was characterized by the most extreme Russian “nationalism,” was contained in it. In Russia, Russian prints were banned in 1876.

Alexander considered for a long time that the “union of the three emperors” was a comprehensive medicine for Russia; it added security to absolute governments, and was meant to help to foster opposition for government goals, enabling that popular external undertaking, namely in the Balkans, which was supposed to find a safe “outlet” for all oppositional agitation. Pan-Slavism prevailed because the government was fueling it, and it carried on its waves, above all, the enthusiasm for Russification as a deposit of a great historical mission to be fulfilled by Russia. If Slavs were to be united under the aegis of Russia (unless they were condemned to extermination for “deviation”) in one political union, with one literary language, in one Orthodox Church, Russia itself had to prepare for this unity of Slavic peoples in its own state, which was made up of so many different nationalities! Russification would provide ideological attachment for thousands of oppositionists, liberals, and even nihilists, who were reluctant to look to “the rotten West”! And next to this, they were marching on the Balkans as the first stage of the incarnation of pan-Slavism. There, even Russian constitutionalists could find a job, and they left Russia alone. The whole opposition would be put on the outside, the state would be enlarged, and both the state and the tsar’s throne would be surrounded by glory, gaining popularity in the broader layers of the nation, and would be able to rule as before, to make a reverse return, and maybe even delete the land. All this was possible thanks to the “union of the three emperors” which, having reconciled Russia in an alliance with Austria, would allow it to expand freely on the Balkan Peninsula. So the situation in Berlin was presented in that way, and St. Petersburg accepted it. Doubts about England—concerned about the victorious expedition of Russia to Khiwa in 1873—were dismissed by a surprise move: the only daughter of Alexander II married the young Duke of Edinburgh, and in May 1874 the tsar came to England on a political visit. Everything was the best, and all thanks to “the honest intermediary,” Bismarck. This idyll was supposed to last for two more years.

The Balkan march did not raise the slightest doubt. The Russian ambassador in Constantinople, Nikolaj Ignatiev, had kept the High Porte down for 12 years (1864–1876), and for that reason the pan-Slavic camp was encouraged to demonstrate and in effect force on the government the action of “liberating the Slavs.” Ignatiev skill-fully prepared the uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which broke out prematurely in 1875. Vienna did not like it, so in 1876 Serbia got two-thirds of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the condition that it committed to neutrality in the case of an Austro-Russian war. Serbia refused and “the union of the three emperors” continued to demonstrate its unity to the outside. It demanded a ceasefire with the insurgents, so that the Porte considered them a militant party, but the Sultan refused. He promised only “reforms,” but again no one believed him; then, on July 1, 1876, Serbia and Montenegro declared war against the Sultan.

Montenegro attacked the Turks, but the defeated Serbia gave up under the Turkish invasion. Finally, the Tsar, having concluded a military convention with Romania, also declared war on Turkey on April 24, 1877.

The Porte thought that it would break Russia’s forces, causing it to rise in the Caucasus. But the attempt to stop Russia in Asia was late because Alexander II had already excluded Russia from Central Asia. He conquered the smaller states that blocked the road to Khiva. In 1865, he conquered Tashkent, in 1866—Khodzhent, in 1868—the ancient Samarkand, and then in around 1865 the western part of the Caucasus. Then he defeated the Circassians and, in 1873, he forced Khiva to renounce the land on the right bank of Amu Darya and to recognize Russian sovereignty. In this situation, the Turks were not able to surround the Russians in Asia, and the Caucasian rebellion was severely suppressed after a dozen or so months, and Turkish rule itself was threatened when the Russians, on November 18, 1877, took Kars—the famous fortress on Asia Minor—by storm.

On the Balkan battlefield, the Russians crossed the Balkans. Shortly after, there was a technical failure on the military side, all the defects of the Crimean War came to light, and so did the incompetence of the commanding general, who was unable to gain a victory or to unite the movements of several armies. Hard times came for Russia—but when new armies came from Russia, a triumphant march into the Balkans began. After four months of exhausting battles, Osman-bassa capitulated in Pleven on December 10, 1877 before joining the Russian and Romanian armies. On January 14, 1878, General Gurko was in Philippopolis, and on January 20, Russian armies united in Adrianople. Serbia re-entered the Sultan’s territory, Greece occupied Thessaly, uprisings began in Macedonia and Crete, while at the end of January 1878, the Russians stood almost four miles from Constantinople. The Preliminary Treaty of San Stefano, contracted on March 3, 1878, did not give anything directly to Russia, but the dream of the “Slavs’ union” became real. The borders of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania were extended, and the Bulgarian principality was established within such limits that only the narrow strip of land between the Rhodopes Mountains and the Aegean Sea was left in the Porte. None of the Balkan states were strong enough alone; they could only exist under the Russian protectorate. It was apparent that new autonomous states arose, but only ones that were dependent on Russia. The Russian Tsar took the place of the Sultan.

Finally, “the union of the three emperors” and England spoke! At the end of 1876, the English diplomats took a reluctant position, and Russia answered with a more energetic war-motive. Austria tacitly prepared the diplomatic ground for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Germany seemed completely neutral. But there was a general protest against the Preliminary Treaty of San Stefano. The European convention, convened in Berlin, imposed other conditions on Russia: the borders of the Balkan states were reduced, and the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina were assigned to be occupied. Not Russia, but Austria became the main Balkan state. Russia only acquired Bessarabia and northern Armenia for itself with difficulty.

According to the conclusions of the Berlin congress, Alexander II had to surrender, and he could not provoke the European coalition against Russia after the Balkan War. It was such a big humiliation of Russia—the victorious!—that the whole Russian nation was feverish. All Russia was shaken, the opposition spoke even among the bureaucracy. Suddenly, all harmony with the government disappeared, secret organizations started re-expanding, and the most radical slogans became as popular as possible, such that the government itself started to use the slogans of the constitution so as to be able to rely on “moderate” elements, or at least not nihilistic ones. The government started strong Russification in vain, experimenting with violations not only in Poland and Lithuania but also in Livonia and Finland, producing new feeding grounds for officials and for formal patriotism. But it did not work anymore. When the new administrative and police regulations were issued, while the freedom of universities was even more limited, nihilism organized itself into a party of terror, which non-nihilists also joined. A specific Russian socialism was being developed—looking for support in the “mir”—which was claiming to be better than the Western one, ready to extort social changes immediately. The whole of Russia was covered by terrorist organizations; from 1878 attacks on offices and attempts on the lives of high ranking dignitaries began, and from April 1879 a series of attempts on the life of the tsar took place.

After six attempts, the Tsar finally decided on a constitution. He agreed on the project prepared by Mikhail Loris-Melikov—the “Supreme Administrative Commission”—and even printed a manifest, convening representatives of the 33 gubernances, when he was killed by a bomb while driving in St. Petersburg on March 13, 1881. An article which appeared in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung assigned that murder to the Polish people.

When Nicholas, the elder son of Alexander II, died in 1865, Alexander III came to the throne (1881–1894). He had the opinion of a pan-Slavist. The despot, with innate disposition and fondness, hesitated at first, however, with regard to how he was to treat Loris-Melikov, but then he turned categorically in the opposite direction. On May 9, 1881 he issued a manifest, arranged by his former teacher, Constantine Pobiedonossev, proclaiming the maintenance of absolute power, which Katkov called a rescue for Russia and “manna from heaven.” The interior minister, Ignatiev, tried to get the Tsar’s approval for the renewal of the “Zemsky Sobor,” with a consultative voice only, but that project (developed by historian Paul Gollochvastov) was never even a subject of deliberation. Pobedonoscev became the advisor of Alexander III for his entire reign—and Russia never had a more passionate enemy of freedom of thought or a stronger persecutor of all that was non-Orthodox and not Russian under Russian rule (especially everything that was Polish!). Appointed by the “Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod” and equipped with a wide purview, having access to the Tsar at every moment and firmly influencing his mind, he joined Karamzin, Arakczeev and Leontiev in one person.

There was a real “official’s orgy” in the name of reaction and Russification. According to the law of 1883, all of the universities were subjected to police control and the “door of the intervention of administration in all areas of university life” was opened. Similarly, the lands were limited. By the new law of 1890 “the gubernational offices for land affairs” and an institution standing above the autonomous land were created, and it was some kind of controlling authority; at the same time, land officials were incorporated into the hierarchy of the state administration. All persons “not entitled to perform state service” were removed from the executive departments of the land. As a result of the fatal way of solving the agrarian question, hunger became more acute than ever before (at its heaviest in 1891). When departments of the land developed a vigorous rescue operation, the issue of food was removed from their field of competence. In that way, self-government was made to disappear in every way, its activity being limited more and more, breaking the link between the land and the population. It became the main focus of the non-nihilistic opposition and thus the constitutional tendency was re-established. When, in 1894, they were consulted on the reform of agrarian legislation, they replied that the country needed a general reform, not a partial correction of the outdated system.

The reign of Alexander III was rightly characterized as “absolutism in all spheres of life, mitigated by the freedom of official patriotism, that is, the freedom to praise the government and help it with the word and the pen in repressing liberalism within and the foreign elements in the Borderlands.” Nihilism was born against such a background; although it was disorganized in those years and less ready for “action,” it was constantly gaining supporters, even among officers. There were two terrors in the territories of the “imperium”: reds and “whites”—the governmental and the latter one, which was against some Russians, was against all “non-citizens” without exception. Official patriotism, which was some kind of oppression of other nationalities, was called “cannibalistic,” and it was rightly stated that “cannibalism is seeking within Russia to consume multimillion, cultural nations.” Polishness was persecuted, ways of teasing out an influx of Livonian Germans were devised, and the Finnish constitution was rejected more systematically. The oppression of Poles was explained to foreign countries and even to Poland as a kind of “punishment” for the uprising. But has there ever been even an attempt at an uprising in Livonia or Finland? Obstinacy of that “cannibal zoological patriotism” was so far-fetched that even the inexhaustible source of the best bureaucratic aristocracy and the most obedient tools of tsarism in Livonia were discouraged.

The only “plus” of this truly unthinking reign was to give the old believers more tolerance, namely, permission for officiations. It was expected to win the “most conservative elements in the state” for the government—but the future proved that it was impossible to orient oneself in the government among the various types of conservatism.

The consequence of this reactivity was the return of external politics to the interrupted “union of three emperors,” which was resumed on the Russian initiative, moving the tradition of the “Holy Alliance,” which was accepted for a police system of government. Gorchakov’s successor, Giers, organized a meeting of the Russian, Austrian and German emperors on April 9, 1882 in Skierniewice. It was supposed in St. Petersburg that it was sure that no one would be against Russia in reference to the Polish question, and also that it would gain carte blanche for a “peaceful” conquest of the Balkans and to work around the conclusions of the Berlin congress.

That plan was carried out with excessive, awkward zeal. Bulgaria was asked to accept and to make a third of the officers in its army Russians and to make a Russian the minister of war in the duchy. But an anti-Russian party was formed in Bulgaria, which very dynamically influenced opinions in the country, and directly quoted the fate of Poland under the rule of Russia. The Russians intrigued more and more directly against the Bulgarian prince, Alexander Battenberg; it was even difficult for him to expand the borders of the new state (limiting the “Rumelia investiture” under the influence of Russia for five years, 1885). In the end, General Kaulbars, who in Sofia took on the roles of Igelstroem and Repninfrom Warsaw, succeeded in organizing a plot and deposing Battenberg. His successor was to be a Russian prince (not from the dominant dynasty), but these intentions were interrupted by the entry of the powers. The new ruler of Bulgaria was Ferdinand Koburski, against whom Russia kept intriguing for 10 years. He was acknowledged in 1896, when he ordered his son to be affiliated to the Orthodox Church, having made this “passage” with great pomp—but the prince only regarded it as something inevitable and temporarily given to Moscow.

Similarly, Russia was intriguing in Serbia against Milan Obrenović, who was associated with the Viennese court. The matter took on a sharp shape, because the pan-Slavs, under the leadership of the potential “Slav Charity Society” of St. Petersburg, publicized everything, not hiding that they wished to push the government into a situation where there would be no other way out but war with Austria and even with the German Empire.

In 1887 a regulation was issued that was aimed against German landowners in Polish provinces. In revenge, the Germans issued rules crippling Russian trade—and Bismarck publicly announced the text of an alliance with Austria that would be formed in case of Russian attacks. That was how the last resumption of the “tri-empire” alliance ended. Europe was entering a new era of political history.

The French diplomats wished to lead the war out of the diplomatic misunderstandings in the east. The aim was to join it and regain Alsace and Lorraine. An alliance against the Germans was offered to Russia. At the beginning of 1888 there were war armaments on both sides, and soon there was a war that had been prepared in the small details, and people were waiting to formally declare it from St. Petersburg. This would undoubtedly be a general European war, in which at first Russia would be allied with France, and Austria with Germany and the whole of the Balkans. At the last moment the Tsar turned back, unable to decide to fight next to Republican France.

The operations of the pan-Slavs did not stop. In March 1889 Obrenović was forced to abdicate, and after 1894 a Russophilian party was in power in Bulgaria. The situation was becoming more serious, because it could break the Tsar’s personal dislike of France because of its revolutionary nature. In 1891, the French fleet held a demonstration visit in Kronstadt, and an astonished Europe saw that during the ceremony at the port the Tsar was listening to the Marseillaise. It was the strangest thing in history!

This was how Europe entered into a new era of political history: the new German emperor, William II (since 1888), removed Bismarck, and allied with Austria against Russia, but also had a German-Russian contra-coalition (Ruckversicherungsvertrag)! This second secret contract was valid between 1887 and 1890, providing mutual neutrality in the event that one party was attacked “without its own fault”; it thus excluded the possibility that Austria would declare war on Russia. The contra-coalition was not resumed by Bismarck’s successor, Capriva, and after 1890, Austria had the freedom of initiative in questions of war and peace.

But the Bulgarian revolutions were the culminating point of the solstice. In 1894 even the customs war was finished and a new German-Russian trade treaty was concluded. There was thus a break in the rivalry over the Balkans until 1903.

Meanwhile, continual progress had been made in Asia, as if by the force of inertia. In 1881 the Turkmen were conquered, and in 1884 Merv was assimilated. In 1886, after long negotiations with England, the Afghan Pendżeh was set and next year so was one of the districts on Amu Darya. In the summer of 1891, a Russian exploration expedition appeared on the Pamirs plateau. All efforts were made to gradually weaken the Afghan emir and a diplomatic conquest of Persia—anticipating the British diplomats at every step—was made. There were two triumphs: good trade agreements with Korea and Japan. Central Asia was undoubtedly already subject to Russia but it was not enough for the Russian expansion.

Russia became an Asian power to such an extent that doubts arose in St. Petersburg itself about whether, with such an expansion in Asia, the interests of the state could be ensured, i.e. whether it could also expand in Europe; in the Russian press, reflections began to appear on which expansion should have priority, and whether Russia should be considered as a more European or more Asian state. Pan-Asianism had already appeared against pan-Slavism.

When Alexander III died, his son Nicholas II (Tsar since 1894)—after Nicolas de Giers’death in 1895—entrusted external affairs to Lobanov-Rostovsky. He did not wish to have any complications in the Balkans, because he wanted to control the affairs of the Far East. The center of gravity of the foreign ministry moved from the Black Sea to the Pacific. In 1895, a Sino-Japanese war started, in which China suffered defeat, and the Treaty of Shimonoseki imposed really hard conditions on China. Both European camps made an alliance to prevent the emergence of a new “superpower,” which had puzzling aims and was questionable for the European supremacy. Russia, France and Germany joined in defending China, and forced Japan to abandon its overly rigid peace conditions. The Japanese hegemony over the Pacific Ocean was effectively reversed, and Russia received the right to extend the Siberian railway through Chinese Manchuria from a grateful China (1896). This railway would be the final confirmation of Russian rule over North and Central Asia. Russia’s political advantage over China was already considered to have been obtained.

German attention accompanied the progress of Russia up to the “Far East.” The Chinese port of Jiaozhou was surreptitiously established by Germany. The successor of Lobanov, Muraviev, concluded a contract for a lease concerning the ports of Talienwan and Port Arthur for 25 years, transforming the latter one into a strong fort. Soon, a contract with Japan was made, according to which both sides would not interfere with the internal affairs of Korea.

All the opportunities for misunderstandings about Balkan affairs were avoided. When Greece occupied Crete and a Greco-Turkish war began, the Tsar tried hard to localize it. In order to maintain peace in Europe, Nicholas II did not hesitate to distribute a memorandum about universal disarmament to the European governments and to convene a peace conference in The Hague in 1898. Just in case, a year earlier it was made public that Russia indeed remained in an alliance with France, and although the visit of the Republican President Faure was accepted in St. Petersburg, it was pointed out that Russia was not going to use this alliance against anyone, but rather that it withdrew it from the European conflict.

Pan-Slavism seemed to have been suppressed by pan-Asianism, but nihilism remained, and finally it transformed itself into a special kind of Russian socialism wishing to endure on the “mir.” Some elements of the Russian Revolution that did not allow it to “back out from Europe” also remained.

BUREAUCRACY

F. Koneczny, “Biurokracja,” in F. Koneczny, Państwo i prawo w cywilizacji łacińskiej (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997), pp. 82–95.

It is necessary to take a closer look at the state system that has led all European countries to absurdity and that is going to lead them to bankruptcy. The problem of bureaucracy is particularly painful. All for nothing: all the effort, sacrifice, work, money saved, all the virtues of a man and a citizen; all for nothing, literally for nothing, if we do not get rid of this nightmare.

