Jacek

Woroniecki

Publishing Series

THE POLISH CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE 20TH CENTURY

Mieczysław Gogacz

Stanisław Kamiński

Kazimierz Kloskowski

Kazimierz Kłósak

Feliks Koneczny

Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec

Piotr Lenartowicz

Tadeusz Styczeń

Tadeusz Ślipko

Józef Tischner

Karol Wojtyła

Jacek Woroniecki

Zofia Józefa Zdybicka

The Companion to the Polish Christian Philosophy in the 20th Century

Scientific Board

Artur Andrzejuk

Tadeusz Biesaga SDB

Józef Bremer SJ

Piotr Duchliński

Rev. Grzegorz Hołub

Rev. Jarosław Jagiełło

Adam Jonkisz

Rev. Jan Krokos

Anna Latawiec

Anna Lemańska

Damian Leszczyński

Rev. Ryszard Moń

Zbigniew Pańpuch

Ewa Podrez

Paweł Skrzydlewski

Rev. Jan Sochoń

Krzysztof Stachewicz

Rev. Kazimierz M. Wolsza

Rev. Władysław Zuziak

Editorial Board

Rev. Maciej Bała

Piotr Stanisław Mazur

https://pchph.ignatianum.edu.pl

Jacek

Woroniecki

Piotr S. Mazur

Barbara Kiereś

Ryszard Skrzyniarz

Agata Płazińska

Ignatianum University Press

Krakow 2019

© Copyright by Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie, 2019

Texts by Jacek Woroniecki OP

© Copyright by Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej

This publication was financed within the frame of the Minister of Science and Higher Education programme: “Monuments of Polish philosophical, theological and social thought

of the 20th and 21st century,” conducted in 2016–2020.

Project no. 0033/FIL/2016/90

Editor of the volume

Piotr S. Mazur

Reviewers

Artur Andrzejuk

Ryszard Polak

Supervising editor

Roman Małecki

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Bożena Małecka

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I. JACEK WORONIECKI OP: PERSON AND WORK

List of Abbreviations of the Works of Jacek Woroniecki OP

CEE – Katolicka Etyka Wychowawcza [The Catholic Educational Ethics].3 vols. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2013.

CPP – “Program pedagogiki katolickiej”[Catholic Pedagogy Program], in Pedagogika Katolicka. Zagadnienia wybrane. Edited by A. Rynio, pp. 15–36. Stalowa Wola: Wydział Nauk Społecznych KUL, 1999.

CT – Katolickość tomizmu [The Catholicity of Thomism]. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 1999.

DPM – “Rozwój osobistości człowieka. Dynamiczny aspekt personalizmu”[The Development of the Personalence of a Man: A Dynamic Aspect of Personalism],in Wychowanie człowieka. Pisma wybrane, pp. 59–92. Kraków: Znak, 1961.

Ethics – “Etyka”[Ethics], in Zarys filozofii. Praca zbiorowa.Vol. 2, pp. 179–281. Lublin: Towarzystwo Wiedzy Chrześcijańskiej, 1929.

FCC – U podstaw kultury katolickiej [At the Foundations of Catholic Culture]. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2002.

FTMF – “Podstawy nauki o małżeństwie i rodzinie”[The Foundations of Teaching on Marriage and Family],in Wychowanie człowieka. Pisma wybrane, pp. 212–247. Kraków: Znak, 1961.

HS – “Nawyk czy sprawność”[Habit or Skill], in Wychowanie człowieka. Pisma wybrane,pp. 33–58. Kraków: Znak, 1961.

NS – Quaestio disputata de natione et statu civili. O narodzie i państwie [Quaestio disputata de natione et statu civili: On Nation and State]. Translated from Latin into Polish by R. Maliszewski. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2004.

PP – “Paedagogia perennis. Św. Tomasz a pedagogika nowożytna”[Paedagogia perennis: St. Thomas and Modern Pedagogy], Przegląd Teologiczny 5 (1924), pp. 143–160.

PTFChTM – “Podstawy filozoficzne i teologiczne chrześcijańskiej nauki o małżeństwie”[The Philosophical and Theological Foundations of the Christian Teachings on Marriage], in U podstaw kultury katolickiej, pp. 71–108. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2002.

RLCPI – “Życie religijne współczesnej inteligencji polskiej”[The Religious Life of the Contemporary Polish Intelligentsia], in U podstaw kultury katolickiej, pp. 23–70. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2002.

SGGO – Umiejętność rządzenia i rozkazywania [The Skill of Governing and Giving Orders]. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2016.

SU – W szkole wychowania. Teksty wybrane [In the School of Upbringing: Selected Writings]. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2008.

SUSW – “Wychowanie społeczne i praca społeczna”[Social Upbringing and Social Work], Prąd 9, no. 1–2 (1921), pp. 13–22; no. 3–4, pp. 58–73.

UM – Wychowanie człowieka. Pisma wybrane [The Upbringing of Man: Selected Writings]. Kraków: Znak, 1961.

1. LIFE AND SCHOLAR ACTIVITY

Jacek Adam Woroniecki was born on December 21, 1878 to Duke Mieczysław Woroniecki and Countess Marianna Drohojewska; at his baptism he received the names Adam (his grandfather’s name), Marian (after his mother), Tomasz (which was prophetic), Pius and Leon. He was the second child from a large family and spent his childhood on his father’s estate in Kanie, in the vicinity of Chełm (in the Lublin region). From 1892, he attended the 4th all-boys Gymnasium in Warsaw, where he also participated in clandestine Polish language and history lectures. It was during this period that he developed an enduring interest in the humanities and natural sciences. He received his high school diploma [matura] in 1898 and subsequently opted to join a military academy, from which he graduated with the rank of ensign of the cavalry (cornet).¹

After completing one year of service in the Grodno Hussar Regiment, he left in 1899 for Freiburg, Switzerland, where he studied the natural sciences and, later, theology and philosophy. During his stay in Switzerland he became acquainted with the work of the Dominican friars who were professors at the University of Freiburg, individuals who influenced his later decision to join the priesthood. It is there that he received a Bachelor of Science in natural sciences, in 1902, and in 1905 a Bachelor of Arts in theology. In the same year he entered the Lublin Seminary, where he was ordained the following year. The studies and the intense activities of the future Dominican led to exhaustion, which affected his health and resulted in vagotonia—an illness of the vagus nerve—that he suffered from until the end of his life.²

Considering his vocation for religious life would occupy his mind ever more frequently. During a trip around Italy, he felt compelled to enter the Dominican Order upon visiting the cell of St. Dominic in Rome (on December 24, 1907). In 1909, he left for Switzerland again where he defended his doctoral thesis in theology entitled Les principes fondamentaux de la sociologie thomiste at the University of Freiburg. In the same year, after his father’s death, he began his novitiate at the San Domenico di Fiesole cloister near Florence run by the Dominican Order and assumed the religious name of Jacek. On October 11, 1911 he took his perpetual vows in Düsseldorf and was appointed as the spiritual father and viceregent of the theological boarding school in Freiburg.³

From 1914, Jacek Woroniecki taught ethics at the Dominican priory in Krakow. He was accepted on the History of Philosophy Commission at the Polish Academy of Learning. In 1918, he took up the mission to revive religious life in Poland by spreading awareness among the members of the Polish intelligentsia about their tasks and obligations.⁴ In 1919, he was appointed as professor of moral theology and ethics at the Catholic University of Lublin, where he became involved in the process of hiring specialists in the field of humanities and the natural sciences. Between 1922 and 1924, he was the rector of the Catholic University of Lublin and in 1928 he became its vice-rector. As a professor and rector, he contributed to the development of the Catholic University of Lublin, which he saw as becoming a center of the official teaching of the Church, namely Thomism; he was ultimately thwarted in this venture due to external circumstances. He participated in talks at the Ministry of Religious Beliefs and Public Enlightenment to secure support for the Catholic University of Lublin. He was the founder of the Friends of the Catholic University of Lublin Association as well as the Saint Thomas Aquinas Society, which was created to fund fellowships to enable priests to study abroad. Furthermore, it was on his initiative that the university building was expanded. He was the patron of the Religious Studies Club, a student association which took on the task of deepening religious, philosophical and ethical knowledge. In order to get the youth involved in the Catholic missionary endeavor, in 1927 he established the Academic Missionary Club.⁵

Proficiency in several foreign languages enabled Woroniecki to publish his works in international journals, as well as correspond with numerous European universities. In 1929 he became Chair of Moral Theology at the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas (Angelicum) in Rome, and a year later he received its highest possible scholarly title: master of sacred theology. He left the Holy City due to the progressive deterioration of his health. In 1932, he founded the Jesus and Mary Dominican Missionary Nuns Congregation, wanting to keep this fact a secret. The purpose of the congregation was the Christianization of Russia which had been overwhelmed by communist ideology.  From 1933 he performed the duties of the rector of the Philosophical-Theological Dominican College in Lwow (Lviv), where he lectured on moral theology, patristics and Church history. He ensured a high intellectual level among his future brethren by initiating and participating in the construction of a cloister-college of the Dominican friars in Warsaw. Between 1937 and 1939, he lectured at that institution, performing the duty of rector and dedicating his time to editorial work for the Szkoła Chrystusowa [Christ’s School] journal. When World War II broke out, Father Woroniecki was in Krakow, where he remained until the end of his life. Initially he gave sermons and lectured on moral theology and canon law; however, due to his deteriorating health, he devoted himself to writing on philosophical matters, especially in the field of ethics, pedagogy and the history of the Church. During his residence in Krakow, he established the St. Augustine Society and he  organized the monasterial archive. He passed away with what was deemed a saintly reputation on May 18, 1949. He was buried in the Dominican Order tomb in the Rakowicki Cemetery in Krakow and in 1960 his remains were moved to St. Hyacinth’s Church in Warsaw.⁶ His beatification process began on December 7, 2004 in Krakow.

Father Jacek Woroniecki left behind significant accomplishments that continue to make a substantial contribution to Polish intellectual life. He was considered an authority in the fields of theology, religion and Catholic life, as well as an excellent educator. He was also renowned for his piety and had an immense impact on the formation of the Polish intelligentsia, especially in the inter-war period.⁷

Publications

Among Jacek Woroniecki’s most important works are: Historia katolickiej akcji społecznej w XIX wieku [The History of the Catholic Action in the 19th Century] (Lublin 1906), Metoda i program nauczania teologii moralnej [The Method and Program of Teaching of the Moral Theology](Lublin 1922), Około kultu mowy ojczystej [On the Cultivation of the Language of the Fatherland](Lwów 1925), Umiejętność rządzenia i rozkazywania [The Skill of Governing and Giving Orders](Poznań 1947,1992, 2001, 2016), U podstaw kultury katolickiej [At the Foundations of Catholic Culture](Poznań 1935, 2002, 2013), Nawyk czy sprawność. Centralne zagadnienie pedagogiki katolickiej [Habit or Skill: The Central Problem of Catholic Pedagogy](Wilno 1939, Kraków 1961), Hagiografia, jej przedmiot, trudności i zadania w Polsce. Rzecz o świętych polskich [Hagiography, Its Subject, Difficulties and Tasks in Poland: On Polish Saints](Kraków 1940), Św. Jacek Odrowąż i wprowadzenie Zakonu Kaznodziejskiego do Polski [Saint Hyacinth, O.P. and the Introduction of the Order of Preachers to Poland](Kraków 1947), Błogosławiony Czesław dominikanin (1175[?]–1242) [The Blessed Ceslaus, O.P. (1175[?]–1242](Opole 1947).

The Dominican philosopher was also the author of many academic articles, among others: O stosunku moralności do religii  [On the relationship of morality to religion] (Warszawa 1911), Studium nad kardynalną cnotą roztropności [Study on the cardinal virtue of prudence] (Wilno 1923), Ofiarność społeczna i warunki jej rozwoju [Social generosity and conditions for its development] (Lublin 1923), Paedagogia parennis. Św. Tomasz a pedagogika nowożytna [Paedagogia parennis:St. Thomas and Modern Pedagogy](Lublin 1924), Katolickość tomizmu [The Catholicity of Thomism](Lublin 1924, 1938, 1999, 2010, 2011), Życie religijne współczesnej inteligencji polskiej [The Religious Life of the Contemporary Polish Intelligentsia](Warszawa 1926, Lublin 2002), Moc i wartość spekulatywnych cech tomizmu [The Power and Value of the Speculative Traits of Thomism](Lwów 1927), Ogólne podstawy filozoficzne i teologiczne chrześcijańskiej nauki o małżeństwie [The General Philosophical and Theological Foundations of the Christian Teachings on Marriage](Lublin 1928, 2011), Nauka św. Tomasza o gorliwości [St. Thomas’s Teachings on Ardour](Warszawa 1936), Moralność a religia [Morality vs. Religion](Lwów 1944, Lublin 2002).

Altogether, Woroniecki wrote about 199 works that were published yet numerous works remain in the form of manuscripts and typescripts in the Archive of the Polish Province of the Dominican Order in Krakow. Among his scholarly accomplishments there are works on philosophical, ethical-pedagogical and theological issues. His philosophical interests focus especially on the issues of upbringing, ethics and morality, society and politics. He was against the separation of philosophy from theology and pedagogy from philosophy, linking the latter especially with ethics. He treated philosophy as an autonomous sphere of inquiry in relation to the positive sciences, based on metaphysics and anthropology, and practiced in a social manner. He stands in opposition to cognitive individualism and subjectivism. He places a particular emphasis on the issue of the upbringing of people, as well as pedagogy, stressing their lasting connection to Catholic philosophy, by which he meant Thomism. He indicates the significance of the potentialized human being in upbringing as well as the role of the cardinal virtues: prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice. In the social realm he stresses the role of natural communities: monogamous marriage, the family, nation and state. As a theologian, he rejected moral casuistry and taking up the issue of divine mercy, instead preaching the necessity of a religious and patriotic upbringing.⁸

In his research Woroniecki remained under the enormous influence of St. Thomas Aquinas, something which was evident in almost all his works. His publications from the field of ethics and pedagogy indicate his in-depth study of Aquinas’s writings. He believes that the thought of the author of the Summa theologiae is characterized by universalism, for it was formulated as a synthesis of humanity’s hitherto scholarly accomplishments and it is constantly open to what is truewith respect to the scope of the entire human cognition. It makes it possible not only to avoid the errors of individualism and subjectivism when practicing philosophy, but it is also open for further progress, ultimately serving the good of the human being. He considers Thomistic realism to be the best method of cognizing objective truth. Being grounded in this system he refers simultaneously to the classics of philosophy, among others Aristotle, and his contemporaries, seeking inspiration among them as well as disputing them on a variety of issues. In his considerations he often used examples from daily life, literature and history.⁹

An overview of the most significant publications

In Historia katolickiej akcji społecznej w XIX wieku [The History of the Catholic Action in the 19th Century](Lublin 1906)Woroniecki analyzes the historical background and development of this social movement throughout history. He also underlines the role played by the social activities of the Catholic Church, the intense development of which took place in the 19th century. He dedicates particular attention to the difficulties of the expansion of Catholic Action in Poland which due to historical circumstances could not develop to such an extent as in Western Europe.

Katolickość tomizmu [The Catholicity of Thomism] (Lublin 1924, Warszawa 1938, Lublin 1999) which he wrote for the 600th anniversary of the canonization of St. Thomas Aquinas, sheds light on the particularities of the Angelic Doctor’s philosophy. The author emphasizes the universalist nature of Aquinas’s doctrine, explaining the significance of his approach for the cognition of the objective existence of the world and stressing his input in the intellectual heritage of humanity. This universalism is linked with the social practice of philosophy, which is different from the individualistic concept of practicing philosophy, specific for modern and contemporary thinkers. St. Thomas’s teachings surpass the existing philosophical systems. It is impossible to ascribe them to theological categories and doctrines. Woroniecki indicates the origins and the reasons for which St. Thomas Aquinas’s teachings should be linked to and interpreted in reference to the Gospel. By the “Catholicity” of Thomism, he understands not only the connection of that system with Christ’s teachings, but also the universalism of Aquinas’s thought.

Pełnia modlitwy.Studium teologiczne dla inteligencji [The Fullness of Prayer: A Theological Study for the Intelligentsia](Poznań 1924, 1935, 1982, 1988, Kraków 1997, Lublin 2000)is an analysis of the character of Catholicism in Poland. In this book he accuses the social elites that they lack the fullness of Christian faith, the reason for which is their susceptibility to other intellectual trends. In this study he lays out detailed teachings on prayer, questioning the Fideist, Quietist, Jansenist, sentimentalist as well as individualistic interpretation of religious phenomena. He places emphasis on the significance of prayer which he perceives as the revival of religious life. Grounding his theses in Thomas Aquinas’s thought, he stresses the need to combine the practice of daily life with prayer in order to endow it with power and durability.

Woroniecki’s most significant philosophical work is Katolicka Etyka Wychowawcza [The Catholic Educational Ethics](Etyka ogólna [General Ethics],vol. I, Poznań 1925; Etyka ogólna [General Ethics], vol. I, Etyka szczegółowa [Applied Ethics], vol. II, Kraków 1948; Etyka ogólna [General Ethics], vol. I, Etyka szczegółowa [Applied Ethics],vol. II/1, II/2, Lublin 1986, 1995; Etyka szczegółowa [Applied Ethics],vol. I–III, Lublin 2013)containing a meticulous analysis of man’s moral life as manifested in the following spheres: theological, ethical, and pedagogical. The crux of the work is to show the indissolubility of the relationship between moral improvement and man’s upbringing which is focused on the religious life of the human being, derived from his reason and will. The improvement of these powers is required both by the integration of the corporal-biological life with the personal life as well as the actualization of the potentiality situated in human nature. The formation of natural skills is linked with the readiness of man to open himself up to the influence of the supernatural. Woroniecki considers upbringing to be a social process in which some people form the personality of others as well as themselves. Katolicka Etyka Wychowawcza [The Catholic Educational Ethics] can be considered a work in the field of philosophy, moral theology and pedagogy.

In Quaestio disputata de natione et statu civili. O narodzie i państwie [Quaestio disputata de natione et statu civili: On the Nation and State](Piacenza 1926, Lublin 2004) Woroniecki focuses on the issue of the role of the state and nation in human life. He understands the natural moral-customary bond, through which members of a community influence other people, as aiding one another in personal development.

In the article “Moc i wartość spekulatywnych cech tomizmu”[The Power and Value of the Speculative Traits of Thomism](Lwów 1927)Woroniecki emphasizes that the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas occupy a distinct position in the history of human thought. Because of its role in the teaching of the Church, it has been exposed to much criticism and many negative remarks. One of the sources of this misunderstanding is the dispute on the speculative and positive method in theology and philosophy. When refuting critical accusations in reference to the teachings of Thomas Aquinas, he states that his teachings was based on cognizing the being. According to Woroniecki, Thomism is a speculative study which is characterized by realism, a source of which is the observation and cognition of reality. It is also a philosophical study which undertakes meticulous inquiry into the structure of reality, looking for its essential reasons. Woroniecki states that the speculative theology is the analytical inquiry of truths of the Catholic faith, in order to build particular norms of human action on their basis.

Ogólne podstawy filozoficzne i teologiczne chrześcijańskiej nauki o małżeństwie [The General Philosophical and Theological Foundations of the Christian Teachings on Marriage] (Lublin 1928, 2002)were dedicated to the topic of marriage and the factors that lead to the weakening of relations between spouses. Woroniecki emphasizes the social character of marriage which is most fully realized by having children and raising them appropriately. When writing on the significance of marriage as a sacrament, he refers to St. Paul’s Letter to the Ephesians. He states that marriage is characterized by sanctity which is not only the symptom of distinct Divine grace, but it is the reason for this grace. In the social sphere marriage is a contract which is agreed upon between the spouses. Through this contract the act of mutual sacrifice of the spouses takes place.

U podstaw kultury katolickiej [At the Foundations of Catholic Culture](Poznań 1935, Lublin 2002) is a collection of articles and papers delivered at conferences where the author grapples with the broadly understood issue of religious-moral culture. Referring to Thomistic philosophy, he points to the most significant Polish moral vices which weaken the spirit of the nation and hamper its progress. He expresses his objections towards fideism, individualism, and sentimentalism which have deformed Polish religiosity. In his opinion, the fundamental role in religious life is played by the Catholic sensibility which manifests itself in objectivism and universalism. At the same time, he criticizes subjectivism, which leads to spiritual selfishness.

Nawyk czy sprawność. Centralne zagadnienie pedagogiki katolickiej [Habit or Skill: The Central Problem of Catholic Pedagogy](Wilno 1939, Kraków 1961) is a treatise discussing the issue of human upbringing which is to a greater extent based on the development of skills rather than habits. Woroniecki describes the two eponymous issues in a very detailed manner, indicating the differences between them and their mutual dependencies. He believes that the entire study on upbringing should be reconsidered and understood anew taking these two issues into consideration. According to Thomas Aquinas’s understanding of pedagogy the study of skills has a central position.

In his article “Moralność a religia”[Morality vs. Religion] (Lwów 1944, Lublin 2002)Woroniecki discusses the issue of the mutual relationship between morality and religion. In his view, this frequently causes many misunderstandings between the supporters of independent ethics. At the heart of his reasoning he places the concepts of natural and supernatural order. He poses himself the question of whether natural morality is possible without reference to a supernatural religion and he replies that, without morality supported by religion, the human being is not able to fully understand one’s actions.

Umiejętność rządzenia i rozkazywania [The Skill of Governing and Giving Orders](Poznań 1947, Wrocław 1992, 2004, Lublin 2016) is about the manner of governing, which is connected with the responsibility for the realization of the common good as well as the pursuit of the community’s development. According to Woroniecki it is supposed to teach the art of managing one’s actions as well as those of third parties, both in the aspect of the effectiveness of this governance as well as the obedience to moral rules. The author emphasizes the role of giving orders which are inseparably connected with moral, divine and human law that draws its mandate from those. He treats it as a part of the virtue of prudence which is an improvement on the practical reason that directs human action. In his work he also discusses the issues of discipline and reprimands.

In his article “Rozwój osobistości człowieka” [The Development of the Personalence of a Man] (Kraków 1961) he confronts the problem of the human person as a being endowed with a potentialized nature. The dynamic aspect of the personal status of the human being is personality which is the result of the actions of the spiritual powers: the intellect and the will. Personalence¹⁰, in turn, is perfection resulting from such an improvement of the actions of these powers that respect the dignity of the human person.

2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The life of Jacek Woroniecki was filled with formational, educational and scholarly and administrative work. The context of this activity was set against the background of significant historical events, and it was dedicated entirely to renewing the life of Europe and reminding us of its forgotten cognitive foundations. He fulfilled this goal by referring to the philosophical and theological heritage of European culture and engaging in disputes with those trends which, as he believed, had distorted the logos and ethos of the vernacular civilizational and cultural tradition.

Civilizational transformations and the Catholic revival

Among the historical events of particular significance for Europe and its culture were: World War I, which brought about the downfall of empires and monarchies as well as the emancipation of enslaved nations; the Russian revolution and the triumph of the Bolsheviks; Poland regaining its statehood in 1918; the 1919–1921 Polish-Bolshevik war as well as World War II with its political consequences for Poland and Europe.

According to Woroniecki, all of the events from the French revolution to World War II are, in fact, a consequence of Europe’s departure from its original tradition, of which the most significant cognitive achievement and world-view expression is what he calls Christian philosophy, consisting of Catholic realist philosophy and theology. The knowledge contained within it must be restored to Europe, and especially to the newly independent Poland, and one must also indicate the intellectual currents that spring from the tradition of philosophical idealism and distort the image of the world and, most of all, disfigure the image of man with its anthropological reductionisms.

Woroniecki’s scholarly, didactic and social activities draw most of all from the spirit of the renewal of Catholic culture initiated in the 19th century, in which the key role was played by popes Pius IX, Leo XIII, Benedict XV, Pius X and Pius XI. In this teaching he clearly stresses the postulate for the need for the Church to return to the tradition of cognitive realism and most of all to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Thus, Pius X and Benedict XV in the Code of Canon Law (Can. 1366, par. 2; Can. 589, par 1) emphasize that the study of philosophy and theology should “firmly follow the doctrine, principles and method of the Angelic Doctor and follow them faithfully,”¹¹ which Pius XI, in turn, expresses in the encyclical Studiorum Ducem: “the Church has adopted his philosophy for her own.”¹² Similarly Leo XIII, in his famous encyclical Aeterni Patris, calls out: “ite ad Thomam,” while Pius X in 1914 encompasses the basic truths of Thomistic thought in the form of 24 theses.¹³ 

Woroniecki was inspired by the guidelines of the popes and, thanks to his studies on the philosophy of St. Thomas as well as through commenting on his thought, he discerned its crucial qualities: realism and cognitive objectivism; historicism, that is the inclusion of the accomplishments of tradition within philosophy and theology as well as universalism. Therefore, he stated with conviction that St. Thomas’s teaching constitutes a “synthesis of thought of the entire humankind.”¹⁴ It encompasses the entirety of Catholic thought “both within the realm of faith as well as philosophy,” and it thus creates the aforementioned Christian philosophy, which constitutes the foundation of what Woroniecki calls a sensus catholicus (Catholic instinct).¹⁵

The abandonment of Christianity and the birth of ideology

The aforementioned process of European culture abandoning its civilizational roots, of departing from Christian culture, or more precisely—Catholic culture, began during the Renaissance and deepened as a result of the Reformation, Enlightenment, Positivism and finally Romanticism.¹⁶ The reason for this was philosophical idealism and the ideology of modernism which sprang from it. Thinkers such as René Descartes, Francis Bacon, Jean Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant contributed to this process. It was as a result of the Renaissance that Europe began to lose its intellectual unity, a consequence of which was the negation of the accomplishments of tradition, or antihistoricism. This thought was initiated in European philosophy by Descartes, according to whom philosophy and all science in general must be started “anew” and be endowed with a critical character, which later in the line of thought of Rousseau started to mean “as one wishes,” that is according to a private view on the world and man.¹⁷ As Woroniecki writes:

from the two employers of the modern intellectuality Bacon stated that the thinkers of times past must be treated as children, who cannot think yet in a serious manner, whereas Descartes with his principle of universal doubt and his contempt for history recommended pondering philosophical problems in ways that have not been thought of before … [L]et us still add to that J.J. Rousseau, who stated that in all disputable issues one must lean towards the claims which contradict universally accepted convictions.¹⁸

From an epistemological perspective, this means moving the objective of scientific cognition from the real world to the human being, who is the eminence of his own cogito-I think which determines the criteria of the validity of cognition. In this way subjective idealism is born, in light of which the individual human being is a specific cognitive-mental absolute being. The result of this turn was the negation of the world’s cognizability, reducing knowledge to subjective cognitive patterns of consciousness, to mere constructs of the mind. The aforementioned human absolutizing, or even deification, is consequently completed by anthropological voluntarism: all human beings randomly create their own visions of the world based on their own cognitive patterns and afterwards implement this vision into real life. Voluntarism, therefore, leads to subjectivism in the realm of practical human activity, especially in the sphere of morality and religion. As Woroniecki concludes, in this way the ideology of modernism is born, the political manifestations of which are socialism (Bolshevism, Nazism) as well as liberalism, immensely harmful a priori social systems, where each of them, regardless of the cost of lives, wishes to liberate the human being and grant him happiness.¹⁹ 

Woroniecki set himself the task of reviving the memory of the cognitive heritage of European culture, to create the cognitive and moral foundation of Catholic culture in Poland, as well as to educate the Catholic intelligentsia after years of partitions and systematic denationalization. In pursuit of this goal he undertook a critical analysis of philosophical idealism, pointing to its historical roots and identifying all of the idealist “-isms” which he felt had contaminated European culture and Polish intellectual life. According to Woroniecki, spiritual work in this reborn country should focus on the following goals: rebuilding social institutions and state structures; brining up a new generation; and especially on educating the clergy, which is connected with his care for the institutional Church; and, finally, on the reflection on the particularly significant social strata of the intelligentsia, on its mentality and role in national and social life.

The intellectual state of the intelligentsia

When Woroniecki became involved in the discussion on the spiritual state of the Polish intelligentsia, he primarily claimed that the state of its mentality and its ethos did not differ substantially from the intellectual condition of the European intelligentsia of the late 19th and early 20th century. The criterion of the assessment of the European intelligentsia, as well as the Polish, is its stance towards Christianity and religion. Woroniecki appealed to this criterion, convinced that religion and its doctrine determines the issue of the ultimate destiny of human life and, as a result, forms the moral sphere, i.e. the sphere of human action towards other people and the common good. Taking this into consideration he distinguishes three distinct groups among the intelligentsia: declared enemies of Christianity, declared Catholics, as well as—as he calls them—“the undecided mass” that in times of crisis manifests its attachment to the tradition and faith of the forefathers, but on the other hand is easily susceptible to various ideological manipulations, the consequences of which are various behaviors discordant with the rules of Christian ethics. According to Woroniecki one must not devote too much time to currents which are hostile towards Christianity, because as he states: “our opponents do not have any strength of their own, their power is in our weakness.”²⁰ Nevertheless all of these sources of weakness of the religious faith of the Polish intelligentsia should be enumerated and their sources indicated, that is the various intellectual currents which have been dominant in the life of Europe for the past several centuries.

Woroniecki agrees with Stanisław Brzozowski’s opinion that “Catholicism practically does not play any role in the lives of enlightened laymen.”²¹ Alluding to this opinion he adds that religion is for the majority of the Polish intelligentsia “some venerable relic from childhood or family and national traditions.”²² Just like Henryk Sienkiewicz, he describes its religious life as “life in the mist.” As he assumes, one of the reasons for this spiritual collapse was the political situation of Poland in the 19th century, and, what went along with this, the low level of education, especially religious education, lack of clergy, especially those with a university degree. On the other hand, in modern times intellectual currents and political developments appeared in Europe that were hostile towards religion and Christian culture. This process resulted in the emergence of various pseudo-philosophical, i.e. ideological, “-isms,” which left a mark on the stance of Europeans towards religion and Christianity.

Idealistic fideism

One can assume that the axis of Woroniecki’s polemic with the idealist tradition consists of fideism, sentimentalism and individualism. The first defect of European, and thus also Polish, religiosity and, consequently, mentality, was fideism. Its beginning should be linked to philosophical rationalism (Descartes), which during the Enlightenment and especially in the ideology of the French revolution attained the status of the “divine cult of human reason.”²³ According to Woroniecki fideism emerged from the noble, yet instinctive defense of faith, and at the same time from the rightful prejudice towards the pretenses of rationalism, but it completely succumbed to the erroneous conviction of the independence of religious faith from reason, which constitutes the essence of this position. Fideism appeared in the form of so-called traditionalism (Louis Gabriel Ambroise de Bonald, Jean-Marie de la Mennais) or simply of extreme irrationalism. The Holy See condemned its doctrine twice: in 1840 and 1870, when it stated that “faith should be grounded in reason and use its natural light and power, and reason should be directed by revealed truths, which it cannot delve into on its own and which it should consider to be true by an act of faith.”²⁴

Another important reason for the presence of fideism in Polish culture was the emigration of many renowned Poles after the partitions and the failures of national uprisings. First of all, those Poles were influenced by the wave of irrationalism spreading throughout Europe. Romantic poets had a particularly large impact:

A lot has been said about their religiosity, or as it has been usually described—religious feelings; however, I am not aware of anyone examining the philosophical basis of their religious beliefs. I presume that one can find a substantial dose of fideism in it, combined with an even larger dose of sentimentalism. For example, Mickiewicz’s poem Reason and faith is a “fideist manifesto” per se, which explains his lack of resistance to Tovianism.²⁵

Nevertheless, Woroniecki acknowledges that Polish fideism does not bear the traits of modernist ideology. At the foundations of the Polish form of fideism lay various arguments that “faith, in order to be of merit, should necessarily be blind,” or that “rationalizing issues of faith leads to rationalism and Protestantism.” It also adheres to the irrational principle credo quia absurdum (Tertulian), and, finally, it spreads the false opinion that irrationalism and sentimentalism are inherent features of Polish mentality. What is characteristic is that, as Woroniecki stresses, this opinion is rather common for many scholarly studies.²⁶ 

Woroniecki’s assessment of fideism in unequivocal. He describes it as “thoughtlessness elevated to the status of a principle,” the product of intellectual laziness and cowardice. Among its practical consequences (Woroniecki often draws upon the argument from the real consequences of the criticized view) is not only the inability to defend the Catholic faith, but most of all the inability to defend Christian culture; it is the selfishness and indifference to the neighbor’s wellbeing. Fideism poisons human life with subjectivism, deprives the aforementioned sensus catholicus of its rational foundation and makes the religious sphere bereft of objective and socially significant justifications.²⁷

Idealist sentimentalism

One of the forms of fideism is sentimentalism which reduces religious faith to the realm of emotions. It has been known since the Greek antiquity and its contemporary representative is Rousseau, the propagator of extreme irrationalism. The cultural sphere where sentimentalism became particularly prevalent was romantic literature, which helped to expand the use of the term “feeling” to nearly all mental phenomena, e.g. feeling of warmth and cold, hunger, tooth or stomach aches, fear, sadness, etc. And also, to religion, because religious life becomes reduced to an enactment of feelings.²⁸ What is worse, similarly as in the case of fideism, sentimentalism identifies the entirety of human spiritual life with feelings, it speaks of “logical feelings,” or the necessity of taking a “clearly emotional position” with respect to the life of a nation or in reference to nationalism. It practically becomes the only method of scientifically interpreting conscious human life and its relation to the world and culture.

Woroniecki admits that both fideism and sentimentalism played a significant role in the religious revival of European culture at the beginning of the 19th century, because they were a reaction both to rationalism and positivism which denied theology the right to the scientific domain, considering its theses and all statements of religious nature as nonsensical; nevertheless, he adds that at the turn of the 19th and 20th century sentimentalism “became one of the philosophical foundations of modernism.”²⁹ This ideology both in its theological version and in the general opinion states that the source of all religion is the religious feeling that “springs from the dark depths of subconsciousness through carnal immanence.”³⁰ Woroniecki adds that although many writers and thinkers indicate the presence of sentimentalism in the lives of contemporary Poles (Stanisław Wyspiański, Henryk Sienkiewicz), it is completely unjustified to link Polish religiosity with fideism and sentimentalism, for both of them, especially sentimentalism, “were a common disease which affected the Catholic world in the first half of the 19th century.” Although it was already condemned by the Church and is declining to a large extent, it still lingers, especially in Poland, through inertia, as an unconsciously and passively inherited left-over from a past period.³¹

Sentimentalism also leads human lives astray towards subjectivism and selfishness. It is also the aftermath of philosophical irrationalism which extends the struggle of human existence between reason and the realm of sensual experiences and feeling and thus impoverishes human life by eliminating its power, which is the will. Its acts have an objective character for the will is linked to reason. The effect of this relation is the “ability to draw the human being out of the claustrophobic realm of one’s desires and drive him to creative acts, the ability to join with the effort of other humans in one whole.”³² The sentimentalist infection is based on the degradation of the will to the primacy of sensual experiences and feelings, i.e. on the bestialization of human life. Woroniecki underlines that the emphasis placed on the primacy of the will or, speaking more precisely, on human rational choices does not mean that the emotional sphere must be excluded from human life—as it is postulated by e.g. the stoics or Immanuel Kant. The emotional sphere is connected with the human sensual life and as such it requires to be nurtured.³³ 

Idealistic individualism

Another trait of European mentality, including Polish mentality, is individualism, which similarly to fideism and sentimentalism is not a Polish invention, but came to Poland from Western Europe due to the Reformation and French revolution, and contaminated the entire Latin tradition. The evil of individualism is caused by its particularism, i.e. by ignoring the assumption that “the progress of knowledge is most of all a social function.”³⁴ The reaction to anthropological individualism, that is social liberalism and anarchic tendencies, were socialism and communism (forms of anthropological collectivism), which reduce the human being to a unit, that is to somebody who only numerically differs from other similar units, and completely subordinate his or her being to a superior statist ideology.

In Woroniecki’s opinion, the social group most affected by individualism is the European intelligentsia, including the Polish one. It severed itself off from social bonds, it does not understand tradition, especially the role of Catholic culture in forming the aforementioned unitas ordinis, that is social unity. The European thought of the beginning of the 20th century is depraved in a variety of ways. The consequence of individualism is intellectualism and probabilism in the moral sphere, resulting in social indifference which preaches lofty slogans of tolerance that conceal, in fact, “selfish humanitarianism.” The peculiar resentment to the European tradition and especially to its key element—Christian culture—is, therefore, unsurprising. This is the reason why it is pushed to the margin of social life, into the realm of private life, thus rejecting its universal character.³⁵

Religious revival

Woroniecki notices symptoms of the revival of religious life in Western Europe (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, or Germany). He places a lot of hope in the institution of the Catholic Action, he sees in it the power to unite the nation and revive its social life around common goals. This task is particularly important in the reborn Polish state. Because of that he elaborates philosophical and theological foundations of the Catholic Action. Along the way he draws attention to the necessity of teaching philosophy, he criticizes history of philosophy textbooks which are “limited to inventorying philosophical systems and acknowledging the novelty of their creators, but so little interested in answering the question about where the truth lies,” yet that question—crucial for the human existence—found its excellent solution in the tradition of realist philosophy.³⁶ He recalls the realist theory of social life (Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas) in accordance with the teaching of the Catholic Church, judging that the urgent task is to socialize Polish people. One of the topics of Woroniecki’s writings is the problem of social generosity. He explains why generosity (traditionally: charity) is an essential social virtue. He considers generosity as such to be one of the key criteria of social service, describing it within the notion of “enlightened patriotism” or simply “the service to God and the Homeland.”³⁷ He emphasizes that the purpose of all generosity must be genuine, which means that it must realize actual social needs; he also criticizes so-called statism that paralyzes the grass-roots social initiatives and invokes social passivity. This passivity is expressed in the opinion that all generosity belongs to the obligations of the state. The state itself, in turn, should not hamper civic initiative with bureaucratic decrees.³⁸ An example of such paralysis is the state’s monopoly over schooling which consequently is “not only an immense burden to the budget, but also smites the development of private initiative, which due to the spiritual development of schooling, and due to its material foundations cannot be replaced by anything.”³⁹

Woroniecki believes that these issues require for individual citizens and society as a whole to realize the role of the state in social life as well as its obligations, and on the other hand to be aware of the duties which one must fulfill with his or her personal initiative and that are important for the social organism.⁴⁰ A means to the socialization of citizens is the return to classical ethics of social life. Its foundations lay in social virtues, especially the cardinal virtues: justice, temperance, fortitude and prudence. Their opposites are asocial vices: avarice, greed, miserliness and lust for material goods.⁴¹ 

Although Fr. Jacek Woroniecki lived in exceptionally difficult times, he stood up to their challenge with the aid of his broad knowledge and fortitude. Thanks to his accurate diagnosis he analyzed them thoroughly, and while using the cognitive resources of European culture, that is the tradition of philosophical realism and the Catholic interpretation of theology, he recalled its conceptual foundations. What is more, thanks to his polemic with intellectual idealism he enhanced classical anthropology, especially the ethics of communal life. His diagnosis of the logos and ethos of European culture is accurate not only with regards to his times, but continues to be relevant today.

3. CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY

Jacek Woroniecki’s concept of understanding philosophy—its subject, method and relation to other domains of knowledge—has a realistic character. The application of Thomism to Woroniecki’s philosophy is not only a result of Woroniecki considering Aquinas’s particular theses on God, the world and human beings to be real, but he also observes advantages of the Thomistic manner of philosophizing. Thomism advocates for the autonomous practice of philosophy, i.e. with regards to the positive sciences, and a maximalist one, situating metaphysics, which investigates the primal as well as ultimate reasons of being, in the center of its inquiry.⁴²

The universalism of Thomism

According to Woroniecki the first distinct feature of Thomism is the Catholicity of that system, the second one is the social character of philosophizing, and the third one—the connection between philosophy and the revealed truth. Catholicity should not be mistaken with religious affiliation, although he considers such a correlation to be natural and in a particular way he proposes to philosophize within the context of the Christian faith.⁴³ Nevertheless, Catholicity is for him predominantly a synonym for universalism which is simultaneously a description of the hitherto manner of practicing philosophy within scholastics, as it is a postulate for resolving fundamental philosophical issues. When analyzing Woroniecki’s approach to Thomism, Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec states:

In ancient Greek “KATHOLOU” means that which is common, universal, necessary, in opposition to that which is individual, unnecessary, particularistic. “Thomism” is not understood in this case as some closed system of thought which must be “learned”—but as a vivid drive of human cognition to cognizing the necessary factors of reality.⁴⁴

In Woroniecki’s opinion the universal character of Thomism is derived from the social manner of philosophizing, in which one gradually reaches the objective cognition of truth thanks to the effort of many thinkers:

It is enough to gaze into St. Thomas’s works, in order to see how profusely he drew from the treasury of knowledge, collected by humanity of the past generations and how many truths, deeply pondered by the most ingenious minds of centuries past, did he directly incorporate into his synthesis.⁴⁵

This explicit change in the manner of philosophizing, according to which it is not a “social function” anymore, but a variation of individualism calling for the “acquisition of knowledge by one’s own ways,” opposing tradition in this way, is detrimental to both philosophy and philosophers.⁴⁶ The obvious primacy and perfection of collective cognition can be, in Woroniecki’s opinion, noticed in the context of doctrines of early modern thinkers, such as Bacon, Descartes or Kant, often original, yet contaminated with subjectivism. Because of individualism “the history of modern philosophy presents an image of complete chaos, entirely bereft of a unitary plan and clear keynotes as well as subject to such a frequent tossing from one side to the other.”⁴⁷ The consequences relate not only to modes of cognition, but its results. While socially practiced philosophy gradually leads to encompassing all of the truth accessible to mankind, solitary philosophizing only makes it possible to cognize it in part, without the possibility of verification and because of that it is prone to errors or discovering things that have already been known.⁴⁸ The universalism of the classic approach to philosophy also finds its reflection in reference to truth itself, which once cognized ceases to be individual property and thus becomes common property of all humanity.⁴⁹ As a result of such an approach, Woroniecki’s understanding of Thomism is expanded. Thomism makes it possible to integrate extreme and unilateral conceptualizations, simultaneously enabling the inclusion of everything into that system that is true in case of different concepts.⁵⁰ And this is why the relationship of this philosophy to other modes of philosophical cognition is ultimately the relation of the whole to its parts. Because of its universalism, Thomism is open to any cognition which approximates the truth and is thus capable of crossing boundaries of particularistic positions as well as to modify one’s own cognition. This openness causes that “the system of Christian philosophy is far from being accomplished, that, on the contrary, it presents unlimited possibilities for further development in all its branches.”⁵¹ Due to such an approach gradual progress in cognizing reality is possible.

As an ethicist and a pedagogue, Woroniecki linked with this type of philosophical practice a distinct form of ethos which opposed all of these dangers that are the result of particularism in the practice of philosophy. Instead of pursuing originality and separateness which leads to the elevation of a person above the cognizable truth, he proposes the subordination of cognizing to the most important purposes of human life, through the improvement of the will, which is diligence (studiositas).⁵² This trait is the golden mean between laziness and the relentless lust for power. The result of acquiring such moral improvement is the capacity of the human being to subordinate his or her individual inclinations to a purpose which is the pursuit of truth and thus the acquisition of the capability of the social practice of philosophy. Therefore, apart from the traits typical for philosophy Woroniecki adds an ethical-pedagogical element. Human cognitive efforts, including those connected with the practice of philosophy, are supposed to serve the human being’s personal development and simultaneously the fulfillment of his fundamental purpose in life. Cognizing the truth constitutes not only an intellectual requirement, but also a moral one, because truth is the good of the entire human person and not only of its intellect.

Subject of cognition

In his philosophy Woroniecki accepts St. Thomas’s principle according to which, for methodological reasons, one should discern between the natural order, accessible thanks to human cognitive capabilities, and the supernatural order, accessible thanks to Revelation. At the same time, like Aquinas, he believes that one should try to integrate the acquired cognitive results in order to reveal the truth in the most complete possible way. He assumes the consistency and compatibility of both types of cognition. This unity encompasses everything which relates to cognition as well as everything necessary for human action conditioned by this cognition. The close relationship of cognition and practical life, in which faith plays a fundamental role, constitutes for Woroniecki a stimulus both for the frequent supplementation of philosophical considerations with knowledge drawn from various domains of theology as well as the opposite, including philosophical conclusions into the order of faith. For this reason, he sharply criticizes, for instance, religious fideism. In Woroniecki’s opinion the changes which took place in early modern philosophy lead to the formation of two traditions of philosophizing, in which one tried to maintain the unity of philosophy with faith and theology and the other (independent ethics) in a more or less conscious manner attempted to breach this relation. At least in the realm of ethics this led to the erosion of both currents and to hampering its positive development as a result of disputes conducted between them. Woroniecki also emphasizes that both currents “had to bear, in the field of ethics, the same setbacks, springing from the same sources, the same mental substrate, from which all modern culture has been developed.”⁵³ He considers these sources to be moral intellectualism and individualism. Despite recognizing the close relationship between faith and philosophy, he is the supporter of the autonomy of philosophical cognition not only in relation to theology, but also in reference to the positive sciences.

In the classical manner of philosophizing, the foundations of which were laid by Aristotle, and that after centuries of developing it by many thinkers, was synthesized by St. Thomas, the fundamental role is played by objective cognition, “the initial object of which is being in itself, the same for everyone and subsequently the principle of universalism, … which requires for the acquisition of truths to be undertaken by the collective effort of all mankind.”⁵⁴ Being, in this view, is every existing entity which is internally compiled of essence and existence, matter and form, substance and accidents, act and potentiality. The concrete being is connected to other beings constituting reality by various types of relations, some of which are necessary and transcendental by nature. These relations, in particular, are sought for by metaphysics in order to explain the existing reality. The character of thus understood philosophy is succinctly described by Woroniecki’s student, Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, when stating that the object as well as the ultimate verifier of human cognition is “reality of the really existing world of persons and objects.”⁵⁵ Indeed, reality present in commonsensical cognition is the subject of philosophical cognition and at the same time an objective and universal measure of all of the undertaken cognitive efforts.⁵⁶ Metaphysics, on account of explaining reality given in sensual-intellectual cognition in the general existential as well as analogous aspect (being as being), acquires the status of the primal and most fundamental philosophical discipline.⁵⁷

The philosophical method

Woroniecki clearly discerns the theoretical and practical realm of Thomistic philosophical cognition which have a different subject, method, purpose and certainty of cognition. In case of theoretical knowledge which can be equated with Aristotelian theoria, cognition predominantly has an analytical character that allows achieving certainty of a metaphysical nature. In the practical sphere Woroniecki discerns theoretical-practical knowledge which is acquired thanks to the analytical method, granting metaphysical certainty. In the strictly practical sense practical-habitual knowledge appears, which is acquired with the aid of the synthetic method; it serves, just like the two earlier types, the cognition of reality per se, but because of its probabilism it does not provide any certainty. The type of knowledge which has the most practical character is the one about the actions that are accessible for the human intellect acquired in a synthetic manner and that while enabling us to act allow us to achieve moral certainty.⁵⁸ As one can easily notice, in the realm of philosophy Woroniecki supports the pluralism of cognitive methods with respect to the particular subject. At the same time, keeping in mind the specifics of cognition in particular domains, he sees the ultimate basis for all philosophizing and verification of cognitive output in metaphysics, ascribing it the highest rank of certainty.

Woroniecki explains his philosophical method, when he states that it is not enough to externally describe symptoms

… of beliefs, just as they have been signified throughout history and what is an important and interesting thing. Apart from that it is necessary to get to know the source, from which the beliefs on obligations and moral rights are derived, examine their grounding in human psychology, determine their relation with the major issues of the Universe and ultimately derive all of their consequences, both for the individual and society.⁵⁹

In a descriptive, practically colloquial language he encompasses all the essential properties of the classical manner of philosophizing. What is most essential in it is the encompassing (description) of the examined fact (being) in a complete manner, avoiding reductionism and pursuing its explanation by way of indicating its reasons and fundamental conditions. This sort of approach is typical for the metaphysical method, where one searches for the necessary and sufficient ontic reasons within the external structure and inter-being relations between facts given in experience and encompassed in the general-existential aspect.⁶⁰ This cognition is based on intellectual intuition, the expression of which is the commonsensical approach to reality: “as far as the basics of metaphysics go, then … it is most precisely connected with the doctrine of common sense and its role in the foundations of philosophical thinking.”⁶¹ 

Woroniecki believes that “common sense” should be present in all philosophical cognition, although he does not propose a more precise definition for it. This does not mean that issues connected with common sense can be arbitrarily interpreted, because in a fundamental aspect it is connected with the prudential approach to cognizing reality and the human being in particular. If a “commonsensical judgement” means for him “the proper reasoning in practical issues,”⁶² then analogously “common sense” should be connected with the proper reasoning in theoretical issues, delivered by metaphysical knowledge. In a way this commonsensical character of metaphysical cognition means a prudential type of knowledge that allows us to understand reality in its subordination to the primal and ultimate reasons of its existence. The basis of this approach is commonsensical cognition which despite its inherent errors contains a vast array of obvious facts that rule human rational life. This issue was elaborated by Krąpiec, who indicated the obvious character of the intuitive-sensual nature given in the form of judgements, e.g. “the whole is greater than its parts,” “one thing is not another.” In Krąpiec’s opinion these judgements are “the foundation of life and point of departure for all practical human actions.”⁶³ There are also commonsensical judgements accepted as intellectually obvious which grasp the basic principles of reality, e.g. “every entity is itself” (identity), “something cannot be and not be at the same time,” “that what is, has a reason for it.”⁶⁴ The third group of obvious propositions are constituted by commonsensical data which are the direct consequences of both orders. Woroniecki considers those to be general moral norms as well as fundamental elements of the human worldview—the existence of God and the soul.⁶⁵ The fundamental content of commonsensical data due to its obviousness is spontaneously affirmed by the human intellect and it requires its acceptance at a philosophical level. This cognition, though imperfect, is already a particular anticipation of the ultimate metaphysical conclusions.

Autonomy of philosophy

Although Woroniecki considers commonsensical cognition to be the basis for philosophical cognition, he does not negate the data acquired by the positive sciences. Nevertheless, he is for the full autonomy of philosophy with regards to the subject, purpose and method of cognition. This autonomy does not mean its isolation, but openness towards the positive sciences to such a degree that it makes it possible to better understand and explain philosophical problems in particular aspects of the philosophical reflection on the world and humanity. He acknowledges the necessity of studying, understanding and critically analyzing their cognitive output. In such an approach one does not acknowledge the primacy of the positive sciences with regards to philosophical cognition. However, the aspect of reality which they analyze may be a supplement or an enhancement of philosophical cognition. These sciences can be useful for philosophy to such a degree as they serve the universalized human cognition (historically, logically, systemically), becoming thus incorporated into philosophy. At the same time, they cannot deny the truthfulness of the cognitive results of metaphysics or other philosophical domains in that aspect in which the latter have objectivized knowledge of reality at their disposal. In general, one can say that Woroniecki is for the autonomy of the philosophical cognition of reality, but with a prudential reference to the cognitive output of the positive sciences, in the development of which he notices the positive approach of the human intellect to the complexity and diversity of reality.⁶⁶

Woroniecki supplies a model example of his manner of practicing philosophy and relating it to other domains of knowledge in his ethics, the realm of philosophy which he explored the most. The subject of ethics is the conscious and voluntary human action. He distinguishes ethics among other philosophical domains. He opposes the positivist philosophical approach in ethics which reduces it to narrowly apprehended facts with the omission of normative elements. The subject of philosophical cognition (the being) is not only the sphere of the narrowly understood sensual data, because “that, which ought to be, also belongs to the scope of being and should be examined as something that, in a particular way, is.”⁶⁷ Philosophy is not only supposed to examine sensual data, but also that which is grasped by reason in terms of external as well as internal experience.

The timeliness of Woroniecki’s concept of philosophy

In light of the contemporary negation of metaphysical cognition, the concept of understanding philosophy proposed by Woroniecki may be, at least in some aspects, considered archaic. Nonetheless, this verdict cannot be treated as final and objective, because it is relativized to the contemporary context of practicing arts and science, among others connected with the narrowing down of human cognition under the influence of naturalistic methodology, or the instrumentalization of that cognition. The negation of metaphysics within the realm of philosophy is not common and is not a result of the complete and ultimate questioning of the cognitive output acquired on account of it, which is signified by the fact that it is still practiced by philosophers, but also due to the fact that it is criticized. Regardless the discussion on the role and the timeliness of metaphysics, one must also emphasize the timeliness of many of Woroniecki’s postulates in reference to the way philosophy is practiced, such as the abandonment of particularism and subjectivism, the urge for the universalization of cognition, the striving for ascribing a prudential character to philosophical knowledge, as well as a greater focus on moral and ethical issues in the context of civilizational transformations and the danger of depersonalizing the human being in the social context. The issues that he discusses have an invariably timely character: the human condition, upbringing, culture, religion, social life as well as the state and politics, which can also provide intellectual inspiration nowadays, as long as the purpose of scholarly cognition is getting to know the truth and not originality per se. Most of all, his cognitive realism is still timely; it requires that philosophy ought to be directed towards explaining the existing reality and not creating one’s own ideas.

4. PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Woroniecki is a Thomistic personalist. His concept of the human being bears clear marks of this current, which include the emphasis placed on the personal status of the human being, the substantiality of his or her subjectivism and the multi-aspect complexity of his or her internal structure. These elements constitute the basis of Woroniecki’s philosophy, but they only partially determine its specificity. Similarly to any other philosopher belonging to a particular philosophical school, he imparts general solutions with his own understanding. The basic indicator of his concept is the emphasis on the multifold potentializations and, with that, the dynamicity of the human being. The ability to control and direct one’s own dynamism makes the actualization of the human being’s potential rely on oneself. However, it is not unrestricted, because the human being is morally responsible for the realization of the ultimate purpose ascribed to his or her personal life. The process of mastering the human being’s dynamism takes place gradually as an effect of the effort focused on improving and refining his or her internal dispositions. On account of this, the issues of morality and upbringing gained a central position in Woroniecki’s philosophy.

The potentialization of human nature

“Potentiality … rules over the entire human life; it rules both the relation of the world to the human being as well as the relation of the human being to the world and to oneself.”⁶⁸ The multifold potentialization of human nature is connected with the fact that human weakness is easy to notice in comparison with the natural world. Animals in their natural environment receive everything they need in order to be ready to function; they quickly obtain the necessary ability to cognize the world and, what’s more, they have an instinct that is required to effectively achieve the goal of their actions. For the human being, the world constitutes a distinct resource which he or she must transform into what is necessary for him or her through his or her labor. The human being is born without knowledge and the process of cognizing reality, understanding its rules as well as the relations taking place in the world is very slow. What is also unique is the slow, yet deeper, more systematic and wider ranging acquisition of knowledge by the whole of humanity. Finally, the human being is endowed with particular natural inclinations (to sustain and to pass on life) determining his or her actions; nonetheless, they need long-term “development, deepening and consolidation.”⁶⁹ What is more, apart from positive inclinations to do good, there is also an inclination to do evil that hampers human development and the formation of persistent inclinations in the form of virtues.

Woroniecki, similarly to Arnold Gehlen, distinguishes human uniqueness based on its biological shortcomings.⁷⁰ First of all, the human being is capable of transforming reality in accordance to his or her cognition, the range of which greatly exceeds everything that is necessary for biological survival. Through upbringing and long-lasting formation, the human being can manage his or her natural inclinations and in extreme conditions is even capable of overcoming them. On account of this he or she is a being in whose nature participates that what is biological, but over which biologism does not hold its absolute power. What is determined, encounters that what is independent from that determination. As a result, the human being “is able to direct not only externally his or her actions, but also the internal development of one’s personality.”⁷¹ The ability to direct one’s own actions and development results from the fact that humans are personal beings.

Person, personality, personalence

In the understanding of the person Woroniecki reaches for Boethius’s definition stating that it is “the subsistent individual of a rational nature, and thus capable of self-knowledge, self-governance, self-responsibility.”⁷² Subsistence is the basic trait of every individual (individuum) endowed with substantial unity (indivisibility in itself) and separateness from other individuals (indivisum in se et divisum ab aliis).⁷³ The human person differs from other types of being on account of his or her rational nature. The distinct factors of this nature which Woroniecki considers to be the ability to know oneself, governing oneself and being responsible for oneself, point to three fundamental human phenomena: intellectual cognition, freedom and morality. In each of them the transcendence of the human being over that which is biological and material manifests itself in him or herself (self-transcendence) as well as in reality. Woroniecki uses the term “person” to refer to the description of the ontic status of the human being as a distinct act, but when taking into account the potentiality of human nature and its dynamic-developmental profile he speaks of “personality” and “personalence.” Personality indicates the potentialized aspect of the life of the human person which is subject to development through human choices and the manner of self-guidance. It is expressed by subsistence and autonomy, due to which it can steer the actualization of a human being’s personal life.⁷⁴ Personalence, on the other hand, signifies the perfection which the development of the human being’s personality should ultimately aim at, on account of the personal status of the human being and his or her rational nature. Therefore, personalence has both a normative character towards all that is potentialized in the human person, because it requires for a human being to behave according “to a sense of responsibility for oneself.”⁷⁵ And thus, personalence means the maturity and ful-fillment of the personal life relevant to the being status of the human being.

Ontological structure

In his understanding of the structure of the human being, Woroniecki refers to Aristotelian hylomorphism. He considers the soul to be the factor (“element”) that organizes (the substantial form) matter into the body and vitalizes the body (the act), at the same time constituting a source of various acts performed with the assistance of the body, such as “motoric, physiological and even appetitive functions from the sensual domain.”⁷⁶ Apart from that he distinguishes the so-called immaterial acts, the properties of which (limitless scope) indicate that they are independently fulfilled by the soul, nonetheless, accompanied (accidentally) by the activity of sensual powers. This distinction plays a key role in the Thomistic understanding of the human being, serving the highlighting of the functional unity of processes of cognition and appetition on a sensual and mental level, manifesting itself in human experience and at the same time in the structural separateness of the order of his or her sensual life.

Integral development

The human soul, independently fulfilling mental activities, is from the ontic point of view an autonomous (incomplete), uncomplex (simple), immaterial (spiritual) and subsistent subject-substance.⁷⁷ It is a self-aware spiritual substance capable of cognizing things other than itself and relating to the subject in the form of desire or non-desire, appetite or non-appetite.⁷⁸ It is essentially potentialized and this potentialization indicates the necessity of actualization, becoming the reason for the dynamism of the human being. Its actualization encompasses the sphere of both existence and action. In the realm of existence, improvement can take place exclusively on a supernatural level, for in the natural order the soul is an act of being endowed with the ultimate perfection. Thanks to grace it can participate in the nature of God himself.⁷⁹ In the realm of action, spiritual potentialization encounters the corporal-biological potentializaton, becoming dependent on it.⁸⁰ The dynamisms that infer from them are governed by different rules and goals which at the point of departure do not assemble into a consistent rule of action. Although they originate from the same source as the soul or the complex spiritual-corporeal subject, i.e. substance, they are not integrated with each other, having a somewhat anarchic character. Woroniecki speaks “about the confusion of human nature with which we arrive in this world.”⁸¹ As a result, the human being encounters a challenge, regardless of whether he or she is aware of it or not; it is the challenge to harmonize these dynamisms as well as to assemble them in such a way as to realize both the particular purposes of their action and the ultimate purpose of his or her existence. The emphasis is placed on the potentialization of the human being and his or her dynamism, as well as on the fact that this dynamism delineates a realm for personal life, the realization of which requires a synthesis of various orders and different activities. By considering that potentialization with respect to spiritual (personal) life is greater than with respect to sensual life, Woroniecki makes a claim about their mutual dependency and direction.⁸² The dynamism of sensual life should be subordinated to the dynamism of personal life. Directing one’s personal life is much harder than in the case of biological life due to the scope of potentialization and it requires greater responsibility.

The integral development requires the inclusion of the presence of all dynamisms in human life: the dynamism of existence (open to the supernatural), personal dynamism (intellect and will), as well as biological dynamism, based on two fundamental natural inclinations: to preserve and transmit life.⁸³ Among these dynamisms, the most important role is played by personal dynamism, based on the human being’s ability “to reflect upon his or her own actions.” The “consciousness of their internal purposefulness is the most outstanding trait specific to human activity”⁸⁴ arising from this reflection. Personal dynamism is most susceptible to formation by the human being and at the same time it allows, at least to a certain degree, to direct the remaining dynamisms. It encompasses rational cognition and desire which are the main focus of formative actions. The improvement of the intellect and will opens the human being to the fullness of good and the truth, at the same time allowing to control and direct his or her biological inclinations in accordance with the requirements of personal life. The possibility of the actualization of the potentiality in the intellectual and moral domain distinguishes the human being from the natural world, and in this way it defines his or her position in the universe as the most perfect of material beings endowed with dignity.⁸⁵ The direction of the actualization of personal life is not accidental. Its measure is the existence of the objective purpose inscribed into human nature. For there is a necessary coupling between the pursuit of complete perfection and happiness, and that which subjectively conditions it, namely with God as the highest Good.⁸⁶ The human being “is the only creature in the world capable of cognizing the purpose that it is pursuing as well as to consciously steer its own actions towards it.”⁸⁷ Deciphering this purpose as well as pursuing it are not possible without the support of other persons. “The human being cannot reach his or her ultimate purpose on his or her own; the human being has a social nature and his or her moral life can be properly developed only in a society of people similar to him or herself.”⁸⁸ Potentializing the human being makes him or her a being that is naturally inclined towards relations with other persons, i.e. a social being.⁸⁹

Human social nature

The multitude of the forms of collective life constitutes a response to the variety of human potentializations. A distinct role is played in this respect by natural communities: the married couple and the family as well as the nation and state to which Woroniecki dedicates a large part of his philosophy.⁹⁰ The manner of organizing these communities should not be random, but ought to correspond with the being status of the human being as well as the actualization of specific potentialities embedded in its nature. That is why human nature constitutes a specific norm for the purpose and manner of organizing these communities. Since the human being has a nature “which can only accomplish its full development within social life,”⁹¹ then society should be organized in such a way that comprehensively realizes this progress. Each of these natural communities has a different role to fulfill, gaining the justification of its existence in the inclinations of the nature of the human person and mutually complementing each other in the actions serving its actualization. As a result of the existence of a community, various types of relations between it and the human being appear. Natural communities are, in a certain aspect, necessary for the human being’s life and personal development as well as to define the manner and scope of their activity. At the same time their existence requires from the persons that create them, to do so in accordance with moral and legal obligations. The particularities of natural communities as well as the appropriate arrangement of relations within them constitute, apart from the issue of morality and upbringing, the main topic of Woroniecki’s philosophical inquiries.

Although Woroniecki does not use the term “anthropological error” which was distinct for Karol Wojtyła (John Paul II), he claims that social life can be deeply deformed as a result of false concepts of humanity. He considers its basic forms to be individualism, the roots of which reach back to the Renaissance as well as the Reformation, and its contrasting counterpart of collectivist totalitarianism.⁹² Keeping in mind the social role of religion and culture in the personal development of human being’s, he points out the shortcomings in the intellectual formation and the views of the Polish intelligentsia, i.e. fideism, sentimentalism and individualism.⁹³

Openness to Transcendence

A human being is a social being, but human life is not limited to the community. Woroniecki emphasizes that human existence is inscribed into the desire of the complete and perfect happiness which from the subject’s side corresponds with the “ultimate, objective purpose that is able to grant us everything beyond our expectations and to soothe the deepest rush of our self.”⁹⁴ This purpose is God. The fact that a purpose that transcends the natural order exists, influences the entire individual and social human life. This points to the objective direction of human activity; the internal driving force is the desire for happiness and the external one—duty. “The pursuit of God is the social responsibility of the human being.”⁹⁵ The existence of the ultimate purpose inclines the human being to be personally open to Transcendence. On the one hand, he or she cannot achieve this goal through his or her own strength; it requires the completion of his or her nature in the individual and social influence of grace coming from God.⁹⁶ On the other hand, the existence of such a purpose liberates human action of its biological and social determinants. The awareness of the connection of the human being with God as the source existence, and at the same time the adequate purpose of human life, is the driving factor of human actions. It is also the basis of religion as a specific relationship of human beings with God. Noticing the dependency of the human being on God as well as deciphering it as the highest Good, existing in a personal way, causes that religion understood as worshiping God also becomes the human being’s moral responsibility. Religion revealed through the theological virtues of faith, hope and love offers the human being the necessary support for the achievement of the ultimate purpose of his or her existence.

The human being is thus a dynamic personal subject endowed with a potentialized spiritual-corporal nature, living in a community and through this community approximating the fullness of his or her development that ultimately is assigned to entering into an ever more complete relationship with God, based on love. This concept was accurately grasped by Zbigniew Pańpuch, who stated that the human being

as the most perfect being on Earth is … someone existing in the most complete way, endowed with powers to cognize and act not only in a corporal manner, but also in an immaterial, spiritual form that endows him or her with a unique quality, namely—dignity; the human being is also potential, capable of further development and improvement, most of all in the realm of spirituality defined by the powers of the intellect and free will.⁹⁷

Culture and religion, morality and upbringing, social life and politics are various realms of human activity that serve the foremost purpose of human life. This life is marked in various aspects by potentialization and actualization, the pursuit for perfection and the perfection through which the dynamic profile of human nature is expressed.

Just like Aquinas, Woroniecki looks upon the human being in an integral manner: from the philosophical and theological side, noticing in both cases the complementary modes and dimensions of understanding and fulfilling one’s humanity. That is why, discerning both types of potentialities, he postulates their simultaneous actualization for the fulfillment of the fullness of humanity. The reference to the supernatural order plays a two-fold role, the epistemological and the ontological. In the epistemological aspect it is necessary for the ultimate explanation of the human being, the life of which is not limited to social relations. However, in the ontological aspect, the indication of the purpose of human action that surpasses the natural order serves to highlight the perfection of human existence. For Woroniecki, the distinction of both orders is a necessary cognitive procedure which makes it possible to extract the philosophical knowledge about humanity. At the same time, the complete separation of philosophy and theology must lead to the deterioration of both of these domains, not allowing them to reach the complete truth about the human being.

The unique nature of Woroniecki’s anthropology

Woroniecki’s anthropology is at times considered to be essentialist, which is in contrast to existential anthropology that perceives the human being from the perspective of the consciousness and internal experience.⁹⁸ Undoubtedly, Woroniecki does not use the cognitive and linguistic tools supplied by early modern and contemporary philosophy of the subject in his description of the human being. This is partially a result of the fact that he prefers a metaphysical (objective) approach to the human being and partially because the philosophy of the subject has not indicated a method for rationalizing its cognitive output and ultimately in some of its variations has renounced its pursuit for a scientific and thus objective status, which was very important for Woroniecki’s philosophy. Therefore, it is no accident that Woroniecki’s anthropology has been juxtaposed with that of Karol Wojtyła’s; the relation of the latter to contemporary philosophy cannot be denied. Jerzy Gałkowski notices the similarity of these visions of humanity in the following: (a) referring to the act as the basis of analyses concerning human beings; (b) emphasizing the role of subjectivity; (c) distinguishing the spheres of existence which mutually effect each other—the sensual and the intellectual (Woroniecki) and the person and nature (Wojtyła); (d) referring to the social sciences (psychology and sociology) in order to understand the human being; and (e) attempting to synthesize cognitive results of various philosophical currents on the basis of classical philosophy.⁹⁹ Although Woroniecki’s anthropology is deeply embedded in the Thomism of the first half of the twentieth century, it is open to those issues from contemporary philosophy that can contribute to the personalist understanding of the human being. This is possible through highlighting the potential and dynamic aspects of existence in human existence. Simultaneously one can enrich this philosophy by emphasizing the ability to responsibly guide oneself and one’s dynamism.

5. MORALITY AND ETHICS

Morality and ethics are situated at the heart of Jacek Woroniecki’s works. In his texts he deals with both metaethical and ethical problems. He is interested in the issues of the subject, method and status of ethics and its relations to other philosophical domains as well as the positive sciences. He puts a particular emphasis on the reflection on the practical aspects of ethics as the factor that formulates, actualizes and improves the human being as well as realizes the fundamental purpose of human action. Because of this, his ethics is strongly connected with pedagogy and upbringing.

The practical character of ethics

The uniqueness of Woroniecki’s approach can easily be noticed in comparison with another renowned philosopher, Karol Wojtyła.¹⁰⁰ Both for Woroniecki and Wojtyła the key role in human moral life is played by the act, i.e. voluntary and conscious human action. For Wojtyła the act constitutes a privileged moment of manifesting the personal character of the human being. The analysis of the act constitutes the basis for conducting an anthropological study, because the being functions mediated by its nature, manifesting its mode of existence. The human being’s rational nature indicates personal existence. In his study Wojtyła reaches for the scholastic formula agere sequitur esse, whereas Woroniecki treats the personal status of the human being as a fact in the context of perceiving such phenomena like acts of intellectual cognition and desire or the scope of potentialization. The act is the reply to the person’s status of being, and that is why he notices in it a distinct moral challenge, accentuating what a person should do, while being what he or she is. He also draws attention to the fact that apart from specific purposes which the human being pursues in his or her actions there is also an objective ultimate purpose inscribed into his or her rational nature that requires fulfillment in human action. Moreover, while the act for Wojtyła is a way of integrating the person and nature, for Woroniecki this integration of various types of dynamisms within a human being, on the one hand the biological and personal one, on the other hand, the intellectual, appetitive-mental and emotional-appetitive dynamism, constitutes a task for morality. While Wojtyła focuses on indicating that such a fact takes place, Woroniecki strives to point to the manner of realizing such a purpose. That is why his ethics has a practical character, whereas speculative elements usually constitute its substructure or a supplement.

At a meta-subjective level Woroniecki engages in a dispute with, in his opinion, erroneous and one-sided ethical concepts, namely individualism and intellectualism. Modern ethical intellectualism, the roots of which go back to Socrates and Plato, is linked with the post-Cartesian tradition and it is accused of reducing morality to the intellectual sphere and the simultaneous omission of the will in human action.¹⁰¹ This tradition includes, apart from Descartes himself, also Baruch Spinoza, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Immanuel Kant, Alfred Fouillé and William James. Individualism, deriving from the Renaissance and the Reformation, leads, in his opinion, to subjectivism and the separation of individual ethics from the social sphere. Conversely, for Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas “social ethics was not only a segment of general ethics, but rather the framework in which one should examine individual ethics; in their understanding of the issue one could more quickly consider individual ethics as a component of social ethics and not the contrary.”¹⁰² As a result of this approach the universalism of classical ethics was substituted by various versions of early modern and contemporary particularism that led to its significant impoverishment.¹⁰³ Woroniecki has a separate criticism for Kant’s ethics, which reduces morality to a duty and opposes it to the natural human pursuit of happiness. And, finally, Woroniecki rejects sociological tendencies in ethics (Lucien Lévy-Bruhl) which lead to equating it with mores.¹⁰⁴ As a result of incorporating particularism into ethics, various types of antitheses emerge: eudemonism and deontology, determinism and indeterminism, sentimentalism and stoicism, heteronomism and autonomism, rationalism and fideism.¹⁰⁵ Complete cognition is a synthesis encompassing both what is accessible with the aid of natural cognition and what is given in the form of revelation. Every form of particularism leads to deforming the view on human morality to a certain extent and most of all it harms the understanding of the rational order of human action and its moral evaluation. That is why the emphasis is placed on the best possible understanding of classical virtue ethics and its implementation in action.

Woroniecki’s ethics is distinguished by its pedagogical character, for it encompasses the development of the human person: from what is potentialized in it, to that which is its act and perfection. Moral action is the basic form of actualizing and improving the human being. That is why ethics is not only a set of rules which make it possible to determine the moral character of action and a proposal how to solve particular problems, but it is also a domain of the overall understanding of the nature of human action: its subjective and objective conditions, the decision-making process, which is the combination of the cognitive and volitional powers, its execution and formation of versatile subjective improvements (virtues) succoring the realization of the good. Therefore, it is ethics taking care of human moral upbringing.

The subject and method of ethics

The subject of ethics, in Woroniecki’s view, is “the entirety of voluntary human action, for which one is responsible and which is concentrated on one’s obligations and rights leading to the fulness of spiritual development and the realization of one’s purpose in life.”¹⁰⁶ This activity, called performance, encompasses the entirety of human life, in the scope of consciously attributing to it a specific direction and taking responsibility for it. Ethics perceived in a universal way cannot be limited to theoretical considerations. Therefore, the point is not simply that the human being while undertaking voluntary action should follow the norms of moral law. Morality also covers the sphere of fulfilling actions that inscribe into human nature its ultimate purpose. That which is possible to be realized in the natural order should be open to the acting of the supernatural factor.¹⁰⁷

Woroniecki indicates the complexity of the method of ethics by referring to Aquinas’s resolution. “Being a supporter of the realist concept of philosophy,” Ryszard Polak writes, “Woroniecki preferred the method of practicing ethics in which the initial, and simultaneously final, stage of inquiry should be the detailed description of reality and every symptom of moral life.”¹⁰⁸ In the theoretical layer that constitutes the basis for ethics it is necessary to refer to the analyses of the factors present in human moral action.¹⁰⁹ However, moral action as such requires using the synthetic method that serves the appropriate application of one’s knowledge to a particular act.¹¹⁰ Woroniecki is convinced that these two different ways of approaching the human being’s moral life are not only noncontradictory, but they should also be balanced to a certain degree. Separating action from its theoretical foundations leads to the overgrowth of casuistry and the theory itself, even if it be the most perfect, cannot substitute the ability of its practical application.

The division of ethics

Woroniecki divides ethics into general ethics and applied ethics. General ethics examines those moral elements that appear in every act, e.g. the specific purpose of a particular action, acts of reason, will and feelings, the participation of memory and the imagination or reference to the moral law and the greater or lesser ability to act.¹¹¹ On the other hand, applied ethics examines those factors that decide about how particular acts differ from other ones. While general ethics refers to a more theoretical aspect and hence the study of action, applied ethics is focused on applying this knowledge in practice.¹¹²

Woroniecki divides applied ethics according to the duties that the human being should fulfill in reference to God, himself or herself as well as other people—individually or socially. In the first segment he elaborates the problem of religion as worshiping God, complemented by the theological virtues: faith, hope and love. In the second one—the issue of sustaining biological life (the body) and personal development (the soul), focused on morality and acquiring moral virtues. In the third one he takes on the issues of love towards other people which takes into consideration their spiritual and corporeal needs as well as different forms of justice; legal—which considers the individual’s obligations to the community; distributive—encompassing the obligations of the community towards its members; and commutative—referring to the mutual relations between members of a particular community.

Objective conditions of morality

Woroniecki considers human moral action to be conditioned by objective and subjective factors. The objective order consists of those factors which have an effect on the moral assessment of human action. It is constituted by the teleological structure of reality together with the objective purpose of human nature and the existence of natural law. The subjective factors of morality are the human being’s permanent dispositions in the form of his or her powers (reason and will), which together lead to the emergence of decision acts that are the basis of moral action. The place where the subjective and objective conditions meet is the human conscience.