With historical education no one would be a supporter of statism, centralism, bureaucracy, because it would remind them of the Byzantines. How bureaucratism affected the state! The history of Moscow will tell you that at the end of the fifteenth century it was necessary to stop the expansion of the state, because of the lack of officials. How much wisdom is contained within the “reforms” of Peter the Great! On the other hand, the twentieth century shows that parliamentarianism has to fall, as statehood consists of bureaucracy, etc.

Bureaucracy is a system of office papers wherein a man is nothing. It does not see a man, and when it accidentally sees him, it considers him worthless, because for bureaucracy only papers between offices exist. The movement of these papers is called administration, and a man is not important at all! The most important thing is to be “all right” with papers and to completely ignore the person they formally deal with. In the city or district, chaos and a mixture of all evil may prevail; whatever! It is all right if the administration adheres to the formal rules. Through order in the administration, the order in the papers is understood, even if the whole country is plagued in terrible disorder.

Office control is the control of the papers. The reform (“reorganization”) of the administration is understood to be a variation in paperwork rather than a change in the method of administering the country. Bureaucracy is seen in the papal administration. There are four cradles of bureaucracy: the Egyptian, Byzantine, and Chinese civilizations (with branches to Kipchak and Moscow) and the French Revolution. Revolutionary bureaucratism went completely into socialist statism. The present bureaucracy of European continental countries is a mix of revolutionary bureaucracy and Byzantine bureaucracy (from German-Byzantine culture).

There have been bureaucracies in various centuries, states, and parts of the world before. But three inherent characteristics were repeated and are still being repeated always and everywhere, namely: working while sitting, writing, and regulations. If, for example, an official supervises some district, he sits at a designated place and waits until this district comes to him. A pen-pusher is a huge measure of accuracy in office. What about the administrative regulations? How many times have we met an official explaining that he is not deprived of reason, or a man of bad will, but it is difficult, because it is protocol…

Bureaucracy leads society to revolution. The more significant the bureaucracy’s position, the more vulnerable the ground is to the revolving currents. We could say that revolution is an emanation of bureaucracy. As history teaches us, the victorious revolution is even more bureaucratic. All bureaucracy carries the revolution in petto; every revolution strengthens bureaucracy. This relationship is often unconscious, but it is inevitable. That has always been the case throughout universal history.

The beginning of this relationship is that bureaucracy, imposing itself on the society in every case without exception, spoils and weakens the social power; it is a disturbance at every step of the society’s development. French society, the most powerful on the European continent, the most economical, the smartest, would have created a triply-strong state without centralism and bureaucracy.

The whole of Europe is submerged in the chaos of bureaucracy. In the meanwhile, this “universal” crisis, which crushes Europe, is primarily a state crisis, a crisis of states based on the wrong statehood. Bureaucracy is so pointless a creation that even the advantages become a social disaster in this system.

It is mistake to consider that bureaucrats were characterized by laziness, a lack of sense of duty, etc. Nothing could be more wrong! One does not know bureaucracy if he thinks in this way about it. Negligent people are everywhere, including in offices, but this has nothing to do with bureaucracy. It is full of zeal and so diligent that it always dreams of expanding its area of activity, wishing to work always and everywhere. Because it is a papermaking administration, the amount of work is measured by paper. We Poles know a state where the consumption of meat, sugar and soap has been constantly decreasing and the consumption of paper has increased—which is thanks to offices.

The diligence of bureaucracy is unfortunately pointless. “It is a waste of time.”

Bureaucracy knows how to excuse its greatest nonsense by referring to causality. Officials will explain immediatelywhy they must do something against common sense; even in such cases, they will usually enumerate several reasons.

The diligence of bureaucracy is extremely dangerous for the citizen, because he is threatened with the danger that whenever an official draws up a new “case,” the citizen will “be called” to a designated place. What for? He will know when he comes.

There is a sin against the seventh commandment, which Poles usually do not realize, although it is such a grave commandment. The worst of all thefts is the theft of time because it demoralizes the one who has been robbed. It is a specialty of bureaucracy towards the citizen, and it is worst where bureaucracy grows the most, for example in Poland. The more offices there are, the more time is wasted; the more officials are in an office, the more sophisticated forms the robbery of time takes. It is not the fault of an official but of the bureaucratic system; an official does what he has to do and in the way he has to do it.

Time management (i.e. intentional disposal) is a factor in civilization that is more important than the control of nature and space. What is the finishing line in space in time is the deadline. Setting a time limit for your activities restricts your freedom, and therefore you control yourself; you can form your will and create your spiritual power. This is a way to become the master of one’s life. Together with time control, ethics is developed. In the name of saving time, the urgency, providence, saving, thinking about the future, and finally a sense of duty for the next generation appear. Progress depends on those who look beyond their own death, beyond their grave, who look forward to the future of their children and grandchildren.

The future of society, of the nation and of the state depends in large part (and perhaps even in most part) on the way time can be used. Time wasting is a crime crying to heaven; it is robbing both oneself and everyone else. What should we think about a state that wastes its time? If we count the amount of time that we are going to waste by walking to dozens of unnecessary offices with superfluous things, the time we spend toddling there, waiting, and coming back a few times, then we could see that there are many years being stolen from our creative work. Here is an example of how a state can be robbed by its own statehood.

If we talk about accusations of bureaucracy, it is also fair to hear the other party as to what they have to blame the state for. They say: we were lured into it when we were young, inexperienced, and although we were promised that at one stroke we will get rid of the struggle for material being, we—us and our families—are stuck lifelong for real hunger. Is it fair to condemn us to a life of poverty, of feeling more distressed, when we have to look out on the outside? Pay us appropriately, and only then consider our drawbacks.

There is no minister in Europe who does not admit to officials that with this reasoning they are completely right. There is no minister who would not want to raise pay in accordance with the requirements of righteousness, but, unfortunately, there is no minister who would have the funds to do so.

Here is a situation that is absolutely impossible to solve: that there is no help. The salary of an official should be high enough so that he can not only live comfortably with his family, but also save some money for a rainy day and for the future, to equip his children. The simplest rightness and decency require it.

In order to meet this requirement of justice, taxes would have to be at least doubled and spent exclusively on officials’ salaries.

If you want to pay officials well, you cannot have many of them. This is the only advice we all have known for a long time and everyone agrees with it. No one wants to come up with a certain conclusion, which is unavoidable: if the officials are few, bureaucracy must end up the same way, whereby the clerical state is a kind of state bond, because it will be the end of this social layer at the same time. In short: either clerical misery will get worse, or the end of bureaucracy will come. There is no third option.

In all languages we have long and wide tirades and even curses against bureaucracy. All complaints come from the assumption that a certain bureaucracy, a certain country, and a certain time are guilty; each complaint ends with a call for a reform of bureaucracy. In France, citizens complain that “officials often become almost rulers in a given area of life”—but no one has yet thought that one could go without centralism.

It seems to me that, for the first time in this article, there is a voice that the guilt of bureaucracy does not rely on defects in a certain time or country, but relies on its existence, always and everywhere. All bureaucracy, even “the best,” must be harmful. Bureaucracy cannot be useful for the society and, therefore, in the Latin civilization it is harmful to the state. There is no other way. Good bureaucracy—it is absurd.

Let us take a look at our own examples, to the methods of government given by Pilsudski and his followers. Theywere wrong and insane, but not every mistake resulted from bad will. Perhaps even the most dangerous ones are those that come from good will, but lack the knowledge of the subject. We are all aware of how the colonial governments relegated the Sandomierz province, our good oligopolistic voivodeship, to being industrial and spent millions on this concept. In Lodz, officers were delegated to supra-directors, to factories; a number of government factories, led by people inuniforms, were also built in the country. Did anyone think that industry is worthless if trade is not properly organized? Somewhere in the eastern part of the country, the industry of Zduny was flourishing, and it was being plundered by the Jews. When the local governor saw this, he ordered them to break off relations with the Jews, made the necessary advances for the poor, set up shops, paid for material and for better tools, etc. In other words, he did his truly civic duty. The shop was filled and overflowing, but the straits came with severe poverty, because nothing was going out of the warehouse because no Jew was there, and there were no other merchants in the county. When the advance fund had run out, they had to apologize to their former masters and accepted the new price list, which was lower than the previous one. This example did not teach anyone the connection between industry and trade.

Can you teach bureaucracy at all?

What is worse, no bureaucracy can ever be improved or cured. Each constitutes an incurable disease, even if the bureaucrats themselves have a good will. The reform of bureaucracy—it is absurd. Historical experience teaches us about it. How many times have these “reforms” been organized in all parts of the world? None of them have succeeded; every reform was blocked at some stage.

Austria has repeatedly tried to introduce greater and smaller reforms. It was a waste of time! Up to the end, the situation was as it was described by the Vienna newspaper Polnische Stimmen on February 1, 1981.

“Regulations” replace the clerk’s thinking, initiative, energy, personal interest. Everything has already been thought up, foreseen, done. Do you feel hurt? Would you like your case to be dealt with individually? A vain effort. Everything has long ago been handled, dated and numbered, and the clerk should only calligraphically rewrite the relevant regulation and give you the relevant act. In the fourth year of the war, however, there seemed to be a fresh wind. In the moldy yellowed acts, the bureaucratic Amtsschimmel was replaced by the modern, democratic thoughts of the last “regulation” of President Dr Seidler. Whoever obeys such a measure of duty, according to the formal separation of work and responsibility on him, and does not care about the significant further development of the matter doesnot do anything. The clerk really did something, as long as he pushed the case forward. This is how a clerk who only follows the bureaucratic procedure is different from a clerk who is trying to do something for the case. After describing a bureaucrat who is diligent in keeping up his office hours, who is eternally busy and “always on time” but in fact is a useless person, Seidler tried to describe the character of an official-citizen, who always has the important purpose of the entire administrative machinery in front of his eyes, and serves purposefully and actively.

“The most important thing is not to sign the act, but to do the job quickly, properly, and for the general order.” Here is the ipsima verba by Dr Seidler, golden thoughts taken from his last circular sent to all ministries for the benefit of and use by the heads of all ministerial departments.

It did not work out. At the end of the first universal war, Austrian bureaucracy “grew” even more strongly!

The best clerks will not be able to create a good bureaucracy, because it is fundamentally and incurably evil. The bureaucratic system unnecessarily wastes thousands of decent people (here is its entire achievement) and millions are stumbling because of it. I do not mean that the kind of people who work in it are evil, but the system itself.

There is only one remedy for bureaucracy: remove it, try to stop it.

Not every office needs to be bureaucratic, but all over the European continent, offices have degenerated into bureaucracy. Many clerks defend themselves from bureaucracy as much as they can, because they see that it is something bad, but “what cannot be cured must be endured.” So with time they become indifferent.

Bureaucracy is a mechanism, and therefore it is deadly for the culture of deeds. Where is the place for reason if everything is supposed to be the same?

The choice requires reflection only in the midst of diversity. Only then is responsibility connected with choice. Bureaucracy kills any creative ability, being an enemy of personalism. It is not easy to work on the grounds of collectiveness.

Centralism governs everywhere equally, without taking into account any variation in the social structure. This is contrary to reason, but it is considered to be something quite natural. In society there is a triple doctrine: equality, uniformity, justice. Uniformity in the name of equality, and equality in the name of justice! There is a uniform administration for an “average” province, which does not exist.

One of the principles of the bureaucratic system is that the clerk must not be spiritually connected to anything. The central government needs monotony and uniformity to be able to shift clerks from one end of the state to the other. So the “administrator” migrating with his paragraphs does not really know any country, so he cannot be useful anywhere.

Citizenship, on the other hand, wants the clerksto be integrated with their province.

Bureaucracy lives and feeds on fictions. It exists in its official residence like a capercaillie on the branch, and “like a capercaillie during his tooting, it sees nothing, feels nothing and does nothing”; it loses the directness of perceiving reality. The clerkcomes from the law department, from this truly fictitious department; he did not attend university, he passed his exams from scripts, and then he had to confine himself to the merciless illusion of the official’s life. He decides things he has never observed in his life; knowing something, he decides about everything. He is closed in his office and he has to govern.

In the bureaucratic system, the boss does not know what is going on in his subordinate offices. The boss does not select his co-workers; the personnel are picked up from all corners of the country, and they are constantly on the move. The boss knows the state of affairs from his reports, which are arranged to make him happy. Out of ten reports, eight are fictitious (because no one knows anything about them). The greatest fiction lies with the Minister of the Interior, who is informed by reports drawn upfrom reports.

Let me ask the question, would it have changed anything in Poland if the voivods and starosts had gone on strike? Or maybe we would not even have noticed it?!

I am going to discuss another weakness of the bureaucratic state, which I have called legislative elephantiasis. If there was a government that wanted to collect all the law gazettes, collections of new ordinances, regulations, instructions, etc. concerning the whole country and every department in one place, he would have to build a whole street of buildings to have room for this bureaucratic manna. Nobody knows it, especially ministerial superiors; they do not have time to study the laws that were binding until yesterday, because they are busy preparing the laws for tomorrow. The nosy state, enormously busy with everything that does not belong to it, “is expanding” through new and more recent legislation.

To be honest, the general public likes the “interference” of the state, and so elephantiasis does not disturb it. A journalist is so proud when he can report how hard people work in the legislative sphere. The deputy has many projects on statutes, the chief official is composing the regulations, and both are convinced that they are increasing the state’s good. They hasten each other to “heal, establish, and regulate” relationships through the miraculous ointment of laws because they all have the deepest conviction of the miraculous power of written law. We can still remember from school what the difference was between Sparta and Athens: they had different legislations. The confusion of cause and effect during school years usually lasts for one’s whole life.

People dream of good legislation to help them develop good relationships. Thicker and thinner laws appear, and the smaller the range, the more paragraphs there are. How often relations are subordinated to laws that are so fabricated! One thinks in an a priori way and therefore he is working unnecessarily and wants to predict everything that can happen in the world, putting it into written law in advance. Such lawmakers or administrators often create things that do not exist. Never mind! After all, there are new laws that can be immediately announced for the next quarter, aren’t there?

Wanting to foresee everything, the legislator (small or large) goes into details, tries to combine, complicate, mix, and often he makes mistakes. The ones who were ordered to do something are chapfallen, but they have to do the job, even if they spoil what was supposed to be improved. And the law is getting longer and more complex; it is a paradise for all kinds of blumism.

Since it is believed that the law works miracles and contains everything, what do people need beyond law? All you have to do is to read the ministerial regulations and you already know everything. Keep the law, and the rest will be good to you! Deliberate on what is fair and what is not, have everything in black and white, it is ready! Elephantiasis is beneficial for all those who like to “cheat conscientiously” and to investigate the law. The more laws and regulations there are, the easier it is to find loopholes. The more laws there are, the less rightness there is. We put more and more laws into the place of ethics and in consequence we need more laws to know what to do. But ethics cannot be dependent on law, and the consequences of the division of these categories are frightening and inevitable.

Bureaucracy accelerates these effects, forcing citizens to be indifferent not only to morality but even to reason in order to maintain the fiction that the law has created. In the face of bureaucracy, everyone can evade the law, just to show the bureaucrat the paragraph on which the slipperiness was based. The most important thing is to be “all right” with papers! Vivat blumism!

If I had to sum up diligent but pointless bureaucratic work in a sentence, I would use a termite analogy. Appearances are preserved everywhere, no blemish is seen from the outside, but you must not touch anything, because everything is going down, because it is decayed. Bureaucracy is hollowing out, devastating. Woe to the state in which bureaucracy is a foundation!

It must be noted that in a state organized according to the requirements of the Latin civilization, the state offices would be few and the matters falling under their jurisdiction would also be few.

However, the bureaucratic state cannot be transformed into a citizenly one at once. We must take into account the necessity that bureaucracy will take some time, and therefore the more you have to think in advance about how to tame it.

Let us now consider the most radical question of how bureaucracy can be destroyed. Let us remember that all our intelligentsia, with some exceptions, are sitting in offices. You also need to remember the Decalogue and not to kill, not to starve. Commandments of morality are binding on everyone and always, in all circumstances. The civic state also cannot sin against the seventh commandment. Any state contract with officials must be adhered to; it is a dogma that cannot be broken by anyone.

However, it is necessary to immediately discharge false clerks, i.e. all the military followers of Pilsudski, who were sent to the civilian administration in such an unfortunate way. They burst into the offices by iure caduco, without qualifications, and were pests in every respect. Sending them back immediately to the army where their claims (retirement) are justified must of course be taken into account. Thus, the promotions which were taken from real officials will be placed back in their hands.

The basic appointment will be that, from a certain date (as soon as possible), one cannot employ anyone, even for free practice. There are no vacancies. All offices in the administration are closed. Under no circumstances can you make exceptions.

I sustain my old claim that a fifth of the current administrative officials are enough (at most) to administer the whole of Poland perfectly. In a civil society administration, the vast majority of cases will gradually move to self-government; all offices will become unnecessary. So even if the number of bureaucrats is not sufficient, they would come from these offices (larger ones) where there were too many officials.

I also propose three norms:

Every official of the former state administration is allowed to retire at any time without giving motives.

Officials for whom there is no work will be forced to retire. Because they will not hire anyone in their place, the public treasury will not be wasted.

Everyone retiring has the right to capitalize his salary. Upon request, the national bank will pay him a pension for ten years in advance. Thus, all claims of this official are stopped. This method will enable young retirees to move to trade or industry.

In all probability, a large part of officials will benefit from this decision. The state treasury, even if it was even overwhelmed in the first year for that reason, will gain from it, however. This will be an investment outlay. Even next year, we will feel relief! After ten years there will be no trace of these expenses. Let us keep in mind that even with this capitalization, we will not spend as much money as we used to before on the salaries of the enormous collection of officials. As a last resort, “indemnification letters” can be used for the compensation of officials.

So all the old bureaucratic administration will be doomed to extinction or retirement, but no harm will be done to anyone. Transitioning to self-government services may happen, but this will be an exception, because a bureaucrat will not be good for this kind of office. There will be few offices in local government.

Let us move on to a more joyful topic. We can finally ask the question: what would we be without bureaucracy?

The state would no longer be threatened by bankruptcy. Maintaining bureaucracy has crossed the threshold of the financial strength of all European countries. Although officials’ salaries are reduced, there are more and more officials. From the inevitable bankruptcy of the state, the ghost of anarchy that has appeared in several generations arises. Afterward, the so-called “middle class” will remain only a memory. At the same time, the bankruptcy of several European states is more or less the bankruptcy of officials, officers, teachers of all kinds and grades, judges, police, industrial and commercial suppliers, or it is the collapse of many small “capitalists” and a large majority of stock companies. It will not be prevented by the radical cutting of all budgets in general and the reduction of taxes.

Without bureaucracy we would live in an atmosphere of mutual kindness of the state and society. The reasons for conflicts would disappear if the state offices limited themselves to state affairs and stopped interfering in social affairs.

The disease of the Polish organism, coming from the fact that almost all our intelligentsia are sitting in public offices, would disappear. People are the slaves of this thing which was the “first” one; they are materially dependent on the state’s power. How does this intelligentsiacreate “public opinion,” since it cannot express its thoughts? It would be different if they passed to trade and industry. If the youth could not count on official posts, the social structure in Poland would be changed for the benefit of the Polish nation.

We would not be the poorest people in Europe. But we do not even realize that we are so poor! We have lost all measure of material existence and we do not even know what wealth looks like. Our poverty is a heavy burden for all categories of our being, from politics to literature.

The Jewish question would be settled quite naturally if our people were serious about trade. Removing bureaucracy would be bad for Jews for many reasons.

There is the question of whether we are capable of living in a civic statehood.

The school of public administration existed for Polish people only in the Austrian partition. There was not only not a single German official in the whole country, but—what is more—we had considerable self-government. We had a lot of power over ourselves, we exploited every open field; the Polish representatives in the central government distorted even some of the general Austrian framework, adjusting it to the Polish needs. In Galicia there were Polish governments. Because Austria was a bureaucratic state, Galicia could not have another system, but with all confidence, of all the “crown states,” Galicia was the least bureaucratic.

Nevertheless, there was a lot of bureaucracy and we often complained about it. The author of this work has allowed himself a thesis, according to which the purpose of officials is to hinder and keep down social developments. Who would think that only in independent Poland would we know what “real” bureaucracy could be! The previous “Galician” bureaucracy was strangely gentle and tame. Even the number of officials was insignificant compared to the next generation. But I considered it unmeasured and claimed that it would be enough if bureaucracy was not there.

When we regained independence on October 21, 1918, I was convinced that the number of Galician officials would be enough for all of Poland. I repeat it today with more emphasis, having reaffirmed this belief for over twenty years.

We have outstanding abilities for civic institutions. The Cracovian “Duke-Bishop Committee,” which was the exemplary ministry of labor, health and social welfare, is a great proof from the first universal war. At the same time, the “Citizens’ Guard” developed from the militia to the best police, into some administrative power of the first instance, and it was unmatched in its simplicity, speed and cheapness of office practice. It “was at the same time a control over the preserving of the rules and it was working perfectly.” In that “Guard” there was the germ of the entire civic administration system and it would have emerged—but then the Guard was hastily removed. Similarly, the Cracovian “Committee For Fighting Against Usury” of 1917 and 1918 and the Varsovian “Social Self-Help” committee of 1920 were unmatched.

But we can be proud of a certain work, completely finished up to its finer details, a truly great work, bringing us the greatest honor; this is the work of Franciszek Stefczyk. What punishment did the “collectivists” who destroyed much of the work deserve? The wonderful results achieved by this notable man indicate that, in Poland, there is no lack of all those abilities needed to change the statehood to civic statehood.

Such a change will be disturbed by any government whose purpose is … to stay in power. Because of this kind of rule, the administration has to serve as a political tool to support the central government and nothing else.

Instead of applying the administration to life, it was conceived as if life was subject to administration, with the help of which it would make society a tool of “cabinet” politics.

Political relations have changed but the view of the administration has remained unchanged until our days. Absolutism was rejected and constitutionalism was introduced, i.e. the system of public life consisting of the abilities of the citizen toward the State, but the administration has remained a political tool. Until our days, until the most recent times, administration is led out of the doctrine that is currently held by those who are in power and who want to defend this aprioristic doctrine. This view of administration is widespread everywhere. How glorified is the French bureaucracy, how admirable it is that it is like this; because regardless of the government’s changes, regardless of the direction of the state’s changes, the French state stands like a wall, and every government can use it. Yes, any government’s politics can rely on this administration because it is designed for the government as such, but is it for the benefit of France “as such”? This is a typical political administration.

And we must break with these views, we must reject the political administration and condemn it if we want to remain in the Latin civilization. We have to realize that administration should be apolitical.

Constitutionalism did not fill the old habits. It transferred unlimited power not only to parliament, but it also stayed in love with absolutism in monotony. While administration must be varied, suitable for the variety of life, all politicians demand that administration must be uniform everywhere.

The more important bureaucracy is, the more centralized the state will become. Centralism and bureaucracy are the same thing. You can also divide countries by their type of administration and express it with words “centralized” and “decentralized”—and that is exactly the same as the division between bureaucratic states and civic states.

The notion of decentralization should not be mixed with a lack of uniformity. Historical experience has shown that the greatest uniformity is found in those societies in which centralism has become impossible, because it is the object of hatred, and bureaucracy is the object of regret. Such societies turn out to be the bravest and the most solidary in times of danger. Uniformity not only does not require monotony, but they are quite different things, being opposite to each other. The more monotony there is, the more uniformity is exposed.

People do not realize that the antagonism of society and the state is being prepared in this way in all the provinces, because society is never satisfied with a monotonous state.

The Byzantine superstition of monotonousness also hung on Polish minds. I will cite an example of what degree of monotony destroys the brain. I had an opportunity to hear the talk of a deputy about administration in Poland. He was not a socialist at all; on the contrary, he belonged to the national democracy in Poland. He drew the audience’s attention to the diversity existing in various Polish provinces and the consequence of it, namely the extraordinary inequality of all administrative circumstances. He recognized that the liberal constitution and self-governing administration, which was perfect for Pomerania, was not appropriate for Volhynia as a backward country. What was his conclusion? Here you need to lower the level of government laws; provinces of higher status should sacrifice themselves in the name of the common good of the whole state; he proposed that “Pomerania should give something back to Volhynia.” There below the need, here a little over the need to be everywhere equally. However, one must be careful not to cross the border of the Volhynian possibilities, and thus legislation and administration must be carried out throughout Poland in the way that is possible in Volhynia. He explained that (“as is known”) there must be uniformity (“equality”); since Volhynia cannot adapt itself to Pomerania, because it is too poor and too dark, Pomerania must adapt itself to Volhynia. In other words, he decided to degrade Poland to the level of Volhynia.

But the unity of the state is the strongest in plurality, if every land has what it needs. The monotony of Moscow, and then Russia, never led Russia to unity; neither the Byzantine Empire nor the Turkish Sultanate ever did it either. In our days, Serbia and the Czechia insisted on monotonousness with increasingly worse views on unity. The same mistake took over Poland as a manifestation of aprioristic thinking.

Some would like to introduce monotony even in social matters. American technocracy “standardizes” what is possible, and a great amount of Europeans look at it with jealousy. If this line of thought, this course, is not stopped, some consequences that no one dreamed of are inevitable, namely stagnation in the further differentiation of society. The more monotony of production there is, the more the personality shrinks in manufacturers. In that case, we would have to hope that we could convert to two principles of the medieval economy: to have as many materially independent persons as possible, persons “standing on their own feet,” and that the weaker do not have to be cut out by the stronger. The development of prosperity and education (yes, education also) has been dependent not on increasing the salary of factory workers, but on increasing the number of economically independent people. This would at the same time be the most effective way to save the Latin civilization from the mess of common impoverishment.

Unfortunately, the deception of monotony is pressing everywhere, from trade unions to parliaments. Our legislators, who have been struggling for a long time to figure out some perfect constitution, once and for all, dream of a “simplification of social life.” They do not realize that constitutionalism is the citizens’ rights to the government and to their guarantees. They argue about the voting system, uni- or bicameral Seym, and in the meantime, it is all a trifle in the face of the question of whether the administration is responsible in cases of the violation of citizens’ rights. Old absolutism continues in many directions, because every office can carry out abuses if it is consistent with the wishes of the supreme office. There is no real constitutionalism until it has the responsibility of an official for damage done to a citizen either by ill will or by negligence or ineptitude. If this were so, how the atmosphere of public life would change!

In the Latin civilization devices, any part of public life should be covered by one’s public responsibility. There is no order and composition where one does not know who is responsible and what responsibility it is that it entails. Where the responsible one must be sought among whirlpools and mud, they can easily absorb the one who is seeking and protect those who are sought; where responsibility and all its circumstances are not visible to everyone and do not become valid on anybody’s call, there are shaky foundations of the society and the state.

The closer one is to the totality of the state, the less responsibility there is towards the citizen. The state (i.e. the appropriate official) briefly declares sic volo, sic jubeo, and the German peasant works under the supervision of the office, receives an order as to how much to sow and what to do and how to do it, and the crops belong to the state because they are sold only by the state and at the price that the state will designate. The office will also determine how many crops the peasant can take for his family. It has been rightly said that in a totalitarian state one has the features of a private man only during sleep, but he can be awoken by the office at any moment and get orders about what to do immediately. This characteristic of the administration of the total state is very accurate.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and articles by Feliks Koneczny (selection, in chronological order)

Koneczny, F. “Kazimierz Wielki protektorem kościoła ryskiego,”in Pamiętnik słuchaczy UJ na uroczystość otwarcia Collegium Novum, pp. 554–569. Kraków: Nakładem Młodzieży Akademickiej, 1887.

—. “Geneza pedagogii,” Muzeum 4 (1888), pp. 627–646, 704–729.

—. “Polityka Zakonu Niemieckiego w latach 1389–1390,” in Rozprawy i sprawozdania z posiedzeń Wydziału Historyczno-Filozoficznego Akademii Umiejętności, vol. 24, pp. 247–311. Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności, 1889.

Koneczny, F., Krotoski, K. “Z archiwum Karmelitanek Bosych wileńskich,” Przegląd Powszechny 26, no. 7 (1890), pp. 193–212, 329–346.

Koneczny, F. “Charakterystyka Erazma Rotterdamczyka,” Muzeum 6 (1890), pp. 575–582, 634–640, 673–679, 769–779.

—. “O współczesnej poezji czeskiej,” Świat 3 (1890), pp. 80–86, 222–230, 255–259, 392–399, 572–575.

—. “Walter von Plettenberg, ladmistrz inflancki wobec Zakonu, Litwy i Moskwy 1500–1525,”in Rozprawy i sprawozdania z posiedzeń Wydziału Historyczno-Filozoficznego Akademii Umiejętności, vol. 28, pp. 132–207. Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności, 1891.

—. “Szkoła Hozyusza w Prusiech,” Przegląd Powszechny 30, no. 8 (1891), pp. 1–13, 208–227.

—. “Sprawa Hozylska. Wzajemne stosunki Polski, Inflant i Zakonu Niemieckiego za Zygmunta Starego 1523–1540,” in Sprawozdania z posiedzeń Wydziału Historyczno-Filozoficznego Akademii Umiejętności. Kraków:Akademia Umiejętności, 1892.

—. Jagiełło i Witoldpodczas unii krewskiej 1382–1392. Lwów: Wyd. nakładem autora, 1893.

—. “Słowiańszczyzna pierwotna,” Ateneum 18, no. 72 (1893), pp. 353–360.

—. “Z młodości Zygmunta III Wazy,” in Sprawozdania z posiedzeń Wydziału Historyczno-Filozoficznego Akademii Umiejętności. Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności, 1893.

—. “Dziady po czesku,” Przegląd Polski 31, no. 122 (1896), pp. 99–118. 

—. Głos w sprawie ludowej. Kraków: Księgarnia G. Gebethnera i Sp., 1896.

—. “Nowiny o Piastach,” Ateneum 21, no. 83 (1896), pp. 530–542.

—. Dzieje Śląska,1st ed.: Bytom: 1897; 3rd ed.: Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1999.

—. “Liturgia króla Jana III Wazy,” in Sprawozdania z posiedzeń Wydziału Historyczno-Filozoficznego Akademii Umiejętności. Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności, 1898. 

—. “Teatr Krakowski,” Przegląd Polski 127, no. 379 (1898) pp. 204, reprint in: F. Koneczny, Teatr krakowski. Sprawozdania 1896–1905, ed. K. Gajda. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej, 1994.

—. Życie i zasługi Adama Mickiewicza, eds. S. Szczepanowski, A. Potocki, Kraków, W Drukarni Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 1898.

—. Jan III Waza i misja Possewina. Kraków: Księgarnia G. Gebethnera i Spółki, 1901.

—. “Oświata a dobrobyt w Galicji,” Biblioteka Warszawska 62, no. 247 (1902), pp. 532–560.

—. Dzieje Polski, 1st ed.: Łódź 1902, 2nd ed.: Bytom 1908, 3rd ed.: Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997.

—. Dzieje Polski za Piastów,1st ed.: Kraków: Krakowskie Towarzystwo Oświaty Ludowej, 1902; 2nd ed.: Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997.

—. Dzieje Polski za Jagiellonów, 1st ed.: Kraków: Krakowskie Towarzystwo Oświaty Ludowej, 1903; 2nd ed.: Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997

—. “Konserwatyzm chłopski,” 1st ed.: Biblioteka Warszawska 63, no. 251 (1903), pp. 364–383, 567–587; 2nd ed. in Znak 37, no. 1–2 (1985), pp. 4–46, 79–151.

—. W sprawie górnośląskiej. Kraków: Drukarnia “Czas”, 1903.

—. Dzieje Polski opowiedziane dla młodzieży, 1st ed.: Kraków 1905; 2nd ed.: Poznań 1922; 3rd ed.: Warszawa 1983; 4th ed.: Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1999.

—. Geografia historyczna. Lwów: Macierz Polska, 1905.

—. “Karol Estreicher” [obituary], Kwartalnik Historyczny 22 (1908), p. 799.

—. “Teoria Grunwaldu,” Przegląd Powszechny 27, no. 107 (1910), pp. 1–23.

—. “O pajdokracji,” Biblioteczka Słowa 3 (1912), pp. 71.

—. Dzieje Rosji do roku 1449.Warszawa: Spółka Wydawnicza Warszawska, 1917.

—. “Historyczność polskich praw do księstwa Cieszyńskiego,” Przegląd Powszechny 34, no. 137 (1917), pp. 1–12.

—. Oświęcimskie niemieckie czy też Cieszyńskie polskie? Kraków:Komitet Pięciu Miast, 1917.

—. Tadeusz Kościuszko,1st ed.: Poznań 1917; 2nd ed.: Poznań 1922; reprint: Warszawa: Gutenberg-Print, 1996.

—. “Rzut oka na polskie dzieje gospodarcze,” in Polska w kulturze powszechnej, pp. 268–287. Kraków: Krakowska Ekspozytura Biura Patronatu dla Spółek Oszczęd. i Pożyczek, 1918.

—. “Warunki pracy kulturalnej w Polsce porozbiorowej,”in Polska w kulturze powszechnej, pp. 366–412. Kraków: Krakowska Ekspozytura Biura Patronatu dla Spółek Oszczęd. i Pożyczek, 1918.

—. “Wpływ literatury polskiej w Słowiańszczyźnie,” in Polska w kulturze powszechnej, vol. 2, pp. 70–94. Kraków: Krakowska Ekspozytura Biura Patronatu dla Spółek Oszczęd. i Pożyczek, 1918.

—. “Wpływy polskie w zachodniej Słowiańszczyźnie,” in Polska w kulturze powszechnej.Część I. Ogólna, ed. F. Koneczny, pp. 104–152. Kraków: Krakowska Ekspozytura Biura Patronatu dla Spółek Oszczęd. i Pożyczek, 1918.

—. Czeskie a polskie prawa historyczne do Cieszyńskiego. Warszawa: Druk. Art. K. Kopytowski i S-ka, 1919.

—. “Chyżość historyczna,” Przegląd Powszechny 37, no. 145–146 (1920), pp. 344–348.

—. O pierwotnej polskości Ziemi Chełmińskiej i Rusi Czerwonej. Warszawa: Druk. Art. K. Kopytowski i S-ka, 1920.

—. Skrót do nauki historii Polski. Wilno: J. Zawadzki, 1920.

—. Dzieje Rosji od najdawniejszych do najnowszych czasów, 1st ed.: Warszawa 1921, 2nd ed.: Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997.