Human action is purposeful by nature.¹¹³ It is a distinct case of purposefulness ruling the entire dynamism of reality, visible mainly in the world of living creatures. The human being is distinguished by the fact that he or she is capable of choosing his or her purpose and means of action. “Only the human being has in his or her action conscious purposefulness, in such a way that he or she can set goals for his or her actions and choose means leading to them.”¹¹⁴ The choice of goals and means is accompanied by “the ability to reflect on one’s actions and the awareness resulting from their internal purposefulness.”¹¹⁵ Woroniecki considers this to be the distinct trait of human activity and the moral basis of one being responsible for it. Apart from the multitude of individual goals that can become the object of the human being’s choice and action, one can also point to an ultimate purpose which is proportional to human nature. This purpose is happiness which objectively corresponds to infinite good—that is God.¹¹⁶ Only such a being can endow the human being with complete and eternal happiness. The existence of such a purpose influences in an essential way the evaluation of the decisions which favor or impede its fulfillment.

The second factor apart from purposefulness that constitutes the objective basis for human morality is moral law, i.e. “certain general norms according to which we should plan out acts.”¹¹⁷ The warrants of the practical mind are formulated by those directing the community in a way that binds their conscience; they have their deeper, natural source in the form of natural law.¹¹⁸ This law manifests itself through natural inclinations and moral directives included in Revelation; ultimately, in both the first and the second case, they are derived from God. These directives bind the human being in his or her conscience, but they do not determine his or her will. The human being should decipher them and make them the basis of his or her action. Although this law is immutable, in the historical-cultural reality it has been interpreted in various ways. This may invoke the opinion that this law does not exist or is unstable. This does not alter the fact that the foundation of moral life is set on the rule “do good, avoid evil!” (bonum faciendum, malum vitandum). This law “demands … doing good, avoiding evil and thanks to its most general contents it is the unchanging foundation and starting point for the entire activity of the practical mind in coordinating our moral actions.”¹¹⁹ This norm is given to every human being due to synderesis as the most general basis of judgements that reason (conscience) issues in reference to action. Its legitimacy is not questioned even by the fact that particular subjects may differ in their assessment of what is good and what is evil in a given case.

The subjective conditions of morality

In the subjective aspect, the human act is a struggle between cognition and desire. The moral decision is a result of a complicated process in which an interaction between the activity of reason and will takes place: “The process of moral conduct is as if a continuous chain, the links of which are subsequent acts of reason and will.”¹²⁰ While reason points to various goods as purposes and means of achieving them, the will through its approval (acceptance) or disapproval makes a selection of one purpose amongst others, and subsequently makes a selection of a specific means, thanks to which the acting subject shall strive to achieve the purpose. These means are determined by the intellect that on the basis of cognition (theoretical judgements) formulates specific theoretical-practical judgments in which in a given situation the will selects one practical judgment that is the basis of its action.

The action of the practical mind is directed towards self-determination and ultimately the fulfillment of good on account of its distinct significance for human personal life is called the conscience.¹²¹ This is the “practical judgement of our reason, which tells us what we should do and what not to do (pre-deed conscience) and evaluating this act after performing it (post-deed conscience).”¹²² In a formal sense it is the act of adjusting the general norm of “doing good!” to a specific situation, manifesting itself in the judgement which has the form of a demand: “do this and that!”, “don’t do that!” Woroniecki considers conscience to be the ultimate subjective norm of morality. The choice of a particular practical judgment about the action in the decision act is in accordance with the directive of conscience or not. In the act of choosing, therefore, the agreement or the lack of agreement of the judgment selected by the intellect about the action deciphered by the same intellect about this good comes about. And although the human conscience is not infallible, as Woroniecki stresses, “the human being has no other possibility to coordinate one’s performance with the foremost purpose in life, as only to pursue what reason manifests through the warrant of conscience.”¹²³ Morally decent behavior requires that the judgement of the conscience should be accompanied by the righteous will. The constant repetition of the act of subjugation of the human being to the moral law creates a permanent inclination making it possible to perform decent moral action in a quick, easy and satisfactory manner.¹²⁴

Through the act of decision, the subject constitutes a causative reason of his or her action for itself, because this is the only way he or she can transgress from the potentiality of action to action. And, indeed, “the choice of the practical judgement about the good-means with the aid of which we fulfill our good, is a moment of self-determination and, therefore, a significant moment of human freedom.”¹²⁵ Freedom understood in such a way is neither deterministic, nor indeterministic; it is the actual binding of the acting agent with the particular good, through his or her autonomous, subjective want.¹²⁶ Objectively its basis is the lack of access of the will to the ultimate good (“good in itself”), which by satisfying its desire could not be denied. The role of the will in moral action does not end with the act of decision. The will manages also its execution.

Woroniecki underlines that in moral action, apart from the mental powers—reason and will—emotions also play a role. In accordance with Thomas Aquinas, Woroniecki links the emotional sphere which is extremely abundant in its various manifestations with human corporeality and sensuality. As much as emotions are not included in the very essence of the act of decision, “they are an incentive of our acts and they contribute to their execution as well as participate in our free activity.”¹²⁷ In an extreme situation they can take control over the human being’s personal life and limit or even eradicate human freedom. Each emotion consists of three factors: the awareness of a particular state (cognition); relation of the appetitive power (desire) to the object; and corporeal agitation (physiological change). Due to the sequence of the occurrence of these factors, emotions can be divided into corporeal—they begin from an agitation within one’s body and lead to satisfaction or distress, and sensual—they begin from cognizing an object, followed by fancy or disgust, and ultimately they lead to a transformation in one’s body. These feelings usually occur one after another.

Improving moral action

Although emotions are autonomous in relation to personal life, they are not entirely separated from it. Woroniecki criticizes both sentimentalism, which assigns emotions an equivalent role to mental powers, and the stoicism present in the Kantian tradition that aims at removing emotions from the domain of human moral life.¹²⁸ He himself calls for the necessity of controlling one’s sensual emotions and to include them in one’s personal life. In order for this to be possible, emotional education is necessary: “The formation of emotions has this very purpose to supply mental factors constant aid of sensual factors through improving them with virtues for the sake of the regular cooperation of reason and will.”¹²⁹ The result of this behavior is that that emotions not only do not oppose the spiritual life of the human being, but they constitute a foundation for him or her through the inclusion of the entire potential of human corporeality.¹³⁰ Moral upbringing is thus simultaneously a process of integrating human dynamisms, leading to the formation of a morally mature human person.

In a concept formulated in such a way, human moral life is integrally conjugated with upbringing and ethics with pedagogy. Upbringing requires the formation of virtues and the elimination of moral vices. Virtues are the improvements of the powers to act. Prudence improves the practical intellect in selecting the purpose and means of action, whereas the remaining virtues improve the human will to give everyone that which one deserves (justice), controlling one’s appetitive feelings (temperance) and vehemence (fortitude). Woroniecki combines his concept of ethics with religion. He states that although ethics without revealed religion is possible, ethics independent of natural theology is not. Ethics without religion “cannot be sufficient for the human being and it cannot satisfy the full development of one’s spiritual life.”¹³¹ Not only can moral law not find its full explanation in the moral order, but without supernatural support the human being is incapable of pointing to an ultimate purpose of his or her actions or to find the adequate means for realizing them.

Although morality, according to Woroniecki, is something that is both granted to and required of the human being, it is not his or her ultimate purpose. Interestingly, he dedicates the final paragraphs of his Catholic Educational Ethics to the topic of moral perfection, which goes beyond the order of the virtue of justice and finds its most complete expression in religious life. While morality is the factor that improves the human being, his or her perfection is accomplished through the achievement of the ultimate purpose of his or her life. “The perfection of the spiritual being … can only be achieved through accomplishing that for what it was made and that is merging with its Creator.”¹³²

6. PEDAGOGY AND UPBRINGING

Woroniecki is a proponent of the tradition arising from classical European culture based on the philosophical foundations of ontological realism (metaphysics) as well as personalism in anthropology and social philosophy. Realism ascertains that the object of cognition and the criterion for evaluating its truth value is the perceived, autonomously existing world of things and persons. Personalism, in turn, stresses the fact that the human being and his or her life–from conception to natural death with the prospect of eternal life—is the sole purpose of individual and social life. Philosophical personalism, based on recognizing human nature, becomes supplemented by the Christian vision of the human being created “in the image and likeness” of God. Woroniecki not only affirms the cognitive value of the heritage of the classical tradition which he collectively calls Christian philosophy, but also enriches it cognitively due to the altered historical and conceptual notion of European culture. In his analyses he argues that every abandonment of this tradition leads to a spiritual crisis that causes Europeans to cease understanding themselves and make sense of their cultural activities as well as the meaning and need for upbringing a human being.

According to Woroniecki, philosophical personalism constitutes the appropriate cognitive context for the theory and practice of upbringing. Two of his anthropological theses deserve particular attention: first, the human being exceedingly transcends the natural world and that which distinguishes him or her amongst other beings is the personal life; second, the human being is a potentialized (incomplete) being and his or her life relies on the perpetual, reflected and free actualization of everything that is required from him or her by a rational and free nature. The aforementioned theses of classical anthropology substantially justify the irrevocability of the reflection on human cultural activity and, most of all, the necessity of upbringing a human being which is concordant with the nature of the social formation (actualization) of mankind.

Pedagogy as educational ethics

The cognitive context of pedagogy (philosophical realism and personalism) and its history led Woroniecki to “negate the methodological autonomy” of pedagogy whatsoever.¹³³ He claims that singling out pedagogy as a separate field of inquiry which autonomously defines its subject, method and purpose took place during the Renaissance and brought disastrous effects for the field because it separated it from the realistic scholarly foundations, especially philosophical ethics, and in consequence it was reduced to didactics and subordinated to psychology. He believes that early modern and contemporary pedagogy is “struck by the disease of psychologism”¹³⁴ and this reductionism is the source of “the infirmity of modern formative doctrines.”¹³⁵ He also points out that separating pedagogy from ethics greatly impoverished ethics itself, because it eliminated from its subject matter and cognitive competences the essential issues which are “their criterion.”¹³⁶ 

Woroniecki refers to the classic division of philosophy into theoretical philosophy and practical (moral) philosophy, called ethics, from the Greek word for custom—ethos—and within it he includes pedagogy: pedagogy is educational (formative) ethics. He stresses that pedagogy, as with every practical study apart from casuistry and the practice of life, must be based on strong theoretical foundations which realize all of the factors lying at the roots of human moral life, as well as which formulate it. Hence, theoretical philosophy has an important place in ethics, since it gives it its realistic metaphysical and anthropological foundations. On account of this, he emphasizes that the universalist cognitive-mental system, encompassing all spheres of human life, is the system of Christian philosophy which draws knowledge from the intellectual tradition going back to ancient Greece, but most of all from the father of realism, Aristotle, whose reflections were continued and creatively supplemented by St. Thomas Aquinas. This philosophy includes “both the natural factors available to natural powers of reason and thus being the object of philosophical inquiry, and the supernatural factors contained in the Christian Revelation.”¹³⁷ According to Woroniecki, the aforementioned factors should not be separated, because both of them are inherent to human nature and constitute its substantive unity, while the elimination of the supernatural perspective from human life could cut off the sphere of morality from its ultimate justifications. Christian ethics is a holistic approach to human moral performance; it encompasses all of its organically connected orders. The elaboration of these issues takes into account—as he writes—“the entirety of Catholic ethics.”¹³⁸

In Woroniecki’s opinion, contemporary ethics, both theoretical and practical and therefore also pedagogy, is contaminated by two reductionisms: the first is moral intellectualism and the other is anthropological individualism. Moral intellectualism is about “reason not only being attributed primacy before the will, but the entire moral activity is reduced to reasoning, with the exclusion of appetitive factors, but most of all the will.”¹³⁹ In his view, such an approach to human moral performance equates upbringing with education and brings it down to simply teaching truths relating to moral performance. It tends to be forgotten”—claims Woroniecki—“that knowing something is necessary in order to be capable and to act, but it is not sufficient—one must also want and know how to systematically and persistently want, and this skill is not acquired through education, i.e. intellectual influence.”¹⁴⁰ And he stresses emphatically: “one must teach with words, but shape with deeds.”¹⁴¹ This aspect of pedagogy is the essence of the ancient Greek study of virtues as constant abilities to perform morally good deeds. Abandoning aretalogy, the study of virtues, has led contemporary pedagogy to the aforementioned intellectualism and subsequently to individualism, which in turn caused that issues connected with the purpose of social life were neglected.¹⁴²

The subject of upbringing

According to Woroniecki, pedagogy in the realm of theoretical reflection should lean on the Aristotelian concept of the four causes: material, formal, efficient and final.¹⁴³ One ought to distinguish and include firstly—the subject of upbringing which is the human being subdued to formation, i.e. the material cause and partially the efficient cause of the formative practice; secondly—the objective of formation, i.e. its formal and partially final cause, therefore, everything that must be created (actualized) in the human being thanks to formative activities; and, thirdly, the tutor understood as a specific person and a so-called social tutor, i.e. two efficient causes guiding the process of human upbringing.

The necessary condition of a fruitful upbringing is an understanding of human nature. Together they constitute mutually dependent, yet different powers: appetitive and cognitive, as well as two levels of life: the mental level that draws its cognitive material from the sensual powers, but it has its own supersensual domain, and the sensual level connected with physiological functions. Graphically, this can be presented as follows¹⁴⁴:

Contrary to anthropological functionalism which is connected to contemporary pedagogy (the human being is the function of the whole, e.g. of the state or a function of sensual-emotional life), Woroniecki is a proponent of essentialism, existential unity and human subjectivity. On account of this he notices that all powers and levels of human life co-create the moral life of the human being, but the adequate subject of his or her activity is the human soul (self) that acts with the aid of various powers. As he writes, “Indeed, neither reason, nor the will, nor emotions shall do anything on their own, it is the human soul that acts supported by one capability or another.”¹⁴⁵ And thus upbringing consists in improving all the levels of life and all the powers that the human being makes use of in his or her life in such a way that human performance becomes ever more free and independent from external as well as internal determinants as well as assumed the trait of stability to an ever greater extent, and thus were in accordance with human nature and the ultimate purpose of human life. Woroniecki stresses the fact that although upbringing encompasses also the activity of the intellect, it should, however, concentrate only on those cognitive functions with which the human prudently directs his or her actions. However, the foremost purpose for upbringing is the formation of the appetitive powers: the will and the emotions.

As it has been mentioned already, the raison d’être of the process of upbringing is the fact of the potentiality of human nature and the plasticity of all of its powers. On account of this the characteristic feature is that on the one hand its mark is individual, because they are powers of a specific human being who in a way distinct to him or herself fulfills particular activities and in a specific way improves these powers; nevertheless, on the other hand the actualization of their potentialities and the formation of capabilities never gets exhausted and can assume various shapes.

The objective of upbringing—theory of skills

As for the issue of the objective of upbringing, Woroniecki stresses (following Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas) that an essential component of human conduct is his or her conscious purposefulness.¹⁴⁶ The issue of the moral responsibility of one’s own acts is connected with this special moment, i.e. becoming aware of the internal purposefulness of one’s own actions, Upbringing is about preparing the pupil to act in a morally good way. Its purpose is, therefore, “formation in the pupil those constant modes of conduct, i.e. capabilities or skills, which shall constantly direct his or her life.”¹⁴⁷ 

As the realist tradition stresses, the motivation for human action is always some sort of good which draws to itself, knocks out of indifference and becomes the purpose of this action. The good as a purpose grants every human act a direction and constitutes the basis of the evaluation of this act, i.e. the action of determining its value. This is particularly important in the sphere of the moral conduct of the human being. On account of this a key role in human life is played by the knowledge of the good and in particular the knowledge about the good that is the ultimate purpose of human life. According to Woroniecki the entire human life is a sequence of goods-means and goods-purposes that are subordinated to one ultimate purpose, i.e. God. For only God is capable of granting the human being ultimate happiness which from the subjective side constitutes a purpose for the human being and thus constitutes the ultimate objective purpose of the human being’s life as a human being. This purpose has an impact on the entirety of human life; therefore, its clarification on the basis of pedagogy as well as within the process of upbringing is necessary, because “establishing that God is our purpose, sets for our entire moral life a singular and constant direction.”¹⁴⁸ The Christian has the obligation to fulfill God’s will in his or her own life and happiness itself is an inseparable consequence of this duty.¹⁴⁹ Woroniecki stresses that the purpose of human action is always some real good and on account of that he warns against contemporary moral intellectualism which recognizes the sphere of good, accentuates the norms of moral performance, speaks of ideals, but not about the good as the real purpose of human actions. Ideals are only certain guidelines and these guidelines only point to the path which leads to the purpose, but on their own they do not constitute an incentive to act. Woroniecki concludes this thesis with the following statement: “in the intellectual realm: the ideals are the first place, but in the realm of action—the purposes!”¹⁵⁰

Woroniecki recalls and meticulously elaborates the concept of a skill, known since Greek antiquity (as habitus) but nowadays forgotten, which constitutes the clou of the process of human upbringing. One of the reasons for forgetting this, in his opinion, is the lack of a distinction between a habit and a skill, because of which many contemporary philosophers wrongly believe that skills lead to the mechanization of moral life. Among the skills Woroniecki mentions are cognitive ones, including theoretical (intellectual) and practical (technical), as well as moral skills, our vices and virtues. Only one intellectual skill belongs to the moral order, namely prudence, which draws from knowledge in order to achieve the intended good in a decent manner. On the other hand, those skills that relate to the appetitive powers, both sensual (feelings) and intellectual (the will) are always moral; therefore, they are divided into good—virtues, and bad—vices. Virtues improve human behavior and make it concordant with the requirements of a rational human nature, whereas vices, on the contrary, lead to acts contradictory to its requirements. Among virtues there is an internal solidarity, which means that there is no possibility of becoming specialized in one set of virtues and neglecting the other.

Skill theory helped Woroniecki define pedagogy as the study of training moral skills and to justify its separateness from didactics, i.e. the study of training intellectual and technical skills. As mentioned before, upbringing is a part of ethics, whereas didactics is a part of psychology. Upbringing mainly refers to the appetitive powers, i.e. the will and emotions and the means to improving them and binding them with the good, as well as good acts, are virtues. Woroniecki frequently emphasizes that reason is “pedagogical” as long as it guides the will and emotions, targeting them towards the good. Therefore, a harmonious cooperation of upbringing and education must take place. Except for intellectualism and psychologism, that is connected with the former, Woroniecki criticizes various anthropological reductionisms (psychoanalysis, behaviorism) and stresses that a pedagogue should gaze upon the human being integrally—including in his or her tutoring and practice natural, social and supernatural factors (the influence of grace). The labor connected to upbringing is based on these factors and so are the self-formation efforts of the pupil which grow more and more self-conscious and conscientious, and continues until death.

The method of acquiring skills is the repetition of the same acts, i.e. practicing them. As a result, “we can build on our natural inclinations as if a second storey, a second layer of acquired inclinations.”¹⁵¹ The moral skill, the result of conscious work on oneself is subject to perpetual improvement, it is not threatened by routine or mechanization. The acquired virtue only—as Woroniecki claims—shortens the process of reflection and makes the human being decide to commit a particular act quicker. It grants the human being a certain degree of uniformity and moral character which consists of a “cluster of human moral skills, connected by internal bonds into one organic whole.”¹⁵² This homogeneity is a result of the relationship that occurs between the particular virtues, especially the so-called cardinal ones historically known as prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance.

The causative reason of upbringing—the so-called social tutor

In the scope of the efficient cause of upbringing Woroniecki mentions and acknowledges, apart from the individual tutor, the so-called social tutor. He believes that a significant influence on the pupil comes from the appropriate formative atmosphere: “there where the youth is surrounded by a positive formative atmosphere, very little talking and moralizing is needed.”¹⁵³ In his view upbringing is, most of all, the task of the family and the Church. Schools, apart from the educational efforts, must engage in formative activities; education is their predominant task, because “without an elementary level of education, one cannot speak about upbringing.”¹⁵⁴ Conversely, upbringing has a large significance for education which requires effort as well as persistent and systematic work from the pupil.¹⁵⁵

Woroniecki also takes on the issue of national upbringing. Upbringing cannot take place in abstracto, beyond the individual properties of a particular nation. It must have a national character. He says: “one must get to know the material well, from which in a particular environment one must want to shape characters, because the bedrock of the national character is the national temperament.”¹⁵⁶ It is about becoming aware of these national properties that constitute the strength of a particular nation including the history of the nation, its literature and customs.¹⁵⁷

The effort connected with upbringing must be, therefore, “a result of the joint action of the family, the Church, school and the entire society and one must strive for each of these factors to participate in it in an ever more efficient way; since each of them to be responsible for it”¹⁵⁸: above all, however, the family is responsible for upbringing.¹⁵⁹ Upbringing is ultimately assistance in self-formation and depends on the cooperation with the pupil and co-coordinating his or her development.¹⁶⁰ On account of this, every tutor must know the theory of good and the theory of virtue, as this is the necessary condition for his or her persistent and systematic work protecting his or her pupil from vices. An important condition of the tutor’s work is his or her ability to be demanding, which is the result of the virtue of being strict, but still understanding. It must be accompanied by thinking in the long term as a form of virtue which grants the tutor “internal control over discouragement.” Quite meaningful in this regard is Woroniecki’s statement: “As long as a human being is alive, one must not doubt in him or her.”¹⁶¹ 

Catholic pedagogy

When Woroniecki discusses Catholic pedagogy, he states that it constitutes a “scholarly system of upbringing and teaching which is not only completely concordant with theology and Christian philosophy, but closely connected with them and issuing rules from the formative experience in their light.”¹⁶² A responsible Catholic tutor must know the cognitive accomplishments of one’s own tradition as well as all of the erroneous formative doctrines and their intellectual context, i.e. the idealist tradition.¹⁶³ He draws attention to the issue that the foremost tutor in Christian pedagogy is God himself with whom, through the Church, “we are, as if, organically connected into one mystical body” and he emphasizes the “formative power of the Eucharist.”¹⁶⁴ He adds that the teachings on original sin and its remnants in human nature are essential for Catholic pedagogy, especially the primary vices as its manifestations. Pedagogy must be centered on Christ and the central point of its analyses in reference to the objective of upbringing should be Christ. In his analysis of the process of human upbringing Woroniecki points to the virtues granted to the human being together with grace. These virtues, being the theological virtues, among them faith, hope and love, form within our powers—reason and will—a constant inclination in relation to God himself. That is why Woroniecki observes that Christian upbringing consists in the harmonious combination of the natural and supernatural factors, which makes the abilities acquired through training “fuse into one whole with the constant supernatural inclination to the same act granted to the soul from above.”¹⁶⁵ The result of the combination of the internal natural element with the supernatural is its Christian character. This “complete development of the Christian’s personality requires, on the one hand, a strong base in the natural foundation of the character, on the other hand it requires from him or her to penetrate it deeply, i.e. to deify it with the supernatural elements of grace.”¹⁶⁶

Woroniecki deplores the “truly astounding ignorance of the old, traditional Christian teachings on upbringing and the role which was played in it by the great Christian philosophers, first and foremost—St. Thomas Aquinas. It is the “genuine paedagogia perennis,” incomparably deeper and more powerful than the one that emerged in the Enlightenment and which prevails until this day in the entire pedagogical movement.”¹⁶⁷ The accomplishments of this tradition are not known even to many Catholic pedagogues, the consequence of which is, for instance, succumbing to behaviorism and, therefore, eliminating the concept of purpose from pedagogy. Yet St. Thomas Aquinas combines the observation of human life (the material subject of upbringing) with the philosophical knowledge about the human being, his or her nature and the ultimate purpose of human life (the objective of upbringing).¹⁶⁸ 

7. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

In his social philosophy, Woroniecki discusses the issue of the essence of the nation and state and the mutual relations between them, the question of the so-called nation state and nationalism as well as patriotism, and consequently the problem of national culture (education). However, he gives primacy to the question of the relations between the human being and the basic forms of human communal life, i.e. marriage and family. From the ontic perspective the human being is a substantial being; therefore, his or her conscious and free life depends on actualizing everything which has been endowed to him or her by his or her nature. Woroniecki strongly emphasizes that since “all the basic phenomena of social life arise”¹⁶⁹ from the potentiality of human nature, and, above all, the irrevocability of life in a social environment, the community is necessary to optimally actualize human nature. Each of the forms of social being distinguished—marriage, the family, the nation and the state—has its specific purposes to fulfill, but all of them serve one purpose, i.e. the common good.

Marriage and family

The family is a natural community. It is the result of marriage, i.e. the union of a man and woman; at the same time it is the primal, socially (generationally) complete “component of social life,” and, furthermore, it is a distinct environment which creates a specific civilizational atmosphere “without which the human being cannot accomplish complete flourishing.”¹⁷⁰ The necessary condition for this atmosphere that serves as the guarantee that human nature is adequately actualized in the human being is the inseparability and unity of the institution of marriage. Woroniecki stresses the fact that marriage serves first of all “social purposes” and he bases its significance on this, for its basic natural function is the perseverance of humankind. This is why matrimony “is not only something that concerns the spouses, but also society, for which it is supposed to ensure natural growth and—what goes together with that—its persistence.”¹⁷¹ This is the result of the fact that one of the necessary conditions for the occurrence of the more complex forms of social life—the nation and the state—is the care for that which guarantees its own sustenance. On account of this, the marital union has a public aspect to it, above and beyond the private. The foremost purpose of marriage “is not individual happiness, but the good of society”¹⁷²; similarly, the second purpose of marriage which is derived from marital love, i.e. cooperation and the “satisfaction of desires,” is also connected with the “obligation to help one another in all tasks and perils of life.” Therefore, marriage has a social dimension.¹⁷³

The durability of the marital union has its general significance in the process of upbringing and socializing subsequent generations; therefore, so-called free love, which is a transgression of natural law that imposes the responsibility on the parents “for conceiving a new life and it does not permit freeing oneself of it, even by way of material compensation,” just like adultery and divorce, which break family bonds and violate marital vows, are unacceptable on account of the spouses taking upon themselves responsibility “in reference to all of society and the being that receives life from them.”¹⁷⁴ In the spirit of this tradition Woroniecki stresses that “the family is a part of natural law”; therefore, the natural obligation of marriage is “for sexual intercourse to take place within marriage, i.e. the permanent relationship between parents in order for those who conceived the child to bear responsibility for its life and upbringing.”¹⁷⁵

Contemporary individualism, the fruit of early modern mentality contaminated with intellectual idealism, is the reason for marriage to be treated primarily as an individual issue, a sort of contract. As a result, such an contract can be annulled any time, if the relationship does not satisfy the subjective expectations of the interested parties. Setting up the issue in such a way, i.e. separating the institution of matrimony from its fundamental substantially social dimension, causes that the remaining forms of communal life and thus the family, nation and state, become conventional entities dependent on the individual will of the human being. Contrary to this tendency, the Catholic Church and the civilization that it created defends the natural procreative function of marriage and its social significance, perceives in it the plan od Divine Providence and elevates marriage itself to the status of a sacrament which becomes for the spouses “a seedbed of genuine grace that is intended to help them fulfill the difficult tasks connected with parenting” as well as aid in fulfilling the duties of social life.¹⁷⁶

Nation and state

Subsequent forms of social life that are imposed by the potentialized human nature are the nation and the state. The necessity for the existence of the state is derived from the human being’s objective potentiality, i.e. the necessity of organizing the actions of the community with respect to the common good, that is such a good in which all people participate and which guarantees that they shall accomplish their ultimate life purpose. The state, or more precisely the governmental authority, selects such specific goods which lead to the common good as the purpose of human life, accomplishing that with the aid of the law which determines and harmonizes social activities in a uniform way. On the other hand, the necessity for the existence of the nation is a consequence of the subjective potentiality of human nature. An individual, a concrete human being, “while acting in a way proper to himself, can behave differently; namely he can do the right thing, i.e. in harmony with moral laws, or the wrong thing, i.e., contrary to moral laws.” That is precisely why the national community is necessary, one that morally educates the human being with the aid of customs and uniform moral principles.¹⁷⁷

Both the nation and the state constitute the same type of community, because they “consist of collectives that lead to the unity of common life”; however, they differ substantially, because there is a different principle that connects these collectives. In contrast to a civic community, e.g. the state, where the unity is enforced by governmental authority and state laws, the foundation that constitutes the nation is the morality and customs that comprise it; they “endow the community with a unified mode of action.” The nation, as Woroniecki writes, “is not only the part of a material state from which it gains its shape and unity, but it is endowed with its own unity, arising from its own constituent principle, i.e. common customs and not infrequently kinship, language as well as religion.”¹⁷⁸

The nation and state, although they differ with respect to the factor that unifies people, have the same purpose, i.e. the aforementioned common good of the community that grants the particular individuals the possibility of having “a good and virtuous life.”¹⁷⁹ While the state fulfills this purpose by way of “providing citizens with means sufficient to live the best possible life, both material and, in particular, “moral”¹⁸⁰ which is supposed to be secured by state law, “the purpose of nation consists in fostering citizens for a more perfect life in which they alone are not sufficient: supported by the assistance of fellow citizens, often encouraged by them, the citizens are gradually trained into the uniform skills which are called ‘customs’ and which develop strong bonds of internal unity in the community.”¹⁸¹

Woroniecki stresses that the nation supervises compatriots through customs and moral principles, and thus it has a fundamental formative function. Thanks to common customs compatriots become citizens: “the nation is rather mindful of upbringing and forming characters which is derived from good customs and constitutes a necessary condition for the common good.” The state, on the other hand, “rather tries to sustain the common good internally, protecting it with the law.”¹⁸² Woroniecki concludes: “just as laws are the utilities of the state, customs are the utilities of the nation.”¹⁸³ Furthermore, life within a nation engages a human being to a greater extent than life within a state, because national life grants the community “internal unity based on customs and such a unity in an obvious manner superior to the external one which the state accomplishes through state law and means of repression.”¹⁸⁴ Although governmental authorities are endowed with various effective tools with which they can coordinate civic life, it is nonetheless the nation that controls the state, imposing on it an obligation to protect national customs. This is the result of the nation being the subject of social life; it has the right in the name of justice to protect its own customs and to resist the state when its legislation undermines them. Woroniecki adds that the influence of the national ethos on the human being is deep and permanent; that is why it is hard to get rid of acquired customs and it is not easy to accept the customs of other nations. On the other hand, abandoning this ethos and the unintended or—what is worse—intended alteration of its rules in the name of becoming more like another nation, leads to the loss of identity and undermining the existence of one’s own country.¹⁸⁵

Although the national ethos creates strong social bonds, Woroniecki approaches the topic of the so-called nation state with caution: “the theory of the nation state need not be automatically discarded, nor should it be overestimated and stubbornly enforced.”¹⁸⁶ Why? Experience backs this stance which demonstrates—on the one hand—that within nation states, due to their internal homogeneity, it is easier to achieve agreement and unity in action, both in the internal issues of state life and in the issues of external politics; nevertheless, the diversity of nations and the variety of forms of statehood in modern times was beneficial from the civilizational perspective, because it led to the imitation and coordination of their activities in the realm of customs and even a common language. This is not, however, as Woroniecki stipulates, an easy process, for it can cause a lot of damage, which is dangerous for nations and states.¹⁸⁷ In the case of the nation state, state law is aligned with customs and there are no disparities between the common good of the state and the common good of the nation; therefore, the theory of the nation state, “when applied moderately with the consideration of the circumstances and conditions of social life, reflects a particular natural tendency of mankind and can greatly benefit the moral development of civil society.”¹⁸⁸ In case of a so-called multi-national state (imperial) state disparities and conflicts occur that particularly manifest themselves in the sphere of upbringing and education, because the state must lean on the foundation of uniform law, the consequence of which shall be the collision of its law with the customs of particular nations and when the uniformity of the state laws shall succumb to the diversity of customs, then “the internal unity, which constitutes its power, shall fall apart.”¹⁸⁹

National politics and education

One of the aspects of the problem of the relation between the nation and the state is the issue of politics and, to be precise, the question of a criterion for evaluating the activity of the institutions of the state. This good is a result of experiencing the national community and it is inscribed in its customs. Customs determine which of these actions are morally good for all members of the community and which are reprehensible and should be eliminated because they harm everyone. This limited bond of the common good and national customs is important on the grounds of the policy realized by the state. The common good protects the citizen from the abuse of the state and it also protects the institution of the state and its law from the errors of its citizens.¹⁹⁰

According to Woroniecki, the politically and pedagogically significant condition for preserving the national community is the national school—a school embedded into the tradition of national life and thus serving the purposes of the nation. A crucial role in such a school is played by the mother tongue. Teaching the mother tongue should ensure not only that the youth has an in-depth proficiency in it and “cause that it shall use it perfectly,” but most of all it is supposed to teach the youth proper thinking, because language “is the main factor assisting the thinking process … learning a language is of necessity learning how to think.”¹⁹¹ From the factor of “whether the Polish school shall understand this depends not only whether it can be called a national school, but also the role that it shall play in the life of the nation,” for the mother tongue is the main measure of the level of national culture.¹⁹²

The problem of nationalism

One of the important and timely social issues is nationalism. Therefore, it is necessary to explain what nationalism is in its essence and how it is related to integral Christian ethics, which consists of the philosophical theory of the good or virtue theory (aretology), especially of civic virtues and the theological interpretation of the human being. In Woroniecki’s opinion, national life must be subsumed to both natural and supernatural law. This subordination results from the fact that national life is “one of the factors of the entirety of human moral life.”¹⁹³ Therefore one must distinguish nationalism, or to be precise, chauvinism, from patriotism. Patriotism is the love of one’s own nation, love based on Christian love. It is something good and desired by nature, because the care for the wellbeing of the national community, its customs and common good, is expressed by it. The opposite position to patriotism is nationalism, where the nation is subdued to state ideology and it is treated as the highest good: as the “nation-god” and, therefore, a being that requires religious worship. In this manner nationalism eliminates religion as well as faith in God the Creator and incorporates it into the state ideology. On the basis of these explanations Woroniecki differentiates national chauvinism which detests other nations, as well as liberal chauvinism, “more or less atheistic and unethical,” that wants to eliminate the institution of the nation.¹⁹⁴ This last form of nationalism “cannot be agreed with Christian ethics and it is very harmful for peace on Earth, but also for the moral flourishing of the national lives of the people.” Woroniecki regrets that Christian criteria of patriotism, i.e. the love of one’s own nation are not sufficiently included in the considerations of theologians and Christian philosophers.¹⁹⁵ His evaluation is based on the belief that Divine Providence assigned the national factor a specific role in the moral development of the human being and therefore his or her life situated in the framework of the nation is significant for the complete moral development of the human being. Christianity not only does not remove the natural source of life within a particular nation, the source connected with the fact of the potentialization of human nature and the necessity of the moral development of the human being, but it also purifies and improves life, increasing its productivity.¹⁹⁶

Civic virtues and social life

For Woroniecki, the basic social virtues are love and justice. The theological virtue of love, which the soul is endowed with by God through sanctifying grace, “does not require for us to love our neighbor, because of him or her personally—the assets and values he or she has in our eyes—but He wants us to love him or her on account of God, who wants for us to love on account of the fact that God loves him or her and calls upon us to live in friendship with one another.”¹⁹⁷ Love is, therefore, “the driving force of moral life, which is supposed to unite all of mankind in the pursuit of a single goal.”¹⁹⁸ Justice, on the other hand, has “as its subject the rights of the neighbor, which we should always take into account in our performance, regardless of the emotions that he or she evokes in us.”¹⁹⁹ Justice is simply “the sensitivity of the conscience to the rights of others.”²⁰⁰ It imposes such a formation of the human will in order for it to voluntarily give everyone that which that person rightfully deserves on account of the rights derived from human nature and thus from the fact of being a human being as a human being. Apart from the rights that have their source in human nature, there are also rights that are “the necessary consequence of living within society” and that constitute an extension of natural virtues within state law.²⁰¹ 

Woroniecki relates all of these rights—both those based on human nature and those derived from positive law—to various aspects of justice. He defines justice itself in accordance with classical philosophy as “perpetua et constans voluntas ius suum unicuique tribuendi,i.e. the constant and perpetual will to give everyone that to which he or she is entitled.”²⁰² Within it he distinguishes: first, commutative justice (iustitia commutativa), which is simply honesty that regulates relations between members of a community as well as the relation of the individual to particular social groups; second, distributive justice (iustitiadistributiva), which is supposed to regulate the relations of society as a whole in relation to the parts that constitute it, i.e. to the particular individuals and social groups as well as the regulation of individuals’ rights in relation to the social group to which they belong; third, legal justice (iustitia legalis) encompassing commutative and distributive justice, the purpose of which is to improve the will of the citizen to give society that which it rightfully deserves from the individual.²⁰³

Woroniecki notices that placing justice at the forefront of moral human life stems from the fact that “ethics cannot be treated only from the individual point of view, but it is the study of the entirety of human behavior, which can only be precisely cognized and understood within the realm of social life.”²⁰⁴ This means that the individual life of the human being must always be examined and evaluated in the context of social life. In his opinion, one has to draw particular attention to the shortcomings of legal justice that are the consequence of so-called self-love (selfishness), and they depend on the “complete indifference towards the common good of society.”²⁰⁵ Therefore, the most important educational task is to encourage the citizen, especially a child, to such activities, the purpose of which is the common good and the cognitive result of which is becoming aware of the common good and conceptualizing it.²⁰⁶

Social life and the issue of labor

In his social philosophy Woroniecki also considered the issue of human labor in the aspect of its sense and political significance. Most of all, he criticized liberalism that reduces the purpose of labor to material income, the consequence of which is the phenomenon of social exploitation, and socialism for subordinating labor to collective purposes and overlooking its individual aspect. In the spirit of classical tradition, he claims that work by its nature must improve the human being cognitively and morally, and it is supposed to satisfy his or her material needs and the livelihood of his or her family; the right to own private property is connected with this requirement.²⁰⁷ On account of this, every work, both physical and intellectual, should be appropriately remunerated, but wages should diverge with respect to the effort put into the labor as well as the needs of the worker and the family he or she supports. Work requirements belong to the sphere of social ethics, i.e. “the entirety of our moral performance.” For work is “on the one hand the service to society and on the other hand a source of sustenance.” Its essential feature should be the passion for work itself, its intellectually and morally improving role, the expression of which are such civic virtues as diligence, attentiveness and caring with respect to one’s own social obligations.²⁰⁸ Woroniecki also opposed egalitarianism. He stated that so-called social equality contradicts the natural order due to the factual diversity of professional aptitudes which are connected with the social background of a particular person as well as his or her education.²⁰⁹ 

8. THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT

Theological thought in Jacek Woroniecki’s works, similarly to St. Thomas Aquinas, constitutes an integral supplement to his philosophy. Among his broad theological interests, his reflections on the topics of Christology, Mariology, the priesthood, grace and nature, theological virtues, moral virtues, mercy, prayer and hagiography deserve particular attention.