—. Polskie Logos a Ethos. Roztrząsanie o znaczeniu i celu Polski, vols. 1–2, 1st ed.: Poznań 1921, 2nd ed.: Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997.

—. Skrót do dziejów włościaństwa w Polsce.Wilno: J. Zawadzki, 1921.

—. “Wtargnięcie Renesansu do Moskwy w XV stuleciu,” Przegląd Powszechny 39, no. 155–156 (1922), pp. 336–344.

—. “Rzekoma koalicja Litwy z Tatarami przeciw Moskwie w roku 1480,” Ateneum Wileńskie 1 (1923), pp. 140–204, 352–397.

—. Dzieje administracji w Polsce,1st ed.: Wilno 1924, 2nd ed.: Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1999.

—. Dzieje Litwy i Rusi przed unią z Polską: Teksty źródłowe do nauki historii w szkole średniej, no. 22. Kraków: Druk. W.L. Anczyca i S-ki, 1924.

—. “Sprawy religijne i cerkiewne w państwie Iwana III,” Przegląd Powszechny 41, no. 161 (1924), pp. 219–240.

—. “Warunki parlamentaryzmu,” Przegląd Powszechny 41, no. 164 (1924), pp. 13–30.

—. “Do metodologii nauki o cywilizacji. Referat na IV zjeździe historyków polskich w Poznaniu w dniach 6–8 XII 1925,” in Pamiętnik IV powszechnego zjazdu historyków polskich w Poznaniu,pp. 1–7. Lwów: Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne, 1925.

—. “Geneza roszczeń Iwana III do Rusi litewskie,” Ateneum Wileńskie 3 (1925–1926), pp. 194–264.

—. “Religie a cywilizacje,” Ateneum Kapłańskie 12, no. 17 (1926), pp. 1–14, 117–131.

—. “Bizantynizm niemiecki,” Przegląd Powszechny 44, no. 176 (1927), pp. 18–45.

—. “Czterdzieści tez zasadniczych,” Trybuna Narodu 2, no. 19 (1927), pp. 2–3.

—. “Jakiej ordynacji wyborczej do parlamentu potrzebuje Polska?,” Trybuna Narodu 2, no. 22 (1927), pp. 10–12.

—. “Prawa przyrody a ducha,” Przegląd Powszechny 44, no. 174 (1927), pp. 284–302; no. 175, pp. 73–94.

—. “Sprawy z Mengli-Girejem 1473–1504,” Ateneum Wileńskie 4 (1927), pp. 138–189, 287–348.

—. “Kościół w Polsce wobec cywilizacji,” Ateneum Kapłańskie 14, no. 22 (1928), pp. 413–429.

—. “Polska między Wschodem a Zachodem,” in VI Tydzień Społeczny Stowarzyszenia Młodzieży Akademickiej „Odrodzenie”,pp. 63–100. 1st ed.: Lublin 1928; 2nd ed.: Lublin 1996.

—. Dzieje Rosji. Litwa a Moskwa w latach 1449–1492,vol. 2, 1st ed.: Wilno 1929; 2nd ed.: Komorów: Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2003.

—. “Szczęście a państwo,” Tęcza 3, no. 17 (1929), pp. 1–2.

—. “Wiadomość z roku 1447 o stanie ludu wiejskiego w Polsce czy na Litwie?” Ateneum Wileńskie 6 (1929), pp. 8–15.

—. “Rozmnożenie bolszewizmu,” Myśl Narodowa 10, no. 32 (1930), pp. 496–498.

—. “Sprawa Księcia Geldrji 1389 roku,” Ateneum Wileńskie 7 (1930), pp. 21–58.

—. “Tło polityczne renesansu włoskiego,” Myśl Narodowa 10, no. 21 (1930), pp. 327–329.

—. “Uwaga o szkolnictwie państwowym,” Przegląd Powszechny 47, no. 186 (1930), pp. 3–22.

—. “Z rzekomych syntez religijnych,” Przegląd Powszechny 47, no. 185 (1930), pp. 3–18, 169–182.

—. “Etyki a cywilizacje,” Przegląd Powszechny 48, no. 189 (1931), pp. 129–148, 332–345.

—. “Chrześcijaństwo wobec ustrojów życia zbiorowego,” Ateneum Kapłańskie 18, no. 30 (1932), pp. 131–147, 255–276.

—. “‘Elephatiasis’ prawodawcza,” Myśl Narodowa 12, no. 55 (1932), pp. 798–801.

—. “Tło cywilizacyjne odsieczy wiedeńskiej,” Ateneum Kapłańskie 19 (1933), pp. 144–170.

—. “Zawisłość ekonomii od etyki,” in Życie gospodarcze a ekonomika społeczna. Lwów: Biblioteka Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego, 1933.

—. O wielości cywilizacji,1st ed.: Kraków: Gebethner i Wolff, 1935; 2nd ed.: Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM, 1996; 3rd ed.: Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997.

—. “Harmider etyk,” Myśl Narodowa 16, no. 24 (1936), pp. 369–371.

—. “Nauka a cywilizacje,” Myśl Narodowa 16, no. 49 (1936), pp. 765–767.

—. “Polemika z K. Chodynickim,” Kwartalnik Historyczny 50 (1936), pp. 175–178.

—. “Rodowód monizmu prawniczego,” Myśl Narodowa 16, no. 35 (1936), pp. 542–544.

—. “Warunki postępu moralności,” Przegląd Filozoficzny: Księga pamiątkowa trzeciego polskiego zjazdu filozoficznego 39, no. 4 (1936), pp. 501–503.

—. “Napór Orientu na Zachód,” in Kultura i cywilizacja, vol. 5, collective work, pp. 1–24. Lublin:Towarzystwo Wiedzy Chrześcijańskiej, 1937.

—. “Prawda a cywilizacje,” Myśl Narodowa 17, no. 4 (1937), pp. 49–50; no. 5 (1937), pp. 67–68.

—. “Różne typy cywilizacji,” in Kultura i cywilizacja, vol. 5, collective work, pp. 117–136. Lublin: Towarzystwo Wiedzy Chrześcijańskiej, 1937.

—. Święci w dziejach narodu polskiego, 1st ed.:Miejsce Piastowe 1937; 2nd ed.: Kraków 1985; 3rd ed.: Kraków 1988; 4th ed.: Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997.

—. Kościół jako polityczny wychowawca narodów, 1st ed.: Warszawa: Archidiecezjalny Instytut Akcji Katolickiej, 1938; 2nd ed.: Warszawa: Instytut Narodowy im. Romana Dmowskiego, 1985; 3rd ed. in Znak 41, no. 4 (1989), pp. 63–70.

—. Protestantyzm w życiu zbiorowym, 1st ed.: Warszawa: Archidiecezjalny Instytut Akcji Katolickiej, 1938; 2nd ed.: Gliwice 1995; 3rd ed.: Gliwice 1998.

—. Rozwój moralności, 1st ed.: Lublin: Towarzystwo Wiedzy Chrześcijańskiej, 1938; 2nd ed.: Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997.

—. “U źródeł kultury polskiej,” Tygodnik Warszawski 2, no. 51 (1946), p. 4.

—. “Polskie Logos a Ethos (o etykę w życiu publicznym),” Tygodnik Warszawski 3, no. 27 (1947), p. 4.

—. “Słowo o wolnej woli,” Niedziela 18, no. 25 (1948), p. 217.

—. “Między Śląskiem a Krakowem,” Niedziela 19, no. 1 (1949), pp. 68–69; no. 10 (1949), pp. 76.

—. Cywilizacja bizantyńska, 1st ed.:Londyn: Towarzystwo im. Romana Dmowskiego, 1973; 2nd ed.: Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1996.

—. Cywilizacja żydowska, 1st ed.: Londyn: Towarzystwo im. Romana Dmowskiego, 1974; 2nd ed.: Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1995.

—. O ład w historii. Z dodatkami o twórczości i wpływie Feliksa Konecznego,1st ed.: Londyn: Towarzystwo im. Romana Dmowskiego, 1977; 2nd ed.: Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1991.

—. Państwo i prawo w cywilizacji łacińskiej,1st ed.: Londyn 1981; 2nd ed.: Wrocław 1989; 3rd ed.: Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997.

—. Prawa dziejowe oraz dodatek Bizantynizm niemiecki, 1st ed.: Londyn: Towarzystwo im. Romana Dmowskiego, 1982; 2nd ed.: Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997.

—. Dzieje Rosji, vol. 3: Schyłek Iwana III 1492–1505. London: Towarzystwo im. Romana Dmowskiego, 1984.

—. Kościół a cywilizacje. Lublin: Onion, 1996.

—. O cywilizację łacińską,1st ed.: Lublin: Onion, 1996; 2nd ed.: Gliwice: Onion, 1999.

—. Państwo i prawo. Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM, 1997.

—. Napór Orientu na Zachód i inne pisma o życiu społecznym. Lublin: Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 1999.

—. O sprawach ekonomicznych,ed.J. Skoczyński, P. Karaś. Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM, 2000.

—. Obronić cywilizację łacińską. Lublin: Fundacja Rozwoju Kultury Polskiej, 2002.

—. Zwierzchnictwo moralności. Ekonomia i etyka. Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2006.

—. Słowiański świat. Zbiór artykułów z miesięcznika “Świat Słowiański”. Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2010.

—. O państwie obywatelskim, edited and selected by P. Wiśniewski, Z. Baranowski. Rzeszów– Lublin: Ius est ars. Instytut Mistrza Wincentego z Karwowa i Profesora Feliksa Konecznego, Fundacja Instytut Naukowy im. Prof. Józefa Litwina, 2017.

Selected translations of Feliks Koneczny’s works

Koneczny, F. On the plurality of Civilizations, trans. A. Hilckman. London: Polonica Publications 1962; reprinted: Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2011.

—. Synopsis of “The Jewish Civilization” by Feliks Koneczny,trans. M. Giertych.London: Committee for Publication of Koneczny’s Posthumous Work, 1975; 2nd ed.: Poznań: Wydawnictwo Wers, 1999.

—. The Jewish Civilization, trans. M. Giertych. Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2011.

—. The Laws of History, trans. M. Giertych. Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2013.

—. On Order in History, trans. M. Giertych.Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2013.

—. The Bizantine Civilization, trans. M. Giertych, vols.1–2. Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2014.

—. The Development of Morality, trans. M. Giertych.Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2016.

—. The Latin Civilization, trans. M. Giertych. Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2017.

Archive sources

Archive of Science of the Polish Academy of Learning and the Polish Academy of Sciences in Krakow, W II 24. A letter from S. Smolka to E. Soderini, Krakow 21 I 1890.

Archive of Science of the Polish Academy of Learning and the Polish Academy of Sciences in Krakow, Correspondence of the Secretary-General, Manuscript 2854/97.

Jagiellonian Library, Manuscript 6510 IV, 369–370. A letter from F. Koneczny to J.I. Kraszewski, Krakow 26 IX 1883.

Jagiellonian University’s Archives, Manuscript 7097, V. 1. Letter from W. Komornicki to F. Koneczny, Vilnius 9 XI 1929.

Jagiellonian University’s Archives, S II 134–135, Catalogue of Students UJ, 1883–1884.

Jagiellonian University’s Archives, S II 619. F. Koneczny personal acts.

Jagiellonian University’s Archives, S II 906. Copy of a document from 28 V 1897.

Jagiellonian University’s Archives, signature 126/14. Letter from F. Koneczny to T.E. Modelski, 21 I 1930.

Jagiellonian University’s Archives, Faculty of Philosophy II 121. Opinion by W. Konopczyński and W. Sobieski.

Library of the Ossoliński National Institute in Wrocław, Manuscript 7700 II, k. 295. A letter from F. Koneczny to O. Balzer, Krakow 26 IV 1892.

Lithuanian State Modern Archive, F 175, A 5, IV B 100, k. 14.

Lithuanian State Modern Archive, F 175, I Bb 86, k. 4.

Parish of the Blessed Salvator in Krakow, Libri mortuorum, V. 12, 1949, p. 296, l. 18

The National Archives in Krakow, Bartłomiej Nowodworski High School in Krakow, Manuscript 134.

The National Archives in Krakow, St. Hyacinth’s Gymnasium and Lyceum in Krakow, Manuscript 14.

The Scientific Library of the Polish Academy of Learning and the Polish Academy of Sciences in Krakow, Manuscript 7097, vol. 1. Letter from A. Górski to F. Koneczny, Krakow 8 VII 1898.

The Scientific Library of the Polish Academy of Learning and the Polish Academy of Sciences in Krakow, Manuscript 7097, vol. 2. Letter from J. Pelczar to F. Koneczny, Przemyśl 13–19 XII 1913.

The Scientific Library of the Polish Academy of Learning and the Polish Academy of Sciences in Krakow, Manuscript 7097, vol. 2. Letter from L. Gadon to F. Koneczny, Paris 4 V 1890.

The Scientific Library of the Polish Academy of Learning and the Polish Academy of Sciences in Krakow, Manuscript 7097, V. 2. Letter from A.S. Sapieha to F. Koneczny, Kraków 8 XI 1913.

The Scientific Library of the Polish Academy of Learning and the Polish Academy of Sciences in Krakow, Manuscript 7097, V. 2. Letter from K. Włodkowicz to F. Koneczny, Rome 16 I 1905.

University of Toruń Library, Manuscript 962 II, k. 6v. R. Mienicki, Diary.

Official Church documents

Leon XIII. Encyclical Aeterni Patris. Rome1879.

—. Encyclical Humanum genus. Rome 1884.

—. Encyclical Immortale Dei. Rome 1885.

—. Encyclical Libertas prestantissimum. Rome 1888.

—. Encyclical Sapientiae christianae. Rome 1890.

—. Encyclical Rerum novarum. Rome 1891.

Studies

Balzer, O. Sprawozdania Towarzystwa Naukowego we Lwowie,ed. P. Dąbrowski. Lwów: Towarzystwo Naukowe we Lwowie, 1921.

Barlik, J. “Czy kres cywilizacji łacińskiej? O historiozofii Feliksa Konecznego,” Chrześcijanin w Świecie 18, no. 11–12 (1986), pp. 150–162.

Bezat, P. Poglądy polityczno-prawne Feliksa Konecznego. Krzeszowice: Dom Wydawniczy “Ostoja”, 2004.

—. Teoria cywilizacji Feliksa Konecznego. Krzeszowice: Dom Wydawniczy “Ostoja”, 2002.

Bębenek, M. “Paradygmat polityki w cywilizacji łacińskiej,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, ed. J. Skoczyński, pp. 85–92. Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2000.

Będzińska, E., Madej, E. “Z korespondencji literackiej Feliksa Konecznego,” Rocznik Biblioteki PAN w Krakowie 15 (1969), p. 280.

Białkowski, I. Idea ścierania się cywilizacji według Feliksa Konecznego a bezpieczeństwo współczesnej Europy. Krzeszowice: Dom Wydawniczy “Ostoja”, 2007.

Biliński, P. “Feliks Karol Koneczny – droga do kariery akademickiej,” Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki 50, no. 1 (2005), pp. 95–115.

—. “Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949) – szkic biograficzny,” Arcana, no. 3 (2000), pp. 187–212.

—. Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949). Życie i działalność. Warszawa: Inicjatywa Wydawnicza “Ad astra”, 2001.

—. “Feliks Koneczny a ‘Świat Słowiański’,” in Slovanstvi a věda v 19 a 20 stoleti. Práce z Archivu Akademie věd ČR, pp. 15–39. Praha: Řada A, sv. 8, 2005.

—. “Feliks Koneczny jako badacz dziejów Rosji i Europy Wschodniej,” Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 38 (2003), pp. 227–246.

—. “Feliks Koneczny, studioso della storia della Russia e dell’Europa Orientale,” Organon, no. 32 (2003), pp. 71–92.

Błachowska, K, “Feliks Koneczny jako historyk Rosji: podstawy koncepcji,” Klio Polska 6, (2012), pp. 169–196.

Bokiej, A. Cywilizacja łacińska: studium na podstawie dorobku historiozoficznego Feliksa Konecznego. Legnica: Wyższe Seminarium Duchowne Diecezji Legnickiej, 2000.

Bolszewizm. Praca zbiorowa. Lublin: Towarzystwo Wiedzy Chrześcijańskiej, 1937.

Braun, J. “Feliks Koneczny, twórca nauki o cywilizacji,” Wiadomości 25, no. 10 (1970), part 1.

Bukowska, S.“Feliks Koneczny – indukcyjna nauka o cywilizacji a prawa dziejowe,” Folia Philosophica, no. 8 (1991), pp. 201–215.

—. Filozofia polska wobec problemu cywilizacji: teoria Feliksa Konecznego. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2007.

Chłodna-Błach, I. Od paidéi do kultury wysokiej.Filozoficzno-antropologiczne podstawy sporu o kulturę. Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2016.

Chodynicki, K. [Review of] “Koneczny Feliks, Litwa a Moskwa w latach 1449–1492,” Kwartalnik Historyczny 44 (1930), pp. 386–408.

—. “Replika,” Kwartalnik Historyczny 50 (1936), pp. 587–588.

Chrost, S. “Czy możliwe jest mieszanie kultur? Refleksje o integracji kulturowej w pracy na kanwie teorii cywilizacji Feliksa Konecznego,” in Praca socjalna wobec wyzwań współczesności, vol. 2, eds. E. Bojanowska, M. Kawińska, pp. 61–72. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Kontrast, 2016.

Czyżkiewicz, M. “Cele prawa w cywilizacji łacińskiej,” Cultura Christiana 1 (2012), pp. 59–68.

—. “Etyka w cywilizacji łacińskiej,” Cultura Christiana 1 (2012), pp. 69–76.

Ćuk, A. “Idea słowiańska w ujęciu Feliksa Konecznego,” Studia z Filozofii Polskiej 4 (2009), pp. 261–275.

Dianowa, M. “Filozofia historii Feliksa Konecznego: swoistość i paralele znaczeniowe,” in Myśl polska w obszarze rosyjskojęzycznym,ed. J. Skoczyński, pp. 95–108. Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2016.

Dworczyk, A. “O odnowę łacińskiej Europy. Polska historiozofii Feliksa Konecznego,” Szkice Humanistyczne 17, no. 1 (2017), pp. 29–44.

Filipowicz, M. Wobec Rosji. Studia z dziejów historiografii polskiej od końca XIX wieku po drugą wojnę światową. Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej,2000.

Floud, J. [Reviews of] The Evolution of Civilization: An Introduction to historical Analysis. By Carroll Quigley. New York: The Macmillian Company, 1961, pp. 248. On the Plurality of Civilisations. By Feliks Koneczny. London: Polonica Publications, 1962. pp. XV + 348, History and Theory 4, no 2. (1965), pp. 271–275.

Gajda, K. “Feliks Koneczny: Szekspir dla teatru czy teatr dla Szekspira?” in Szekspir wśród znaków kultury polskiej, eds. E. Łubieniewska, K. Latawiec, J. Waligóra, pp. 316–328. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego, 2012.

—. “Koneczny o dramatach Wyspiańskiego,” Annales Academiae Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Historicolitteraria, no. 5 (2005), pp. 85–93.

—. “Naukowe ambicje Feliksa Konecznego,” in Krytycy teatralni XX wieku. Postawy i światopogląd, ed. E. Udalska, pp. 40–51. Wrocław: Wiedza o Kulturze, 1990.

—. “O krytyce Feliksa Konecznego,” in F. Koneczny, Teatr Krakowski,pp. 7–19. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego, 1994.

—. Świat krytycznoteatralny Feliksa Konecznego. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego, 2008.

Gawor, L. “Etyka a cywilizacja. O wpływie moralności na rozwój cywilizacji według Feliksa Konecznego,” in Studia z historii etyki polskiej 1900–1939, ed. S. Jedynak, pp. 131–157. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 1990.

—. Katastrofizm w polskiej myśli społecznej i filozofii 1918–1939.Lublin:Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 1999.

—. O wielości cywilizacji. Filozofia społeczna Feliksa Konecznego. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2002.

—. Szkice o cywilizacji. Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, 2009.

—. W poszukiwaniu rozumienia bytu społecznego człowieka. Filozofia polska końca XIX wieku i w XX stuleciu. Rzeszów:Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego,2015.

Giertych, M. Wojna cywilizacji. Krzeszowice: Dom Wydawniczy “Ostoja”, 2007.

Giza, A. Neoslawizm i Polacy 1906–1910. Szczecin: Wydawnictwa Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej, 1984.

Goćkowski, J. “Konecznego model dziejów powszechnych,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, ed. J. Skoczyński, pp. 21–34. Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka,2000.

—. “Perspektywa ethosowa w nauce o cywilizacji (O koncepcjach Feliksa Konecznego),” Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace Etnograficzne, no. 29 (1990), pp. 47–63.

—. “Teoria cywilizacji jako socjologia wiedzy (O koncepcjach Feliksa Konecznego),” in Rozmyślania o cywilizacji,eds. J. Bardziej, J. Goćkowski,pp. 99–136. Kraków: Baran and Suszczyński,1997.

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Wescott, R.W. “The Enumeration of Civilization,” History and Theory 9, no. 1 (1970), pp. 59–85.

Węcławski, M. “O jedność w rozmaitości. Z filozofii społecznej Feliksa Konecznego,” Studia Philosohica Wratislaviensia 8, no. 4 (2013), pp. 19–38.

Węgrzyniak, R. [Review of] “Feliks Koneczny, Teatr Karkowski. Sprawozdania 1896–1905, Przedmowa wybór i opracowanie K. Gajda,” Pamiętnik Teatralny 45, no. 1–2 (1996), pp. 211–214.

Wierzbicki, A. Groźni i wielcy. Polska myśl historyczna XIX i XX wieku wobec rosyjskiej despotii. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo “Sic!”,2001.

Wiśniewska-Paź, B. “Szwajcaria jako fenomen wśród państw Europy ukształtowanych w cywilizacji zachodniej: w perspektywie koncepcji Feliksa Konecznego,” in Kulturowe uwarunkowania bezpieczeństwa personalnego i społecznego, eds. T. Grabińska, Z. Kuźniar, pp. 213–239. Wrocław: Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska Wojsk Lądowych, 2017.

Wybraniec, A. “Zemsta w ujęciu Feliksa Konecznego, św. Tomasza z Akwinu i Jana Jakuba Rousseau. Porównanie problematyki,” Człowiek w Kulturze 24 (2014), pp. 361–378.

Wyszyński, S. Duch pracy ludzkiej. Włocławek: Księgarnia Powszechna, 1946.

—. Katolicki program walki z bolszewizmem. Włocławek: Neuman & Tomaszewski, 1937.

—. “Myśl katolicka wobec nieładu w gospodarstwie międzynarodowym,” Ateneum Kapłańskie 30 (1932), pp. 503–506.

—. “Pius XI o walce z komunizmem,” Ateneum Kapłańskie 39 (1937), pp. 466–478.

J. Koneczny, “Poprawki poczynione przez wnuka prof. Konecznego w 1951 roku,” in O ład w historii, ed. F. Koneczny (Londyn: Towarzystwo im. Romana Dmowskiego, 1977), p. 167.

Polski Słownik Biograficzny, vol. 13, s.v., “Koneczny Feliks,” p. 498.

S. Możdżeń, Reformy szkoły średniej w Galicji w latach 1884–1914 (Kielce: Kieleckie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1989), p. 43.

  The National Archives in Krakow, Bartłomiej Nowodworski High School in Krakow, Manuscript 134, p. 295.

F. Koneczny, Państwo i prawo (Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM, 1997), p. 183.

The National Archives in Krakow, St. Hyacinth’s Gymnasium and Lyceum in Krakow (hereinafter: HGL), Manuscript 14, p. 13.

Ibidem, HGL, Manuscript 17, p. 19.

Ibidem, HGL, Manuscript 61, p. 38.

F. Koneczny, O wielości cywilizacji (Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM, 1996), p. 11.

Jagiellonian University Archives (hereinafter: JUA) S II 134–135, Catalogue of Students JU, 1883–1884 (Senat’s Catalogue).

F. Koneczny, Prawa dziejowe (Londyn: Towarzystwo im. Romana Dmowskiego, 1982), p. 1.

  Faculty of Philosophy of the Jagiellonian University (hereinafter: FPh), II 504. Koneczny’s PhD notecase.

  Scientific Library of the Polish Academy of Learning and the Polish Academy of Sciences in Krakow (hereinafter: SL PAL and PAS Kr), manuscript 7097, vol. 2. Letter from L. Gadon to F. Koneczny, Paris 4 V 1890.

  Archive of Science of the Polish Academy of Learning and the Polish Academy of Sciences in Krakow (hereinafter: AS PAL and PAS), W II 24. A letter from S. Smolka to E. Soderini, Krakow 21 I 1890.

  Ibidem, W II 25. Rome expedition.

O. Balzer, Sprawozdania Towarzystwa Naukowego we Lwowie (Lwów: Towarzystwo Naukowe we Lwowie, 1921), p. 82.

  Oral account of M. Wiatrowa, Skomielna Biała, 26 June 1999, recording in the author’s private hands.

  Correspondence of the author with W. Koneczny, Sanok 3 December 1997.

F. Koneczny, Dzieje Śląska (Komorów–Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1999), p. 506.

  AS PAL and PAS Kr, PAS, Correspondence of the Secretary-General, Manuscript 2854/97.

JUA S II 906. Copy from 28 V 1897.

F. Koneczny, “Karol Estreicher” [obituary], Kwartalnik Historyczny 22 (1908), p. 799.

SL PAL and PAS Kr, Manuscript 7097, V. 1. Letter from A. Górski to F. Koneczny, Kraków 8 VII 1898.

E. Będzińska, E. Madej, “Z korespondencji literackiej Feliksa Konecznego,” Rocznik Biblioteki PAN w Krakowie 15 (1969), p. 280.

AS PAL and PAS Kr, PAS, W I-193, k. 36 v.

Ibidem, W I, 193, k. 50 v. Reports from Literary Commission meetings 1875–1933.

Library of the Ossoliński National Institute in Wrocław, Manuscript 7700 II, k. 295. A letter from F. Koneczny to O. Balzer, Kraków 26 IV 1892.

Jagiellonian Library, Manuscript 6510 IV, 369–370. A letter from F. Koneczny to J.I. Kraszewski, Kraków 26 IX 1883.

T.S. Grabowski, “Feliks Koneczny,” Kwartalnik Historyczny 57 (1949), p. 337.

SL PAL and PAS Kr, Manuscript 7097, V. 2. Letter from K. Włodkowicz to F. Koneczny, Rome 16 I 1905.

See more: J. Kochan, “Oblicze ideowo-polityczne «Świata Słowiańskiego»,” Kwartalnik Historii Prasy Polskiej 18, no. 2 (1979), pp. 41–62; Z. Solak, “Marian Zdziechowski i Klub Słowiański,” Studia Historyczne 30, no. 2 (1987), pp. 219–239; P. Biliński, Feliks Koneczny a “Świat Słowiański”, “Slovanstvi a věda v 19 a 20 stoleti. Práce z Archivu Akademie věd ČR,” Řada A, sv. 8, Praha 2005, pp. 15–39.

C. Lechicki, “Krakowski «Głos Narodu» w latach 1914–1939,” Studia Historyczne 16, no. 3 (1973), p. 345.

SL PAL and PAS Kr, Manuscript 7097, V. 2. Letter from A.S. Sapieha to F. Koneczny, Kraków 8 XI 1913.

Ibidem, Letter from J. Pelczar to F. Koneczny, Przemyśl 13–19 XII 1913.

U. Perkowska, Uniwersytet Jagielloński w latach I wojny światowej (Kraków: Universitas, 1990), p. 95.

Lithuanian State Modern Archive (hereinafter: LSMA), F 175, A 5, IV B 100, k. 14.

About Koneczny’s standpoint on the subject of history of Russia, see: M. Filipowicz, Wobec Rosji. Studia z dziejów historiografii polskiej od końca XIX wieku po drugą wojnę światową (Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2000), pp. 70–76; J. Kolbuszewska “Konecznego koncepcja dziejów Rosji,” in Koneczny dzisiaj, ed. J. Skoczyński (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2000), pp. 187–197; A. Wierzbicki, Groźni i wielcy. Polska myśl historyczna XIX i XX wieku wobec rosyjskiej despotii (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo “Sic!”, 2001), pp. 188–220; P. Biliński, “Feliks Koneczny, studioso della storia della Rusia e dell’Europa Orientale,” Organon 32 (2003), pp. 71–92; K. Błachowska, “Feliks Koneczny jako historyk Rosji – podstawy koncepcji,” Klio Polska 6 (2012), pp. 169–196. 

JUA, FPh II 121. Opinion by W. Konopczyński and W. Sobieski.

LSMA, F 175, I Bb 86, k. 4.

Ibidem, F 175, A 5, IV B 12, k. 102v.

Ibidem, F 175, I Bb 86, k. 23–24.

Ibidem, F 175, A 5, IV B 100, k. 4.

Ibidem, F 175, A 5, IV B 12, k. 99v.

Ibidem, F 175, A 5, IV B 100, k. 45v.

Ibidem, F 175, I A, 387, k. 267.

Ibidem, F 175, A 5, IV B 283, k. 35.

Ibidem, k. 40.

Ibidem, k. 9. University of Toruń Library (hereinafter: UTL), Manuscript 962 II, k. 6v. R. Mienicki, Diary. The author is grateful to prof. Waldemar Chorążyczewski for providing him with access to its electronic version.

Ibidem, F 175, I A, 951, k. 32.

Ibidem, F 175, I Bb 86, k. 41.

Ibidem, k. 47.

UTL, Manuscript 962 II, k. 6v. R. Mienicki, Diary.

J. Pawlak, “Feliks Koneczny – profesor Uniwersytetu Stefana Batorego (1919–1929),” in Filozofia na Uniwersytecie Wileńskim, eds. R. Jadczak, J. Pawlak (Toruń: Wydawnictwo UMK, 1997), p. 154.

JUA, sign. 126/14. Letter from F. Koneczny to T.E. Modelski, 21 I 1930. 

Ibidem, Letter from F. Koneczny to T.E. Modelski, Kraków 5 I 1930.

K. Chodynicki, [Review of] “Feliks Koneczny: Litwa a Moskwa w latach 1449–1492. Dzieje Rosji tom drugi,” Kwartalnik Historyczny 44 (1930), pp. 386–408; F. Koneczny, “Polemika,” Kwartalnik Historyczny 50 (1936), pp. 175–178; K. Chodynicki, “Replika,” Kwartalnik Historyczny 50 (1936), pp. 587–588.

SL PAL and PAS Kr, Manuscript 7097, V. 1. A letter from W. Komornicki to F. Koneczny, Vilnius 9 XI 1929.

Wiesław Koneczny’s oral account, Kraków, 23 VI 1999, recording in the author’s private hands.

JUA, S II 619. F. Koneczny personal acts.

Parish of the Blessed Salvator in Kraków, Libri mortuorum, V. 12, 1949, p. 296, l. 18.

Wiesław Koneczny’s oral account, Kraków, 23 VI 1999, recording in the author’s private hands.

F. Koneczny, O ład w historii (Wrocław: Nortom, 1999), pp. 111–117.

It is worth pointing out here the encyclicals of Holy Father Leo XIII: Immortale Dei, 1 XI 1885, “Acta Leonis papae XIII” 2.146; Libertas prestantissimum, 20 VI 1888, “Acta Leonis papae XIII” 3.96; Sapientiae christianae, 10 I 1890, “Acta Leonis papae XIII” 4.6; and Rerum novarum, 15 V 1891, “Acta Leonis papae XIII” 4.177; see also Kodeks społeczny. Zarys katolickiej syntezy społecznej, trans. L. Górski, A. Szymański (Lublin: Towarzystwo Wiedzy Chrześcijańskiej, 1934).

Encyclical of Holy Father Leo XIII Aeterni Patris, 1879; C. Strzeszewski, Katolicka nauka społeczna (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1994), pp. 254–258.

H. Romanowski, Wstęp do ekonomji społecznej chrześcijańskiej (Kraków–Warszawa: Gebethner & Wolff, 1910), p. 1ff; see also S. Wyszyński, Katolicki program walki z bolszewizmem (Włocławek: Neuman & Tomaszewski, 1937); S. Wyszyński, “Pius XI o walce z komunizmem,” Ateneum Kapłańskie 39 (1937), pp. 466–478; S. Wyszyński, “Myśl katolicka wobec nieładu w gospodarstwie międzynarodowym,” Ateneum Kapłańskie 30 (1932), pp. 503– 506.

Bolszewizm. Praca zbiorowa (Lublin: Towarzystwo Wiedzy Chrześcijańskiej, 1937).

Encyclical of Holy Father Leo XIII Humanum genus, Rome 1884.

A. Szymański, Zagadnienie społeczne (Lublin: Towarzystwo Wiedzy Chrześcijańskiej, 1939), pp. 20–38.

Encyclical of Holy Father Leon XIII Libertas Praestantissimum, 1888.

F. Koneczny, “Tło polityczne renesansu włoskiego,” Myśl Narodowa 10, no. 21 (1930), pp. 327–329.

J. Szczepanowski, Paradygmat cywilizacyjny jako zasadniczy element koncepcji historiozoficznych Feliksa Konecznego i Oswalda Spenglera (Warszawa: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych UW, 2013).

“German philosophy made from history a kind of a speculative entertainment”. F. Koneczny, O wielości cywilizacyj (Kraków: Gebethner i Wolff, 1935), p. 21; see also J. Skoczyński, Idee historiozoficzne Feliksa Konecznego (Kraków: Nakładem Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 1991), pp. 15–18.

According to Koneczny, historiography based on the method of German historians or on the positivist method was ultimately, for him, “the most false and above all an insufficient and already wrong way”; see F. Koneczny, Polskie Logos a Ethos. Roztrząsania o znaczeniu celu Polski, vol. 1 (Poznań: Księgarnia św. Wojciecha, 1997), p. 23.

Ibidem.

F. Koneczny, Prawa dziejowe (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997), pp. 16–17.

“Let us all do our own job, scientists and humanists, in our own way, and we will find ourselves on the right path to those high places where everything coincides, where we find the relationship of everything with everything. I was succeeding, I suppose, in indicating the direction of a new path for pilgrims to the Truth. It is about the method of learning about civilization.” F. Koneczny, O wielości cywilizacji, p. 320.

F. Koneczny, Polskie Logos a Ethos…, vol. 1, p. 266.

J.B. Serafińska, Filozofia kultury Feliksa Konecznego (Warszawa–Krosno: Wydawnictwo Armagraf, 2014); P. Bezat, Teoria cywilizacji Feliksa Konecznego (Krzeszowice: Dom Wydawniczy Ostoja, 2002); K Gajda, Świat krytycznoteatralny Feliksa Konecznego (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pedagogicznej w Krakowie, 2008).