Jesus Christ and the Blessed Virgin Mary

The main theological issue discussed in all of Woroniecki’s writings is Christology, based on three pillars: the Holy Scriptures, tradition and experiences of the faithful. Woroniecki refers in his texts to the role of Jesus Christ and his significance for the human being’s salvation. Jesus, through his incarnation, passion, death and resurrection, became the savior of all of mankind and its intermediary to God the Father.

In Woroniecki’s view, Christ constitutes the center of Christian life, whereas His Mother is the exemplar of human personhood. As an ideal of what it is to be human she encourages the imitation of her earthly life. She assists the faithful in their pursuit of the truth and the good with her maternal intercession to her Son. With the Virgin Mary we move towards Christ and with Christ we move towards God the Father.

Woroniecki derives certain truths from the Holy Scriptures, taking into consideration all of the Marian dogmas: the Immaculate Conception, the Divine Maternity and the Assumption. He devotes most attention to the presence of Mary in the redemptive act of Jesus, i.e. Her participation in the sacrifice on the Cross and in the distribution of Divine graces. At the time, those issues were new to Mariology.²¹⁰

In the brochure Podkamień²¹¹ Woroniecki emphasizes the national values of the Marian cult which during the partitions contributed to maintaining Poland’s spiritual unity. He shares the view of Cardinal Désiré-Joseph Mercier²¹² about the participation of the Virgin Mary in the distribution of Divine graces. In his article on the role of the Mother of God in the teachings of St. Paul, he discusses the difficult problem of St. Paul’s Mariological silence.²¹³ He tries to demonstrate that the presence of the Virgin Mary in this saint’s theology is visible within the entire Church through which Jesus realizes his saving work, whereas the Mother of God participates in it through the Immaculate Conception and her Son’s sacrifice of the Cross. Since Mary participated in the passion and the redemptory act of Christ, she has a unique place in the Church as her most perfect element, who is closely connected to her Son. In 1939 Woroniecki published a collection of Mariological reflections.²¹⁴ He stresses in them that God gave us Mary as an example of fulfilling the theological virtues: faith, hope and love, demonstrating them through the mysteries of Her life—the joyful, sorrowful and glorious ones. Mary is not only an example to be followed, but also a source of grace, because in the treasure chest of redemption, besides Christ’s, there is also Her merits which are connected with Him. The epitome of Woroniecki’s Marian writings is the book on the maternal heart of the Virgin Mary.²¹⁵ He demonstrates in it the intercessions of Mary in the history of human salvation, in the form of evangelical images referring to the role that Mary played by her son, Jesus, in the history of redemption.

Woroniecki’s Mariological reflection concentrates on four questions: (1) the spiritual maternity of the Virgin Mary—she realizes her spiritual maternity as a medium between us and Her son, Jesus; (2) the intermediation of the Virgin Mary—directed towards Christ and by Him to God the Father; (3) co-redemption—the sacrifice that was made by two Persons: the Son of God and Mary; however, Jesus’s sacrifice is eternal and fully liberating mankind from the evil of sin while the sacrifice of the Virgin Mary is cooperative and making amends, subordinate to Christ’s salvation; (4) co-intermediation of Divine grace—the intermediation of the Virgin Mary was fulfilled in Salvation.²¹⁶ As far as Mariology is concerned, Woroniecki expressed views that were later confirmed by the Second Vatican Council.

The priest

Woroniecki, when discussing issues connected with the priesthood, claims that the clergy was affected by a crisis of vocation as a result of: (1) the low number of priests caused by the population loss in World War I; (2) the secularist-fideistic stance of the intelligentsia and gentry (most newly ordained priests came from lower social classes)²¹⁷; (3) the lowering of the level of education and formation of the future priesthood.²¹⁸ This is why his writings dedicated to the priesthood, its beauty and dignity, are addressed especially to the Catholic intelligentsia, urging them²¹⁹ not to “deter their sons from the service to God.”²²⁰ Woroniecki was absorbed by the issue of the formation of priests, he was experienced in this realm as the viceregent of the theological boarding school in Freiburg (1911–1912), as well as the rector of the theological boarding school in Lublin (1921).²²¹ Apart from that, he stayed in touch with many bishops and was their advisor.²²²

In his text Królewskie kapłaństwo: Studium o powołaniu i wychowaniu kapłana katolickiego [Royal Priesthood: The Study on Vocation and Upbringing of a Catholic Priest] (Poznań 1935, Warszawa 2000) Woroniecki deals with the topic of vocation which is a reply to God’s calling. He points to the lowly and inappropriate motivations that may direct men to the priesthood. The person, who cares for his soul and ardently solicits for the salvation of the souls of other people, sustaining the Glory of God and serving God and for His sake, has noble and supernatural motivations. The Church has a very important role in discovering vocations. Its task is to notice the willingness, talents and motives that drive the candidate, because the priesthood has a sacramental character and ordination is the fruition of the vocation and strengthening by the Holy Spirit.²²³ The role of the priest is to be an intermediary and an unsparing person, who sanctifies the souls with the aid of the sacraments and teaches truths of the faith as well as guides the souls to salvation; the priest is supposed to be “the apple of the eye” of the Church.²²⁴

Woroniecki pays particular attention to the preparation of the candidates to the role of a priest. He argues that an essential role in the life of a future clergyman is played by upbringing guided towards sanctity, in order for him to spread the glory of God and through his whole behavior to worship the Lord God. During the preparations the candidate is supposed to form the spirit of priestly sanctity, learn how to pray well in order to develop the spirit of prayer which is the active love of God. He should also develop the gift of understanding in order to illuminate the mysteries of faith and to grant insight into the contents of the revealed truths. To achieve this, he must gain philosophical knowledge and—subsequently also theological—mastering the Holy Scriptures as well as canon law.

Despite many sacrifices and obstacles on the path to the priestly vocation, when the priest submits himself entirely to Christ, he can find happiness and joy even in those things which hurt and harm him in his life. Joy may be the result of faith, love and prayer; it is a similar case with the virtues of hope and love. The source from which the priest should draw all his strength and refreshment are the daily holy mass, priestly prayers (Liturgy of the Hours), quiet prayer, as well as the cults: of the Eucharist, the Heart of Jesus, the Virgin Mary and through the Lord’s saints. Joy should be a result of pastoral work, most of all among children and youth, service in the confessional, preaching, conducting the liturgy as well social actions and writing. The source of comfort and joy in the life of a priest is his relationship with the Church and participation in the joy of Church; then he will hear the significant words: “enter into the joy of your Lord.”²²⁵

In 1939 Woroniecki dedicated a special edition of the journal Szkoła Chrystusowa, of which he was the editor-in-chief,to the issue of the priesthood. In many other periodicals he also discusses this topic, backing it with the examples of renowned priests, such as bishop Franciszek Jaczewski, archbishops: Józef Teodorowicz, Józef Bilczewski, Aleksander Kakowski, primate August Hlond or pope Pius XII.²²⁶ Based on their lives, he construes an exemplar of the priest-pastor.²²⁷ He believes that the priest should be obligated to practice Christian perfection. There are two reasons for that: the first one is the ordination to priesthood and the sacrificial activities connected with them; the second one is submitting to pastoral duties.²²⁸ Priestly perfection is accomplished in the dignity of the bishopric, because in order for a bishop to educate others he is expected to be excellent.²²⁹

Woroniecki also shows the ideal of a priest-preacher based on the considerations of the preaching activity of St. Thomas Aquinas.²³⁰ He defines the characteristic role played by the spiritual father in the formative group that has two tasks: (1) accustoming the alumni with the rules of internal life as well as implementing them to the practice of all the spiritual exercises which are practiced during the daily life in the seminary; this purpose can be achieved by means of conferences preached to the clerics; (2) the individual guidance and tutoring on how these general rules should be projected on the platform of individual religious life. “The spiritual father should be the main and adequate supervisor of the spiritual life of the clerics.”²³¹ Therefore, the spiritual father bears responsibility for the preparation of the clergy for guiding the lives of other people on the path towards fulfilling perfection.

Grace and nature

A frequent motif in Woroniecki’s writings is a thought from St. Thomas Aquinas: gratia supplet naturam—grace supplements, i.e. assumes nature.²³² Woroniecki emphasizes that God grants every human being enough grace to enable him or her to live on Earth and assist in his or her salvation. Nonetheless, revealing this grace and its power remains in a close relationship with human nature. This nature, in turn, can be shaped through disposing of one’s vices and bad habits. Therefore, the human being’s duty is to work on his or her character in order to ennoble it. Since nature abhors a vacuum, the place of the vices should be taken by virtues, solidly developed and grounded in the human being.²³³

Grace, according to Woroniecki, can be actual grace (gratia actualis) as well as habitual or sanctifying grace (gratia habitualis sanctificans). In its every form it is a supernatural (i.e. not subjected to nature), undeserved gift from God, granted to the human being in order to achieve everlasting happiness, i.e. eternal life consisting in the direct participation in the internal life of God. He believes that the human being acts in the natural order, when he or she is guided by reason. Human action is then concordant with the action of Divine providence, encompassing his or her reason and will.²³⁴

Theological virtues

Theological virtues have a substantial influence on the transformation of the human being’s spiritual powers, i.e. reason and the will, enabling him or her to have a relationship with God²³⁵ and to live in accordance with the requirements of the faith. As Woroniecki explains:

reason through faith, and the will through hope and love become powered from within by God’s power; thanks to that they become capable of raising one’s entire life to God and to guide our moral actions in order to lead us at the end of our lives to see God “face to face.”²³⁶

He presents the theological virtues of faith, hope and love, exemplified in the most perfect possible way by the Virgin Mary. He stresses the numerous times that God gave the Virgin Mary to the people as an example to follow as well as a source of grace: “for in the Treasury of Redemption apart from Christ’s merits there are, in connection with Him, also Her merits.”²³⁷ He explains that in Her maternal heart “all grace which she acquired throughout Her life on Earth with us is laid, and in that grace the foremost place belongs to the merit of her theological virtues: faith, hope and love.”²³⁸ The Virgin Mary, as a human being, was uniquely gifted by these virtues. For this reason, when she prayed or committed good deeds she rose in perfection and gained grace for herself and others. Her remarkable sanctity and unity with God grant her astounding power and capabilities to act in a redemptive way.²³⁹ Mary received the virtue of faith in the most perfect degree and this was present throughout Her entire life. Mary’s virtue of love, identically to the other virtues, reached its apogee in the moments of the passion and death of Jesus.²⁴⁰ The Church sees in her the most excellent example of life in faith, hope and love.

In one’s moral life, in Woroniecki’s view, one should cherish both the theological virtues and the natural ones, because focusing only on one type does not guarantee ethical perfection. These two types of virtues constitute an organic whole, mutually supplementing each other. In Christian life the natural virtues must be subdued to the theological virtues in order to avoid the danger of instrumentally treating God and the community in which one lives.²⁴¹

Mercy

Referring to sister Faustyna Kowalska’s revelations, Woroniecki dedicated a separate publication to mercy which is God’s greatest attribute.²⁴² In the first part of this text he explains mercy from the perspective of Christian revelation. He discusses the beginnings of the teachings on Divine Mercy by the biblical patriarchs, in Moses’s revelations, King David’s Psalms, the prophets, as well as didactic books and subsequently in the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles. His reflections in the second part focus on Divine Mercy in Catholic theology. Mercy is the highest attribute of God the Creator and Lord of the world, as well as the main motif of Incarnation and the source of all of the benefits for the human being. The first response to His mercy, which God expects from the human being, is hope. The second reply to His mercy is fear of the Lord, and the third one is the virtue of mercy. It enables one to receive Divine mercy in this life and the next. Citing Saint Ambrose, Woroniecki stresses that mercy is the epitome of the Christian religion.

Prayer

In the book Pełnia modlitwy [The Fullness of Prayer]²⁴³ Woroniecki teaches prayer and shows its role and sense in the dialogue with the Creator. He presents and analyzes the best examples of prayers by Jesus, the Virgin Mary, or Saint Dominic, and discusses the particular graces that accompanies prayer in relation to their diverse character. The entire construction has a theoretical and practical character. In Nauka o modlitwie [The Study of Prayer] he elaborates on the role of prayer in Christian perfection; the particular types of prayer: of praise and supplication; for the neighbors; the conditions of effective prayer; the prayer of an entire human being; the role of grace in prayer as well as  faith as a source of prayer; and he shows what we should pray for. In Sztuka modlitwy [The Art of Prayer] he shows the liturgy as a school of prayer, the holy mass, intellectual prayer, contemplation, distinct graces on the path to contemplation, Jesus’s prayer, and the saints’ with Saint Dominic’s prayer as an example, as well as the spirit of prayer. In Woroniecki’s view, prayer is the reply of the rational creation to the gift of existence, encompassing the whole person. Through prayer, the human being in the name of the entire material world, of which he or she is the crown, worships God. Woroniecki’s Thomistic approach to prayer manifests itself in the fact that prayer encompasses the entire human being—the body, imagination, the senses, and then the blessing envelops the whole person. The epitome of prayer is the Eucharist, during which Christ prays and among the faithful surrounding Him entrusts them to God the Father, and He desires that His prayers and those of the gathered faithful unite in the praise of God the Father of all creation.

Sainthood

To strengthen his appeal to promote interest in hagiography, Woroniecki made a list of the best monographs on the lives of saints which he included in his Przewodnik po literaturze religijnej [Guide to Religious Literature].²⁴⁴ In this book he defines the conditions for creating hagiographic texts that meet specific methodological standards.²⁴⁵

In Woroniecki’s writings a significant role is played by his conviction that saints, as exemplary persons, have a profound formative function. Most of all he stresses their impact on the moral stance of entire societies²⁴⁶, for which the saints were genuine spiritual leaders.²⁴⁷ He focuses, most of all, on the saints coming from the Dominican Order. He shows Saint Dominic predominantly from the perspective of his efforts to establish the order, and in several texts he presents his prayer as exemplary.²⁴⁸ He devotes the most space to Saint Hyacinth.²⁴⁹ He draws attention to the figures that the Church beatified and he presents them as the most beautiful crown surrounding Saint Dominic²⁵⁰: his family (his mother, the blessed Joanna of Aza, and his brother, the blessed Mannes), closest associates (bl. Jordan of Saxony), as well as the blessed friars/monks/Dominicans: Bernard of Garrigue, Nicholas Palea, Guala of Bergamo, John of Salerno, Bartholomew of Brabant and the blessed Sadoc, together with the 48 martyrs who were murdered by the Tatars in Sandomierz. He dedicated a separate work to bl. Ceslaus²⁵¹, presenting a new exemplar of Christian excellence which the Polish Church can be proud of. In his writings Woroniecki also introduced other blessed people, especially nuns—representatives of various orders. He also indicates some figures who in his opinion deserve to have their beatification processes prepared: e.g. Mother Magdalena Mortęska—the abbess of the Benedictine nuns in Chełm, Fr. Wojciech Męciński—martyred in Japan, Mother Teresa Marchocka—a Carmelite nun, Fr. Fabian Maliszowski, Mother Marcelina Darowska and Eufemia Raciborska. Woroniecki also felt responsible for the beatification process of Queen Jadwiga, who now is considered a saint.²⁵²

In the abundant body of Woroniecki’s works, both those published and those left behind in manuscript form, there are many theological issues that have been omitted here, e.g. the question of Divine filiation (living the fulness of theological virtues).²⁵³

9. DISCUSSIONS AND POLEMICS

Jacek Woroniecki’s philosophy is systemic, not critical. Nonetheless, discussions as well as polemics constitute an integral part of the philosophy that he practices and of his entire intellectual activity. Woroniecki is convinced that cognitive objectivism requires a critical approach to scientific theories as well as to the understanding of human moral, religious and social actions. The traces of such a cognitive approach are present in his works.

On scholastics and philosophy

In his writings Woroniecki reveals an excellent knowledge of scholastic literature contemporary to his times, e.g. the publications by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange on moral issues (the agreeableness of faith and reason), Jacques Maritain (Christian personalism—the life of a Christian in the modern world), Ambroise Gerdej and Éduard Hugon (Thomistic doctrine), or Luis Bouyer (the inseparability of theology, spirituality and the liturgy). He also refers to Christian philosophy understood in a broader way, e.g. Max Scheler (homo religiosus, personal freedom, realism and personalism). He makes use of the methods of renowned German and French philosophers, adapting from them the synchronic analytical (one can cognize exemplary principles) and synthetic (allowing to see these rules in a specific life situation) methods used in moral theology.²⁵⁴ 

Woroniecki gives special recognition to Pope Leo XIII²⁵⁵, who encouraged a deeper reflection on the universalist character of Thomistic inquiries. Woroniecki acknowledges that Thomism was created and developed by Désiré-Joseph Mercier, Martin Grabmann, Martin Gillet, Jacques Maritain and Josef Mausbach, who wrote superb ethics and pedagogy textbooks.²⁵⁶ In his reflections on the theme of the will he refers to works by Wilhelm Wundt, Ernst Meumann, Albert Michotte, Johannes Lindworsky, Władysław Witwicki, Mieczysław Kreutz and Benedykt Dybowski, criticizing the views of some of them.²⁵⁷ He also critically refers to the philosophy and Thomistic works of Dominican scholars, such as Jacques Berthier, Martina St. Gillet, Gallus Menser, Pierre Mandonnet, Sandro Ramirez, Sadoc Szabó, and Norbert del Prado, as well as other scholars, including Ludwika Jeleńska, Julian Ochorowicz, Pierre Russelot SJ, or Fr. Aleksander Żychliński.²⁵⁸

In his defense of scholastics, Woroniecki engaged in disputes with Kazimierz Twardowski²⁵⁹, stating that those who consider themselves supporters of Thomism, did not penetrate its essence, because they do not understand that its strength lies in universalism. He claims that while stressing the immutable and permanent elements of Thomism, they are not able to notice “this hidden abundance, to which it owes its capability of developing and mesmerizing minds.”²⁶⁰ Defending Thomism from the position of rational psychology, he argues with Jacques Chevalier; on the issue of natural and positive law, with Hans Kelsen; on the question of purposefulness, with Alfred Adler, Alexis Carrel and Max Planck; whereas on the issue of pragmatism he takes issue with William James.

On individualism

Woroniecki is against cognitive individualism and subjectivism, especially in the approach of Descartes and Immanuel Kant. These are, in his opinion, doctrines that falsely interpret the nature of human cognition and action, and therefore they are harmful for pedagogy and ethics. Moreover, they have an anti-social character. Indirectly they lead to the dissemination of selfish attitudes and weaken the religiosity of individuals.

Being influenced by materialistic and spiritualistic concepts, individualism spread throughout almost all realms of life, causing the dissipation of social ties and an increase in self-centered social attitudes.²⁶¹ Woroniecki ascertains that “individualism rejected the Christian doctrine on the necessity of the individual and society to cooperate for the fulfillment of the common good, which, in turn, caused a complete omission of the social role of upbringing.”²⁶² He states that individualism falsely explains the nature of human freedom, absolutizing its importance in the life of the human being. Woroniecki’s views in this respect are shared, among others, by Fr. Józef Pastuszka, Franciszek Sawicki and Fr. Jan Szmigielski.

Woroniecki points to the relationship between individualist doctrines and intellectualism which reduces moral performance to thinking based on hitherto acquired theoretical knowledge and disregards the significance of the human will in the making of moral decisions by a person. Ethical individualism led to the moral downfall of societies in the early modern times and the contemporary era. Indirectly it led to the fall of early modern pedagogy which became a study of education and not upbringing, severing its traditional ties with ethics.²⁶³

In Woroniecki’s opinion, individualism often comes hand in hand  with subjectivism. As a result of this combination, religious life becomes deeply disfigured and becomes a refined, albeit unconscious, cult of egoism. A person affected by this approach considers the cognition of the supernatural order to be inaccessible.²⁶⁴

Cognitive particularism is also a form of individualism according to which “acquiring knowledge by humanity is exclusively the result of the cognitive activity of individual people”²⁶⁵ and not of the entire community. This view absolutizes the freedom of the human intellect and purposefully severs ties with tradition trivializing the accomplishments of antecedents in the domain of philosophy, theology and the humanities. Woroniecki considers these particularistic tendencies in philosophy and the sciences to be very dangerous. They manifest themselves in the lack of objectivism and the lack of knowledge of philosophical issues. When evaluating the views of early modern philosophers, he states that they are not very original.²⁶⁶ He holds the position that nowadays particularistic tendencies have especially increased among the authors of philosophy textbooks.²⁶⁷ He deplores the fact that this view is also shared by clergymen, e.g. the Jesuit Fr. Jan Rostworowski.²⁶⁸ 

Woroniecki also refers to probabilism in a skeptical way. According to him, probabilism became the reason for sterile disputes and for many years it hampered progress within moral theology. In his opinion this doctrine has a destructive impact on ethical, pedagogical and theological reflection.²⁶⁹ This view was promoted in Poland predominantly by the Jesuits, who used Western European textbooks. Woroniecki believes that it is possible to overcome probabilistic doctrines based on philosophical particularism.²⁷⁰

On intellectualism, sentimentalism and naturalism

Ethical intellectualism is, in Woroniecki’s opinion, a threat to contemporary philosophy, because “in metaphysics as well as psychology, and even in ethics, it grants primacy and a supervisory role to reason and not the will.”²⁷¹ Its supporters assume that the human mind has unlimited capabilities of cognizing reality and it influences human behavior. Woroniecki, however, states that it is a result of not distinguishing between the theoretical and practical activity of the human intellect²⁷², it is contrary to the rules of the faith to which it cannot open itself. He believes that under the influence of philosophical intellectualism pedagogy became a study of education and not upbringing, reducing upbringing to education, and “both of these developmental processes are mutually dependent on each other to a very high degree, they continually permeate each other and support each other, and yet they are something very different and they depend on different principles.”²⁷³ A theoretician of pedagogy who tried to implement the rules of the intellectualist philosophical current to the study of upbringing was Johann F. Herbart.²⁷⁴ Woroniecki claims that pedagogy based on intellectualism, assuming the Herbartian concept of teaching and upbringing, not only does not prepare young people to an appropriate and skillful acquisition of knowledge and necessary abilities, but it actually deprives them of its autonomy and initiative in this respect. An excessively intellectualized attitude in didactics and focus on the transmission of knowledge and information lead to the omission of the spiritual formation and upbringing.²⁷⁵

Sentimentalist doctrines which move the emotional aspect to the fore in ethics were also subject to Woroniecki’s criticism. The factor that stimulated sentimentalism was liberalism and its ideology.²⁷⁶ When referring to the assumptions of sentimentalism, he states that although emotions play an important role in human life, one must not overestimate their significance. Following only one’s emotions instead of the will and reason, does not lead the human being to an objective good. In Woroniecki’s opinion, sentimentalism can be stopped and controlled by placing the will at the forefront of moral life and understanding its central role in the formative as well as self-formative efforts. In religious, national and social life one should give up sentimentalism for the sake of training the will in order for it “to desire in the realm of Divine issues and know how to desire.”²⁷⁷ He states that not only Polish poets and writers contributed to the proliferation of sentimentalism, but also philosophers, pedagogues and psychologists. This current made its mark on the minds of the Polish intelligentsia that had a sanguine temperament²⁷⁸ and participated in the literary and scholarly life of Europe. Woroniecki believes that sentimentalism was present for a long time in Catholic culture and teachings, without countering Catholic dogmas; this only took place at the turn of the 19th and 20th by modernism which emerged out of sentimentalism that was condemned by Pope Pius X.²⁷⁹

Woroniecki also combats naturalism²⁸⁰, the disastrous effects of which he noticed in the philosophical, pedagogical and psychological concepts of his time. Naturalistic views are derived from materialistic concepts of the human being that deny the existence of the immortal soul and God; therefore, he claims that these views should be rejected. He dedicates a considerable amount of space to pedagogical naturalism. He is convinced that the destruction of the harmony connecting philosophy with theology that existed in the collective consciousness of the Christian society since the Middle Ages led to tragic results in early modern and contemporary pedagogy. Modern pedagogy transferred the focal point of its interests from the holistic formation of the human being (in relation to life on Earth and the after-life) to the upbringing of a child. Naturalism in pedagogy leads to secularization and the rejection of the role of supernatural factors in upbringing.²⁸¹ Woroniecki writes that naturalism “overestimates natural upbringing and underestimates the supernatural factor, reduces its part or even rejects it entirely.”²⁸² Overestimating the role of natural upbringing and promoting the idea of the individual making sacrifices for the sake of humanity as a whole is according to him a detrimental propagation of ideology which does not benefit the human being or society.²⁸³

On religious and social life

Woroniecki critically evaluated the questionnaire referring to the religious life of youth in the interwar period in Poland created by Lucyna Dobrzyńska-Rybicka, despite his appreciation of her Catholic stance.²⁸⁴ He engages in a dispute with Marian Zdziechowski, the author of Pesymizm, romantyzm a podstawy chrześcijaństwa [Pessimism, Romanticism and the Foundations of Christianity], who questions the role of the Church in the formation of the European civilization:

[F]rom a variety of Catholic thinkers, Professor Zdziechowski concentrated only on those, who to a lesser or greater degree succumbed to the influence of religious subjectivism, at times, they stood in contradiction to the teachings of the Church or, ultimately, the entirety of their views was condemned under the term modernism by Pius X as incompatible with the Catholic faith. … [S]ince the proclamation of the Pascendi encyclical, modernism is a formal heresy.²⁸⁵

Woroniecki also provides a thorough critique of fideism (he considers it to be contrary to the Catholic faith and morality) which assumes a priori the redundancy of rational elements in the justification of the truths of the faith, morality and Christianity as such.²⁸⁶ He regrets that fideism spread throughout the Polish intelligentsia already during the Great Emigration²⁸⁷, its foremost representative being Adam Mickiewicz, and, despite its condemnation by subsequent popes, has been present among the Polish intelligentsia up until the times contemporary for Woroniecki.²⁸⁸ Fideism, by discarding the possibility of rationally justifying truths of the faith, contributed to decreasing religious awareness and, consequently, many people who remained under its influence, could not defend the moral principles preached by them.²⁸⁹ The fideistic attitudes of some Catholics contributed to the decrease of religious awareness and morality in their societies.²⁹⁰ As a supporter of Thomistic realism, Woroniecki does not accept fideism on the grounds of theology and Christian ethics.

Woroniecki also opposes egalitarianism, a current based on materialism, stating that the social uniformity of everybody, due to factually existing divergence, is unnatural and impossible to attain. He states that the rule of egalitarianism generates various types of social pathologies and corrupts citizens through protectionism and bribery. Equal social benefits for all members of a particular state are, in his view, impossible.²⁹¹

Woroniecki opposes statism and socialism. He claims that excessive intervention of the state in the economic life of the citizens and professional groups destroys social initiative and accommodates poorly disciplined people; furthermore, it contributes to economic stagnation and conserving social injustice. He considers the liberal concept of the human-egoist, who is motivated in his or her economic and social actions by the urge for profit and pleasure, to be false. In his opinion contemporary liberalism and anarchism undermine the sense of the existence of a strong and well-organized state which is necessary for the human being to properly function and exist.²⁹² While acknowledging the input of the liberals in their rightful criticism of statism, he believes that their economic concepts are based on inappropriate anthropological and social premises.²⁹³

In his writings Woroniecki engages in disputes on patriotism and nationalism. He claims that the love of one’s homeland and nation is the duty of every human being. However, he calls into question the views on nationalism by Józef Ujejski and Fr. Jan Rostworowski, according to whom national life is reducible to irrational, sentimental factors that oppose the state.²⁹⁴ He believes that customs are the basis for the national bond as a mode of moral life and the necessary condition for developing it within an individual is the existence of the nation.

According to Woroniecki, every human being has the duty to take up work which—being indispensable—naturally improves him or her morally and intellectually and grants him or her the capability of satisfying one’s material needs as well as those of one’s family. On account of this, every human effort serving morally good purposes—both physical and intellectual—ought to be adequately rewarded and the remuneration should be diverse, taking into consideration both the efforts put in the executed labor and the needs of the worker and his or her family. Drawing inspiration from the views of Thomas Aquinas and his followers²⁹⁵, he opposes both the concepts of liberals and socialists in this respect.

To sum up, one must stress that Woroniecki does not avoid disputes. In his texts he more often argues with intellectual views and positions than with specific thinkers. In these discussions he is firm and even caustic at times. He always holds the position of Catholic philosophy in its Thomistic variant and more often refers to Western philosophers from prior epochs, such as William Ockham, Baruch Spinoza, Francisco Suarez, Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Gottfried Leibniz, Jean Jacque Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Jean-Marie Guyau, Friedrich Nietzsche or Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, than to Polish thinkers.

10. LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPACT

Although Woroniecki wrote his works in the first half of the 20th century, they are astoundingly universal from a philosophical-theological-pedagogical perspective and on account of the timeliness of his suggested resolutions. His style is delightful, the timeliness and timelessness as well as the richness of the presented solutions and their realism can absorb the reader.²⁹⁶ Woroniecki’s oeuvre is invaluable. Those who study his texts call for the necessity of republishing and popularizing those publications in order for him to gain his rightful place among other renowned Polish philosophers, theologians and pedagogues. His texts on the philosophical, ethical-pedagogical and theological as well socio-political questions are particularly popular. It is worth mentioning the publications dedicated to him personally.²⁹⁷ Woroniecki’s philosophy is present not only in lecture scripts (e.g. of Karol Wojtyła and Feliks W. Bednarski), monographs, articles, edited volumes and reviews, but also at numerous national and international academic conferences. The most famous proponent of his work was Bednarski.²⁹⁸

The reception of Woroniecki’s works in philosophy

Woroniecki grounded his understanding of philosophy deeply in the scholastic tradition, drawing especially from the heritage of St. Thomas Aquinas who creatively expanded the philosophy of Aristotle. The unique nature of the philosophy practiced by Woroniecki, as well as his particular interest in ethics and the philosophy of upbringing, delineates the scope of the reception of his thoughts.

Woroniecki’s philosophical considerations were most broadly adapted and promoted by scholars from the Thomistic Lublin School of Philosophy, beginning with Fr. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, through Henryk Kiereś²⁹⁹ and Fr. Andrzej Maryniarczyk, up until Stanisław Gałkowski³⁰⁰, Zbigniew Pańpuch³⁰¹, Paweł Skrzydlewski³⁰² and Imelda Chłodna-Błach.³⁰³ An excellent expert on Woroniecki’s philosophy, his works and life is Ryszard Polak, who is also connected with the Lublin School of Philosophy.³⁰⁴ Woroniecki’s life and works are also analyzed by scholars in other academic centers in Poland, including Artur Andrzejuk³⁰⁵, Mieczysław Gogacz³⁰⁶, Krzysztof Kalka³⁰⁷, Wanda Kamińska³⁰⁸, Tomasz Krajski³⁰⁹, Remigiusz Król³¹⁰ (his interests focus on Woroniecki’s philosophical concept of the person), Jacek Grzybowski³¹¹, Maria M. Boużyk³¹², and Katarzyna Kalinowska³¹³, who not only wrote about various problems discussed by Fr. Woroniecki, but also organized academic conferences dedicated to him and his work. Numerous encyclopedic entries have also been written about him.³¹⁴ Most academic conferences dedicated to Woroniecki or related to his works have taken place at the Catholic University of Lublin and the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw.

The reception of Woroniecki’s intellectual works in pedagogy (social sciences)

Woroniecki’s pedagogy, based on substantial and epistemological realism, promotes the integral and universal upbringing as well as the education of the human being.³¹⁵ Caring for the social formation of people, Woroniecki tries to demonstrate the timeliness of the classical approach to upbringing and elaborates and promotes upbringing based on Catholic values, corresponding to the classical vision of the human being and his or her social nature. A good model of upbringing is for him the Christian ideal of perfection. The culmination of his theoretical-practical work is the concept of integral pedagogy presenting in a synthetic manner the Christian model of education and upbringing.³¹⁶

Although contemporary pedagogical problems are described differently than they were in the first half of the 20th century, they resemble those confronted by Woroniecki. One of the main sources of errors in upbringing is moral intellectualism, occurring nowadays as the “no-lose conflict resolution method,” which minimalizes the authority of the tutor. Woroniecki’s views on the formative capabilities of public schools and their limits also remain up-to-date. Responding to the problems of his times and struggling for the Catholic formative ideal, Woroniecki promotes ideals and role models that are a bridge of pedagogical interactions with contemporary upbringing and educational concepts.

Woroniecki’s reflection on pedagogy is still up to date and has been analyzed by a number of contemporary scholars in the field, such as Maria M. Boużyk³¹⁷, Bogdan Czupryn³¹⁸, Jarosław Horowski³¹⁹, Jadwiga L. Jabłońska³²⁰, Katarzyna Kalinowska³²¹, Grażyna Karolewicz³²², Beata Karpińska³²³, Barbara Kiereś³²⁴, Janina Kostkiewicz³²⁵, Mikołaj Krasnodębski³²⁶, Remigiusz Król³²⁷, Longin Marchlewicz³²⁸, Katarzyna Olbrycht³²⁹, Ryszard Polak³³⁰, Kacper Radzki³³¹, Marek Rembierz³³², Arkadiusz Robaczewski³³³, Alina Rynio and Małgorzata Tomczyk³³⁴, Ryszard Skrzyniarz³³⁵, Krzysztof Śleziński³³⁶, Fr. Edward Walewander³³⁷, or Sister Gabriela Wistuba.³³⁸ In their publications they refer to the concepts and ideas contained in Woroniecki’s works, drawing particular attention to issues connected with upbringing, the role of the tutor and his or her authority, the anthropological foundations of upbringing, the timeliness of Catholic educational ethics, or the formation of a human person and make use of the educational, formative and personalist contents from Woroniecki’s various writings. Master’s theses and doctoral dissertations have been dedicated to his oeuvre, especially at Catholic institutions of higher education (e.g. The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin³³⁹, the Jesuit University Ignatianum and the Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow, as well as the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw).

The reception of Woroniecki’s intellectual work in theology

Woroniecki was not only a philosopher and an ethicist, but also an expert in the field of Catholic social thought and the history of the Church, a hagiographer, theoretician of ascetics and mysticism, an expert on the liturgy and the knowledge about Divine mercy, a Mariologist and an organizer of spiritual life. His scholarly interests concentrated on the issues connected with dogmatic theology (Christology, ecclesiology, pneumatology, caritology, sacramentology, Mariology), fundamental theology (Revelation, the Church, religion) and moral theology (the virtues, sacraments, ethics of the social life), as well as pastoral theology, liturgics, history of the Church and Catholic social teachings. This very broad spectrum of theological interests resonated in his writings—both in the published works and the manuscripts which he left behind.

In the broadly understood field of theology, contemporary scholars deal with Woroniecki’s views on: religiosity, moral theology, soteriology, pastoral work, Christian formation, moral virtues, Divine Mercy, the Bible, spirituality and the human person. Among those who refer to Woroniecki’s theological works are: Janusz Hochleitner³⁴⁰, Michał J. Kempys³⁴¹, Romuald Kostecki³⁴², sister Gabriela Wistuba³⁴³, Natalia Lietz³⁴⁴, Fr. Jerzy Misiurek³⁴⁵ and Jacek Grzybowski.³⁴⁶

The reception of Woroniecki’s philosophy on history and culture

Woroniecki was interested in Polish history and, after World War II, he supported the idea of assimilating the so-called Recovered Territories.³⁴⁷ When presenting the figure of bl. Ceslaus, he demonstrated a new model of Christian perfection. Besides this he was motivated—due to the socio-political situation—by a patriotic purpose. Ceslaus, similarly to saint Hyacinth, came from Silesia. He was the apostle of Wroclaw and he left numerous Polish traces there. Referring to them, Woroniecki argued the Polishness of this city, opposing, among others, German territorial claims.³⁴⁸ As a philosopher, he focused also on the question of the nation and state, emphasizing the role of moral life.³⁴⁹ Several of his publications might become a reference point for historical research on the Polish inter-war period and the period after World War II.³⁵⁰

It seems that the historical questions included in Woroniecki’s body of scholarly works are practically absent from the works of historians. The issues that evoke most interest are those connected with the state and nation³⁵¹, as well as those relating to his genealogy.³⁵²

Woroniecki was quite well acquainted with Polish and world literature, and on numerous occasions he expressed his views on literary topics, as well as being recognized as an expert on the Polish language.³⁵³ He expresses his concern for the development of the Polish arts, sciences and culture and defends the purity of the mother tongue from deformation and contamination from various macaronic terms and phrases. He stressed the value of the mother tongue in pedagogy³⁵⁴ and gave advice on teaching the Polish language. Much like in historical research, the reception of his intellectual work in literary studies is extremely limited or is referred to in passing while discussing other issues.³⁵⁵

Questions connected with culture were also a topic of Woroniecki’s considerations and reflections³⁵⁶ and these issues have been mentioned in some publications on philosophy and pedagogy.³⁵⁷

Woroniecki believed that a significant role in human upbringing is played by youth organizations, especially scouting organizations, because they teach arduousness in the fulfillment of duties towards other people. However, it is hard to find publications referring to these issues.

An important role in promoting Woroniecki’s publications has been played by the Servire Veritati National Education Institute Foundation which publishes new editions of Woroniecki’s works because many of them were published before World War II and became unavailable after the war. During the Communist era in Poland, Woroniecki’s publications and philosophy were purposefully “forgotten,” because he referred to personalism and Thomism which was inconvenient for those trying to consolidate a regime based on the ideas that he criticized.

Reception of Woroniecki’s intellectual work abroad

Woroniecki also wrote books and articles in foreign languages (in French and Latin), because he wanted his thought to be discussed on a wider European forum by a broad milieu of readers from the 20th century world of the arts, science and culture. It can be said that he deliberately promoted his views outside of Polish borders. He also translated works from French, Latin and Greek into Polish.

Although Woroniecki’s theological, philosophical and pedagogical works are not completely unknown to English, Italian or French readers, they have not to date become the object of a larger study outside of Poland.³⁵⁸ He is still waiting to be discovered, researched in-depth, especially in the context of his contemporaries in Western philosophy and which have been made better known to a wider public.

11. GLOSSARY

Collectivism (totalism): demands that the individual treat the supreme communities, i.e. the state or the nation, as his or her ultimate purpose and renounce for them the personal purpose to which he or she was predestined. Collectivism can be statist or nationalist.

Conservatism: it is contained in customs. It grants society its internal stability and sense of security that are necessary for the personal development of the human being. Conservatism is governed by the principle of moderation. It should have a democratic and social character. In a political sense it is the urge for preserving in social life that what is considered most important and precious in the spiritual accomplishments of the past ages as a permanent and immutable good.

Custom: common norms undefined by any law or legislation. With the help of customs society spontaneously grants itself a particular homogeneity as well as internal consistency and further conserves it. It is not possible to define the time when a custom emerges and since when it has functioned in society. It is thepositive law which does not have the traits of immutability and necessity. It has the character of moral law. It is a warrant or injunction of practical reason which considers the common well-being of society as its purpose. A custom should serve the human being as a guideline in his or her daily life, showing him or her which deeds correspond to his or her rational nature and Divine plans. A custom is one of the most important factors in the life of a nation, in which the differences between particular nations become evident.

Education: the process of training, exercising, developing and enhancing one’s cognitive abilities with new skills and knowledge as well as the result of this process. The purpose of education is to train the cognitive powers: the senses, memory, imagination and the intellect, namely its cognitive functions.It should not only provide a particular body of knowledge, but also the skill to use the aforementioned powers.

Ethics: a field of philosophy which deals with the moral life of the human being. It has a theoretical-practical character. The subject matter of ethics are human acts (deeds), i.e. conscious and voluntary action, perceived in the light of the fundamental obligations and rights leading to the fulness of spiritual development and to the realization of the purpose specific to it. Ethics deals with the cognition and explanation of the commonly accepted principles of human moral life in the context of the truth about reality and the truth about the human being.

Faith: in its objective aspect it is a theoretical activity of human reason, directed at the truths existing beyond us on which we do not have any influence. The subject of faith is that which is not directly or indirectly accessible to our knowledge and something about which we cannot generate personal certainty, be it physical or metaphysical. Faith is grounded in the testimonies of other people. In the psychological aspect it is the assumption of a particular judgement under the influence of the human will. The judgement of faith is made on the basis of the power of another person’s testimony about a subject that was not cognized earlier.

Fideism: the belief that among the mysteries of the faith there are things which are contrary to reason and its logic, and that one must renounce his or her intellect in order to make room for faith. Fideism separates faith from the order of rational cognition. As the conscious rejection of the possibility of the rational justification of truths of the faith, it constitutes a threat for individual and social religious life.

Fortitude: acardinal virtue assisting the will in controlling impulsive feelings. It is characterized by perseverance and persistence on one’s position in the face of threatening evil as well as attacking this evil. Fortitude grants the skill of appropriate behavior towards danger. Martyrdom is considered to be the peak of fortitude; it is understood as the acceptance of a violent death in defense of some ideal truth or good.

Governing: it is one of the highest human skills consisting in the introduction of law and order in the social sphere. To govern means to lead the entirety of one’s entrusted community to its adequate purpose. Governing requires respect for the reasonableness and freedom of particular human beings, who have the ability to decide about themselves and can show their objection to the government. The art of governing is complemented by the abilities to command and punish.

Grace: internal divine assistance, supporting the human being’s spiritual powers.It is a gratuitous gift that the human being receives. Grace is not granted to every human being in an identical way; it manifests itself in a variety of forms and to a various extent. God gives us this supernatural aid due to His infinite mercy and decides Himself about its scale, time, manner of realization and even its internal strength. Grace is divided into: actual, habitual and efficacious. Grace constitutes an essential element for the development of the moral and spiritual life of the human being.

Habit: an autonomous action of a human being taking place without special participation of our consciousness and thus, independently from our will. It is a mechanized action which is the result of repeating a particular action for a longer period of time.

Happiness: the ultimate aim of the human being. It is the result of achieving the ultimate good capable of satisfying all aspirations of the human soul, excluding at the same time all evil, privation, shortage and the fear of losing it. Happiness can only be achieved through the good that we could love only for itself, not relating it to any other, higher purpose. Such an ultimate good is God. Ultimate happiness is achievable through cognizing God and uniting with Him.

Human potentiality: is the supreme principle of human development; it is the fundamental phenomenon in human life, not only in the sensual sphere, but even more so in the spiritual domain. In the spiritual domain potentiality encompasses human cognition as well as moral and creative action.

Humility: a fundamental virtue in Christian life; it requires rigorous sacrifices of a spiritual nature. It is supposed to prevent the human being from setting oneself above other people and incline him or her rather to become subordinate to them. It consists in containing within the human soul the spirit of subordination to God; thanks to this it makes the soul susceptible to God’s doings. The human being’s acceptance of his or her dependence on God influences his or her relations with other people. Humility does not exclude a feeling of satisfaction with the good that we possess, as long as we do not attribute it to ourselves with a lesser or greater rejection of the role of God and do not set ourselves above our neighbors.

Individualism: a viewderived from naturalism, juxtaposing the human being as a rational unit (individual) within a community. Its source is the disparity introduced to human nature by the original sin; from it flows out the reduction of everything to oneself and the unwillingness to become subdued by anybody. This is manifested in the form of particularism which rejects the social character of acquiring human knowledge. In religious life this leads to shifting to the forefront individualist forms of spiritual life and an increasing neglect of social entities.

Justice: the constant and perpetual will of giving everyone that to which he or she is rightfully entitled. Its task is to teach respect for the good of others within people. We distinguish three types of justice: legal justice, by force of which particular people give that what a given community (state-level, national, local, etc.) rightfully deserves; distributive justice which refers to that what the individual is entitled to receive from the community; and commutative justice, commonly called “honesty,” which regulates the relations between particular members of society. The basis for justice (giving the good that is due) is ultimately the personal dignity of the human being. Justice is a social virtue and its fulfillment brings peace.

Language: the primary and predominant instrument of knowledge. It is an important auxiliary tool of the thinking process itself. Language is the fundamental substance of national culture. Without its own language, no nation is capable of creating its own scholarly culture, because the development of scientific thought in a particular environment is dependent on the level of proficiency in using the mother tongue. Acquisition of the mother tongue influences in a spontaneous way the development of human mental powers.

Love: it is the liking of the will in a being perceived as a good. The formal objective of love is good, towards which the one who loves is inclined. It encompasses all the phenomena of human emotional life that assumes the form of: liking (amor complacentiae), desire (amor concupiscentiae), benevolence (amor benevolentiae) and friendship (amor amicitiae). Friendship is the highest form of love in which mutual benevolence leads to the deepest spiritual unification. Apart from natural love (amor) one can discern love of choice (diligere). Amicitiae means mutual love which assumed the traits of stability, whereas charity (caritas) may mean an act as well as the virtue of love; it adds to it a trait of something higher, more excellent and directed towards an objective that is highly cherished. At the bottom of each love always lies the unification with something mutual, and this unity is from one point-of-view the reason for love, from another one—its essence, and from yet another one—its most important consequence, its result. Christian love does not require reassurance about emotional love, which one does not feel, but about spiritual love that should never be lacking in the Christian soul.

Marriage: the natural union of a man and a woman, created as a result of bilateral agreement with a stable character which it owes to its contractual nature. The couple who enter matrimony agree that they shall live together, help each other and satisfy each other’s needs and that they shall guarantee decent and sustaining living conditions for their offspring; and enable them to reach full physical, mental and moral maturity. The agreement between spouses has a private as well as public character. It is not only a subject of interest for the spouses, but also for society—to which it is supposed to enable natural growth and stability. From a religious perspective, marriage is considered a sacrament which means that a Christian marriage has the significance of something sacred which is not only a sign of special Divine grace, but also a cause of this grace.

Morality: human performance, i.e. conscious and voluntary action subject to evaluation from the point-of-view of moral norms, the basis of which is the principle of natural law: do good, avoid evil! Moral action is the basic form of the actualization and improvement of the human being, headed towards the fulfillment of the ultimate purpose inscribed into human nature.Morality constitutes the ultimate purpose of human nature. There are two types of morality: natural and supernatural.

Mysticism: is a higher level of supernatural perfection, when the soul after undergoing the main phases of purification, becomes, in a way, transparent for the light of God and susceptible to the inspirations of the Holy Trinity that lives within it. 

Nation: has its own unity consisting of common customs and not infrequently kinship, as well as language and religion. It is created through the unity of morality and customs which give it its uniform way of functioning. The nation uses customs as tools for the realization of its purpose. The purpose of the nation is the common good of the entire community: to live a good and virtuous life and bring up the citizens to an improved life. The nation takes care of compatriots in a general way, imposing on them common directions and actions as well as in a particular way, condemning acts against the customs and the common good. The nation is based on the subjective indetermination of the individual nature of the human being due to the mode in which it functions.

Pedagogy: the study of upbringing, integrally connected with practical ethics. Its purpose is a meticulous analysis of the process of accustoming, acquiring habits as well as skills, both positive ones (virtues) which must be implanted and negative ones (vices) which must be combated, controlled and eradicated.

Person: a self-contained being endowed with a rational nature, therefore, capable of cognizing oneself, governing oneself and being responsible for oneself (rationalis naturae individua substantia). A human person is a being not only as unitary and indivisible in itself and distinct from others, like all beings from among other species of the world, but additionally it is conscious of its unity as well as self-containment and distinctness. A human person is distinguished from other individuals by its rational nature. The rational nature manifests itself through mental cognition, freedom and morality.

Personalence: the perfection, to which the development of human personality should ultimately lead, on account of its personal status and rational nature. Personalence demonstrates how a particular person should behave and act with a sense of responsibility for oneself.

Personality: a potential-dynamic aspect of a human person’s life which is the result of a particular mode of managing by a given person the actualization of one’s personal life. Personality is susceptible to changes that take place as a result of human decisions.

Personalism: claims that the human being is a personal being that transcends the biological and social world. It assumes that the human being has his or her personal aim, beyond any social ones, and any community, in which he or she lives should help him or her to fulfill this aim and achieve it; no community should conceal this purpose or, what is worse, divert his or her attention from it.

Prayer: is an act of love in which God’s love manifests itself most significantly, for all powers of the human soul, through prayer, consciously and presently address God and become connected with Him. During prayer the human being turns to God and reveals to him everything he or she owes to Him: adoration and glory, thanksgiving, apology, pleading, etc.

Priesthood: an internal process within a human being called a vocation. The entire idea of Christ’s priesthood is summarized in the term “intermediation.” The priest is, as St. Paul states, “selected from among the people and is appointed to represent the people in matters related to God,” he acts like an envoy of God to the people and of the people to God. In a priest’s activity one can discern two parts: the first one, when turned towards God he presents Him human problems and directs sacrifices and supplications in their intention; the second one, when turned towards people he passes onto them heavenly graces and preaches to them about the truths of the faith and God’s commandments.

Prudence: the supreme skill of the mind that is supposed to supervise all human conduct in everyday existence and encompassing everything that has the character of a voluntary act. The task of personal prudence is to improve the governing of oneself; social or political prudence is necessary for those who intend to govern societies, military prudence …is applied in the defense of the greatest temporal goods, family prudence, i.e. formative, encompasses specific tasks which family life is supposed to fulfill.

Purpose: the ultimate result of the course of every natural phenomenon,towards which the entire process has been headed from the start;the result that gives the direction to a particular process before it has been realized. From the subjective point-of-view the ultimate purpose of the human being is happiness. From the objective point-of-view—it is the infinite good.

Purposefulness: the character of the processes taking place in the world of nature as well as in human life; it is the main trait of human conduct.Purposefulness controls every action as well as the development of the entity subject to development; one cannot cognize the nature of anything without cognizing its purpose.The human being is the only entity in the world capable of cognizing the purpose to which it is headed and of consciously guiding one’s actions towards it. The ability to reflect upon one’s actions and the awareness of one’s internal purposefulness is the most distinct trait of human action; the responsibility that we take for our moral conduct is based on it.

State: is a collective (civic community) ruled by a governmental authority through laws.It has a territory subject exclusively to its rule. The state is entitled to use force against its citizens, but only within the limits of natural divine law. The state supervises the community, exerting universal control,by the force of the law constituting identical ways of conduct from which the homogeneity of the conduct of the collective and the increase of the significance of the individuals is derived.The purpose of the state is to enable its citizens to acquire sufficient means both material and—in particular—moral to live the best possible life.

Religion: everything that relates to God and the relationship between him and the human being. We distinguish two elements in every religion: the natural and the supernatural. In the natural religion the human intellect, by cognizing the existence and the attributes of God, comes to the conclusion that he or she has duties towards Him, the fulfillment of which constitutes the substance of religion. Supernatural religion evokes faith in reason as well as hope and love together with other supernatural virtues in the will.

Sanctity: a higher level of spiritual life, which manifests itself to a greater extent than in an average person in a control of the evil inclinations of the human nature spoiled by the original sin and in the great harmony and homogeneity of one’s entire moral conduct.

Temperance: the skill of controlling one’s sensual desires. It consists of the sense of dignity and shame. It manifests itself in the form of moderation and chastity, granting the human being control over the desires of his or her nature, ensuring the individual’s and species survival.The task of the virtue of temperance is to moderate the desires springing in these domains and maintain them within reasonable measures.

Thomism: the philosophical system created by St. Thomas Aquinas. It is a synthesis of natural knowledge and the faith. It constitutes a systematic and precise doctrine characterized by stability as well as immutability. It is the synthesis of the intellectual heritage of all mankind. Thomism is a universalist doctrine surpassing any particularistic systems, without, however, excluding anything positive, truthful and creative that they may contain. Indeed, it eagerly absorbs them after purifying them beforehand. As a doctrine it remains in a harmonious relationship with Catholicism.

Upbringing: personalist upbringing is about transforming an individual unaware of his or her aims and tasks into a self-reliant person, capable of efficiently controlling all of his or her capabilities. It includes the appetitive functions (the will and emotions) as well as the practical functions of the intellect, and indirectly it influences the training and control of human memory and imagination. The purpose of the process of upbringing is the acquisition of permanent skills (virtues) by a human being which enable him or her to control the sensual-emotional sphere and harnessing it into the realization of the aims indicated by the intellect.

Virtue (skill): the strengthening of the capability to consciously carry out particular actions, performing them in a better, quicker way, without hesitation or a second thought, not excluding planning and the participation of higher mental functions (reason and the will). It differs from a habit by the fact that it is not an automated or mechanized action.It accelerates and eases our conduct and, in a way, saves our life force. It is, as if, a condensed or capitalized experience that gives the potential without hesitation and long searches to quickly make a decision which at a particular moment is compatible with both the purpose and the conditions in which it is supposed to be achieved.It encompasses a very wide range of phenomena. A skill is on the one hand an ability that is very well mastered, be it theoretical—therefore, knowledge, or practical, i.e. arts, crafts, and even prudence—the skill of guiding one’s life; on the other hand, moral virtues also belong within its scope, to a no lesser extent than vices. Virtues amplify our capabilities to commit deeds compliant with the moral law and the supreme purpose of the human being. Vices incline us to deeds which deviate from the moral law and the supreme purpose but are adjusted to some particularistic purpose. A skill does not constrain freedom within us, but rather perpetuates it in the direction of the choice we once made. It inclines us to certain acts, to a particular uniform mode of conduct, by no means does it exclude the possibility of committing contrary deeds. A trait of a skill is moderation—flexibility that makes the human being know how to measure his or her act and adapt it to the circumstances and conditions in which it is supposed to operate. The skill preserves in the potentiality of powers of the soul the will towards the good and by that it grants a greater value to the spiritual self as such.

Work: belongs to the dignity of rational beings who are called for cooperation with God. It is the natural duty of the human being that corresponds with his or her necessities of life. Work can be divided into mental work, work focused on the formation of one’s character and manual work. In the Bible it appears as the consequence of the original sin. It occupies an important place in the plan of Divine Providence. Work is connected with suffering and thus with the very redemption of the human being. Accepting the toil resulting from work as the fulfillment of God’s will becomes a source of blessing for the human being.

II. JACEK WORONIECKI OP: SELECTED WRITINGS

Selected and edited by

Piotr S. Mazur

Translated by

Piotr Tarasiewicz

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHRISTIAN SYSTEM OF ETHICS IN COMPARISON WITH OTHER ETHICAL SYSTEMS

Jacek Woroniecki, Katolicka Etyka Wychowawcza, vol. 1. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2013, pp. 109–118.

1. … Let us start by pointing out that our ethics is a Christian or Catholic ethics, put in a strict scientific system by St. Thomas Aquinas. Its Catholicism, however, is not an external feature characterizing its relation to the revealed science, the custody of which was entrusted to the Catholic church. No, in a deeper etymological meaning of this expression, the Catholicism of the ethics, as indeed the Catholicism of the philosophy which the Catholic Church considers to be its own, signifies certain intrinsic qualities that give the whole system of philosophical Christian thought its own scientific character, and distinguish it, so sharply, from all other philosophical systems which have been developed for twenty-some centuries of human philosophical thinking. In this latter, deeper meaning, we will call the Catholicism of Christian ethics universalism, and we will soon see that it is precisely this character of universality to which the ethics owes the fact that the modern mindset has so much difficulty in understanding and evaluating it.

When one thinks deeply into the system of Christian philosophy, such as it is present in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, one cannot help but be struck by the difficulty encountered at almost  every step: the inability to find a place for him within various philosophical systems whereas the views of all other philosophers are easily located there. As one becomes more and more familiar with particular parts of Thomism and better covers its whole, it becomes clearer to one that this system transcends the framework in which it is customary to classify particular philosophical systems, that its relation to them is like that of something whole and full to something fragmentary and partial, that it dominates with its universalism over the particular attempts of individual minds in pursuing the solution of the most important philosophical questions. The closer comparison of Thomism with particular philosophical systems leads one to a very interesting observation: the oppositions between them are always related to what is negation, one-sidedness, or extremity—in a word, what is a  pruning of truth—in particular philosophers, whereas what is positive and affirmative in them always enters into the whole of Thomistic thought and integrates harmoniously with other factors that did not find place in those systems. The reality of the world around us is much more complex than what appears to human minds at first glance. The unprecedented advancement of natural sciences in the last century is the best evidence of how long humanity could have ignored the activity of the factors which surround it. Not only is the game of physical and natural forces so complex and diverse; the whole immaterial reality, mental and moral life, is also more complex than it seems at first glance. It is a very difficult task for the human mind to permeate all their emanations, to get to know the stratagems of all their factors, and finally to embrace them in their entirety. It is not surprising, then, that there are so many different systems in the field of philosophy, especially in the field of ethics that is of special concern to us here.

That which characterizes them is just that fragmentariness and one-sidedness. From many data of a particular philosophical problem, which must be taken into account in order to reach its full solution,  is taken one or some—sometimes indeed , disregarding the rest, and even with a radical denial of them—to build a system which attracts minds with that part of the truth it contains, but is unable to satisfy them completely. It also explains that these systems are so numerous and that—although they are mutually exclusive, sometimes in a very radical way—they all have their supporters gained by virtue of the particles of truth contained in them. None of them, however, can satisfy the mind which, when desiring to know the fullness of reality, will always seek a system that gives not fragmentary or one-sided explanations, but strives to provide a complete and comprehensive explanation of fundamental philosophical issues.

In the history of philosophy a need was often expressed to reconcile the conflicting tendencies of particular philosophical systems and to foster harmony among them, but those attempts, called eclecticism, led only to artificial syntheses in which the unilateralism of this or that particularist system always prevailed. And, therefore, eclecticism, although it had or wanted to have the appearance of universalism, had no harmonious internal unity, so all attempts of constructing eclectic syntheses brought no lasting results.

The unified and universalist system of thought could not arise from above, from the artificial joining together of the heights; it could arise only from below, from the bottom, so as to create—by way of gradual development—an integral, endowed with harmonious cohesion, internal whole of philosophical human thought.

2. The system of Christian philosophy is just such a universalist system of that type. Such a system could be only one, and its development must have taken ages; therefore, although St. Thomas is undoubtedly its most brilliant coryphaeus, it would be indeed a mistake to attribute the system of Christian philosophy only to the genius of that great medieval thinker. For this reason, we will not call it Thomism, because only the particularist systems can be called after the names of their creators. The universalist system cannot be the work of one man, but the result of the centuries-long reflection of the whole thinking human race. The one who thought that Thomism is related to Thomas in the same way as Cartesianism is related to Descartes or Kantianism to Kant, would totally fail to appreciate the vital role of the great Dominican, and lower his position, in the development of philosophical Christian thought.

No doubt the system of Christian philosophy owes so much to the exceptional personal abilities of St. Thomas. And yet it would be childish to think that he alone found universal solutions to the most important philosophical problems, whereas all the other thinkers were able to produce only partial results. It would mean ignoring the creative principle of universalism that is the very guiding principle to which the system of Christian philosophy owes its whole development, and about which St. Thomas, following Aristotle, was so deeply concerned.

This principle boils down to a belief that the progress of philosophical thought is much more a social than an individual function, and that what an individual can do in the field of discovering truth is only a trifle which, only by becoming a link in the great chain of human thought, contributes to enriching its treasury as a permanent acquisition.

This principle implies the necessity of close contact with the human mind of past ages and of vigilant attention to contemporary research. It also implies the necessity of certain moral traits, of deep respect for alternative thought which can teach us much even if mistaken, of control over pride and vanity which often cloud scholar’s eyesight, of subordinating one’s personal views to the requirements of pure knowledge, even of some moderation of the hunger for knowledge which, when distracted in all directions, never comes to deeper results.

St. Thomas developed in a very interesting way these moral traits by which the true philosopher-thinker should be distinguished¹, and he himself set us a beautiful example in all his scientific activity. Alfred Vacant, an excellent expert on the middle ages, when drawing a parallel between the two coryphaei of medieval thought, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, sees the main difference between them in their attitudes: while the former comes to an alien thought, however different it might be from his own views, with benevolence he starts with an attempt of finding in it a scrap of truth to which it owes its success and which can be brought into the treasury of knowledge, the latter behaves oppositely, he first looks—in every single thought, even that closest to his—for what divides him from it, what he could criticize in or reject from it.

These are the most characteristic features of the universalist and particularist minds, and nothing can differentiate the ancient and medieval mindset from the modern one so much as this fundamental contradiction between universalism and particularism. Certainly, in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, there was no lack of particularist minds, authors of partial philosophical systems, but the conviction that philosophizing is a social function, and that the progress of philosophical thought depends on working together, prevailed and set the tone for the whole scientific atmosphere of that time through the mouth of the most eminent thinkers.

3. It is only the outbreak of individualism in the sixteenth century that introduces a radical change by establishing new principles which state that creative work in the sphere of knowledge is primarily an individual function that should seek to escape from the influence of alien thought, especially from the thought of past centuries. Bacon, one of the two lawmakers of the modern mentality, argued that the thinkers of the remote past must be treated as children who are not yet able to think seriously. Descartes, in turn, with his principle of general doubt and disdain for history, recommended to address philosophical questions as though no one had ever thought of them before; he used the comparison that the building put up by one man has more unity and beauty in itself than the one built by many architects. Besides which, let us add Rousseau who argued that in all controversial issues one should accept assertions that oppose the commonly accepted assumptions, and we will have the peak of what the individualism of modern philosophical thought has reached.

These antisocial principles, which burst the chain of human thought and break the solidarity of philosophical efforts in searching for truth, gave rise to the particularism of the thought of recent centuries, and along with it to all modern minds with their previously unknown customs and postulates, prejudices and superstitions.

Let us take, for example, the concept of property in the field of mental work, unknown in the Middle Ages when spiritual goods, and truth in particular, were considered a common property that no one was allowed to appropriate, as was the case with light, air and water. Let us then take the postulate of originality and independence in relation to the thought of others, which is often placed above the postulate of objective truth contained in a given system. Finally let us take the history of philosophy, conceived as a separate philosophical discipline, as something like cataloguing particular doctrines without much reflection on the degree of their truthfulness. History for history’s sake is like art for art’s sake. Indeed, Descartes’ prejudice against history could not last long, and since the seventeenth century we have witnessed the great flourishing of historical sciences, in which the history of philosophy participated quite successfully too. But even in our times there are many historians of philosophy who think that they are not allowed to deal too much with the objective value of summarized doctrines, as if the task of the history of philosophy consisted in making a survey of philosophical systems, while maintaining complete neutrality as to their truth.

It is impossible to ignore certain moral traits that necessarily accompany the particularist frame of mind: self-confidence and contempt for others, the desire to appropriate the revealed truths or at least to impress one’s own mark upon them, anger and envy at the sight of the others’ achievements—these are phenomena very common in the world of scholars and obviously very harmful to the progress of knowledge.

It is easy now to understand how formidable a barrier to cognition and proper evaluation of Christian universalism this modern mental particularism with all its prejudices and superstitions has become. Once one accepted the particularist point of view under which the advancement of knowledge is primarily an individual function dependent on opposing the thought of ancient generations, then the whole system of Christian philosophy had to appear dead, closed, impersonal, precluding independent and original investigations.

Here is the source of this profound contradiction between the Christian mind that prevailed in the Middle Ages, having its roots in Greek universalist philosophical thought, and the modern mind, so distinctly individualist and particularist. Therefore, when one approaches the task of presenting this or that part of the Christian philosophical system, it is necessary to emphasize this antithesis with all one’s strength and only in its light to compare Christian thought with all other philosophical systems.

Those who understand the transcendental character of Christian philosophy, which results from its universalist position and causes it not to fit into the little boxes made for classifying particularist systems, will easily understand its invariable value and eliminate the prejudices towards it that prevail in the modern mind.

They will understand that the true original mental creativity in purely universalist terms is possible, that the system of Christian philosophy is far from being accomplished, that, on the contrary, it presents unlimited possibilities for further development in all its branches, and finally that it alone—albeit slowly, but with all certainty possible in this field—leads mankind to a gradual and ever more accurate cognition of the world’s reality in which they live and which is hidden within them.

The particularist ideal of originality usually ends with the reinvention of the wheel, just as in everyday life the people who chase after originality are the most boring. Minds that are truly original are those who do not think about it, who seek the truth and do not seek originality, i.e., their own ego. The one who knows the results to which the human thought has come before him, who appreciates the positive results that other thinkers have achieved, and even tries to get benefits from their mistakes,  will be able, but only then, to get down to study areas or issues untouched by human thought so far, and discover truths known to no one before.

The Church, in search of a philosophical system which could serve as a natural basis for putting supernatural truths of the faith in a certain universal whole, could not rest upon any particularist system of this or that philosopher, but only the system of thought applying the principle of universalism could get her approval for good. It is due to nothing but its profound universalism that the philosophy of Aristotle, developed and harmonized with the truths of the faith by great medieval thinkers, St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas, was recognized by the Catholic Church as her own forever.

4. All we have so far said about the whole of Christian philosophy also applies to that part of it which deals with the field of human moral conduct, i.e., ethics.² Christian ethics also has an exceptionally universalist character, and if in recent times this characteristic has been lost from sight, often due to the attempts of confining Christian ethics to this or that category of particularist ethical systems³, all the more important does it become today to free it from these bonds and show its transcendentality in relation to particular ethical systems.

Our lecture will do this at almost every stage of its course. In each chapter, we will meet with particularist, i.e. fragmentary, solutions of the fundamental issues of ethics, and it will be our task to show how Christian ethics trumps over them, how its solutions encompass everything that is positive and creative in particularist systems which are mutually exclusive, and how it rejects their negations, prejudices and exclusivities. We will see it both in the antithesis between the ethics of happiness and the ethics of duty, as well as in antitheses between determinism and indeterminism, sentimentalism and stoicism, heteronomism and autonomism, rationalism and fideism, and many, many others. Against the background of the fragmentary character of those particularist solutions, the position of Christian ethics impresses with the fullness and depth with which it embraces all the elements of moral life.

Even if modern theorists of morality are not able to evaluate Christian ethics in its entirety, the practical life completely stands for it, and it is the practical life which has made Christian ethics last so far, despite prejudices surrounding it, and will make it last forever. It becomes also clear that the name of Catholic ethics, which we give to it, does not mean merely its external quality, i.e. a formal belonging to the body of the Church’s teaching, but that it refers to the most essential feature of its internal structure, its universalist character.

In the synthesis that covers the whole of human moral activity, both the natural factors available to natural powers of reason and thus being the object of philosophical inquiry, and the supernatural factors contained in the Christian Revelation will be taken into account. The latter, although unable to be discovered by the innate powers of our reason, but, once revealed, can be examined by our mind and put into one harmonious whole together with the factors of natural life. This is, however, not a task of philosophy, but rather that of theology.

Separating and studying them in complete isolation from one another would be like destroying their harmonious unity. That way natural morality would be divested of its final complement and crowning, while supernatural morality would be deprived of its foundation in the very nature of man. It is much more appropriate to treat Christian morality as one organically united whole and point out, in the course of the lecture, these factors of it which belong to the natural order and remain the object of philosophical research, and those which already enter into the supernatural domain and belong to the scope of theology. …

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MAN’S “PERSONALENCE”

Jacek Woroniecki, “Rozwój osobistości człowieka. Dynamiczny aspekt personalizmu,” in Wychowanie człowieka. Pisma wybrane, pp. 59–92. Kraków: Znak, 1961.

“To be strengthened with might … in the inner man.”

(Ephes. 3:16)

1. The question of personhood is what today intensely occupies the minds. … I think it is possible to make it even more accessible and deepened, if we think over the very words we use in our speech to express various manifestations of that which belongs to the area of humanity. It will allow us to penetrate deeper into its secrets and to know not only its static structure, but also its dynamism, that is, those powers which are implied in it, and which, once fully developed according to their internal laws, provide the world with strong persons. Hence such is the title of this study. It is not enough to deal with the personhood of a human being: it is necessary to know that which is to grow up from and flower in it, i.e. the person who is to be aware of himself, of his purpose and task. The first word is “static,” the second is “dynamic,” and only the latter is that which unveils the whole significance of the issue.

Both these words—as well as the person from whom they originate and a number of other words of the same root as: individual, individuality—come from the reflexive pronouns: myself, yourself, himself, herself, etc. So that, when responding to the repeated call “be yourself,” I ask what is this “yourself” which I am supposed to be, it becomes clear to me that it has something to do with my personhood or personality—with that which makes me something separate from others and one in myself, and that I should behave as such and act with a sense of responsibility for myself. …

Today, the “person” and its derivatives serve … to denote individuals and individual differences, rather than generic differences. They are used for translating the Latin individuum wherein the analysis shows two components: indivisum in se et divisum ab aliis—that which is undivided, that is, one in itself, and thus constituting an intrinsic and substantial unity, and that which at the same time is distinct from other beings, even of the same species. In this sense, the Latin individuum is best expressed by our “individual” [osobnik] and its derivatives, such as “individualisticness” [osobnictwo] unknown to Karłowicz’s Polish Language Dictionary. The latter, it seems, was coined by Julian Ochorowicz for his own needs¹, and also his own life, especially his scientific activity, bore an unmistakable imprint of individualisticness. The term “individualisticness” should become a permanent part of the language to denote a negative side of individualism, that is, its centrifugal relation to the surrounding society.

But the eternal human thought has been well aware that man as an individual is deeply different from individuals of any other creatures in the world; and he differs in that he is aware of his personhood. Boethius, a philosopher living in the 6th century, defined it perfectly: rationalis naturae individua substantia—the subsistent individual of a rational nature, and thus capable of self-knowledge, self-governance, self-responsibility.

The personhood of man consists in the fact that, due to the spiritual element that animates him, and to his mental faculties, he is not only one and indivisible in himself and distinct from others in the same way as all individuals of other species in the world, but also conscious of such unity and subsistence and distinctness. Man is thus capable of directing not only his external actions, but also the internal development of his personhood; and this applies not only to his own personal conduct, but also to the society which surrounds him, from which he draws so much strength, and to which he ought to give so much of himself.

Hence, it follows that a study of human personhood cannot be limited to analyzing its components, but that it should then also address its development which is to create a person from an individual. Eventually, it is necessary for it to approach the question from the perspective of social life; so doing will only allow us to fully understand the interplay between individuals and society, and in the light of this it will highlight the importance of a strong person both to the individual himself and to the society in which he lives. The second, social, aspect was often taken into account, but if the inquiries did not produce quite accurate results, it was caused by the fact that the first, pedagogic, aspect was ignored, that it was not realized that it is not enough to enjoy having a personhood, but it is necessary to raise a personhood to be a brave person.

The personhood of man was already in the pagan world of antiquity provided with legal protection, and Christian ethics put on it even greater value by teaching about its eternal and supernatural destiny. Roman law granted the child, while still in the womb, his rights—nasciturus pro nato habeatur, and the practice of infant baptism unambiguously demonstrated that the Church sees in the newborn a full human person capable of receiving sacramental graces. Both, then, in the eyes of the laity and in the eyes of the Church, the child has a full human personhood and all the privileges that flow from it. But how far is the child from being a brave, mature person! The whole issue of personalistic upbringing lies in the following question: how can personhood be molded into personality? It will be necessary to reach deeper layers of everything that constitutes the human person and more precisely define those personal properties of which a strong person is to be built. In a word, it is about the process of maturing the person’s personhood, about a dynamic aspect of personalism. What is that which explains it? What are the properties of human nature from which it comes? What are, if any, the laws of its development?

2. The main phenomenon, which should be analyzed by us, is what we call “potentiality,” “plasticity”—or perhaps in Polish “developmentalness”—although the last two words do not accurately reflect what we mean here. We have to stay with “potentiality”. It is the most general property of the world which we know, which is the consequence of the character of its creation, which has no source of being within itself and thus consists of a currently possessed—the nature which conceals in itself the immeasurable possibilities of transformation and development in different directions.²

No other creature is controlled by potentiality more strongly than man; potentiality is a fundamental phenomenon of man’s life, not only in the sensory field, but much more in the spiritual field. It is the chief  developmental law for him, from whatever point of view we would consider it.

The world has potential for the sake of man, that is, it contains the latent potential for satisfying his ever-increasing needs, but man needs, by the unremitting effort of an infinite number of generations, to slowly discover and update those potentials; he needs to pull them out of nature in order to harness them to his service. …

But the person also has enormous potentiality in himself, and this is true about him to such an extent that no other creature is comparable. By how his potentiality evolved over the centuries, the gradual progress in penetrating and controlling the world’s potentiality, so that it had to serve the mankind, was conditioned. In order to be able to exploit hidden properties and powers of the world, it was necessary to know them, and this again required a constant and systematic development of human cognitive abilities. This is the first basic human potential. It is, however, intimately associated with another potential, the one that is inseparable from cognition from which it draws indications for its own development, namely the potential in the field of action, the potential for action. The development of the former consists in actualizing cognitive receptive abilities and in completing them with successive pieces of information about both the external world and the internal reality which is hidden in the man himself and forms his nature, his self. The latter, in turn, consists in actualizing the man’s abilities for action, in gradually improving all his faculties so that those could be subsequently used to transform the man himself and the world around him. The relationship of these processes is very close: the world submits to the man’s order depending on what he knows and can do, and depending on whether he can persistently want and strive for his goals.

We will not dwell in detail on the slow development of the potentiality of all components of human nature, whether that applies to species or individuals. This development is visible and easy to observe in the domain of the senses, both when it is a question of external factors such as sight, hearing, walking, speech, etc., and internal factors, like memory, imagination, and that sense in action which testifies to the purpose of action in early childhood play. It is clear that the development and improvement of these abilities are always dependent on physiological factors which have distinct characteristics in each individual. Neither will we dwell on the development of the potentials of mental life which is connected with the physiological activity of the senses. Here, both in the field of knowledge and in the field of action, human individuals each have their own properties which are different from others and go into forming their external personality. Postures, gestures, ways of walking, tones of voice, and above all facial expressions—all these traits give such a personal character to people that they are immediately identified by it.³ I recognize someone close to me by hearing his way of walking, while approaching my room through a long corridor, that is, by hearing a very characteristic sound of his heels striking the floor. Another time I recognize a colleague of mine from afar, as well as from behind, by a very characteristic swinging of his hips while walking; we have not seen each other for over twenty years. … 

I have briefly mentioned these external personal qualities which, in every man, slowly grow, are preserved, and serve to distinguish him from other men. We call them personal, but it is clear that they do not form the personality of man in its most important aspect for it …. They arise from the improvement of the activity of particular psychophysical factors of our nature, factors in which big innate differences, both qualitative and quantitative, have already existed. When then the increasingly conscious process of improvement takes place under different conditions and under different influences, a collection of habits emerges which makes human characters even more diversified ….