L. Gawor, O wielości cywilizacji. Filozofia społeczna Feliksa Konecznego (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2002).

R. Polak, Cywilizacje a Moralność w myśli Feliksa Konecznego (Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2001).

P. Grabowiec, Model społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w historiozofii Feliksa Konecznego (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2000); R. Jadczak, “Feliks Koneczny o państwie i jego roli w wychowaniu,” in Wychowanie a polityka. Między wychowaniem narodowym a państwowym, ed. W. Wojdyło (Toruń: Wydawnictwo UMK, 1999), pp. 69–81.

P. Biliński, Feliks Koneczny (1863–1949). Życie i działalność (Warszawa: Inicjatywa Wydawnicza “Ad astra”, 2001), pp. 147–154.

R.Z. Piotrowski, Problem filozoficzny ładu społecznego a porównawcza nauka o cywilizacjach (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo “Dialog”, 2003).

“Who will save our Latin civilization? I only know one strength, which is called this: the Church. … In this fight you must necessarily be a Catholic, otherwise the fight will be vain. One could even say that it is enough to fight for Polish Catholicism, and when we defend the Church …, Latin civilization will be useful to us, it will be saved.” F. Koneczny, Napór Orientu na Zachód i inne pisma o życiu społecznym (Lublin: Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 1999), pp. 195–196.

F. Koneczny, Dzieje Polski za Piastów (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997), pp. 2–3.

J. Barlik, “Czy kres cywilizacji łacińskiej? O historiozofii Feliksa Konecznego,” Chrześcijanin w Świecie 18, no. 11–12 (1986), p. 152.

J. Braun, “Feliks Koneczny twórca nauki o cywilizacji,” Wiadomości 25, no. 10 (1970), p. 3.

F. Koneczny, Święci w dziejach narodu polskiego (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997), p. 684.

F. Koneczny, Protestantyzm w życiu zbiorowym (Gliwice: Wydawnictwo Onion, 1998), p. 49.

F. Koneczny, Kościół jako polityczny wychowawca narodu (Gdańsk: Franciszkański Ruch Ekologiczny, 1997), pp. 17–18.

F. Koneczny, “Jakiej ordynacji wyborczej do parlamentu potrzebuje Polska?” Trybuna Narodu 2, no. 22 (1927), pp. 10–12.

F. Koneczny, “Czterdzieści tez zasadniczych,” Trybuna Narodu 2, no. 19 (1927), pp. 2–3.

F. Koneczny, Prawa dziejowe (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997), p. 6.

P. Biliński, Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949). Życie i działalność (Warszawa: Inicjatywa Wydawnicza “Ad astra”, 2001), pp. 222–224. A full list of Koneczny’s publications is also contained therein.

F. Koneczny, Rozwój moralności (Lublin: Towarzystwo Wiedzy Chrześcijańskiej, 1938), p. 387.

F. Koneczny, Prawa dziejowe, p. 212.

F. Koneczny, Dzieje Polski za Piastów (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997), pp. 2–3.

B. Miśkiewicz, Wprowadzenie do badań historycznych (Poznań: Polski Dom Wydawniczy “Ławica”, 1993), p. 43; A. Wawrzyniak “Wprowadzenie do filozofii dziejów,” Filozofia 8 (1983), pp. 82–118; J. Szymański, Nauki pomocnicze historii (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1983), pp. 7–21; see also J. Topolski, Jak się pisze i rozumie historię (Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm, 1996); J. Topolski, Metodologia historii (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1984); W. Moszczewska, Metodologii historii zarys krytyczny (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1968); P. Moskal, Problem filozofii dziejów (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1993).

Without knowing the theories with which he polemicizes, we cannot apprehend the specificity of his deliberations and underestimate his research effort, thanks to which—according to K. Sowa, A. Hilckman, and A. Toynbee—he took a significant place in world science. “I suppose that I indicated the direction of a new path for pilgrims to the Truth. It is about the method of studying civilization.” F. Koneczny, O wielości cywilizacji (Kraków: Gebethner i Wolff 1935), p. 320.

J. Jaśkowski, “Sytuacja w Polsce w świetle nauki Feliksa Konecznego,” in F. Koneczny, Kościół jako polityczny wychowawca narodu (Gdańsk: Franciszkański Ruch Ekologiczny, 1997), pp. 30–39.

S. Bukowska, “Feliks Koneczny, indukcyjna nauka o cywilizacji a prawa dziejowe,” Folia Philosophica 8 (1991), pp. 201–215; I. Białkowski, Idea ścierania się cywilizacji według Feliksa Konecznego a bezpieczeństwo współczesnej Europy (Krzeszowice: Dom Wydawniczy “Ostoja”, 2007); A. Bokiej, Cywilizacja łacińska: studium na podstawie dorobku historiozoficznego Feliksa Konecznego (Legnica: Wyższe Seminarium Duchowne Diecezji Legnickiej, 2000).

S. Bukowska, Filozofia polska wobec problemu cywilizacji: teoria Feliksa Konecznego (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2007).

“… after many attempts to build historiosophy according to the new method—he returned to the a priori principles. Based on the empiricism used in social sciences, he tried to rationalize the historical process; he came to religious thinking, stopping at the threshold of Civitas Dei.” J. Skoczyński, Idee historiozoficzne Feliksa Konecznego (Kraków: Nakładem Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 1991), p. 131.

A. Hilckman, “Wschód i Zachód,” in F. Koneczny, O ład w historii (Warszawa: Michalineum, 1991), p. 83. 

“History deals with the description of events that have had an impact on life and general relations.” F. Koneczny, Dzieje Polski, vol. 1 (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997), p. 1.

“The science of any inheritance from the ancestors is called History. It teaches what a generation did or did not do, and in what condition it passed the heritage to the next generation. There may be a history of one family, of a whole nation, or a universal history of all countries and people of the whole world. History explains why we are now what we are, and not others, from where did the good and bad sides of our lives came from. History explains the contemporary state of our affairs.” F. Koneczny, Święci w dziejach narodu polskiego (Warszawa: Michalineum, 1985), p. 6.

A. Piskozub, “Miejsce Feliksa Konecznego w polskim wkładzie w rozwój nauki o cywilizacji,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, ed. J. Skoczyński (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2000), pp. 67–77.

F. Koneczny, Prawa dziejowe (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997), p. 72.

F. Koneczny, O ład w historii, pp. 9–12; F. Koneczny, Prawa dziejowe, pp. 72–96. 

“All animals have an a priori given type of association and it is impossible for them to associate themselves in a different way than in the only one way, and always the same. Man on the contrary … It follows that an animal must form associations according to the compulsion inherent in its nature, and the man himself arranges himself according to his will … The entire animal being is fundamentally different from the human one; how then shall they be subject to the same laws?” F. Koneczny, Prawa dziejowe, p. 73.

F. Koneczny, O ład w historii, pp. 35–40.

J. Szczepanowski, Paradygmat cywilizacyjny jako zasadniczy element koncepcji historiozoficznych Feliksa Konecznego i Oswalda Spenglera (Warszawa: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych UW, 2013); L. Gawor, O wielości cywilizacji: Filozofia społeczna Feliksa Konecznego (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2002); J. Goćkowski, “Konecznego model dziejów powszechnych,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 21–34; P. Golema, “Feliksa Konecznego teoria pluralizmu czy dualizmu cywilizacyjnego,” Acta Politica. Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego 92 (1991), pp. 5–20.

Z. Pucek, “Koncepcje cywilizacyjne Feliksa Konecznego na tle tez humanistyki przełomu antypozytywistycznego,” in Filozofia i religia w kulturze narodów słowiańskich, eds. T. Chrobak, Z. Stachowski (Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej, 1995), pp. 113–127.

A. Toynbee, Cywilizacja w czasie próby, trans. W. Madej (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Przedświt, 1991).

F. Koneczny, O wielości cywilizacyj, p. 316.

Ibidem, p. 317.

S. Swieżawski, Zagadnienie historii filozofii (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1966), pp. 7–41.

F. Koneczny, “Do metodologji nauki o cywilizacji,” in Pamiętnik IV powszechnego zjazdu historyków polskich w Poznaniu (Lwów: Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne, 1926), p. 7. This is a lecture given at the Fourth Congress of Polish Historians in Poznań.

F. Koneczny, Polskie Logos a Ethos. Roztrząsania o znaczeniu i celu Polski, vol. 1 (Poznań: Księgarnia św. Wojciecha, 1921), p. 29. 

Ibidem, p. 23.

He considered Leopold von Ranke to be the leading representative of such history. See F. Koneczny, Polskie Logos a Ethos, vol. 1, pp. 23–31.

Ibidem, p. 23.

F. Koneczny, O ład w historii, p. 9.

“25 years ago, Jan Łukasiewicz questioned the thesis that the purpose of science was truth, claiming that only ‘syntheses of the judgments’ belong to science, because a set of facts is not yet a science … Analysis is a means to an end, but what is the way to synthesize without a previous analysis? Finally, what are the purposes of any hypotheses and syntheses, if not the pursuit of truth? Even if science is limited to synthesis, will the truth cease to be its purpose?” F. Koneczny, O cywilizację łacińską (Lublin: Onion, 1996), pp. 30–31.

As an example of facts, Koneczny questioned here, among others: “what was the policy of the Teutonic Order in 1389 and 1390; what was the position of the Livonian masters of the Order (Plettenberg) towards Prussia, Lithuania, Moscow in the first quarter of the 16th century, etc.” F. Koneczny, Polskie Logos a Ethos, vol. 1, p. 26, note 1.

Koneczny observed this kind of apriorism in such thinkers who wrote about history as N. Malebranche, A.N. Condorcet, J.B. Bossuet, W. Leibniz, J.G. Fichte, Voltaire, J.J. Rousseau, S. Simon, A. Comte, H. Taine, G.W.F. Hegel., F.W.J. Schelling, I. Kant, K.L. Michelet, J.G. v. Herder, and F. v. Schlegel, and, in Poland, S. Staszic, A. Cieszkowski, J.M. Hoene-Wroński, and J. Słupicki. F. Koneczny, O wielości cywilizacyj, pp. 9–37.

A. Hilckman, “Induktywna filozofia historii,” in F. Koneczny, O ład w historii, pp. 150–156.

Z. Pucek noticed that “In the declarative recognition of the value of inductive methods, Koneczny remained seemingly close to the principles of the Krakow school. It is doubtful, however, whether he understood them literally, according to the canons of J.S. Mill, and he used them lege artis. The inductive method is for him a synonym for a research attitude that faces realities.” F. Koneczny, “Teoria pluralizmu cywilizacyjnego,” in Szkice z historii socjologii polskiej, ed. Z. Sowa (Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, 1983), p. 158.

F. Koneczny, Polskie Logos a Ethos, vol. 1, pp. 26–27.

Ibidem, p. 27.

Ibidem.

J. Misiek, “O wielości cywilizacji – refleksje metodologiczne,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 45–57.

F. Koneczny, Polskie Logos a Ethos. Roztrząsania o znaczeniu i celu Polski, vol. 1, p. 27.

Ibidem, p. 28.

F. Koneczny, O wielości cywilizacyj, pp. 316–317.

P. Grabowiec, Model społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w historiozofii Feliksa Konecznego (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2000).

Koneczny demonstrated the issue of historical law above all in: F. Koneczny, Prawa dziejowe (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997); F. Koneczny, O ład w historii (Warszawa: Michalineum, 1991); and F. Koneczny, “Napór Orientu na Zachód,” in Kultura i cywilizacja, vol. 5 (Lublin: Towarzystwo Wiedzy Chrześcijańskiej, 1937), pp. 177–196.

F. Koneczny, Rozwój moralności (Lublin: Towarzystwo Wiedzy Chrześcijańskiej, 1938), pp. 341–371. Koneczny’s life and his academic career were best analyzed in P. Biliński’s works; cf. P. Biliński, Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949). Życie i działalność (Warszawa: Inicjatywa Wydawnicza “Ad astra”, 2001); P. Biliński, “Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949) – szkic biograficzny,” Arcana 3 (2000), pp. 187–212.

L. Gawor, “Etyka a cywilizacja. O wpływie moralności na rozwój cywilizacji według Feliksa Konecznego,” in Studia z historii etyki polskiej 1900–1939, ed. S. Jedynak (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 1990), pp. 131–157; Z. Pucek, “Socjologiczny walor paradygmatu cywilizacyjnego,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, ed. J. Skoczyński (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2000), pp. 93–101.

F. Koneczny, Zwierzchnictwo moralności. Ekonomia i etyka (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2006), p. 11.

F. Koneczny, Rozwój moralności, p. 376.

F. Koneczny, Polskie Logos a Ethos. Roztrząsanie o znaczeniu i celu Polski, vol. 2 (Poznań: Księgarnia św. Wojciecha, 1921), pp. 504–505.

F. Koneczny, “Polskie Logos a Ethos (o etykę w życiu publicznym),” Tygodnik Warszawski 3, no. 27 (1947), p. 4; J. Goćkowski, “Perspektywa ethosowa w nauce o cywilizacji (O koncepcjach Feliksa Konecznego),” Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace Etnograficzne 29 (1990), pp. 47–63.

This is the main message of F. Koneczny’s work Polskie Logos a Ethos. Roztrząsanie o znaczeniu i celu Polski, vols. 1–2; see also: S. Bukowska, Filozofia polska wobec problemu cywilizacji: teoria Feliksa Konecznego (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2007).

M.A. Krąpiec, “O kulturę prawdy,” Człowiek w Kulturze 9 (1997), pp. 154–159.

F. Koneczny, “Szczęście a państwo,” Tęcza 3, no. 17 (1929), pp. 1–2; F. Koneczny, Zwierzchnictwo moralności, op. cit.; M.A. Krąpiec, “Czy człowiek bez celu,” Człowiek w Kulturze 6–7 (1995), pp. 5–36; P. Bezat, Teoria cywilizacji Feliksa Konecznego (Krzeszowice: Dom Wydawniczy “Ostoja”, 2002).

F. Koneczny, “Warunki pracy kulturalnej w Polsce porozbiorowej,” in Polska w kulturze powszechnej. Część I. Ogólna, ed. F. Koneczny (Kraków: Krakowska Ekspozytura Biura Patronatu dla Spółek Oszczęd. i Pożyczek, 1918), pp. 366–412; F. Koneczny “Warunki postępu moralności,” Przegląd Filozoficzny 39, no. 4 (1936), pp. 501–503; J. Barlik, “Czy kres cywilizacji łacińskiej? O historiozofii Feliksa Konecznego,” Chrześcijanin w Świecie 18, no. 11–12 (1986), pp. 150–162.

F. Koneczny, “U źródeł kultury polskiej,” Tygodnik Warszawski 2, no. 51 (1946), p. 4.

F. Koneczny, Polskie logos a Ethos, vol. 2, p. 508.

P. Jaroszyński, “Kultura i cywilizacja. Od Cycerona do Konecznego,” Człowiek w Kulturze 10 (1998), pp. 13–29; P. Jaroszyński, “Cywilizacja łacińska wobec naporu emanatyzmu,” Człowiek w Kulturze 6–7 (1995), pp. 101–115.

F. Koneczny, “Słowo o wolnej woli,” Niedziela 18, no. 25 (1948), p. 217; Ł. Stefaniak, Utopizm: źródła myślowe i konsekwencje cywilizacyjne (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2011), pp. 145–167.

S. Lacki, M. Szarecki, “Feliksa Konecznego nauka o cywilizacjach,” in Elementarz wiedzy narodowej, ed. M. Barański (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Samoobrona Polska, 1995), pp. 7–45.

P. Milcarek, “Świętość w dziejach ludzkich w ujęciu Feliksa Konecznego,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 225–230.

F. Koneczny, “Kościół w Polsce wobec cywilizacji,” Ateneum Kapłańskie 22 (1928), pp. 413–429.

P. Gondek, “Rola Kościoła w kulturze polskiej. Na marginesie prac Feliksa Konecznego,” Człowiek w Kulturze 10 (1998), pp. 87–96.

F. Koneczny, Polskie logos a Ethos, vol. 2, p. 528.

F. Koneczny, Państwo i prawo w cywilizacji łacińskiej (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997), p. 159.

F. Koneczny, “Oświata a dobrobyt w Galicji,” Biblioteka Warszawska 247 (1902), pp. 532–560.

“Jews are distinguished by intellectualism; their disadvantage is the exclusivity of intellectualism. Among them, even a lack of intelligence looks intellectual, because it is usually derived not from a lack of reasoning but from erroneous reasoning.” F. Koneczny, Cywilizacja żydowska (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2001), p. 251.

F. Koneczny, Rozwój moralności, p. 76.

F. Koneczny, “Uwaga o szkolnictwie państwowym,” Przegląd Powszechny 186 (1930), pp. 3–22.

F. Koneczny, Zwierzchnictwo moralności. Ekonomia i etyka (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2006), p. 105.

F. Koneczny, Rozwój moralności, p. 89.

Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, vol. 3, s.v. “Epikeia,” pp. 184–185; P. Grabowiec, Model społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w historiozofii Feliksa Konecznego (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2000).

P. Bezat, Poglądy polityczno-prawne Feliksa Konecznego (Krzeszowice: Dom Wydawniczy “Ostoja”, 2004); M. Bębenek, “Paradygmat polityki w cywilizacji łacińskiej,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 85–92.