3. The problem that now stands before us concerns the potentials of the spiritual element which animates us, that is, our soul, and these two abilities without which the soul is unthinkable, that is, reason and will—is more difficult. The potency for improving their activity in different directions is more than visible, but since this activity is always accompanied by the psychophysical sensory apparatus, the question can be asked: Is it not perhaps that only the latter is subject to improvement, while the spiritual element in its own abilities contains no potentials and is not available for improvement?

Such a view was represented, for example, by Jacques Chevalier, who came to us to give lectures in 1938. Under the influence of Bergson’s Matière et mémoire, and reaching deeper—also of Descartes in whom the crypto-materialism of many even Catholic thinkers is rooted, Chevalier claimed that one can speak of improving potentials exclusively in the domain of matter: L’habitude implique la matérialité. According to him, the mental development of man comes down to the development of his sensual element; the mental element is not subject to development, because in the field of spirit there is no potentiality.⁴

Well, beneath the first Spirit, which in its total simplicity and non-complexity contains no potential or potency to be developed and put into action, since it is always in full action in every respect—actus purus, which Bolesław Prus translated for us with the term “The Archactivist”—no other spirit is in a similar fullness of being, every other spirit always contains within itself the potentials waiting to be actualized both in the sphere of cognition and that of desire. It is clear, however, that the potentials in the sphere of spirit differ from those in the sphere of matter, so their development and improvement are of different kinds too.⁵ It is much more difficult for the mind to grasp its deeper, more comprehensive, and more enduring improvement, because our mind—even when reflecting on itself and examining the laws of its own development—is still forced to do so through the sensory curtains in which it is wrapped, and realize its own development with the help of images and comparisons taken from the sensory domain. And it is easy to understand how difficult it is for this purely spiritual potential of our self to be studied.

It is connected with an even deeper problem—almost completely unaddressed in recent times, since the revival of Thomism began—which here will be addressed only with the most general features. The problem lies in whether and how human souls differ from each other. They do not differ from each other in terms of species—as if each was a separate species different from others, as it is the case among pure spirits—because they are spiritual components of human nature which is the same in all people in terms of species. It is impossible to accept, however, that the souls taken in themselves do not differ in anything except in bodies animated by them.⁶ The problem of differential psychology has often been discussed since the 13th century⁷ and the Thomists in general have come to the conclusion that the souls do not differ from one another in their specific essence (essentia), but in their individual essence (substantia individualis); and that which makes the difference between the specific essence of a spirit and the essence of an individual soul is the reference to a particular body to be animated by this soul (commensuratio ad tale corpus).⁸ St. Thomas, following Aristotle, sees a clear connection between mental and sensual abilities, including the sense of touch which covers the whole body and determines the sensitivity of man. The greater the sensitivity of his skin, the stronger his feelings toward what affects him from outside, and the more numerous his sensations experienced from the surrounding world.⁹ The same observation is a basis for our expression “thick-skinned” which means not so much the lack of the sensitivity of touch, as the lack of delicacy in spiritual matters. …

Knowing the individual properties of the two components of the nature of each human being can be reduced to nothing else than differences in potentials of their individual dispositions. On the part of the body they will be the consequence of inheritance which transmits  certain traits of inclinations and disinclinations accumulated by previous generations. This transmission is not necessary, first for the simple reason that two streams of inheritance are merged in each individual: those after father and mother; hence, there is a set of characteristics distinct from those inherited from one side or the other. Moreover, also various external factors can stimulate or inhibit the development of inherited features. There is, however, no question that the child inherits from his parents a capital that consists of more or less considerable potentials in the field of sensory dispositions. Musical dispositions can be given here as an example, as they are often manifest in certain families, and even nations, while elsewhere they are encountered to a much lesser degree.

How does this difference in potentials manifest itself from the perspective of the spiritual element that animates the body? On the part of the soul itself, the differences originated from inheritance cannot, of course, be the case, and they will only be able to manifest themselves indirectly in the soul’s activity due to the inseparable communication of mental and sensory life. It is also clear that it is impossible to dream about reaching directly to the difference between souls which is hidden in their selves. It will be necessary to be satisfied by examining the potentials of their chief cognitive and volitional dispositions, and only then to draw conclusions about deeper, substantial differences between them in their ordering to particular human bodies. It will be then necessary to examine individually what are these two processes of our higher psychology, namely: the reproduction of something by cognition and, then, the attitude of liking or disliking to what is known. Taken together, these two dispositions of the soul are called “mind,” which reflects the tradition of St. Augustine who, while also adding memory to them, named them collectively, as antennas of our psychic self by means of one expression mens.¹⁰

Therefore, human souls are of unequal potentiality both on the side of reason, i.e. cognition, and on the side of will, i.e. desire. We can grasp the difference only in the activity of both these dispositions wherein sensory factors also have their share. Hence it is not easy to distinguish that which is attributed to the potentiality of sensory factors from that which is attributed to the potentiality of mental factors. No wonder then that, in the psychology oriented materialistically in recent centuries, the potentiality in the mental field has not been taken into account. Neither in the Middle Ages was the issue we deal with here discussed thoroughly. In St. Thomas, it was merely sketched, mostly in the area of cognition rather than that of desire. In our days, it was undertaken by Joseph Mausbach in one of his most valuable works, but he did not exhaust it,  only collected the results achieved by St. Thomas and clarified their meaning.¹¹ The issue fully deserves to be ex professo and thoroughly elaborated. Here we can formulate only general results: human souls in themselves are unequally disposed, and this is a qualitative inequality in the field of both cognition and desire. In individual persons, both dispositions are of different potentiality. This difference, combined with the variety of the potentiality of sensory factors, determines the psychological separation between people and is a little capital of psychical and physical powers with which people enter the world and which is to be managed by them to be enlarged and to be for them as profitable as possible.

4. The start in life, then, is not the same for all people. However, it should not be called unequal, but different, because it is impossible to make any comparative evaluation of the potentiality of human dispositions. What measure would it apply to them? What dispositions would it value more: these in vocal art or rather those in fine arts? What dispositions would it consider as more valuable in themselves: these in the field of cognition, by which some are distinguished, or those in the field of desire and deed, which are so strikingly manifested in others? The first often results in producing “geniuses without a portfolio,” who cannot want in a proper way, the second—stupid and obstinate persons, who don’t know what they want.

But also, in the field of cognition: is it better to have a greater insight which more quickly and deeply reaches into the essence of things, or a more plastic reception which ensures a better organization and storage of all which has been reached? The first can end up with flashes that do not form a unity, the second—with the endless multiplication of pieces of information that cannot be put together. Just as in the case of comparing cognition and desire, so also in the case of comparing those particular cognitive activities, there is no reason to give a greater value to one factor than another, because only their mutual, harmoniously linked and interpenetrating cooperation is a true value, and this should be acquired by personal effort.

In other words: the way in which the personality of a man is developed from his personhood does not depend on the start in different conditions, but on how the development is carried out. When the process of development is not properly driven, or the sustained and reasonable effort is lacking, much better results can be produced from a smaller amount of data at the start than from a larger one.¹² Now, we will look closer at this process and, first, we will find out in what the inequality of the innate mental dispositions of every human being consists. Let’s start with cognitive disposition.

The individual differences are striking here, both from the side of insight (intellectus agens) and from the side of reception, i.e. the ability to impart knowledge (intellectus possibilis). Compelled, while studying the phenomena of mental life, to draw comparisons from the field of the senses, we call that which brings help to insight light (lumen intellectus agentis). Just as light can be weaker or stronger and reach closer and—as we know today due to  some components and manifestations recently known—penetrate deeper into even material objects, so also the light of reason is weaker in the case of some or stronger in the case of some others. The latter were allowed to go further, to embrace more, to emphasize more clearly the qualities of known objects, to penetrate deeper into their inner structure, that is—as we usually say—into their essence or nature. The power of this light is dependent on the disposition to analyze the reality which surrounds us, no less than that which is within us. Both are very complex, and in order to not leave only general and superficial reflection in the receptive disposition of our mind, they must be taken apart and, as if, separately, sequentially introduced into the mind. Just as a machine, if too wide to go through a narrow door, must be first taken to pieces and then put together again in the proper place, so also our knowledge: it is always first analytical, and then synthesizing, i.e. reproducing in the mind the whole of what was grasped bit by bit. We cannot have an instant intuition reaching into the depths of complex reality and covering all its components. It is only in time that we can achieve it in some way after a long consideration, in the mind, of the unity of fragmented reality.

The cognitive light of reason—that illuminates sensible imaginations and highlights their essential qualities, accessible only to mental cognition—is, therefore, undoubtedly unequal in its power in particular individuals. When, however, we ask whether this light is potential, or it can be increased or improved by our effort, then we have to say “no.” The penetrating power of reason is given to us in the fullness of its efficiency and, therefore, is not subject to any further improvement.¹³ One must seek, then, elsewhere for the cognitive potential of our mind; and this potential can be found in the mind’s perceptual quality, that is, its possible intellect. Thanks to it, the essential qualities of things, highlighted in sensual images by the light of reason, are reflected in it (species impressa), and the reason perceives them, that is, expresses in itself (species expressa) in order, then, to  compare and contrast them with others, put them in order and bring them to a certain unity which is the end of every cognitive process.

It is difficult here to agree with Mausbach and Schell that this receptive capacity, that is, the possible intellect (intellectus possibilis), is the same in all people, and that the differences in their mental development depend only on the unequal penetrating power of the reason and the better (or worse) sensual organs.¹⁴ Its inequality is already expressed by its potentiality, that is, plasticity, by which the human minds as they grow differ from each other in terms of both how many pieces of information they collect, and how they arrange and unify those pieces of information, and finally whether they are able to operate those pieces of information. The latter, however, forces us to move on to the other element of our mind on which the operation in the area of all our dispositions depends, namely to the will—the general mover of our psyche.

5. Although it is the subject of a special psychological research today, the will is still not quite sufficiently differentiated in its activity from the whole field of sensual or emotional drives.¹⁵ Laboratory tests on the will yield very poor results, and only a careful observation of life emphasizes its role in our psyche—superior to feelings and equal with the reason with which it is constantly intertwined.

It is truly far from easy to answer the question of whether the will, as a central spiritual motor power, is equal in all people, and if not, whether this inequality is within the will or depends on the cognitive dispositions which, as we have seen, are not equal in people? Equally difficult is the second question of whether our spiritual disposition towards willing—equal or not in humans from birth—is potential, whether it can be developed, strengthened, improved?¹⁶ I think that both questions must be answered in the affirmative.

The basic desire of the will, and that is man’s desire for his own good or his desire for happiness, is so determined, so deeply rooted in the soul that it does not need any improvement. But within that desire, the desire for everything which constitutes happiness is not so much determined, and here the potentiality of the will needs to be developed both in itself and in its role of being a motor of the whole conscious human life.

In his will, man always has a potency to affect will’s desires by reflection. What comes to the forefront here is a loyalty to the leadership of the reason, that is, some kind of adherence to the reason’s orders when they correspond to the integrity of the will, or standing by the reason (persistence), or resisting distractions from the reason (restraint). In this disposition of the will, Kant rightly saw something first and primal, but his mistake was that he failed to proceed and did not understand how this will should then be improved in submitting to the direction of the reason in all that in our psyche falls within the scope of moral conduct and is subject to the will’s power. Therefore, he claimed that there could not be many virtues, but only one, namely obedience to the imperative of the reason.¹⁷

This first concerns the reason itself which guides the will and at the same time depends on the will in terms of what it considers, and even more so in terms of what to judge and choose. By the act of the will, we can arouse in the will itself every kind of affection of which it is capable. Moreover, each of those affections can turn to itself and enlarge itself in some way. We can want to want, desire to desire, fear to fear, love to love, or hate to hate. All these processes directed by the reason improve the will, set, as it were, a regular action to ensure a consistent conduct.

For minds not trained in the analysis of moral conduct, the mutual interaction of reason and will is not an easy-to-understand matter. Management belongs to  reason, whereas the will is that which gives propulsion, but this propulsion decides on whether the management is in line with the will’s appreciation for the end and the means to it.

There is neither a vicious circle nor an endless continuation of the interplay between reason and will. The first is the recognition of good as such to which the will, of necessity, is inclined. Then, consecutive reactions of one side or another are completely of a different nature. The will is an efficient factor, an engine giving propulsion, whereas  reason is a final factor, a driver deciding which road to take. This example is lame—like all examples—because, in the car, the driver does exert an impact on the engine, but the engine does not do so on the driver. Whereas, in our psyche, the will penetrates deeply into the inner working of the reason. Where it comes to theoretical knowledge, the will should as little as possible interfere with making judgments, whereas in the practical field, that is, in the field of action, no judgment, no decision or order, can take place without the consent and decision of that supreme faculty of desire. When the reason is searching for what to choose, the will brings it to a stop at what best suits the mood in which a person is at a given moment. This is what freedom consists in—the ability to pause at the judgment of reason, however, not necessarily at this which in itself is theoretically best, but at that which at the moment is most suitable for a man. Whereby the judgment becomes the final, i.e. the decision of an act.¹⁸

By its influence on the commanding act of practical reason, the will has the power to influence, albeit to a different degree, all the factors of our psyche: motor powers and partly physiological processes, acts of cognitive senses both internal and external, and finally—the play of feelings. The shaping of their potential, greater or lesser improvement in one direction or another is still under the influence of the impulses passing from the mental center, as soon as it begins to realize its potentials. For this reason the lower sphere of our psyche undergoes a certain spiritualization, because the improvements mentioned above do not pass without a trace, but leave behind a constant inclination to take into account the requirements of a higher spiritual sphere and give the senses what St. Thomas calls habitualis conformitas ad rationem—a constant disposition to obey the reason.¹⁹ This is what we call the sublimation of sensual life, that is, pulling it up to the very threshold—sub limen—separating it from mental life, so that the latter could leave its imprint on it.²⁰ We can also impart something of this kind to creatures that are lower than us, forcing them to emerge from their potential properties which  cannot be created by themselves. The breeding of plants and animals consists in that, especially the training of the latter which seems to give animals properties of rational beings.

6. In this way the personhood that everyone brings with oneself into the world begins to acquire its own characteristics, specific to each human individual. From a general, common to all, personhood, a distinct personality develops, a different personality in each man. There can be similarities between persons that allow to classify them into some general groupings, but at the bottom of each person there will be something completely unique, which cannot be unreservedly reduced to a common category. Individuum est ineffabile—they used to say in the past—an individual cannot be defined and completely expressed. This is more so when this individual is of a rational nature, which, by virtue of a spiritual element which animates it and is capable of being self-existent, has a much deeper potentiality not only in the sensual field, but also in the mental field: Persona humana est multo ineffabilius quam individuum cuiuscunque aliae speciei.

In the course of mental development, deeper differences—much more difficult to grasp—in the development of the potentiality of inner talents are linked to differences in physical behavior. Upbringing, depending on whether it is received under more or less skillful direction, not only provides the mind, memory, and imagination with a certain content, but gives them the proficiency to operate with acquired pieces of information so as they form a single whole. Depending on the degree of the acuity of the reason and on the reason’s intelligence, the distinctness in the way of acquiring, adopting, developing, and utilizing knowledge, arises. The same is true in the field of knowledge and practical creativity where, beside the potentiality of mental cognition, the potentiality of sensory factors with their innate distinctness plays so great a role. As this potentiality, which provides so many opportunities for development in different directions, begins to develop in one direction by keeping reins on a definite skill—so the personality of a man becomes more and more distinct and distinguishes him from others.

It is particularly striking in the field of moral conduct wherein what we call moral character arises from the improvement of all our psyche’s powers partaking in moral conduct. In this character we find the most essential expression of each man’s personality. The character is composed of the improvement of the reason in directing the conduct (prudence), the consolidation of the will in respecting all that which belongs to others (justice), and finally the mastery of the emotional domain so that neither is it overly eager for what attracts it (temperance) nor does it shy away from what threatens it (fortitude). In order to have a strong character in the emotional field, what is necessary is a sublimation of the whole sphere of emotionality, a spiritualization of emotionality so that by itself it is ready to be always in unison with mental life. It was perfectly understood and presented by Schiller in Über Anmut und Würde.

Despite—as we have already said—the personality of a man becomes increasingly distinct from others in the course of its development, so that there can be no question of its belonging to a species or even a group, yet three general manifestations in the crystallization of the moral potentiality of a man become visible—three directions, as it were, in which this process unfolds and which leave their particular imprints on the personality. The first one is actually a lack of any definite direction,  a lack of any uniform crystallization, a lack of stability in behavior. The development of personhood into personality took place without a plan, with frequent breakdowns, and gave a man of poor character who cannot be relied on, because it is impossible to predict how he will behave. The second direction leads to one of the positives of this life, of sensual or mental benefits, which people value most but which do not meet their true destiny. Like around an axis, the character crystallizes itself around the will dominated by desire, and it is a character which is not devoid of stability and even certain uniformity, but short-sighted, unable to rise above its own limited goals, to subordinate itself to the higher idea of ​​the common good, to creative work in the long term. Finally, the third direction elevates the man above himself, subordinates himself to the common good, and leads him to eternal destiny which dominates over all that people value on earth. Around such a will, everything that is potential in man is crystallized into a stable and uniform character capable of great efforts not only when man’s own interests are concerned, but also when the great affairs of the world are concerned. Of course, in all these three directions, there will be many intermediate types, and persons with the extreme characteristics of each of the three directions will always be a rarity.

The inner unique characteristics of the personality of a man, resulted from shaping and improving the potentiality of mental factors, cannot be completely separated from external manifestations of the personality. The features of the will are always reflected to a lower or higher degree in movements, in speech, especially of the face, in the smile, and even more in eye-sight. So often it is possible to read from behavior and physiology about laziness and indecision, desire to use at all costs, avarice, envy, tenacity, vanity, or finally desire to hide what is happening inside; but it is not always possible to hide repeatedly betrays the inner spirit of the soul. But also, righteousness, kindness, perseverance, self-control, readiness to get into the fight in a good cause, constant cheerfulness, can often be read from an attitude, from facial expression, from eyes and from smiling … .

Personhood, given to a man at the moment of the creation of his soul, should gradually develop into a personality. These are the talents of the parable of Christ, which everyone must multiply. In those who have died as babies and in those who, due to physiological sickness, will never come to conscious mental life, the development of personality will be nipped in the bud. Their personality will preserve only general human characteristics, differing only in their separate bodily hereditary characteristics, and the degree of mental potentiality that have not been able to develop. In the vast majority of people, the development of potentiality of their nature goes through a process in which they become aware of their personhood and are largely responsible for the personal traits they will develop.

That is what the dynamic aspect of personalization consists in, but it does not exhaust the issue at all. For there are two factors outside of the man that influence the development of his personality, namely the society that surrounds him and God who has given him his personality at the point of departure and waits for him to return as a well-crystallized personality.

7. Let us start with the social factor and ask how it contributes to the development of the personality of a man and to what extent the latter is subordinated by the former. This issue will never cease to occupy human minds and, depending on the different world views, will be provided with opposite solutions: from the pursuit of the complete liberation of the individual—or at least some of the chosen ones—from social bonds and obligations resulting from the bonds, to the full absorption of the individual by the society and the sacrifice of the individual to the interests of the species. The difficulty of the problem lies in the fact that there is a mutual dependence between the individual in its personal development and the surrounding social groups—equally necessary for the former and the latter. It is, therefore, necessary to rise above marginal, unilateral, and as always particularistic solutions, and to give a universal solution, such that would equally take into account both necessities.

We will base ourselves here on the excellent formula of Friedrich W. Förster and supplement it by another clause which he himself did not formulate. Förster expressed the importance of the human personality for society in the lapidary words: Das Soziale lebt vom Persönlichen. Social life, however, is equally important for the development of personality, so that it is equally right to say: Das Persönliche lebt vom Sozialen. In Polish we say that society lives by the personal values ​​of its members, whereas the members draw their strength from society. Let us first look at each of these two dependences separately, beginning with the second one, and then compare them to see which one should prevail, which one should be subordinated to the other in the final account.

That in childhood and youth the person needs a social care to develop his personality is so obvious that it needs no proofs. The influence of individuals, such as mother, father, siblings, teachers and educators, is critically important. What is more important, however, is to have a uniform impact of the whole group, be it family or school, when the atmosphere of law and order is created in it. The group has to encourage everyone to do what the group expects from them, and not only to take into account others in their conduct, but also to try to draw out as much as possible from their association with others. Such a healthy atmosphere will begin to form the child’s personality from his early age, and then, as the awareness of his potency is raised in him, it will inspire the child’s personality to improve in different directions. In the course of daily coexistence, specific guidelines, orders, prohibitions, incentives like rewards and penalties, will be needed, but they will never substitute for the uniform impact of the whole surroundings, and wherever the impact is missed they will not produce exhaustive results, and many a time when used badly, they will essentially undermine the results of upbringing. The basic tone of upbringing should be a love of work, a conscientiousness and diligence in working, an order to which all would be subordinated, and all of these encompassed with mutual kindness and serenity in better and worse moments of life.

There is no substitute for such an upbringing , but it is obvious that such a framework alone does not determine personalities, because this process should be accomplished by the effort of a man. There is no substitute for a man, and the task of pedagogues is to realize, beginning from his early age, ever increasing responsibility for himself, for the formation of his own personality. A personality will receive many features and traits involuntarily and habitually, either from the depths of its heritage or from examples, but the improvement of its basic life activities, its consolidation of essential requirements of human behavior, will have to be a work of deliberation and effort, which will often cost a lot.

The influence of social groups on the development of personalities does not, however, end with the end of adolescence. It lasts all one’s life, be it the influence of the social environment in which each individual exists or of professional groups or finally of the whole society … . To demand a personalistic upbringing and to underestimate in it the importance of national customs is to deny oneself. Only in the atmosphere of healthy national customs … strong personalities can grow and mature, and strong personalities are those which social life so much needs. [Jan Chryzostom] Pasek was right then when he complained in the 17th century that, while there were many people, it was difficult to find a man, and just the disappearance of national customs in the then Poland was to be blamed for that.

8. Having known what the development of man’s personality owes to the social framework, let us now ask, what are personal values that ​​contribute to social life, and what is that which societies have the right to expect from their members, or even to demand from them?

And also, here the importance of people with well-established personalities for any social group is so obvious that it does not need to be proved. Such people are the center around which other parts of a group gradually crystallize.

It is particularly important for society to have no shortage of individuals with stronger characters, capable of taking over leading positions in society and controlling its destiny. History tells us it sometimes happens that such individuals are absent, or that those who take the lead are individuals with strong but wicked characters, unable to subordinate themselves to the good of society, but seeking to subordinate society to themselves. Due to their skills and energy, they can, like Napoleon, do meritorious services to the public, but they eventually perish, because they do not serve the public, but themselves.

But the point is not just that society has a certain number of prominent personalities capable of governing. It is very important that the general level be high in this respect, so that an ordinary, nondescript man—who is unknown outside of his home, factory, or street—reach the full development of his personality. Individuals with greater potentiality should be carefully singled out and given a special care to enable them to fully develop their talents, not only for their own good but also because of the well-being of society which must not waste resources of talents hidden in large masses. But also, the innate abilities of the common population, which do not exceed a certain average potentiality, should be nurtured, educated and brought up so that each individual has the ability to reach the level of personal maturity accessible to him or her. This only adds to the specific weight of the nation, gives it a cohesiveness, an ability to fulfill its particular tasks in the national community of the world, and a power of resistance when it is threatened from outside.

Society lives on the personal values ​​of all its members, not just those who lead it and direct its destiny, but also those who perform the most common duties. The task of navigators of the ship of state is not to hamper the development of the personal values ​​of citizens and to put a straitjacket on them—a homogenous, least personal form. It is by no means in the interest of the state to inhibit the personal spontaneity of broad social strata and to treat them only as a passive tool for responding impulses given from above. For that purpose, the last generation invented the famous “robots,” dummies endowed with an electrical life, but in essence totally passive. That was the fundamental error of the dictatorial governments of our time: Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, and the striking thing was that their nations, though representing old cultures, passively submitted to that training.

On the contrary, the ideal of a well-defined democratic system will always be to give all participants of social life the possibility to bring out their personal values ​​in order to give them to the service of the whole. The real wealth of every nation lies primarily in the bloom of the personal potentiality of their members; this is what determines the extent to which the nation can exploit and harness to its service the potentiality of a piece of land in this world. The nation, however, must ensure that this bloom does not break the social framework and give birth to individualism or anarchy, in a word: to a separateness. It will be a task of the social system and those who enact laws and wield power to safeguard social life from centrifugal forces, from everything that threatens to separate, and thereby would be damaging both to the maintenance of the common good and to the personal upbringing of citizens. Here, as in all human works, it is necessary only on a larger scale to maintain moderation between contradictory aspirations: on the one hand, to leveling and inhibiting personal development, and, on the other, to letting it go astray toward separateness. Such moderation can be found by rising above both unilateral aspirations; basic indications of how to find it can only be received by comparing the above-described interdependence between the society and the human individual, and establishing their hierarchy. We will enter here into the very center of controversies which have always divided minds when goals that should guide human life are in question.

9. Since man can form his personality only on the basis of the framework provided him by the society—das Persönliche lebt vom Soziale—and the society draws its strength from the personal values ​​of its members—das Soziale lebt vom Persönliche—then also the relationship between these two dependencies should be expressed in a formula. It is necessary to give some answer to the question about what prevails here. Is the individual for the sake of society, or rather society is for the sake of the individual? Both parties should give something, contribute to their mutual relationship, and both should receive something, derive some benefit from it. How to arrange this exchange of mutual services to avoid clashes and misunderstandings, so that neither society absorbs the individual nor the individual destroys society?

In animal life the answer is not difficult: the spiritual element that animates them is not capable of being self-existent, contrary to the human soul, and therefore this element cannot survive the death of an animal. The animal has no singular purpose; the purpose of animal’s life, development, and activity is the maintenance of its own species. Depending on whether in the nature of a species there is collective life more or less developed (from a single family to a large herd)—and the life of each animal is completely subordinated to that social group which is a necessary condition for maintaining the species.

Meanwhile, the spiritual element that animates man is capable of being self-existent after the separation from the body. Man, through his immortal soul, has his own personal goal that transcends earthly life within the social framework. Hence, the society in which he lives cannot completely absorb him for its own services, but on the contrary: society should be of assistance for him in attaining his personal goal after death, which necessarily presupposes the upbringing of his personality in earthly life.

And yet man also has the task to maintain his species in earthly life, which is only possible within the social framework. Then, he is subordinate to society and ought to be concerned about it, because in society he is provided with the necessary support for his own personal development, and so for reaching the goal after death.

That with which the individual is supposed to serve society can be broadly reduced to three forms of service: work, wealth and life. With his work man should contribute to the liberation of powers contained in the potentiality of the world, so that by using the fruits of the work of others he would apply himself to increase material or spiritual resources of his society. With his wealth, insofar as his possessions exceed his own needs for maintenance, he should contribute, in the form of taxes and all kinds of benefits, to cover the costs of maintaining law and order, as well as prosperity in society. Finally, man should also sacrifice his own life to his society when it needs to be defended against hostile forces.

None of these benefits requires from man what would prevent the development and strengthening of his personality or would be contrary to true personal values. On the contrary, each of the benefits is based on them and contributes only to their intensification. Without a love of work, a sense of justice, sacrifice, and being in control of undue attachment to temporal goods, and finally without the love of neighbors and courage in the face of the dangers of life—no one will do these last three benefits for their society, while they are the most important ingredients of human personality. They all require a mastery over temporality which is the very core of formation of a strong personal character. It strikes especially in the sacrifice of life for the sake of society, whether in the defense of the country or in the fight against the element of fire, water, or plague. By voluntarily renouncing worldly life, a person in such cases does not reduce his personality in any way, but elevates it and gives witness that it comes to full value only after death.

It is all that man ought to give to the society, that the society has the right to demand from him, for both sides take advantage of what is an essential good for them. In this regard, the social benefits has the character of an end to which individuals must subordinate themselves, and—when it is the question of temporal goods—they must subordinate themselves completely. St. Thomas did not hesitate to call it the main human good: bonum reipublicae est praecipuum inter bona humana.²¹ Elsewhere, by setting God as a goal of contemplative life, as optimum contemplabile—man sets the social achievements as the end of active life and calls them optimum agibile: the best thing that man can accomplish in earthly life is to keep contributing to the common material well-being, and all the more to the common spiritual well-being of the society.²²

10. If we now ask why things are so, we will soon see the same relation in another light. That is, if an individual should see the highest social good in the social well-being and subordinate itself to it as to an end, it is because the highest social good is for this individual is the most powerful means for the full development of its personality and for attaining its personal goal, which is not earthly, but extends beyond earthly life.

The relationship here becomes opposite: what has been an end in earthly life becomes a means when it is seen from the point of view of the eternal destiny of man. At the same time, it also becomes clear that the solution of the problem is in the way the problem is posed. The second relationship outweighs the first relationship. Society demands of the individual to subordinate itself to the society’s common well-being in order to find necessary conditions and aids for the full development of its personality which is to live its earthly life within the society. Thus, the society is allowed to demand the greatest sacrifices from the individual, even the sacrifice of its life, if the sacrifices follow the line of that development, if they have in themselves everything that can contribute to strengthen the righteousness of the person. But the society must not demand anything, even in details of everyday life, which would preclude the crystallization of characters, which would distort them in their development or break them when they are crystallized. The fundamental duties of the state towards its citizens: protection of life and security, protection of freedom, work and property, protection of its good name, assistance in the access to material and spiritual well-being, participation in cultural goods of the nation; all this aims to produce a lasting order in society, the order which is the most powerful factor in the spiritual development of the citizens. There will always be individuals among them who will want to break that rule, but when there is the general will to maintain  rule and continue to strengthen and improve it, the upbringing of one’s personal values ​​will have conditions irreplaceable by others. Even the assistance of divine factors … is only exceptionally able to replace, when it is a question of moral upbringing, the social order necessary for the normal formation of the personality of a man. Neither here in the social area, grace replaces nature, but in nature it should have its natural basis. Through grace, some individuals will perhaps resist negative influences of society, whose inner order is in decay; general public, however, will be stopped in its development, characters will be distorted, the spiritual power and the cohesion of society will decrease, exposing it to all kinds of danger, whether from within or without.

Let us try to formulate some conclusions of our foregoing reflections in the following words: The society lives by personal values ​​in order that its’ rules give each individual the ability to fully develop their personalities and thus facilitate the attainment of their personal goal after death. Thus, in the final settling of accounts, the subordination of society to the personality of man prevails over the subordination of personality to society. The latter is limited to earthly life, the former transcends it and enters the field of eternity. The ontological reason of being prevails: the transient must be subordinated to the eternal.

But is such an establishment of the relationship between individual and society not a masked form of individualism or, even worse, selfishness, since its personal development occupies the first place in our priority system? Not at all! After all, this development requires so much dedication throughout the whole earthly life, so many sacrifices, that it can only be attained by the joint effort of all, subordinated to the common good! But will that egoism earned in earthly life not come out in the posthumous life which for all those sacrifices promises eternal happiness? For a more detailed answer to this question, I send the reader to my Catholic Educational Ethics, where … I tried to develop the doctrine of disinterested nature of Christian ethics as it regards the end of man and the eternal glory to which he is destined. … .

HABIT OR SKILL

Jacek Woroniecki, “Nawyk czy sprawność,” in Wychowanie człowieka. Pisma wybrane, pp. 33–57. Kraków: Znak, 1961.

I

If we wanted to express in the simplest words understandable for all in what upbringing consists, we would have to say that it consists in getting accustomed or used to good. The Duke of Wellington, the victor at the battle of Waterloo, is well known for replying, when said that habit is a second nature, but that it is not the second nature,  it is ten natures.

In fact, to be a well-educated man, it is not enough to afford good deeds at times, fully satisfying the requirements of morality, it is not even enough to perform them often, but with hesitation and struggle, with difficulty and internal fight, to resist opposite inclinations  against the wrong. The notion of a well-educated man which we all have contains the inner virtue due to which our conduct not only meets the demands of morality but to a certain degree, at least in normal living conditions, is free from internal hesitation and struggle. An ideal upbringing makes us do good easily, without long deliberation, in a word, as if under compulsion and at the same time with some satisfaction … .

Getting accustomed to conduct according to the requirements of morality in all areas of human life is therefore the main task of upbringing. It follows that pedagogy, as a science of upbringing, should regard knowing precisely the process of getting accustomed, acquiring habits or skills, both positive (virtues), that should be instilled, and negative (vices), which should be fought against to be controlled and eradicated, as its main task.

The pedagogy of recent times is increasingly aware that its central issue is getting accustomed to good¹, and it is undoubtedly a very comforting symptom in the context of its being consigned to oblivion in recent centuries. Past centuries—both antiquity and the Middle Ages—understood very well that the whole issue of upbringing revolves around that improvement in good. Only moral intellectualism, which gradually took over modern thought beginning with the seventeenth century, set aside that issue and led it to become forgotten. The distinction between the area of action and the area of thought was more and more rarely made which resulted in reducing upbringing to education, as if knowledge itself could be sufficient for action, even if efficiently performed. All the pedagogy of recent generations was marked by moral intellectualism identifying upbringing with education and forgetting about the issue of getting accustomed to good … .

Therefore, it should be considered to be a very positive phenomenon that there is an interest in the issue of habits which is worthy of note in the pedagogy of the modern day. It is possible to see in it a certain overcoming of moral intellectualism, which so badly affected pedagogic doctrines of the last generations, and although it is not yet final, this overcoming undoubtedly is a very important progress which can have a profound impact on the further development of pedagogy. Obviously,  not t everything that has been done in this field is acceptable, and even—let’s say it openly—there is very little in the modern studies on the essence and origin of habits that is of higher value for pedagogy,  due to contamination with its assumptions of modern psychology. But the very fact that the issue has been put to the fore is very important. A new field of study has been opened (or rather the old field has been rediscovered), and now we will have to be involved in a dispute with both overt and conscious materialism and with crypto-materialism which consists in unconsciously succumbing to materialist views, so often, unfortunately, found among Catholics … .

II

The dispute with the materialism of all possible shades about the central issue of upbringing can be reduced to this simple question: habit or skill? I have chosen these two simple terms from my mind, and before I begin to compare them more accurately, I would like to refer to the linguistic sense of the readers who will undoubtedly agree that the two words are not synonymous, but denote two quite different mental phenomena in our everyday speech.

“Habit” contains a notion of something that works automatically, without participation of our consciousness, and so independently of our will; therefore, it signifies some mechanization of activity that results from a longer repetition of the same activity. “Skill” is another thing. It has no feature of mechanization in itself, on the contrary, it means enhancing the ability to consciously do something, to do it better, faster, without hesitation or a second thought, but not without consideration and participation of higher mental functions—reason and will. “Skill” thus does not contain in itself a concept of automatization or mechanization, and this makes it different from habit. The mindless swinging of one’s legs would be called a habit—not a skill, but the finger technique of a pianist would be called a skill—not a habit.

What they have in common is, among other things, that they both result from the repetition of the same activities; at the same time, they are connected to or penetrate one another so that it is often difficult to distinguish them from one another. Habit produces no skills, but skill always produces certain habits, which then can no longer act by themselves as skills, but as habits; for example, a pianist, while thinking over things having nothing to do with music, will start to drum with his fingers on the table: it will be a manifestation of a habit rooted in his motoric powers.

This is what explains the frequent confusing of habits with skills, and either the desire to mechanize all our psychical life, even our moral life, by means of habits, or the fear of mechanization, which goes to the point that even skills are rejected as being nothing but habits which mechanize our psychical life.

The first tendency finds its characteristic manifestation in the position of Pascal who thought that even our religious life can be reduced to habits. He advised unbelievers, who wanted to come to faith, to begin to perform religious acts, and by thus doing to come to permanent habits. He realized that such a mechanization would lower the value of religious life, but he accepted it and quietly recommended reaching the faith by means of habits, though it must appear stupefying … .

We encounter the second tendency in Kant in his fear of the mechanization of moral life by virtues. For Kant, there is actually one virtue, and that is a constant tension of the will to fulfill its duty. In ancient doctrines of virtue, he perceives the danger of automatization, and warns against the ease which they allow, so that they can easily become habits that work of necessity mechanically.²

Thus, we see that the issue which we are interested in here has long occupied  minds. And today it is still returning in various works in the field of psychology or pedagogy, but unfortunately one can very often encounter the confusion of habit and skill even in Catholic writers. The confusion results from the complete or partial failure in distinguishing mental and sensory levels in our psyche, the failure in distinguishing their proper laws of action and development, and the more or less conscious reduction of mental life, i.e., the activity of reason and will, to lower activities of cognition and sensory desire. Under such conditions, highlighting the essential difference between skill and habit becomes impossible. Therefore, either, as Pascal wanted, upbringing will follow the line of mechanization by means of habits, or, similarly to Kant, for the fear of and the sense of the senselessness of that mechanization, it will be limited to the teaching of lofty moral principles, ceasing to try to make these principles penetrate deeply into our appetitive functions to give them stable effectiveness in moral action.

The line of habits is followed by all more or less conscious materialists: for example, William James, in the interesting chapter entitled “Habit”³ in his Textbook of Psychology, as well as the whole school of behaviorists which plays such a great role in Anglo-Saxon pedagogy.⁴ How characteristic in this respect is the chapter entitled “The growth and control of habits” in Ida B. Saxby’s work The Education of Behaviour.⁵ 

In Poland, Fr. Kazimierz Dworak took a similar position in his An outline of experimental psychology⁶, where he speaks without hesitation of the mechanization of the activity of the will and of submitting it to routine.