F. Koneczny, O sprawach ekonomicznych, eds. J. Skoczyński, P. Karaś (Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM, 2000), p. 98.

F. Koneczny, Rozwój moralności, p. 345.

F. Koneczny, Cywilizacja żydowska, pp. 32–44.

F. Koneczny, “‘Elephatiasis’ prawodawcza,” Myśl Narodowa 12, no. 55 (1932), pp. 798–801.

F. Koneczny, Cywilizacja bizantyńska, vol. 2 (Londyn: Towarzystwo im. Romana Dmowskiego, 1973), pp. 355–357.

P. Skrzydlewski, “Sprawiedliwość w różnych typach cywilizacji – na kanwie rozważań F. Konecznego,” in Sprawiedliwość – idee a rzeczywistość, eds. I Chłodna, M. Smoleń-Wawrzusiszyn (Lublin: Fundacja “Lubelska Szkoła Filozofii Chrześcijańskiej”, 2009), pp. 177–205.

F. Koneczny, Napór Orientu na Zachód i inne pisma o życiu społecznym (Lublin: Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 1999).

F. Koneczny, Rozwój moralności, pp. 345–347.

F. Koneczny, O wielości cywilizacji, 4th ed. (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2000), pp. 243–246.

Koneczny noticed that “the lack of personalism in the Brahmin, Chinese and Jewish civilizations deprives them of what constitutes the most abundant source of sciences.” F. Koneczny, Rozwój moralności, p. 350.

F. Koneczny, O cywilizację łacińską (Lublin: Onion, 1996), p. 34.

M. Graban, “Supremacja sił duchowych w cywilizacji łacińskiej,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, ed. J. Skoczyński (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2000), pp. 145–151; A. Robaczewski, “Quincunx jako odbicie klasycznej teorii osoby,” Człowiek w Kulturze 10 (1998), pp. 43–48; A. Bokiej, Cywilizacja łacińska: studium na podstawie dorobku historiozoficznego Feliksa Konecznego (Legnica: Wyższe Seminarium Duchowne Diecezji Legnickiej, 2000).

F. Koneczny, Zwierzchnictwo moralności. Ekonomia i etyka (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2006) p. 9.

F. Koneczny, Rozwój moralności (Lublin: Towarzystwo Wiedzy Chrześcijańskiej), p. 134.

R. Piekarski, “Prymat etyki w życiu publicznym. Dyskusja tezy Konecznego,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 231–242.

Z. Pucek, “Ojczyzna jako postać cywilizacyjnego ładu,” in Rozmyślania o cywilizacji, eds. J. Bardziej, J. Goćkowski (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Baran and Suszczyński, 1997), pp. 195–209; P. Skrzydlewski, Wolność człowieka w cywilizacji łacińskiej w ujęciu Feliksa Konecznego (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2013).

P. Grabowiec, Model społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w historiozofii Feliksa Konecznego (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2000).

W. Szurgot, Prawo jako fundament cywilizacji łacińskiej w myśli Feliksa Konecznego (Krzeszowice: Dom Wydawniczy “Ostoja”, 2007).

K. Stępień, “Dobro osoby celem prawa? Na kanwie koncepcji prawa Feliksa Konecznego,” Człowiek w Kulturze 10 (1998), pp. 49–58.

P. Milcarek, “Świętość w dziejach ludzkich w ujęciu Feliksa Konecznego,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 225–230; T. Wituch, “Religia jako rdzeń cywilizacji,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 79–84.

P. Karaś, “Wątki ekonomiczne w twórczości Feliksa Konecznego,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 259–264.

M. Bębenek, “Paradygmat polityki w cywilizacji łacińskiej,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 85–92; P. Skrzydlewski, Polityka w cywilizacji łacińskiej. Aktualność nauki Feliksa Konecznego (Lublin: Fundacja Rozwoju Kultury Polskiej, 2002).

F. Koneczny, Zwierzchnictwo moralności, p. 41.

J. Skoczyński, “Logos i ethos w teorii cywilizacji,” in Rozmyślania o cywilizacji, eds. J. Bardziej, J. Goćkowski (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Baran and Suszczyński, 1997), pp. 137–142; P. Skrzydlewski, “Religia a wolność człowieka w cywilizacji łacińskiej. Kilka uwag na kanwie rozważań Feliksa Konecznego,” in Filozofia o religii. Prace dedykowane Siostrze Profesor Zofii Józefie Zdybickiej, ed. W. Dłubacz (Lublin: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II; Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2009), pp. 295–314.

R. Piotrowski, Problem filozoficzny ładu społecznego a porównawcza nauka o cywilizacjach (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo “Dialog”, 2003); S. Jojczyk, “Relacja państwo – społeczeństwo u Feliksa Konecznego,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 245–253.

R. Piekarski, “Prymat etyki w życiu publicznym. Dyskusja tezy Konecznego,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 231–242.

P. Skrzydlewski, “Sprawiedliwość w różnych typach cywilizacji – na kanwie rozważań F. Konecznego,” in Sprawiedliwość – idee a rzeczywistość, eds. I Chłodna, M. Smoleń-Wawrzusiszyn (Lublin: Fundacja “Lubelska Szkoła Filozofii Chrześcijańskiej”, 2009), pp. 177–205.

M.A. Krąpiec, Suwerenność – czyja? (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 1996), pp. 176–197.

H. Kiereś, “Polityka a religia. Na kanwie myśli F. Konecznego,” in Wierność rzeczywistości. Księga pamiątkowa z okazji jubileuszu 50-lecia pracy naukowej w KUL Ojca prof. Mieczysława Krąpca, eds. Z. Zdybicka, A. Maryniarczyk (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2001), pp. 481–493.

F. Koneczny, Polskie Logos a Ethos. Roztrząsanie o znaczeniu i celu Polski, vol. 2 (Poznań: Księgarnia św. Wojciecha, 1921), p. 526.

F. Koneczny, Rozwój moralności, p. 94.

A. Hilckman, “Wschód i Zachód,” in F. Koneczny, O ład w historii (Londyn: Towarzystwo im. Romana Dmowskiego, 1977), pp. 88–109.

P. Jaroszyński, “Cywilizacja łacińska wobec naporu emanatyzmu,” Człowiek w Kulturze 6–7 (1995), pp. 101–115.

A. Hilckman, “Rozwój cywilizacji według prof. Feliksa Konecznego,” in F. Koneczny, O ład w historii, pp. 77–87.

K. Kurowska, “Feliksa Konecznego nauka o wielości cywilizacji,” Przegląd Humanistyczny 22, no. 7–8 (1978), pp. 75–90.

F. Koneczny, Zwierzchnictwo moralności, p. 86.

J. Skoczyński, “Cywilizacje harmonijne i defektywne,” Znak 41, no. 4 (1989), pp. 55–62.

P. Szczudłowski, “Niemcy w oczach Feliksa Konecznego,” Życie i Myśl 46, no. 4 (1998), pp. 27–40.

J. Skoczyński, “Idee historiozoficzne Feliksa Konecznego,” Edukacja Filozoficzna 15 (1993), pp. 160–162.

F. Koneczny, Cywilizacja bizantyńska (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2000), pp. 173–174.

F. Koneczny, O wielości cywilizacji (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2000), p. 342.

F. Koneczny, Prawa dziejowe (Londyn: Towarzystwo im. Romana Dmowskiego, 1982), p. 76.

F. Koneczny, Cywilizacja żydowska, vol. 3 (Londyn: Towarzystwo im. Romana Dmowskiego, 1974), p. 409.

J. Szczepanowski, Paradygmat cywilizacyjny jako zasadniczy element koncepcji historiozoficznych Feliksa Konecznego i Oswalda Spenglera (Warszawa: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych UW, 2013); Z. Pucek, “Koncepcje cywilizacyjne Feliksa Konecznego na tle tez humanistyki przełomu antypozytywistycznego,” in Filozofia i religia w kulturze narodów słowiańskich, eds. T. Chrobak, Z. Stachowski (Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej, 1995), pp. 113–127.

P. Milcarek, “Świętość w dziejach ludzkich w ujęciu Feliksa Konecznego,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, ed. J. Skoczyński (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2000), pp. 225–230.

I. Chłodna-Błach, Od paidéi do kultury wysokiej (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2016), pp. 15–24.

The West gives to all human culture, and also to civilization, one analogous goal, i.e. human perfection, which a person can possess because of being a beautiful and good, real man. Beauty and goodness are basically the result of being chastised, improved by virtue. For more about this, see Powszechna encyclopedia filozofii, vol. 5, s.v., “Kalokagathia,” pp. 444–447; see also Powszechna encyclopedia filozofii, vol. 1, s.v., “Arete,” pp. 318–325 and “Aertologia,” pp. 325–329.

This issue was developed by Feliks Koneczny’s student Anton Hilckman in his rich creative work, see: T. Stępień, Europa wobec cywilizacji. Antona Hilckmana porównawcza nauka o cywilizacjach. Zasady – Metoda –Zastosowanie (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2013).

L. Gawor, O wielości cywilizacji: filozofia społeczna Feliksa Konecznego (Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 2002).

F. Koneczny, O wielości cywilizacyj (Kraków: Gebethner i Wolff, 1935), pp. 167–277.

This, of course, does not interrupt the existence of God’s Providence and God’s action throughout the entirety of history.

F. Koneczny, Państwo i prawo w cywilizacji łacińskiej (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 1997); M.A. Krąpiec, O ludzką politykę (Katowice: Wydawnictwo “Tolek”, 1993).

F. Koneczny, Rozwój moralności (Lublin 1938: Towarzystwo Wiedzy Chrześcijańskiej), pp. 342–371.

F. Koneczny, Rozwój moralności. Koneczny showed moral progress and its manifestations, which ultimately lead a man to the “culture of action,” that is, a voluntary and rational moral life based on a proper good.

Koneczny, like Thomas Aquinas, accepted that all science and art are assigned to human perfection, which ultimately is the happiness of man: Omnes autem scientiae et artes ordinantur in unum; scilicet ad hominis perfection, quae est eius beatitudo, St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s “Metaphysics”, proemium; M. Graban, “Supremacja sił duchowych w cywilizacji łacińskiej,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 145–151.

F. Koneczny, O wielości cywilizacyj, op. cit.; M.A. Krąpiec, Suwerenność – czyja? (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 1996), pp. 176–197.

A. Robaczewski, “Quincunx jako odbicie klasycznej teorii osoby,” Człowiek w Kulturze 10 (1998), pp. 43–48.

For more about this, see P. Skrzydlewski, Polityka w cywilizacji łacińskiej. Aktualność nauki Feliksa Konecznego (Lublin: Fundacja Rozwoju Kultury Polskiej, 2002), pp. 33–66.

Today we also have to see the action of the Arab civilization, as well as the Chinese and Brahminic; cf. J. Jaśkowski, “Sytuacja w Polsce w świetle nauki Feliksa Konecznego,” in F. Koneczny, Kościół jako polityczny wychowawca narodu (Gdańsk: Franciszkański Ruch Ekologiczny, 1997), pp. 30–39; J. Skoczyński, “Feliks Koneczny 1862–1949,” in Złota Księga Wydziału Historycznego UJ, ed. J. Skoczyński (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2000), pp. 146–150; I. Białkowski, Idea ścierania się cywilizacji według Feliksa Konecznego a bezpieczeństwo współczesnej Europy (Krzeszowice: Dom Wydawniczy “Ostoja”, 2007).

F. Koneczny, O cywilizację łacińską (Lublin: Onion, 1996), pp. 10–11.

P. Gondek, “Rola Kościoła w kulturze polskiej. Na marginesie prac Feliksa Konecznego,” Człowiek w Kulturze 10 (1998), pp. 87–96.

P. Tarasiewicz, Spór o naród (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2003).

“Each Catholic mission carries with it four demands: perpetual monogamy, the aspiration to abolish slavery, the liquidation of revenge, and finally the independence of the Church from state power in the name of the independence of the spiritual factor from physical strength.” F. Koneczny, Kościół a cywilizacje (Lublin: Onion, 1996), p. 37; see also F. Koneczny, O cywilizację łacińską (Lublin: Onion, 1996).

S. Wyszyński, Duch pracy ludzkiej (Włocławek: Księgarnia Powszechna, 1946). 

P. Skrzydlewski, “Praca człowieka a zniewolenie pracą i terror pracy z perspektywy realistycznej antropologii filozoficznej,” Człowiek w Kulturze 17 (2005), pp. 73–84.

“If this goal could be achieved by the power of human nature, then showing the way to it would be the duty of the king. We assume that we call the king this person, who has been entrusted with the highest rule in human affairs. … However, because the goal of connection with God will not be achieved by human power, but by God, leading to this ultimate goal is not the task of human government.” Św. Tomasz z Akwinu, “O władzy,” in Św. Tomasz z Akwinu, Dzieła wybrane, trans. J. Salij (Poznań: W drodze, 1994), p. 152.

M.A. Krąpiec, “Rozważania o narodzie,” Człowiek w Kulturze 1 (1993), pp. 5–37; M.A. Krąpiec, “Państwo jako rozumny ład dobra,” Człowiek w Kulturze 10 (1998), pp. 5–12.

For the study of these issues I am primarily using the following publications: F. Koneczny (ed.), Polska w kulturze powszechnej. Część I. Ogólna (Kraków: Krakowska Ekspozytura Biura Patronatu dla Spółek Oszczęd. i Pożyczek, 1918); F. Koneczny, Polskie Logos a Ethos. Roztrząsanie o znaczeniu i celu Polski, vols. 1–2 (Poznań: Księgarnia św. Wojciecha, 1921); F. Koneczny, Życie i zasługi Adama Mickiewicza (Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk – Marcin Dybowski, 2009); see also K. Gajda, “Naukowe ambicje Feliksa Konecznego,” in Krytycy teatralni XX wieku. Postawy i światopogląd, ed. E. Udalska (Wrocław: Wiedza o Kulturze, 1990), pp. 40–51; K. Gajda, “Koneczny o dramatach Wyspiańskiego,” Annales Academiae Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Historicolitteraria 5 (2005), pp. 85–93.

F. Stefczyk, “Słowo wstępne,” in Polska w kulturze powszechnej. Część I. Ogólna, ed. F. Koneczny (Kraków: Krakowska Ekspozytura Biura Patronatu dla Spółek Oszczęd. i Pożyczek, 1918), pp. XII–XIII.

F. Koneczny, “Warunki pracy kulturalnej w Polsce porozbiorowej,” in Polska w kulturze powszechnej. Część I. Ogólna, p. 369.

Ibidem, p. 407.

S. Jojczyk, “Relacja państwo – społeczeństwo u Feliksa Konecznego,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, ed. J. Skoczyński (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2000), pp. 245–253.

F. Koneczny, “Warunki pracy kulturalnej w Polsce porozbiorowej,” in Polska w kulturze powszechnej. Część I. Ogólna, pp. 372–373; see also P. Grabowiec, Model społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w historiozofii Feliksa Konecznego (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2000).

F. Koneczny, O pajdokracji (Krzeszowice: Dom Wydawniczy “Ostoja”, 2006).

F. Koneczny, “Warunki pracy kulturalnej w Polsce porozbiorowej,” in Polska w kulturze powszechnej. Część I. Ogólna, pp. 374–408; see also Z. Pucek, “Ojczyzna jako postać cywilizacyjnego ładu,” in Rozmyślania o cywilizacji, eds. J. Baradziej, J. Goćkowski (Kraków: Baran and Suszczyński, 1997), pp. 195–209.

F. Koneczny, Życie i zasługi Adama Mickiewicza, pp. 5–6.

Ibidem, pp. 5–29.

R. Piotrowski, “Filozofia wychowania u Konecznego,” in Polskie ethos i logos, ed. J. Skoczyński (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2008), pp. 115–118.

F. Koneczny, “Rzut oka na polskie dzieje gospodarcze,” in Polska w kulturze powszechnej. Część I. Ogólna, p. 268; see also J.B. Serafińska, Filozofia kultury Feliksa Konecznego (Warszawa–Krosno: Wydawnictwo Armagraf, 2014); P. Jaroszyński, “Kultura i cywilizacja. Od Cycerona do Konecznego,” Człowiek w Kulturze 10 (1998), pp. 13–29.

F. Koneczny, “Rzut oka na polskie dzieje gospodarcze,” in Polska w kulturze powszechnej. Część I. Ogólna, p. 269; see also R. Piekarski, “Prymat etyki w życiu publicznym. Dyskusja tezy Konecznego,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 231–242; P. Karaś, “Wątki ekonomiczne w twórczości Feliksa Konecznego,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 259–264.

A. Robaczewski, “Quincunx jako odbicie klasycznej teorii osoby,” Człowiek w Kulturze 10 (1998), pp. 43–48.

F. Koneczny, Życie i zasługi Adama Mickiewicza, pp. 7–8.

F. Koneczny, Polskie Logos a Ethos. Roztrząsania o znaczeniu i celu Polski, vol. 1, p. 200.

Ibidem, p. 201.

F. Koneczny, Teatr krakowski. Sprawozdania 1896–1905, ed. K. Gajda (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe WSP, 1994), p. 343.

F. Koneczny, Życie i zasługi Adama Mickiewicza, p. 7.

Ibidem, p. 8.

F. Koneczny, Polskie Logos a Ethos. Roztrząsania o znaczeniu i celu Polski, vol. 1, p. 195.

Ibidem, p. 198ff.

F. Koneczny, Życie i zasługi Adama Mickiewicza, pp. 9–12.

Ibidem, pp. 12–14.

K. Gajda, Świat krytycznoteatralny Feliksa Konecznego (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pedagogicznej w Krakowie, 2008).

P. Biliński, Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949). Życie i działalność (Warszawa: Inicjatywa Wydawnicza “Ad astra”, 2001), p. 59.

The significant value of Koneczny’s work in this area is emphasized, among others, by J. Michalik, Dzieje teatru w Krakowie w latach 1893–1915 (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1987), pp. 250–251; see also Z. Raszewski, Sto przedstawień w opisach polskich autorów (Wrocław: Wiedza o Kulturze, 1993), p. 13; J. Tarnowski, “Konecznego aksjologia dzieła sztuki teatralnej,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 265–272.

F. Koneczny, Teatr Krakowski. Sprawozdania 1896–1905, pp. 7–8; see also R. Węgrzyniak, [review of: F. Koneczny, Teatr Karkowski. Sprawozdania 1896–1905. Przedmowa wybór i opracowanie K. Gajda], Pamiętnik Teatralny 45, no. 1/2 (1996), pp. 211–214.

F. Koneczny, Teatr Krakowski. Sprawozdania 1896–1905, p. 188.

Ibidem.

Ibidem, p. 86.

Ibidem, p. 220.

Ibidem, p. 167; K. Gajda, Świat krytycznoteatralny Feliksa Konecznego, pp. 15–23.

F. Koneczny, Teatr Krakowski. Sprawozdania 1896–1905, p. 15.

K. Gajda, “Feliks Koneczny: Szekspir dla teatru czy teatr dla Szekspira?” in Szekspir wśród znaków kultury polskiej, eds. E. Łubieniewska, K. Latawiec, J. Waligóra (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego, 2012), pp. 316–328.

K. Gajda, Świat krytycznoteatralny Feliksa Konecznego, pp. 52–60.

F. Koneczny, Teatr Krakowski. Sprawozdania 1896–1905, pp. 91–104.

K. Gajda, Świat krytycznoteatralny Feliksa Konecznego, pp. 121–130.

F. Koneczny, Teatr Krakowski. Sprawozdania 1896–1905, p. 103.

J. Skoczyński, Koneczny. Teoria cywilizacji (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, 2003), p. 176.

Z. Pucek, “Feliksa Konecznego zarys nauki o cywilizacji,” Zeszyty Naukowe WSE, no. 46 (1972), pp. 21–45; Z. Pucek, “Teoria pluralizmu cywilizacyjnego,” in Szkice z historii socjologii polskiej, ed. K. Sowa (Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, 1983), pp. 155–188; Z. Pucek, Pluralizm cywilizacyjny jako perspektywa myśli socjologicznej. Na przykładzie poglądów Feliksa Konecznego i Floriana Znanieckiego (Zeszyty Naukowe AE, no. 94) (Kraków: Akademia Ekonomiczna, 1990).

M. Pawlikowski, Dwa światy (Londyn: Komitet Wydawniczy Dwa Światy, 1952), p. 20.

M. Poradowski, Talmud czy Biblia? (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo “Fulmen”, 1993), p. 138; M. Poradowski, Dzieje cywilizacji europejskiej (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo “Norton”, 2007).

P. Bezat, Teoria cywilizacji Feliksa Konecznego (Krzeszowice: Dom Wydawniczy “Ostoja”, 2002), p. 117; see also T. Stępień, Europa wobec cywilizacji. Antona Hilckmana porównawcza nauka o cywilizacjach: zasady, metoda, zastosowanie (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2013).

F. Koneczny, On the Plurality of Civilisations (London: Polonica Publications, 1962), Preface, pp. VII–VIII.

R. Marszałek has shown the priority given to Koneczny in many issues in relation to Toynbee’s research; see R. Marszałek, Ex oriente dux. Idea jedności Słowian a historiozofia polska i europejska XIX i XX wieku (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2015), p. 199.

W.M. Dianowa, “Filozofia historii Feliksa Konecznego: swoistość i paralele znaczeniowe,” in Myśl polska w obszarze rosyjskojęzycznym, ed. J. Skoczyński (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2016), p. 100.

J. Floud, [reviews of: The Evolution of Civilization: An Introduction to Historical Analysis. By Carroll Quigley. New York: The Macmillian Company, 1961. pp 248. On the Plurality of Civilisations. By Feliks Koneczny. London: Polonica Publications, 1962. pp. 348], History and Theory 4, no. 2 (1965), pp. 271–275.

R.W. Wescott, “The Enumeration of Civilization,” History and Theory 9, no. 1 (1970), p. 59–85.

L. Gawor, Katastrofizm w polskiej myśli społecznej i filozofii 1918–1939 (Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 1999), pp. 164–172; L. Gawor, O wielości cywilizacji. Filozofia społeczna Feliksa Konecznego (Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 2002); L. Gawor, Szkice o cywilizacji (Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, 2009), pp. 49–70, 87–89, 118–120; L. Gawor, W poszukiwaniu rozumienia bytu społecznego człowieka. Filozofia polska końca XIX wieku i w XX stuleciu (Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, 2015), pp. 143–164.

J. Skoczyński, Idee historiozoficzne Feliksa Konecznego (Kraków: Wydawnictwo UJ, 1991); J. Skoczyński, “Trzecia droga (O metodzie historiozoficznej Feliksa Konecznego),” Historyka 18 (1988), pp. 57–70.

J. Skoczyński, Koneczny. Teoria cywilizacji, p. 175; J. Skoczyński, “Huntington a Koneczny,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 103–110.

J. Skoczyński, Koneczny. Teoria cywilizacji, p. 175; J. Skoczyński, “Huntington a Koneczny,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 103–110.

A. Skorupka, Idea cywilizacji na tle kryzysu filozofii XX wieku (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Naukowe “Śląsk”, 2010), pp. 153–206.

B. Szczepanik, “Analiza porównawcza pojęć «cywilizacja» i «kultura» u Feliksa Konecznego i Oswalda Spenglera,” Studia z Filozofii Polskiej 4 (2009), pp. 239–252; J. Szczepanowski, Paradygmat cywilizacyjny jako zasadniczy element koncepcji historiozoficznych Feliksa Konecznego i Oswalda Spenglera (Warszawa: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych UW, 2013).

P. Biliński, “Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949) – szkic biograficzny,” Arcana 3 (2000), pp. 187–212; P. Biliński, Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949). Życie i działalność (Warszawa: Inicjatywa Wydawnicza “Ad astra”, 2001); P. Biliński, “Feliks Karol Koneczny – droga do kariery akademickiej,” Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki 50, no. 1 (2005), pp. 95–115.

“Will we survive? It depends on ourselves, on our hope and attitude, on our concrete action in the will’s pursuit towards a good that is difficult to obtain; that is, on our struggle for values, for the victory of the Latin civilization, otherwise known as Western civilization.” J.B. Serafińska, Filozofia kultury Feliksa Konecznego (Warszawa–Krosno: Wydawnictwo Armagraf, 2014), p. 95.

A.M. Nowik, “Tomistyczne ujęcie genezy państwa u Feliksa Konecznego,” Doctrina. Międzynarodowy przegląd humanistyczny 9 (2012), pp. 203–209.

M. Czyżkiewicz, “Cele prawa w cywilizacji łacińskiej,” Cultura Christiana 1 (2012), pp. 59–68.

P. Grabowiec, Model społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w historiozofii Feliksa Konecznego (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2000).

W. Szurgot, Prawo jako fundament cywilizacji łacińskiej w myśli Feliksa Konecznego (Krzeszowice: Dom Wydawniczy “Ostoja”, 2007).

E. Olszówka, “Rozważania o związkach cywilizacji i pracy ludzkiej w twórczości Feliksa Konecznego i Stanisława Brzozowskiego,” Universitas Gedanensis 45 (2013), p. 7–20.

P. Skrzydlewski, Polityka w cywilizacji łacińskiej. Aktualność nauki Feliksa Konecznego (Lublin: Fundacja Rozwoju Kultury Polskiej, 2002); P. Skrzydlewski, Wolność człowieka w cywilizacji łacińskiej w ujęciu Feliksa Konecznego (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2013).

M. Czyżkiewicz, “Etyka w cywilizacji łacińskiej,” Cultura Christiana 1 (2012), pp. 69–76.

E. Olszówka, “Generalia etyczne w filozofii społecznej Feliksa Konecznego,” Studia z Filozofii Polskiej 4 (2009), pp. 253–259.

P. Gondek, “Rola Kościoła w kulturze polskiej: na marginesie prac Feliksa Konecznego,” Człowiek w Kulturze 10 (1998), pp. 87–96.

A. Tylki-Szymańska, “Kościół katolicki wobec cywilizacji w Europie według teorii Feliksa Konecznego,” Studia nad Rodziną 7, no. 2 (2003), pp. 187–192.

R. Piekarski, “Znaczenie doświadczenia sacrum w filozofii cywilizacyjnej F. Konecznego, A. Toynbeego i E. Voegelina,” Pieniądz i Więź. Kwartalnik Naukowy Poświęcony Problematyce konomicznej, Prawnej i Społecznej 20, no. 1 (2017), pp. 7–19.

M. Szczęsny, “Rola chrześcijaństwa w tworzeniu cywilizacji łacińskiej według Feliksa Konecznego,” Studia Teologiczne: Białystok, Drohiczyn, Łomża 20 (2002), pp. 377–400.

M. Kuriański, “Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949) o stosunku religii do cywilizacji,” Perspectiva: Legnickie Studia Teologiczno-Historyczne 9, no. 1 (2010), pp. 96–117.

P. Milcarek, “Świętość w dziejach ludzkich w ujęciu Feliksa Konecznego,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, pp. 225–230.

T. Łysiak, “Święci narodu polskiego,” Gazeta Polska 44 (2017), pp. 86–88.

A. Wybraniec, “Zemsta w ujęciu Feliksa Konecznego, św. Tomasza z Akwinu i Jana Jakuba Rousseau. Porównanie problematyki,” Człowiek w Kulturze 24 (2014), pp. 361–378.

R. Polak, Cywilizacje a moralność w myśli Feliksa Konecznego (Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2001).

K. Pol, “Z dziejów nauki prawa administracyjnego i nauki o samorządzie terytorialnym: Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949),” Samorząd Terytorialny 5 (2003), pp. 70–77.

A. Maślach, “Konecznego wizja Europy,” Nowa Myśl Polska 31 (2003), p. 9.

Among other works, see J. Kossecki, Podstawy nowoczesnej nauki porównawczej o cywilizacjach. Socjologia porównawcza cywilizacji (Katowice: Wydawnictwo “Śląsk”, 2003); J. Kossecki, Naukowe podstawy nacjokratyzmu (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo “Har FOR”, 2014); J. Kossecki, Metacybernetyka (Warszawa: Narodowa Akademia Informacyjna, 2015).

I. Białkowski, Idea ścierania się cywilizacji według Feliksa Konecznego a bezpieczeństwo współczesnej Europy: koncepcje, które powracają jak bumerang (Krzeszowice: Dom Wydawniczy “Ostoja”, 2007).

S. Lisiecki, “Feliks eurosceptyk,” Czterdzieści i Cztery 2 (2009), pp. 328–342.

R. Polak, “Nauka Feliksa Konecznego o cywilizacjach a idea zjednoczonej Europy,” in Od Christianitas do Unii Europejskiej: historia idei zjednoczenia Europy, eds. Ł. Święcicki, A. Wielomski (Warszawa: Towarzystwo Naukowe Myśli Politycznej i Prawnej, 2015), pp. 117–140.

J.B. Serafińska, “Stan acywilizacyjny,” Akant, no. 6 (2013), pp. 16–18.

M. Węcławski, “O jedność w rozmaitości. Z filozofii społecznej Feliksa Konecznego,” Studia Philosohica Wratislaviensia 8, no. 4 (2013), pp. 19–38.

M. Wałach, “Średniowieczne starcie o rząd dusz nadal aktualne,” Myśl.pl. Pismo Społeczno-Polityczne 4 (2013), pp. 153–155.

A. Skorupka, “Teoria ‘mieszanek cywilizacyjnych’ Feliksa Konecznego,” in Gospodarka i społeczeństwo w europejskiej perspektywie. Problemy funkcjonowania sektora publicznego i gospodarczego w warunkach zmian, ed. I. Seredocha (Elbląg: Elbląska Uczelnia Humanistyczno-Ekonomiczna, 2017), pp. 57–72.

S. Chrost, “Czy możliwe jest mieszanie kultur? Refleksje o integracji kulturowej w pracy na kanwie teorii cywilizacji Feliksa Konecznego,” in Praca socjalna wobec wyzwań współczesności, vol. 2, eds. E. Bojanowska, M. Kawińska (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Kontrast, 2016), pp. 61–72.

B. Wiśniewska-Paź, “Szwajcaria jako fenomen wśród państw Europy ukształtowanych w cywilizacji zachodniej: w perspektywie koncepcji Feliksa Konecznego,” in Kulturowe uwarunkowania bezpieczeństwa personalnego i społecznego, eds. T. Grabińska, Z. Kuźniar (Wrocław: Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska Wojsk Lądowych, 2017), pp. 213–239.

K. Gajda, “Koneczny o dramatach Wyspiańskiego,” Annales Academiae Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Historicolitteraria 5 (2005), pp. 85–93; K. Gajda, Świat krytycznoteatralny Feliksa Konecznego (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pedagogicznej w Krakowie, 2008).

A. Giza, Neoslawizm i Polacy 1906–1910 (Szczecin: Wydawnictwa Naukowe WSP, 1990).

P. Biliński, “Feliks Koneczny jako badacz dziejów Rosji i Europy Wschodniej,” Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 38 (2003), pp. 227–246.

R. Polak, “Feliks Koneczny wobec Rosji i jej cywilizacji,” Cywilizacja 15 (2005), pp. 82–101; R. Polak, “Konecznego ocena relacji polsko-rosyjskich,” Cywilizacja 16 (2006), pp. 119–140.

A. Skorupka, “Rosja w kontekście teorii cywilizacji Feliksa Konecznego,” Archeus 14 (2013), pp. 199–215.

A. Ćuk, “Idea słowiańska w ujęciu Feliksa Konecznego,” Studia z Filozofii Polskiej 4 (2009), pp. 261–275.

K. Błachowska, “Feliks Koneczny jako historyk Rosji: podstawy koncepcji,” Klio Polska 6 (2012), pp. 169–196.

M. Filipowicz, Wobec Rosji. Studia z dziejów historiografii polskiej od końca XIX wieku po II wojnę światową (Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2000), p. 76.

P. Szczudłowski, “Niemcy w oczach Feliksa Konecznego,” Życie i Myśl 4 (1998), pp. 27–40.

P. Skibiński, “Bizancjum na Zachodzie. Niemcy w historiozofii Feliksa Konecznego,” Fronda 17–18 (1999), pp. 22–47.

P. Schuppe, “Bizantynizm niemiecki według historiozofii Feliksa Konecznego,” Studia Sandomierskie 20, no. 2 (2013), pp. 209–216.

M. Kuriański, Cywilizacja bizantyjska w ujęciu Feliksa Konecznego (1862–1949). Studium historyczno-teologiczne (Legnica: Biblioteka Diecezji Legnickiej, 2013).

R. Polak, “Dzieje Polski w ujęciu Feliksa Konecznego na podstawie jego syntez historycznych,” Wschodni Rocznik Humanistyczny 9 (2013), pp. 303–321.

A. Dworczyk, “O odnowę łacińskiego Zachodu. Feliksa Konecznego okcydentalna wizja dziejów Polski,” Sprawy Wschodnie 11, no. 1–2 (2006), pp. 49–68; A. Dworczyk, “O odnowę łacińskiej Europy. Polska historiozofii Feliksa Konecznego,” Szkice Humanistyczne 17, no. 1 (2017), pp. 29–44.

P. Jaroszyński, “Kultura i cywilizacja. Od Cycerona do Konecznego,” Człowiek w Kulturze 10 (1998), pp. 13–29; P. Jaroszyński, “Cywilizacja łacińska wobec naporu emanatyzmu,” Człowiek w Kulturze 6–7 (1995), pp. 101–115.

H. Kiereś, Osoba i społeczność (Lubin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2013), p. 231.

A. Maryniarczyk, “Osoba – rodzina – naród a Europa,” Człowiek w Kulturze 17 (2005), pp. 159–164.

J.B. Serafińska, Filozofia kultury Feliksa Konecznego, pp. 85–86.

J. Sośnicka, “Nie warto żyć bezmyślnym życiem”. Filozoficzne refleksje nad tym, co ważne (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Politechniki Łódzkiej, 2016), p. 130. There is no lack of positions that are critical of the cognitive value and veracity of Koneczny’s main theses: see e.g. S. Bukowska, Filozofia polska wobec problemu cywilizacji. Teoria Feliksa Konecznego (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2007), p. 124; “Koneczny … unmercifully, but also tendentiously and selectively, traces these deviations of Western civilization. Selectively, because it satisfies his anti-German phobias.” A. Piskozub, “Miejsce Feliksa Konecznego w polskim wkładzie w rozwój nauki o cywilizacji,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, p. 73; “The concept of Russian history … is a perfect example of a theory based on preconceived assumptions.” J. Kolbuszewska, “Konecznego koncepcja dziejów Rosji,” in Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj, p. 197.

M.A. Krąpiec, Człowiek i polityka (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2007), p. 242.