Also Jacques Chevalier, in his above-mentioned work L’habitude, reduces upbringing to the submission of only sensory factors of our psyche to habits, and clearly claims that habits are possible only in the field of matter; according to him, the whole upbringing consists in improving our sensory functions by habits to obey our spiritual functions, but the latter are not subject to improvement by habits. In Chevalier’s position, one can see the influence of Bergson, and even more that of Descartes whose unilateral spiritualism, as was perfectly demonstrated by Cardinal Mercier, had to necessarily lead to mechanism and materialism.⁷ That crypto-materialism, as I mentioned above, originates from this source: when one does not recognize a strict, organic or—to express it more accurately—substantial relationship between the soul and the body, the knowledge about spiritual activities is impossible and the whole psychology is limited to the only one field of senses.

We do not lack, however, opposite tendencies too, to mention Fr. Johannes Lindworsky S.J.⁸, and Fr. Jan Salamucha⁹ who, rather as a rapporteur, presented his professor’s views on the redundancy of habits. Supposedly derived from experience, that doctrine is very clearly of Kantian origin, and if Fr. Lindworsky found it in a psychological laboratory, it was only because he had brought it there himself, being unconsciously concerned in Kantian views which permeated the mental atmosphere of Germany. In any case, in Fr. Lindworsky, this position is connected with his tendency to diminish the role of the will in our psychical life, which by itself, as we shall see, makes it impossible to see the difference between habit and skill. The will, for him, is not a force, and therefore one cannot speak of increasing this force by upbringing; thus the latter comes down, in fact, only to the proper motivation of our actions.¹⁰In addition to Kant’s influence, we have here a very clear example of that crypto-materialism, so common in those who need nothing more than a psychological laboratory for their research.

It does not mean, of course, that none of our contemporaries can see and appreciate the difference between habit and skill. Yes, the conviction that here is the central point of all pedagogical issues becomes increasingly evident, for example, in very interesting studies of such French authors as Placide de Roton¹¹, Émile Peillaube¹², and Georges Dwelshauwers.¹³ In England, for example, John MacCunn, in his work on character formation¹⁴, dedicates the whole chapter VII part I to demonstrate that habit (not addiction—as the Polish translation wants to suggest) is not sufficient to have upbringing strengthened, and in chapters I and II part III it brings up, perhaps not realizing it fully, the whole issue of the upbringing of moral skills. Perhaps the most interesting and important thing is that said by Theodor Steinbüchel in Tillmann’s Handbuch der katholischen Sittenlehre,¹⁵ wherein he rehabilitates the notion of virtue, which has been forgotten in recent centuries, and perfectly highlights its character of spiritual skill throughout its historical development.

But what strikes in all the works, and what testifies to the extent to which the last centuries did not deal with that issue, is the complete lack of defined terms in Western European languages ​​for denoting these two psychic phenomena, namely habit and ability. It can be seen that, when they extended their philosophical terminology so extensively in recent centuries, the notion of skill as a special form of habit was completely absent in the field of their interest … .

III

Let us now concentrate on skill alone and let us try to know it more closely by comparing it, to better distinguish its own characteristics, with habit. It covers a very wide range of phenomena, even quite different phenomena. On the one hand, skill is each well-possessed ability, be it theoretical—that is, knowledge or science—or practical like art, craft, or even prudence—that ability to direct one’s life; on the other hand, its range includes moral virtues and vices, among which virtues enhance our ability to act consistently with the moral law and the chief end of man, and vices—to acts deviating from the law and the end, but conformed to some particular end in which an individual has taken his leading moral interest, e.g., wealth, sensual pleasures, fame, power, personal greatness, etc. The former are skills that improve cognitive functions, while the latter, i.e., virtues and vices, include the field of functions of aspiration or desire; hence between them there are strong interdependencies and profound differences in terms of origin and development as well as in terms of functioning and expiring. For the time being, however, we will not be dealing with those differences, but we will rather focus on what is common in these skills and what differentiates them from habits.

The point of departure of our considerations will be a strong emphasis on the difference between the soul and the body, with no less strong an assertion that, between the two elements of which our nature is composed, there is a close, organic, or— more correctly—substantial relationship that enables us, in the whole span of our psychic life, to discover the activity of purely spiritual functions and separate them from the spiritual-sensory functions. … Let us summarize, in a few words, the old doctrine of the soul and its relation to the body, which was essentially present already in Aristotle’s approach and then so deeply developed by St. Thomas which brought about such fierce struggles over his person both in his lifetime and after his death¹⁶.

The soul, as an element animating the body, i.e., giving it the ability to what we call life, has various, specifically separate abilities for actions. Some of them are performed with bodily organs: motoric, physiological, and even cognitive and appetitive (of a sensory kind) functions are of that type. On the other hand, the soul is capable of performing other functions without any aid of bodily organs, though not without a certain contribution on their part: for, as long as it is in an organic union with the body, the soul cannot come into contact with reality in any other way than through senses, and thus its purely spiritual cognitive and appetitive work deals with data provided by senses. It is not limited, however, to what is material in those data, but it discovers in them immaterial components that cannot be perceived by senses. In spite of all the imperfection of man, the soul can go far in knowing those immaterial elements; so that it can come to know its own spiritual nature and its properties, it can rise even higher and know the existence of the chief spiritual element of the world, i.e., God who contains in himself the fullness of perfection, namely the fullness of being, truth, and good.

Now, the problem that we are dealing with here can be reduced to the question of whether the improvement that we are concerned with covers only lower, sensory abilities of the soul, or also the soul’s higher, spiritual abilities. Or perhaps even more precisely: whether, even in sensory abilities, what is improved are only sensory organs used by respective abilities of the soul, or also the spiritual abilities themselves, and also whether what is improved are also the abilities which have purely spiritual nature and are not associated with sensory organs. …

St. Thomas raised that question very clearly, and in order to express his answer in a similarly short form as Jacques Chevalier’s above words, we will say: L’habitude implique la potentialité¹⁷, in other words: wherever there is potentiality, i.e., the potency of being otherwise or acting differently, there is always the possibility of transformation to action by this or that disposition or improvement. Now, potentiality is not only the property of matter, but of everything which is created and which has not got the reason of its being or full perfection in itself.

We come here to the basic issues of metaphysics, and at the same time to the problem of spirit. The influence of materialism, which was extended over the modern mentality, made that dealing with the problem of spirit was ceased, and beyond a small group of followers of Christian philosophy there was few philosophers admitting to spiritualism who would be able to explain what they understand by such terms as “spirit” or “soul.” Some, if nailed down, would have to come to the conclusion that essentially they are materialists, others would shield themselves with agnosticism, or would refer to faith and theology for the solution of the issue, and thus admitting their fideism.

Every spirit, whether uncreated or infinite, i.e., God, or created and finite, like the human soul or the pure spirit not meant for animating a body (and in philosophy we can speak of it, but only as something possible), as an effect of its immateriality, i.e., its physical non-complexity, has the transparency that makes it reflect different things in itself, and above all, that it is aware of itself. Immateriality and non-complexity necessarily entail intellectuality—the ability to reproduce in itself what is separate, which we call cognition. The ability of cognition is then necessarily followed by the second ability of each spirit, namely the ability to desire. It basically consists in the fact that cognition tells us whether what we have known suits us, whether it is something positive or negative for us; as a result, some tension to or from the known object arises in the soul, which we call willing or nilling, liking or disliking.¹⁸ That basic attitude towards the object is followed by other manifestations of willing or nilling, such as desire or repulsion, joy or sadness, etc. … .

The point is to recognize that these two higher abilities of the soul—cognitive ability: the reason, and appetitive ability: the will—are subject in themselves (and not only in their executive organs) to development, that also their potentiality needs to be improved so that they can easily, quickly, and even contentedly develop their activities. The next point is to recognize that the process of improving spiritual functions is subject to laws other than in the case of lower sensory functions, for the potentiality of spirit and the potentiality of matter are essentially different and ruled by different laws of development. This is that in which the difference between habit and skill consists, and where the core of the dispute lies.

It is very important, however, to remember that those two processes in the mental and moral development of man are strongly connected to and still intertwine one another. The analytical necessities of our cognition force us to separate and consider them separately, but we must not forget that in reality they develop together and that one cannot be known or understood without another. Similar thing is with other issues: one cannot consider the issue of the will and that of the reason separately, but it must not be forgotten that both these functions of mind are always working in close union with one another, as we are not able to want anything without having thought about it before, and vice versa.

It is clear that the source of many difficulties lies here, that many misunderstandings stem from the fact that many minds cannot embrace both spheres—purely spiritual and sensual—and confine themselves to one of them, neglecting the other, or imposing on it methods set in one sphere, but unsuited to the other. This is precisely in which the insufficiency of experimental psychology consists, especially when it is closed only in the laboratory. For pedagogy that encompasses all life, and especially its spiritual manifestations that cannot be measured in the laboratory, its enclosure within the walls of the laboratory is fatal; it necessarily needs to be based on richer and more diverse observation data collected from the fullness of everyday life.

IV

… We will begin with the cognitive factor, which is the most important here and at the same time not always easy to perceive. In fact, confusing habit with skill is explained by, among others, the fact that in the latter the cognitive factor is greatly reduced; sometimes it can even hide itself so that the superficial observer will not see it and will get the impression that he is dealing with an automatized action in which reflection and consciousness do not play any role. It was already St. Thomas who encountered that misunderstanding which Kant could not solve, since he clearly stated that the more the act stems from an entrenched skill, the less it needs reflection; but he immediately adds that it should not be understood as if the act stemming from a skill could do without reflection, since the question here is the skill of determination. As in every skill, however, there is a fixed disposition to a goal chosen once and for all, so as soon as something what corresponds to this goal happens, the decision is made immediately, unless it is stopped by a new and deeper reflection.¹⁹

Undoubtedly, skill greatly shortens the thought process, and in daily details with which life is filled, it reduces this process to a minimum. A kind of reflection, however, is always there, for it is necessary to regulate our action in relation to the intended goal and accompanying circumstances. As an a contrario evidence here, we can use distractedness which precisely consists in the fact that there is the lack of a reflection and the act is not accordingly adjusted to the goal and circumstances in which it takes place.

The importance of a skill lies in that it accelerates and facilitates our conduct and, as it were, saves our life energy. Skill is, as it were, a condensed or capitalized experience that gives us the potency to come, without hesitating or long searching, to make a decision that is best suited, in a given position, to the goal and conditions in which it is to be realized. Skills organize in us a kind of set of spiritual complexes to which we can resort in every need, and in which we can find practical judgments already well-thought-of and endowed with a certain power of tension, able to be bent and adapted to still changing conditions of the world around us. …

How far away we are here from a mechanized habit, and how much superficial one must be as an observer to confuse these two phenomena simply because the element of reflection is here shortened and simplified so that it sometimes becomes overlooked at first glance. But one, who more carefully considers that brief spontaneous moment of conscious reflection (proairezis) which is the culmination point of activity stemming from an entrenched skill, cannot deny that skill is a very spiritual thing which, however, cannot be enjoyed from birth, but is acquired along the long way of self-upbringing.

This leads us to the second characteristic of a skill: it does not curtail freedom in us, but rather strengthens it in the direction of the choice we have once made. Undoubtedly, skill has a way of disposing us to certain actions, to a certain uniform conduct, but it does not impose necessity or preclude the possibility of opposite actions. A virtuous man always retains the possibility to commit an act opposite to a given virtue, just as a man possessed by a vice has always the ability to act against that vice and thereby in accordance with a virtue opposite to that vice. We constantly find examples of it in our everyday life. Anyone who comes to a virtue or a vice strongly entrenched in his character undoubtedly imposes on himself a certain limitation in the sense that he gives advantage to one of the tendencies—to goodness or to evil. So it can be said that he is strengthened to act in one direction or another and hindered from acting in an opposite way. Virtuous man then imposes, as it were, a constant brake on his innate dispositions to that which is incompatible with morality, and at the same time strengthens them toward the good. His freedom remains intact and even better disposed to the good in whose boundaries he operates as freely as he can better control his negative tendencies. The field of spirit has an immeasurable sphere of action, but in order to be able to operate freely within its boundaries, what must be taken under control are those tendencies of our nature which pull us down or concentrate us on ourselves and thereby inhibit the impetus of our spirit to infinity. …

The reinforcement of freedom already at the natural level gives us the spiritual improvement of our main mental functions which we call virtues. We primarily have them in mind here because they belong to the moral domain and take an active part in the performance of our free actions. Intellectual skills, or abilities, are not free in their operation, but dependent on objective, more or less defined, norms of their own domain. And yet also within those norms, skill is at our disposal so that we can use it as and when we want. The philosopher does not feel any necessity or coercion to philosophize, but he does philosophize as much as he wants, and he himself chooses the object of his reflection; and the same can be said about the artist or the craftsman.

It was perfectly expressed by the ancients in various definitions of skill; St. Augustine described it: quo aliquid agitur cum opus fuerit²⁰, and Averroes even better emphasized that element of freedom in the following words: quo quis utitur cum voluerit.²¹ They include all skills, both ability, and virtue, and even vice which, although strongly constraining the will of man by the desire for some finite good, leaves him freedom to use its impulses to a greater or lesser degree within the boundaries of this good.

This element of freedom is extremely characteristic of all skills, and is that which so fundamentally distinguishes skill from habit. Also, this element is directly followed by another characteristic of skill, namely: moderation; that moderation which Aristotle so profoundly grasped in his Nicomachean Ethics. Perhaps his observational genius of moralist has never expressed itself better than in that famous formula: mesotes akrotes pos²², a mean state is in a sense a summit, in other words: the summit of one’s perfection is to be able to keep up with moderation in all one does. This is what skills are supposed to bring to our conduct. How far away we are from the rigid habit operating automatically and uniformly, regardless of need and circumstance.

Skill always has a certain plasticity or flexibility that allow man to measure his action and adapt it to the circumstances, to the conditions within which he operates. Such is moderation which in everyday speech is called tact. Moderation testifies to the fact that both reason and will always operate in a skill—that there is always both consciousness and freedom in a skill.

To those three characteristics of skill, let us add a fourth one—satisfaction. We often encounter it in habits, which also give us some satisfaction in their performance, but it is purely functional satisfaction resulting from overcoming resistance and obtaining ease in a given activity. Thus, once a child learned something with some difficulty, e.g., to pronounce a letter, they will keep repeating it. And something of that functional, purely subjective, satisfaction will be also in a skill, but it will be strengthened by objective satisfaction resulting from the very object whose achievement should bring joy. It is well known that Aristotle put a special emphasis on satisfaction which should accompany skills, and which is to prove that they are firmly rooted in the soul.²³ Where there is no satisfaction, a skill has not yet come to its full maturity, for it has not yet taken under control all the obstacles that hinder it, and has not yet come to the constant love of its object.

Let us finally add that supernatural aids which God gives the soul either as theological virtues or as moral virtues infused with grace, or even gifts of the Holy Spirit, are all sui generis skills, although very distinct from those which we acquire in the natural order by way of exercising them. In spite of far-reaching differences in functioning, they are also a reinforcement of psychic abilities to a certain category of actions transcending our natural forces. The supernatural virtues, like the natural ones, do not compel us to actions, but merely give us a certain inclination which is at our disposal, so that we can follow it when we want, and to the extent that we want. For, in the supernatural order, skills given to us with grace in no way impede our will, but strengthen it in goodness and give it such potencies of which it could not dream in the natural order.

V

It often happens that the basic issues of human life are more clearly understood by thinkers who do not devote themselves ex professo to science than by scholars whose one-sided mindset interferes with the direct observation of the world and of what interests us most in the world—that is, man and his moral conduct.

Here in Poland, we find two thinkers of considerable reputation who make interesting remarks concerning the issue discussed here and casting a very bright light on it. In Without dogma, Sienkiewicz simply remarks that “people do not quite realize that it is necessary to know how to want,” and in The Wedding, Wyspiański throws the accusation in the face of his generation that it “could have already gained a lot, but they just don’t want to want.”

The first one states that desire, like all our natural activities, is subject to development, and that, by exercise, should be raised to a higher level and embodied in the form of skill or virtue. Every human being has the natural ability to walk, to speak, to think, and within certain limits, he himself develops and perfects it through practice. And yet, when he goes to the army, or enrolls himself in a stage school, or takes up studies in philosophy, he immediately sees that he cannot walk or speak or think as he should. And then he becomes convinced that those everyday natural activities can be further developed, perfected, and improved, and that much more can be drawn from them than he has ever thought. They are like wild plants which when left alone bear small and tasteless fruit, but which can be ennobled by grafting, and then bear ripe and juicy fruit.

The same is with the will. It also operates in us by virtue of natural disposition, like a wild plant, and only when carefully brought up it becomes the powerful force of the soul which sometimes even in a weak body is able to perform great actions.

Well, but how to acquire the skill of wanting to which Sienkiewicz attached such importance? The answer to this question is given us by Wyspiański’s excuse: in order to know how to want, it is necessary to want to want. When expressing those bitter words, Wyspiański was not aware of the fact that he dealt with an extremely important issue which many philosophers could not comprehend. For example, Leibniz denies that man can want his own wanting, which, of course, logically related to his intellectual determinism.²⁴

Nothing testifies to the spiritual nature of our mind better than the ability to reflect its primordial functions—reason and will. The senses are not capable of this: the eye cannot see itself or look at its own vision, nor can the ear hear its hearing. The sphere of spirit is different: both reason and will can take care of themselves and their own activity; not directly, but one with the aid of the other: closely related to one another in their activities, they are able to turn towards, reflectere, or bend themselves in a way so to return to the source of their activity as to their object. Reason can think about wanting—and not only speculatively, as about a psychological process, but also practically about wanting this or that object. Similarly, will can want to think, not only in general, but about every single thing; it can bring reason to think about it, at a time it develops our liking and within certain limits it can even exercise influence on the line of thinking, the judgment of reason, and its practical decision. This explains the fact that will through reason can reach its own activity and influence judgments and decisions of reason, charge itself to take definite efforts, that it can, as it were, regulate their tension and endurance and adjust them to circumstances in which they are to be expended.²⁵

Through the ability of his self’s mental functions to reflect on his own actions, man is able to consciously influence the potentiality of these functions, and train this potentiality, shape it, and endow it with definite dispositions of which he can make use at will when needed. This—as we have seen—is skill. Adopting it is possible only because our mental functions have these two properties: as spiritual, they are capable of reflecting on their own actions, and as created and connected to the body, they are actualized to a very small extent and thereby they have a deep potentiality in themselves which requires improvement. Because of the fact that we can want to want, we are able to foster our wanting, develop it in a chosen direction, and strengthen it. The expression “willpower” is not an empty cliché, as some psychologists suggest, nor is it an illusion that, in certain limits, this power can be increased by improvement. …

As we have already mentioned above, spiritual skills always have a certain frame in the form of habits, and therefore the knowledge of them cannot be indifferent to the whole of pedagogy. … Let us take one concrete example of the necessity of examining spiritual skills in connection with the development of sensory factors: this is the question of fostering prudence.

No one will deny that prudence is a spiritual skill which, however, does not change the fact that it is highly dependent on the proper functioning of inner cognitive senses: imagination, memory, and that sensory wisdom called instinct without which our mind cannot make any practical judgment. In this sphere, habits that work automatically are highly significant, but there is also a room for skills, and the proper distinction between one and the other will be extremely important for fostering prudence.²⁶

THE SKILL OF GOVERNING AND GIVING ORDERS

Jacek Woroniecki, Umiejętność rządzenia i rozkazywania, Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2016, pp. 5–31.

I. The importance of the problem

There has long been a belief that the highest of human skills is the ability to govern others: Ars artium—regimen animarum. It surpasses others for two reasons, one of which is its importance to society, and the other is that it is difficult both to provide and to gain government. Indeed, social law and order crucially depend on whether those who lead various social groups or whole societies are able to govern them and, without confusion, lead them to their proper goals. But it is not easy, because in this area one has to inter-act with thinking individuals who determine themselves, who can always express their opposition and resist governments; one needs to know how to approach them, gain their minds, and make them want what they are charged, make their will accept the impulse they receive from the government, together with the impulse power. And the difficulty becomes even more intensified, if we take into account that it is unknown where, how, and from whom the art of government can be learned.

It is often heard that the best school of government and giving orders is obedience. And it is undoubtedly so, but under one condition, that it is obedience to understood orders. Obedience to superiors who cannot give orders in a reasonable way will not teach the reasonable to give orders, but rather prepare them to repeat the same mistakes and shortcomings which they had before their eyes as examples of the art of government. …

We see then that the skill of government and giving orders in a particular way deserves our reflection: it is one of the central issues of Polish pedagogy. … To make the first step toward this goal we will thoroughly analyze the activity of governing others, reveal its components, and know each of them in its correct and incorrect functioning. …

All our study will be a development of the profound teaching, so thoroughly considered by the Greek philosophers, about the virtue of prudence which in itself is nothing but the ability to govern oneself and others. Unfortunately, it has been forgotten by modern thought, and it is only in our day that the interest in this basic issue of upbringing is being aroused anew among pedagogues. For the time being, we will begin by dividing the general activity, which is called the exercise of power, into its component parts: for it can easily be reduced to three particular actions, namely: governing, giving orders, applying penalties. To govern means to lead the whole of an entrusted group of people to its proper end; to give orders is to indicate individuals what they should or may do on their way to that end; finally, to apply penalties is to indicate individuals where they have been wrong or guilty, and to give them the possibility to redress the evil Committed. All three of these activities have their own laws and principles which result from the psyche of man and human society, and are supported by his long-time experience. It is necessary to take a closer look at them, since the whole art of properly exercising power depends on them. …

II. Government

The first action of a superior is to govern society as such. To that end, he should cover the whole of the group entrusted to him and not allow details to obscure it. And since the life of the whole is determined by acts, statutes, or regulations, then his first duty will be to know perfectly well those acts and regulations, and his first task will be to make them known, respected, and as strictly as possible observed by his subordinates.

Of course, the strictness in the observance of laws is relative, and thus one should be guided not by the letter, but by the spirit that inspired the laws and the intention of those who established them. Therefore, the second duty of superiors is to be well aware of conditions under which the group entrusted to them works, and depending on these conditions, to organize its daily life … so that it would be best suited to the purpose of a given institution.

A daily life well-organized in the spirit of the laws in force, and taking account of specific conditions of place, people and time—this is the first condition for fostering the spirit of obedience in subordinates, and the superiors should most carefully watch on keeping the house entrusted to them in law and order, that is: regularity, cleanliness, punctuality, silence, conscientiousness in fulfilling duties, and all permeated by the love for what they serve.

It is obvious that the superior must first align himself with this atmosphere of order and give an example of his subordination to the good of the whole he is to look after. This will give him an internal moral authority to govern, give orders, and demand obedience, which will be willingly recognized by all and never replaced by any external authority of an office.

A fair division of labor is very important in this work of governing the whole. The superior cannot do all the work himself, therefore the regulations of each institution assign him co-workers to various sections of its tasks and define their duties and scope of action. The law and order of each institution is highly dependent on a harmonious cooperation of all those factors, and the superior is to be constantly concerned about it. He should not excessively limit the autonomy and initiative of individual officials, but, within the limits of what the regulations permit, he should develop them, as it is the only way in which he can make for himself good co-workers or successors who might someday take over the reins of government after him. …

In every institution that wants to exist and develop some planned work, a certain amount of conservatism is necessary, even—let us not be afraid to say—a certain amount of routine that ensures uniformity of development. The latter hurts no one as long as there is some bright mind in the institution, a mind which can inspire it with life and use the routine to do what it is best suited for, that is, to enhance its activity and ensure its cohesion. … Another important task of the superior is to train his subordinates for the skill of making predictions. Anyone with an office should first know when, how much, and what they would need, instead of thinking about it only when there is already a need for it. He should know at what time of year such and such things are acquired, prepared, or moved, and be very careful to ensure everything to be done on time, not at the last moment, but well in advance. …

In a well-organized institution, the rule should be that the thing once-decided is at once accomplished, and that there must be special reasons for its postponement. Where there can be lack of strength or time to do everything immediately, the task of the superior is to indicate in what order particular matters are to be settled. …

III. Giving orders

Even if the small community he is to govern is best organized, and even if it is permeated by the spirit of law and order that we have outlined above, the superior at times will have to give a subordinate an order or a ban, a command or an admonition. For no social cell can be governed by regulations so strictly as to function like a machine with the push of a button. It would be far, in any case, from the ideal of human community composed of free and rational individuals who are to contribute to the common good by their spontaneous activity. And it is this spontaneous activity of subordinates which the superior has to guide by means of orders and admonitions; and we need now to consider how he should do so. Let’s get started with orders.

The first requirement we lay down here is that the orders given by superiors must be in accordance with moral, divine, and human laws, because it is clear that they derive their basic binding force from those laws and thus cannot object to them. This primarily applies to the principles of Christian morality which is the common ground of all human conduct, and today, after twenty centuries, has so deeply penetrated our European culture that even those who externally renounce Christianity reckon largely with it. It is important, however, not to underestimate the binding power of human law which submits our social life to discipline; and it is also the law which imposes requirements on our conscience, as St. Paul clearly states while demanding obedience to the state authority “not only because of possible punishment but also as a matter of conscience” (Rom 13: 5). Any institution, then, belonging to this great community, which is the state, should ensure their activity to be in conformity with the state law, and inculcate the respect for and obedience to the state law, as well as their own acts and regulations, in their members. …

The second requirement for the skill of giving good orders is the careful consideration and preparation of an order. In this case, the skill of making predictions should be used, from which the Latin name of prudence, i.e. prudentia, has taken its name. It is necessary to carefully think about what is to be ordered, its necessity, way of performance, difficulties and obstacles it may encounter, and only when all this is matured in the mind, one can give an order. … The conscientious reflection on an order to be given will protect the superior from the necessity of revoking or changing it, which always seriously undermines the authority of government in the eyes of subordinates.

The third requirement for the art of government and giving orders is a good way of giving orders, that is, in a proper time, in a clear and strict form, and a firm tone. For the reflection, though necessary for exercising power, cannot last too long and expose the subordinate to waiting when the time for action has come. The decision should thus be made by the superior in advance and announced in the form of an order so that subordinates have time to reflect on it and make necessary preparations for carrying it out. …

The orders given to subordinates should not be too detailed, but they should contain only essential demands of a superior and leave greater autonomy in their execution. Obedience is not to kill self-reliance, but it is to foster and develop the latter, while at the same time to train for subordinating it to the common good about which the superiors are concerned. The responsibility for an action carried out by order of the superior rests both with the superior who has given the order and the subordinate who has carried it out, and neither one of them is allowed to set the other up to take full responsibility. …

The order, however, should not only be clear, distinct and, when necessary, detailed, but also announced in a firm form so that there is no doubt for the subordinate that the superior wants him to do this or that. For then the subordinate is convinced that the superior knows what he wants, and, when the former is a man of good will and trained for obedience, he will gladly carry out the order. … There is no need for shouting, being angry, raising voice; a certain firmness in tone, which in any case should be natural and even cheerful, will do. The subordinate should intuit that there is no thought of his possible disobedience in the superior’s mind, and in the latter’s nice and cheerful way of giving the order the subordinate should find an incentive to the equally cheerful execution of it. …

IV. Applying penalties

But superiors should not only be able to give orders well; their duties also include applying penalties, admonitions, or punishments, and they should conscientiously fulfill these tasks both for the good of the whole and for the good of each subordinate. For even in the best organized human team, consisting only of goodwill individuals, there will always be some more or less voluntary faults, shortcomings, failures, and the superiors’ job is to prevent them being repeated too often and so becoming a habit, and at the same time to give those who have committed them the opportunity to compensate for them.

Applying admonitions and punishments is connected with some kind of difficulty which consists in the fact that it can easily induce discouragement in the one who did wrong and thus destroy the relationship between the superior and his subordinate. It cannot be neglected, however, both for the sake of social order and for the good of subordinates. It is, therefore, necessary to find such a manner of applying admonitions and punishments which would not discourage or offend, but rather lift the spirit and increase the confidence in superiors.

The secret of such a skillful applying of penalties consists in humility which many people feel disgust for and are prejudiced to only because they know it only from the side which is unpleasant and onerous to our nature, and little do they know that humility also has a nice and very attractive side, and that the latter is even the first and more important one. Its unpleasant side, which costs so much, comes from the fact that we are all fallible, still vulnerable to errors and faults, and that, when we go astray or fall, we rightly deserve to be admonished or even punished, and we should humbly accept it. The humiliation which is connected with every admonition, is always painful to our self-love, and therefore humility costs us so much. But humility also knows another kind of humiliation, which should not cost anything and to which we have many more opportunities in life, namely voluntary bowing before all that is good, worthy, and noble. Thus, the first act of humility is not to tolerate humiliation, but to be able to recognize the good in others, to be able to praise them. One who, in his relations with people, can always perceive what is good and laudable in them, undoubtedly has the makings of being a humble man, and when he also successfully passes his tests in humiliation which are never absent from life, he will acquire in time a certain skill of controlling his self-love which strives to elevate itself above others, and from which pride is born. On the contrary, one who has an inclination to pick, as it is said, holes in something, i.e., who, in every man or in every human work, always sees first something to be criticized or reproached, and when he is to praise someone, he does it reluctantly or, as it were, half-assedly, he already has the makings of having his soul possessed by pride, for reproaching is to elevate oneself above others, whereas praising is to bow before others, to acknowledge their superiority, and this is what a proud man does not like.

The readiness to praise with joy all which deserves to be praised in others is this positive and, at the same time, pleasant and attractive side of humility, which unfortunately is too often forgotten, while we have so many opportunities to practice it. It also contains the secret of applying penalties, admonitions, and punishments in such a way which would not inflict more pain than needed and would not cause discouragement and rebellion. I do not remember who said that it is easier for man to accept admonitions from those who like to praise more than to reprove. In these words, the importance of humility in government is perfectly formulated. In fact, a subordinate who, when deserving, has been many times praised by his superior, now if he deserves to be reproved, he will not be able to see injustice and prejudice in it, but rather the superior’s objective relationship to his subordinates and his concern both for their good and the good of the whole. …

In order to gain a strong basis for giving effective admonitions to subordinates without discouraging them, the superior should be concerned with knowing them well, discovering their assets and qualities, as well as weaknesses and shortcomings, and often give them accolades and encouragements when he sees them fulfilling their duties well. The superior will always keep within the range of strict truth and will not allow himself any flattery to gain the sympathy of his subordinates; he will gladly praise them, when they deserve it. In this way, he will gain their trust, because they will see that he knows and appreciates them, that he is concerned above all for truth and good, that he is righteous. …

Armed with sincere kindness, however, the superior will be obliged not to neglect applying admonitions and punishments, when needed. It is not a pleasant function, and many superiors of a soft heart easily dispense themselves from it, pretending not to see any offenses, or ignoring them and so deceiving their conscience with the obligation of understanding for human weaknesses. Certainly, understanding is a very important virtue, but it must be distinguished from conniving, which is a terrible vice, especially in government. Evil in a neighbor must be understood, but it is also necessary to react against it and help the neighbor get it under control, and all the more so, the more harmful it is for the society.

It would be unnecessary to emphasize that it is important to avoid being too meticulous and that which is called treading on one’s heels. It is not necessary to immediately react against the slightest sign of weakness, especially when the latter rarely happens and does not violate general order in a significant way. One should be, however, more vigilant in the case of offenses resulting from bad habits testifying to an untutored, not good enough or, worse still, bad will. Such offenses must be quickly and vigorously reprimanded in order that nobody will think they can be tolerated permanently. …

The superior should establish it as a rule: do not punish out of anger. When feeling irritated at the sight of a subordinate’s guilt, he should postpone the punishment and summon the guilty only after having gotten his anger under control and having removed all inferior intentions. It will often be fine, if the matter does not require immediate treatment, to put it off till the next day and allow the night to calm down the nerves on both sides. …

However, in order for the punishment to have its benevolent consequences, it must be ensured that, once well served, the guilt is completely eradicated and never reminded due to being fully satisfied. A community wherein such an attitude toward punishment prevails would benefit a lot from it and would provide their members with a great spiritual freedom and a very effective help in getting the impulses of pride and self-love under control. On the other hand, reminding previous offenses paralyzes the beneficial effects of punishment and makes subordinates have problem with seeing their benefit in serving it well. Their benefit is that, when the punishment for their guilt has been served, the guilt should be forgotten, just as God forgets our guilts when we have done penance for them. …

Thus, every superior should be concerned with acquiring the skill of applying admonitions and punishments, and then using it with understanding and kindness, but also with firmness and, if necessary, with severity which would be capable of making impact on less compliant individuals. In the face of greater resistance, he will even have to induce anger in himself in order that this deeper power of our spiritual self will be harnessed to defend law and order in society, but he will have to hold this power well in hand and not to allow it to possess him. Simultaneously, he will have to have a lot of patience, and even more longanimity that is a virtue which does not allow to be discouraged when he does not see the fruits of his work soon enough. In the struggle with the weak or bad will of man, he should not expect immediate results, but having done as best as possible what conscience indicates him as a duty, it is necessary for him to entrust the rest to God.

ON NATION AND STATE

Jacek Woroniecki, Quaestio disputata de natione et statu civili. O narodzie i państwie. Translated from Latin into Polish by Rafał Maliszewski. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2004, pp. 15–31.

ARTICLE I

Do nation and state differ formally from one another?

OBJECTION 1. It seems that one should not distinguish nation from state. Things composed of the same elements cannot be distinguished unless numerically. Yet both the nation and the state are made up of people who join with each other to lead a social life. Therefore, no specific distinction can be made between nation and state.

OBJECTION 2. Besides, assuming that they are not the same, one could distinguish nation from state at most by following distinction between part and whole. The nation is nothing but a certain part of the state, i.e., its material element reducible to unity by the state’s power which is like a formal element of social life. So nation and state in no way should be set against one another.

BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, experience shows that state and nation are not the same. Things which do not arise simultaneously and do not perish simultaneously are not the same. For indeed states arise and perish, while nations do not arise and perish, and vice versa. So they are not the same.

IN THE ANSWER, it must be stated that nation and state are not the same, but they are different in species. In order to realize this truth, one must take into account the fact that unity, which constitutes a formal component of state life in the community of people, is not a simple or homomorphic thing, but many elements can be distinguished in it. The first of them, to begin with what is most obvious, is state power which brings collectivity to unity and leads it with state law. Next, some common territory—on which the community lives and which should be exclusively dependent on the state power—even if it is more or less integrated or divided in itself. Morality and customs, in turn—which give a certain uniformity to the behavior of particular individuals and the whole of community—join the plurality of people inwardly and thus bring it to something one. Another element is the bond of kinship which transforms the community that lives for a long time on one territory into a larger family and gives it a strong unity. One more element is often a common language which allows members of a human community to communicate with each other and by which laws and customs are spread and the unity of society is strengthened. Finally, such an element is very often a religion that is of great importance in building the internal unity of a state community.

Due to the fact that these individual elements do not necessarily connect with each other so that the same people, by virtue of the same factor, are directed to the same unity, individual people can belong to one community for one reason, and to another community for another reason.

Unity then, which is established by state power and state law, produces a civic community that is called “state”; it is connected with the second element, namely the territory subjected exclusively to that power.

The unity of morality and customs, in turn, is the basis for establishing a nation; this element is connected with the unity of kinship, because often nation is only an extension of one kindred group or tribe, and marriages are predominantly entered into by fellow nationals; moreover, it is connected with the unity of common language and the unity of religion.

It follows that nation and state differ from one another in terms of formal elements that constitute them, i.e., principles which bring collectivity to unity. For as the state is formed by the unity of state power, so the nation is formed by the unity of morality and customs which impose a uniform way of conduct on the community, and as “laws are instruments serving the purpose of the state,” so customs are instruments serving the purpose of the nation.

TO REPLY TO OBJECTION 1, it must be said that nation and state belong to the same genus because they are made up of a community that is led to the unity of common life; they differ, in turn, in species within the same genus because the formal principle that unites the community in the state is different from that which unites the community in the nation.

TO REPLY TO OBJECTION 2, it must be said that the nation is not merely a material part of the state from which it receives its form and unity, but that it has its own unity flowing from its own constitutive principle which is common customs and, in many cases, also bonds of kinship, language, and religion.

ARTICLE II

Do nation and state have the same purpose?

OBJECTION 1. It seems that the purpose of nation and that of state are not the same purpose. For, in action, the purpose is like a form; and where formal principles are different, purposes should be different as well. Yet, as was stated in the previous article, nation and state are different in formal terms and, therefore, should have different purposes.

OBJECTION 2. Besides, one should not use many means in order to achieve that which can be achieved by one means. Yet, the common good of human community which is the purpose of state can be best achieved by the state itself. Therefore, nation should have a different purpose than state.

BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, the purpose of both state and nation is the common good of the whole community. And the common good of the whole community can be only one: “to live well and virtuously.” Therefore, there is one purpose of both state and nation.

IN THE ANSWER, it should be stated that nothing prevents many actors from having one purpose; it is so in two ways: first, by dividing the material cause, as when many pull one car, the effect of their work is achieved by a material combination of forces; secondly, by dividing the formal cause, as when many in many ways strive for the same common purpose, partly by physical work and partly by intellectual work which guide the activity of a craftsman.

So, if we consider the purpose of nation and state, it will boldly come forward that this purpose is one, namely the common good of the community which gives individual citizens the possibility of a “good and virtuous life:” to achieve this purpose, however, they strive in different ways.

The purpose of the state consists in providing citizens with the sufficient means to live the best possible life, both material means and, in particular, “moral” means. First, the state leads the community by providing universal protection, since by virtue of law it establishes uniform ways of conduct, which results in a unity of conduct in the community and an increase of the importance of individuals. This general mission of the state is so deeply connected with essential elements of human nature that human beings should never fall short of it—even in the state of original justice.

Secondly, having taken into account the weakness of human nature and its tendency to evil caused by original sin, there is another burden which falls on the state from which it would be exempt in the state of original justice, namely the direct interference in the affairs of citizens on the basis of providing a specific protection of each individual in one of two ways: negative or positive. Negatively by repressing wrong doings, whether external ones—committed by the enemies of the state, or internal ones—committed by citizens who, at times as the result of a corrupt will, lie in wait for the good of fellow citizens or even for the common good. And positively by supporting citizens in what they are not able to achieve by their own strength or only by virtue of the universal protection of the state. It is clear, then, that the negative task in the framework of the specific protection of the state is prior to the positive task.¹

Similarly, the purpose of the nation consists in fostering citizens for a more perfect life in which they alone are not sufficient—supported by the assistance of fellow citizens, often infused by them, the citizens are gradually trained into the uniform skills which are called “customs” and which develop strong bonds of internal unity in the community. By morality and customs, nation, like state, provides fellow nationals with a certain universal protection inasmuch as it imposes common directions of conduct on them—the directions from which the common good results and through which the importance of individual citizens grows. Moreover, it also provides a specific protection, first, in a negative sense by denouncing, by public opinion, offenses against good customs and the common good, and in a positive sense by supporting, through social activities, those of its members who themselves are not sufficient to live their lives well.

The conclusion is that both nation and state have the same purpose and divide the means leading to it between themselves, both in material and formal terms. In material terms, it is due to the fact that in many cases nation and state seek for the common good of a community by the use of the same means: for indeed laws and customs in many cases are compatible with each other and the same public opinion rejects what state power will denounce with penalties. However, it more concerns formal terms, because state and nation use the means leading to the purpose of a community in a very different way. The state does it in a much more visible way and from without, because it leads citizens to the common good and to their own good with official laws secured by the appropriate power which inflicts punishment. And nation does it in a less visible way and from within: it leads its citizens with customs which are, as it were, laws written in hearts and consciences, and induces them, by the influence of public opinion that appeals to customs, to observe the customs.

TO REPLY TO OBJECTION 1, it must be said that two acting subjects can aim at the same purpose but still differ formally if they strive for it by virtue of different formal reasons. And nation and state are oriented towards the common good of society according to different formal reasons. The nation is more concerned with the fostering and shaping of a character which results from good customs and is a necessary condition of the common good. State, in turn, strives rather for the external preservation of the common good which is protected by law.

TO REPLY TO OBJECTION 2, it must be said that the state can, by means of laws, establish, strengthen, and increase the common good of society only if those laws are based on customs, according to Tacitus’s saying: Quid leges sine moribus? Customs are the element which definitely differentiates one nation from another, for they constitute the formal principle by which a community unites in one nation. It is obvious, then, that state is not in a position to cope with providing protection for the common good of society but, to a large extent, requires the cooperation of nation.

As for the argument that supports our claim², it must be added that the common good of a human community, even if it is one in itself, is not, however, uncompounded and indivisible. On the contrary, it is a good composed of many elements, and, in addition, particular groups of people, which work together to achieve it, can do it differently, whether by preserving external order and using coercion, like state, or by maintaining the internal consistency of intentions, like nation.

ARTICLE III

Do nation and state come into being by virtue of natural inclinations?

OBJECTION 1. It seems that nation and state do not come into being by virtue of natural inclinations. For indeed nature aims at something else. So, if nation and state came from a natural inclination, they would not be different. And since they differ in formal terms, as mentioned above, they cannot have the same natural origin.

OBJECTION 2. Besides, what comes from nature always has a certain necessity in itself. And neither nation nor state impose necessity on people, because it is not uncommon for a person to change his affiliation to nation and, even more often, his affiliation to state. Thus, neither nation nor state flow from natural inclinations.

OBJECTION 3. Moreover, if nation and state had a natural origin, they would come from one kindred group or from one tribe. But many nations and states are made up of people who are not united by any bond of a common bodily origin. Thus, nation and state cannot have a natural origin.

BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, it is obvious that all people belong to some state and to some nation, and when they abandon the state or nation of their origin, they join another state and another nation. It is clear, then, that it is necessary for a man to live together with others in a state and in a nation. And since everything that contains necessity arises naturally, nation and state flow from a natural inclination as well.

IN THE ANSWER, it should be stated that the communities in which people associate are always based on an agreement and strive for a good which is common to all members of that community. The common good of particular communities, in turn, is connected in different ways with the ultimate end of man. For there are communities whose purposes do not necessarily coincide with the ultimate end of man which can be achieved without those purposes. Such communities are called “voluntary communities,” because the individual himself declares his belonging to them merely because of potential benefits he expects to receive, and he can also freely leave it. However, there are other communities whose purposes are necessarily linked to the ultimate end of human nature, i.e., they are necessary means without which the ultimate end of human nature cannot be achieved in any way. This kind of communities is called “necessary communities” or “natural communities”: for man seeks them because he is driven by a necessary natural disposition which flows from the basic inclination towards his ultimate end. No one can leave such communities or stay long outside them.

And since man has only a general natural cognition of what is necessary for him, then the inclinations which follow from the cognition are general and indeterminate, and are not quite sufficient to guide man in his practical life which deals with what is individual and definite. It is, therefore, necessary for man to determine, with the aid of reason and will, his natural, general, and indeterminate inclinations with respect to his specific conditions of life, otherwise he would not be able to function. Hence, in necessary communities, a distinction must be made between the natural inclination, often unconscious, which gives them their beginning, and the conscious activity of reason and will which determines, develops, and strengthensthis inclination. Whereas voluntary communities derive all their origin from the free choice of man, necessary communities are partly due to nature and partly due to reason: due to nature which inclines in an indeterminate way, and due to reason which determines natural inclinations.

So, if we thoroughly examine the origin of nation and state, it will be clear that they belong to the necessary communities existing through the nature that inclines them to spring into being, and through the reason that strengthens them. Both nation and state are necessary conditions for the perfect moral life of man. Without them, the ultimate end, the most important end in human nature, cannot be achieved. Man seeks for state and nation through a certain natural inclination, which, though general and indeterminate in detail, requires prudent instantiations by reason and will; therefore, people should build individual elements of state and national life by positive determinations, whether in the form of laws or in the form of customs, and they can change them whenever it is necessary. For indeed people cannot in any way eradicate from their nature this basic inclination towards the nation and the state. And, having rejected life in state and nation, they cannot attain their ultimate end.

Both the necessity of living in a state and the necessity of living in a nation flows from this basic condition of human nature which may be called “potentiality.” Indeed, no creature is born on such a level of indetermination and potentiality as man. Both external goods that he uses to preserve and extend his life as well as his external and internal powers are in a state of potentiality, and it is only after a long period of time that this potentiality, together with the work distributed under principles of social life, gradually takes definite forms. Yet, the necessity of state flows from one element of this potentiality, and the necessity of nation flows from another.

The necessity of the state arises from an objective potentiality, i.e., from the potentiality of a subject in relation to an object or objects which are specific goods. For whatever man does, he does with regard to the ultimate end which is the universal good, but his particular activities are focused on specific goods which themselves remain indeterminate in their relation to the universal good. Thus, by his own free choice, man should determine himself towards specific goods; and he would be self-sufficient in it, if he were destined to live alone. And since, by this very same potentiality of his nature, man is destined to live and act in community, the latter would split into many groups, unless all the community members directed their actions in the same way towards specific objects. And this cannot happen, if there is no one element in the community, one which would rule over the others and by virtue of which all the members would be directed towards something one. This is what man is provided with by living in a state whose formal element, i.e., state power, implements uniform determinations into the community of citizens through state laws.

The necessity of nation, in turn, comes rather from the subjective potentiality of human nature, i.e., from its potentiality not in relation to objects on which actions are focused, but in relation to the acting subject himself who, while acting in a way proper to himself, can behave differently; namely he can do the right thing, i.e., in harmony with moral laws, or the wrong thing, i.e., contrary to moral laws. Thus, nation is based on the subjective indetermination of the individual nature of man, not in relation to objects involved in actions, but with regard to the manner in which these actions are performed, i.e., with regard to certain improvements through which the soul’s powers are shaped so that, in his moral life, man can take actions immediately, with ease, and with satisfaction. For people, since they are destined to live together in community, also need to be equally determined in the field of improvements, and that determination, which is called upbringing, should have a deeper impact on them and inculcate a more stable and secure way of conduct in them. Obviously, state laws are not enough for it, because they are not able to penetrate immediately and deeply into the powers of the soul, and to shape improvements in them: moral upbringing can only be given by virtue of customs that surround man and continually lead him towards himself, and so they alone are able to more profoundly influence and shape the powers of his soul. For, as laws are tools of state, so customs are tools of nation, as was shown in art. I.

It is clear, then, that nation and state have their source in the very nature of man, although they flow from different necessities of the same nature.

TO REPLY TO OBJECTION 1, it must be said that man’s nature makes him inclined to one ultimate end, but not to one means or one path leading to that end. So, there is nothing in his nature to prevent man from being inclined towards two communities, both of which are equally necessary for attaining his ultimate end.

TO REPLY TO OBJECTION 2, it must be said that, given the general nature of man, his natural inclinations always remain indeterminate in regard to what is specific. Man is necessarily inclined to live in a nation and a state, but he is not necessarily inclined to live in this particular nation or state, and remains free to choose, to leave one and join another. This applies far more to state than to nation; for indeed man is more fully engaged by the life in a nation so that he cannot easily and in a short time divest himself of customs of one nation in order to adopt new ones. It is much easier to change one’s affiliation to a particular state. If, however, someone wanted to live completely apart from nation and state, he would be, according to the Philosopher’s saying, either a god or an animal, i.e., either, if he had attained such moral perfection by previous social life to become self-sufficient, he could have lived separately, like a god, or, if he had disregarded human perfection and turned away from the ultimate end of his nature, he would have led the life of a wild animal.

TO REPLY TO OBJECTION 3, it must be said that, when speaking about the origin of nation and state, we do not mean the bodily origin of people who are joined together in these communities; for, by the nature of man, we do not understand only his body, but all elements which enter into the composition of his substantial nature. So, unlike the positivist school, we do not examine how nation and state are born and developed in historical order, but, as presented in the main part of the article, we try to determine whether the necessity of nation and state can be recognized in the analysis of human nature, or, in other words, whether there are any—and what they are—elements of human nature which necessarily require man live in some nation and state.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Published works of Jacek Woroniecki OP (in chronological order)

Woroniecki, J. Ogrody robotnicze. Poznań: Drukarnia i Księgarnia św. Wojciecha, 1905.

—. Historia katolickiej akcji społecznej w XIX wieku. Szkic historyczno-społeczny. Lublin: Nakładem Autora, 1906.

—. “O stosunku moralności do religii,” Wiadomości Archidiecezji Warszawskiej no. 3 (1911), pp. 54–63; no. 6 (1911), pp. 99–107.

—. Przewodnik po literaturze religijnej dla osób pragnących pogłębić swe wykształcenie w dziedzinie wiary katolickiej. Lwów–Włocławek: Gubrynowicz i Syn, 1914.

—. “Z powodu ostatniego dzieła prof. Zdziechowskiego,” Miesięcznik Katechetyczny i Wychowawczy no. 5 (1916), pp. 208–220; no. 6–7 (1916), pp. 283–297, no. 8–9 (1916), pp. 362–373 [reprinted: Lwów 1916].

—. “Konkordat czy rozdział,” Rok Polski 3, no. 6 (1918), pp. 352–363.

—. Kazanie o obowiązku wspierania ojczyzny swym mieniem. Lublin: Lubelski Wojewódzki Komitet Propagandy Pożyczki Państwowej, 1920.

—. Raport niebieski. Gawęda żołnierska. Warszawa: Kuria Biskupia, 1921 [reprinted: Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2000].

—. “Wychowanie społeczne i praca społeczna,” Prąd 9, no. 1–2 (1921), pp. 13–22; 9, no. 3–4 (1921), pp. 58–73.

—. Metoda i program nauczania teologii moralnej. Lublin: Uniwersytet Lubelski, 1922.

—. “Życie religijne współczesnej inteligencji polskiej,” Prąd 10, no. 1–4 (1922), pp. 287–316 [reprinted in: U podstaw kultury katolickiej, pp. 23–54. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2002].

—. “Oﬁarność społeczna i warunki jej rozwoju,” Wiadomości Towarzystwa Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego no. 2 (1923), pp. 8–20.

—. “Studium nad kardynalną cnotą roztropności,” Kwartalnik Teologiczny Wileński 1, no. 2 (1923), pp. 226–247.

—. Katolickość tomizmu. Lublin: Uniwersytet Lubelski, 1924 [reprinted: Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 1999].

—. “Lingua eucharis (na marginesie doktryny kaznodziejskiej św. Tomasza z Akwinu: Summa theologica II-a II-ae, q. 177),” Przegląd Homiletyczny 2 (1924), pp. 253–266.

—. “O kult żywego słowa. Z powodu ukazania się w druku przemówień kpp. Bpa Teodorowicza ‘Na przełomie’,” Rzeczpospolita 5, no. 46 (1924), p. 4.

—. “Paedagogia perennis. Św. Tomasz a pedagogika nowożytna,” Przegląd Teologiczny 5 (1924), pp. 143–160 [reprinted: Lwów 1924, 1934; Warszawa 2000].

—. Pełnia modlitwy. Studium teologiczne dla inteligencji.Poznań: Księgarnia św. Wojciecha, 1924 [reprinted: Poznań: W Drodze, 1982].

—. “Zdolność wychowawcza szkoły publicznej i jej granice,” Miesięcznik Katechetyczny i Wychowawczy 13, no. 5–7 (1924), pp. 65–82.

—. “Z powodu książki o roli Ojca duchownego w Seminarium Duchownym,” Przegląd Katolicki 62, no. 20 (1924), pp. 59–61.

—. Katolicka Etyka Wychowawcza, vol. 1. Poznań: Księgarnia św. Wojciecha, 1925; vol. 2. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Mariackie, 1948; vol. 3. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Mariackie, 1948 [reprinted as: Katolicka Etyka Wychowawcza, vols. 1–3, Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2013].

—. Około kultu mowy ojczystej. Lwów: Książnica-Atlas, 1925.

—. Misja św. Teresy od Dzieciątka Jezus. Teologiczne podstawy drogi dziecięctwa duchowego. Konferencja wygłoszona w Warszawie w „Bibliotece Wiedzy Religijnej” w dniu poświęcenia jej św. Teresie od Dzieciątka Jezus 17 V 1925. Warszawa: Kronika Rodzina, 1926.

—. “Quaestio disputata de natione et statu civili,” Divus Thomas 29, no. 1 (1926), pp. 25–54 [reprinted: Quaestio disputata de natione et statu civili. O narodzie i państwie. Translated by R. Maliszewski. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2004].

—. “Moc i wartość spekulatywnych cech tomizmu,” Przegląd Teologiczny 8, no. 1 (1927), pp. 27–42.

—. Podkamień. W dwóchsetną rocznicę koronacji cudownego obrazu Najświętszej Marii Panny. Lwów: Wydawnictwo oo. Dominikanów, 1927.

—. Ogólne podstawy ﬁlozoﬁczne i teologiczne chrześcijańskiej nauki o małżeństwie, in Małżeństwo w świetle nauki katolickiej. Lublin: Towarzystwo Wiedzy Chrześcijańskiej, 1928 [reprinted as: “Podstawy ﬁlozoﬁczne i teologiczne chrześcijańskiej nauki o małżeństwie,” in U podstaw kultury katolickiej, pp. 71–108. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2002].

—. “Etyka,” in Zarys ﬁlozoﬁi. Praca zbiorowa, vol. 2, pp. 179–281. Lublin: Towarzystwo Wiedzy Chrześcijańskiej, 1929.

—. “Długomyślność jako cnota właściwa wychowawcy,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 1, no. 4 (1930), pp. 178–195.

—. “Św. Dominik jako wzór modlitwy,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 5, no. 7–8 (1932), pp. 14–27.

—. “Chrześcijańskie wychowanie charakteru wysnute z dogmatu,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 10, no. 2 (1935), pp. 49–59; 10, no. 3 (1935), pp. 128–139.

—. Królewskie kapłaństwo. Studium o powołaniu i wychowaniu kapłana katolickiego. Poznań: Naczelny Instytut Akcji Katolickiej, 1935 [reprinted: Warszawa: Oﬁcyna Wydawnicza Viator, 2000].

—. “Miłosierdzie i nasza na nie odpowiedź,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 11, no. 5 (1935), pp. 193–210.

—. U podstaw kultury katolickiej. Poznań: Naczelny Instytut Akcji Katolickiej, 1935 [reprinted: Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2002].

—. “Nauka św. Tomasza o gorliwości,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 13, no. 5 (1936), pp. 113–117.

—. “Rola Najświętszej Marii Panny w świetle nauki św. Pawła,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 14, no. 5 (1937), pp. 297–309.

—. Posłuszeństwo a przełożeństwo. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Księży Jezuitów, 1938.

—. “Teologowie polscy w hołdzie Królowej Jadwidze. Przemówienie na Zjeździe Teologicznym w Krakowie dnia 1 września 1938 r.,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 17, no. 10 (1938), pp. 219–235.

—. “Wady moralne i stopnie ich nasilenia,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 17, no. 9 (1938), pp. 241–249.

—. “Corona Fratrum,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 19, no. 8 (1939), pp. 65–78.

—. “Doskonałość kapłańska w nauce św. Tomasza z Akwinu,” Głos Kapłański 13, no. 1 (1939), pp. 8–10.

—. “Mąż Kościoła. Pamięci Kardynała Aleksandra Kakowskiego,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 18, no. 2 (1939), pp. 65–69.

—. “Nawyk czy sprawność. Centralne zagadnienie pedagogiki katolickiej,” Ku Szczytom 2, no. 4–5 (1939), pp. 319–347 [reprinted in Wychowanie człowieka. Pisma wybrane, pp. 33–58. Kraków: Znak, 1961].

—. “S.O.S. katolicyzmu w Polsce,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 18, no. 10 (1939), pp. 278–290.

—. “Vir desideriorum. Pamięci Arcybiskupa Teodorowicza,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 18, no 1 (1939), pp. 7–11.

—. “W hołdzie Piusowi XII,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 18, no. 5–6 (1939), 5–6, pp. 265–268.

—. Wiara, nadzieja i miłość w życiu Najświętszej Marii Panny. Toruń: Instytut Różańcowy, 1939.

—. Hagiograﬁa, jej przedmiot, trudności i zadania w Polsce. Rzecz o świętych polskich. Kraków: Gebethner i Wolf, 1940.

—. Moralność a religia. [Edinburgh]: Veritas, 1944 [reprint in U podstaw kultury katolickiej. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2002].

—. “Kościół i państwo. Zagadnienie układu ich stosunków,” Wiadomości Duszpasterskie 2, no. 5 (1946), pp. 3–7; 2, no. 6, pp. 3–6; 2, no. 7, pp. 3–7; 2, no. 8, pp. 3–6.

—. Macierzyńskie Serce Maryi. Rozważania o jej pośrednictwie na tle Ewangelii i Dziejów Apostolskich. Poznań–Warszawa–Lublin: Albertinum, 1946.

—. Tajemnica miłosierdzia Bożego. Nauka chrześcijańska o miłosierdziu Bożym i naszej wobec niego postawie. Poznań: Albertinum, 1946 [reprinted: Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2016].

—. Błogosławiony Czesław dominikanin (1175 [?]–1242). Opole: Drukarnia Diecezjalna, 1947.

—. Św. Jacek Odrowąż i wprowadzenie Zakonu Kaznodziejskiego do Polski. Katowice: Księgarnia św. Jacka, 1947.

—. “Program integralnej pedagogiki katolickiej,” Ateneum Kapłańskie 47 (1947), pp. 28–36, 165–174, 272–281.

—. Umiejętność rządzenia i rozkazywania. Poznań: Albertinum, 1947 [reprinted: Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2016].

—. “Nauka o doskonałości chrześcijańskiej w Seminariach Duchownych,” Ateneum Kapłańskie 48 (1948), pp. 147–163, 253–261, 346–361.

—. “Dowody polskości na Ziemiach Odzyskanych,” Róża Duchowna 52, no. 7 (1950), pp. 192–195.

—. “Podstawy nauki o małżeństwie i rodzinie,” in Wychowanie człowieka. Pisma wybrane, pp. 212–247. Kraków: Znak, 1961.

—. “Rozwój osobistości człowieka. Dynamiczny aspekt personalizmu,” in Wychowanie człowieka. Pisma wybrane, pp. 59–92. Kraków: Znak, 1961

—. Wychowanie człowieka. Pisma wybrane. Kraków: Znak, 1961.

—. W szkole wychowania. Teksty wybrane. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2008.

Unpublished works

Fr. Jacek Woroniecki’s personal archive; no. 39/1, Personal documents: birth certificate, identification documents, passports, diplomas, academic degrees et al; years 1878–1949. The Archive of the Polish Province of Dominicans in Krakow.

Fr. Jacek Woroniecki’s personal archive; no. 39/19, Biographies and memoirs. The Archive of the Polish Province of Dominicans in Krakow.

Woroniecki, J. Co to jest filozofia? Typescript. The Archive of the Polish Province of Dominicans in Krakow (No. II 2011, col. 16), quoted after R. Polak,“Filozofia wychowania o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” in Przyszłość cywilizacji zachodu. Filozofia i edukacja. Edited by P. Jaroszyński et al., pp. 161–162. Lublin: Oficyna Hieronima. Fundacja Rozwoju Kultury Polskiej, 2005.

—. Państwo i szkoła. Rozprawa z etatyzmem kulturalnym. Typescript. The Archive of the Polish Province of Dominicans in Krakow (No. VI 2010).

Studies

Andrzejuk, A. Prawda o dobru. Problem ﬁlozoﬁcznych podstaw etyki tomistycznej. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo UKSW, 2000.

Bareła, S. Ethos perenne: ku czci o. Jacka Woronieckiego. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1960.

—. “O. Jacek Woroniecki,” Roczniki Teologiczno-Kanoniczne 6, no. 1–2 (1959), pp. 9–32.

Bednarski, F.W. “Adamo Giacinto Woroniecki, O.P. pioniere della rinascita del tomismo in Polonia,” Atti del’ VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale 3 (1981), pp. 400–405.

—. Przedmiot etyki w świetle zasad św. Tomasza z Akwinu. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1956.

Błeszyńska, I.Z. O. Jacek Woroniecki – Dominikanin – Wychowawca – Patriota 1878–1949. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2006.

Boużyk, M.M. “Jacek Woroniecki o modlitwie jako czynniku doskonalącym naturę ludzką,” Rocznik Tomistyczny 5 (2016) pp. 357–373.

—. “Język – wyraz ducha czy materii?: reﬂeksja w oparciu o teksty Jacka Woronieckiego i Mieczysława A. Krąpca,” in Spotkanie z kulturą duchową. Studia interdyscyplinarne. Edited by A. Jachimowicz, T. Żurawlew, pp. 97–127. Warszawa: Oﬁcyna Wydawnicza Atut, 2016,

—. “Myśl pedagogiczna Jacka (Adama) Woronieckiego w wybranych publikacjach z okresu 1903–1918,” Polska Myśl Pedagogiczna 1 (2015), pp. 221–240.

Chłodna-Błach, I. “Uniwersalizm tomizmu a uniwersalizm etyczny i pedagogiczny Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” Studia z Filozoﬁi Polskiej 2 (2007), pp. 117–132.

Czupryn, B. “Antropologiczne podstawy teorii wychowania według Woronieckiego,” Człowiek w Kulturze 12 (1999) pp. 23–29.

Gałkowski, J. “Filozoﬁa i człowiek w „Katolickiej Etyce Wychowawczej” Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” in Człowiek – moralność – wychowanie. Życie i myśl Jacka Woronieckiego OP. Edited by J. Gałkowski, M.L. Niedziela, pp. 81–100. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2000.

Gałkowski, S. “Aktualność ﬁlozoﬁi wychowania Jacka Woronieckiego,” Człowiek w Kulturze 12 (1998) pp. 37–43.

—. Długomyślność. Wprowadzenie do ﬁlozoﬁi wychowania. Kraków: Akademia Ignatianum, Wydawnictwo WAM, 2016.

—. Ku dobru. Aktualność ﬁlozoﬁi Jacka Woronieckiego. Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Rzeszowie, 1998.

Gliński, E. “O. Jacek Woroniecki OP,” Homo Dei 18, no 5 (1949), pp. 476–483.

Grzybowski, J. “Czy idee nacjonalistyczne zakwestionują społeczeństwo liberalno-demokratyczne? Rozważania o przyszłości narodu w świecie diaspory i bezdomności,” Civitas. Studia z Filozoﬁi Polityki 14 (2012), pp. 137–163.

—. “Filozoﬁczne skutki kontrkultury: profetyczne diagnozy o. Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” Universitas Gedanensis 40 (2010), pp. 17–35.

—. “O. Jacek Woroniecki OP – prekursor myśli tomistycznej w Polsce,” Studia Płockie 35 (2007), pp. 151–158.

—. “Źródła współczesnych przemian kulturowych: społeczno-religijne intuicje Jacka Woronieckiego,” Warszawskie Studia Teologiczne 23 (2010), pp. 295–308.

Hochleitner, J. “Religijność w ujęciu Jacka Woronieckiego,” Zeszyty Naukowe WSZiP im. Bogdana Jańskiego 8 (2001), pp. 223–242.

Horowski, J. “O dojrzewaniu do moralności cnoty w kontekście kultury (post)modernistycznej,” Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici. Nauki Humanistyczno-Społeczne.Pedagogika 27 (2011), pp. 83–101.

—. Paedagogia perennis w dobie postmodernizmu. Wychowawcze koncepcje o. Jacka Woronieckiego a kultura przełomu XX i XXI. Toruń: Europejskie Centrum Edukacyjne, Adam Marszałek, 2007.

—. “Wstyd a rozwój moralny: o antropologicznych fundamentach neotomistycznej teorii wychowania moralnego,” Polska Myśl Pedagogiczna 2 (2016), pp. 231–244.

Jabłońska, J.L. “Autorytet wychowawcy w koncepcjach pedagogicznych Heleny Radlińskiej i o. Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” Kultura i Edukacja 4 (1996), pp. 93–104.

Kalinowska, K. “‘Nie grzebać w przeszłości, ale z całym zapałem patrzeć w przyszłość’. Na 50. rocznicę śmierci o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” Pedagogia Christiana 4 (1999), pp. 177–187.

—. Jacek Woroniecki o społeczeństwie i państwie. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2005.

—. “Liberalizm w ujęciu o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” Lithuania 1 (2006), pp. 185–188.

Kalka, K. Filozoﬁczna antropologia tomistyczna okresu międzywojennego w Polsce jako podstawa kształtowania charakteru. Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uczelniane Akademii Bydgoskiej, 2000.

Kamińska, W. “O poszukiwaniu idei ‘paedagogia perennis’ we współczesnym modelu edukacyjnym,” in Człowiek – moralność – wychowanie. Edited by. J. Gałkowski, M.L. Niedziela, pp. 137–144. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2000.

—. “Podstawy ﬁlozoﬁczno-teologiczne systemu wychowawczego o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” Słupskie Studia Filozoﬁczne 1 (1998), pp. 259–271.

Karolewicz, G. “Ojciec Jacek Woroniecki (1878–1949) jako wychowawca inteligencji katolickiej,” in Ideały wychowania i wzory osobowe narodu polskiego w XIX i XX wieku, vol. 2. Edited by E.J. Kryńska, pp. 149–158. Białystok: Trans Humana, 2006.

Karpińska, B. “Aktualności ‘Katolickiej etyki wychowawczej’ Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” Pedagogika Społeczna 3 (2002), pp. 126–132.

Kempys, M.J. “Charakterystyka gniewu na podstawie pism o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” Polonia Sacra 11, no. 20 (2007), pp. 241–256.

—. “Zagadnienie rozwoju osoby ludzkiej w ujęciu o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” Polonia Sacra 10, no. 18 (2006), pp. 229–242.

—. Rola cnót moralnych w dążeniu ku pełni człowieczeństwa w świetle pism o. Jacka Woronieckiego. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PAT, 2005.

Kostkiewicz, J. Kierunki i koncepcje pedagogiki katolickiej w Polsce 1918–1939. Kraków: Oﬁcyna Wydawnicza “Impuls”, 2013.

—. “Potencjalność podmiotu wychowania w ujęciu antropologii katolickiej,” Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici. Nauki Humanistyczno-Społeczne. Pedagogika 25 (2009), pp. 11–27.

Krajski, T. “Jacek Woroniecki jako przedstawiciel ﬁlozoﬁi społecznej i politycznej,” in Człowiek w zmieniającej się współczesnej kulturze. Edited by K. Kalka, A. Musielewicz, pp. 103–111. Elbląg: Wydawnictwo Elbląskiej Uczelni Humanistyczno-Ekonomicznej, 2009.

Krasnodębski, M. “Pedagogika Jacka Woronieckiego i Feliksa Wojciecha Bednarskiego jako egzempliﬁkacja etyki tomizmu tradycyjnego,” Studia Ełckie 11 (2009), pp. 29–58.

Krąpiec, M.A. “Wprowadzenie,” in J. Woroniecki, Katolickość tomizmu, pp. 5–7. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 1999.

Król, R. Filozoﬁa osoby w koncepcjach Jacka Woronieckiego i Tadeusza Ślipki. Analiza ontologiczna i aksjologiczna. Kraków: Fall, 2005.

—. Klasyczny ideał wychowania w kręgu wartości tradycyjnych. Warszawa–Łódź: Heliodor, 2015.

—. “Koncepcja osoby według Jacka Woronieckiego,” Lumen Poloniae: Studia z Filozoﬁi Polskiej no.1 (2010), pp. 103–116.

—. “Osoba ludzka – ujęcie w świetle pedagogii Woronieckiego,” Logos i Ethos 2 (2005), pp. 66–81.

—. “Pedagogia jako wyraz antropologii i ﬁlozoﬁi moralnej według Woronieckiego,” Przegląd Powszechny 124, no. 6 (2007), pp. 46–55.

—. “Społeczna natura człowieka i jej cel według Jacka Woronieckiego,” Lumen Poloniae: Studia z Filozoﬁi Polskiej no. 1 (2011), pp. 103–111.

—. “The subject’s functional unity – the synergy of human powers,” Reports on Philosophy 21 (2003), pp. 21–32.

—. “Woronieckiego spojrzenie na Dostojewskiego,” Colloquia Theologica Ottoniana 1 (2007), pp. 119–128.

Lenczewski, T. “Rodzinne tajemnice o. Jacka Woronieckiego: korzenie dominikanina,” Do Rzeczy: Tygodnik Lisickiego 33 (2016), pp. 64–66.

Lietz N., Formacja chrześcijańska w ujęciu Jacka Woronieckiego, „Studia Bobolanum”, 3(2006), pp. 151–170.

Malinowski, M., Krajska, A., Andrzejuk, A. “Jacek Woroniecki (1878–1949),” in Tomizm polski 1919–1945. Słownik ﬁlozofów. Edited by B. Listkowska, A. Andrzejuk, pp. 121–135. Radzymin: Wydawnictwo von Borowiecky, 2014.

Marchlewicz, L. “Koncepcja pedagogiki w pismach o. Jacka Woronieckiego (1878–1949),” Życie i Myśl 4 (1999), pp. 91–94.

Misiurek, J. “Tajemnica Bożego Miłosierdzia w świetle wypowiedzi Sługi Bożego Jacka Woronieckiego,” Studia Włocławskie 18 (2016), pp. 103–119.

Niedziela, M.L. “Jacek Woroniecki OP i jego troska o nową świadomość chrześcijaństwa w Polsce,” in Człowiek – moralność – wychowanie. Życie i myśl Jacka Woronieckiego OP. Edited by J. Gałkowski, M.L. Niedziela, pp. 59–79. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2000.

Olbrycht, K. O roli przykładu, wzoru, autorytetu i mistrza w wychowaniu osobowym. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2007.

Pańpuch, Z. “Doniosłość antropologiczna pedagogiki Jacka Woronieckiego,” in J. Woroniecki, Katolicka Etyka Wychowawcza, pp. 41–68. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2013.

—. “Sprawności jako sposoby doskonalenia natury ludzkiej,” Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 11, no. 3 (2016), pp. 67–83.

Polak, R. Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP. Filozoﬁczne podstawy katolickiej etyki wychowawczej i jej zasady. Warszawa–Radzymin: Wydawnictwo von Borowiecky, 2017.

—. “Filozoﬁa wychowania o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” in Przyszłość cywilizacji Zachodu. Filozoﬁa i edukacja. Edited by P. Jaroszyński et al., pp. 159–176. Lublin: Fundacja Lubelska Szkoła Filozoﬁi Chrześcijańskiej, 2005.

—. “Jacka Woronieckiego głos w sprawie programów szkolnych, cech osobowych nauczyciela oraz zadań wychowawczych szkoły w okresie II Rzeczpospolitej,” Człowiek w Kulturze 12 (1999), pp. 45–62.

—. “Jacka Woronieckiego pedagogia cnót,” Cywilizacja 10 (2004), pp. 137–147.

—. “Woroniecki Jacek,” in Encyklopedia Filozoﬁi Polskiej, vol. 2. Edited by A. Maryniarczyk, pp. 838–841. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2011.

—. “O. Jacek Woroniecki – postać i dzieło,” in J. Woroniecki, W szkole wychowania. Teksty wybrane, pp. 7–16. Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati. Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2008.

—. “Jacek Woroniecki – życie i twórczość naukowa,” Człowiek w Kulturze 12 (1999), pp. 214–240.

Próba biograﬁi Jacka Woronieckiego OP i jego Wyznania. Edited by M.L. Niedziela. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Archidiecezji Lubelskiej Gaudium, 2011.

Przybylski, B. “Ojciec Jacek Woroniecki OP (W 25. rocznicę śmierci),” Tygodnik Powszechny 3, no. 1326 (1974), p. 3.

Pylak, B. “Maryjność Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” in Człowiek – moralność – wychowanie. Życie i myśl Jacka Woronieckiego OP. Edited by J. Gałkowski, M.L. Niedziela, pp. 187–206. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2000.

Radzki, K. Prowadzić życie: antropologiczne podstawy wychowania u Jacka Woronieckiego. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Wrocławskiej Księgarni Archidiecezjalnej, 2011.

Rembierz, M. “‘Sensus catholicus’: uniwersalizm, obiektywizm, realizm. Myśl ﬁlozoﬁczno-teologiczna i działalność pedagogiczno-duszpasterska Jacka Woronieckiego OP w rozprawach i wspomnieniach Stefana Swieżawskiego,” in Człowiek – moralność – wychowanie. Życie i myśl Jacka Woronieckiego OP. Edited by J. Gałkowski, M.L. Niedziela, pp. 207–233. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2000.

Robaczewski, A. “Doskonałość człowieka celem wychowania,” Człowiek w Kulturze 12 (1999), pp. 31–35.

Rynio, A., Tomczyk, M. “Sprawności moralne jako elementy konstytutywne w formowaniu moralnego charakteru w twórczości o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” in Sprawności moralne w wychowaniu – wyzwania i rzeczywistość. Edited by I. Jazukiewicz, E. Kwiatkowska, pp. 13–47. Szczecin: Przedsiębiorstwo Produkcyjno-Handlowe Zapol Dmochowski, Sobczyk, 2012.

Schrade, U. “Problem Narodu i Ojczyzny w ujęciu J. Woronieckiego i I.M. Bocheńskiego,” Arcana: Kultura, Historia, Polityka 3 (2000), pp. 60–78.

Sługa Boży Ojciec Jacek Woroniecki uczy. Edited by M.L. Niedziela. Warszawa: Maurycy Lucjan Niedziela, 2006.

Stefaniak, Ł. “Język ojczysty w mediach i jego oddziaływanie na kulturę narodową: z perspektywy nauczania o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” in Medialne reprezentacje kultury, literatura, teatr, sztuka, religia, vol. 1. Edited by A. Sugier-Szerega, pp. 251–258. Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2015.

Szydłowski, P. “Woroniecki Jacek,” in Wizerunki ﬁlozofów i humanistów polskich wiek XX. Edited by J. Szmyd, p. 412. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Edukacyjne, 2000.

Śleziński, K. “Założenia realizmu ontologicznego i aksjologicznego w koncepcji wychowania Jacka Woronieckiego,” Polska Myśl Pedagogiczna 2 (2016), pp. 175–187.

Tończak, E. “I presupposti antropologici dell’etica delle virtù nel pensiero di J. Woroniecki,” Studia Bobolanum 4 (2005), pp. 67–85.

—. “Le virtù nell’ educazione morale: secondo il pensiero di J. Woroniecki,” Studia Bobolanum 4 (2005), pp. 125–142.

Turzyński, M. “Spór ﬁlozoﬁczny o. Jacka Woronieckiego OP z profesorem Marianem Zdziechowskim o podstawowe zagadnienia myśli katolickiej,” Universitas Gedanensis 18, no. 1 (2006), pp. 37–87.

Usowicz, A. “O. Jacek Woroniecki,” Przegląd Powszechny 228, no. 66 (1949), pp. 121–133.

Wistuba, G. “Chrześcijańskie zobowiązanie przemieniania świata: zadania wynikające z funkcji pasterskiej pośrednictwa zbawczego w ujęciu o. Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” Warszawskie Studia Pastoralne 10 (2009), pp. 47–55.

—. “Obowiązek poznawania i przekazywania prawdy objawionej w ujęciu o. Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” Roczniki Teologiczne Warszawsko-Praskie 6 (2010), pp. 125–160.

—. “Ojca Jacka Woronieckiego paedagogia perennis,” Cywilizacja 7 (2003), pp. 235–246.

—. Prowadzić ku Zbawcy: duszpasterstwo w nauczaniu i posłudze o. Jacka Woronieckiego OP. Sandomierz: Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne i Drukarnia, 2011.

Doctoral dissertations

Horowski, J. “Tomistyczna pedagogika o. Jacka Woronieckiego w kontekście przemian społeczno-kulturowych w XX wieku,”. Ph.D. thesis. Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, 2005.

Sernikova, G. “Praktyka cnót jako droga spełniania się życia osobowego człowiek w ujęciu o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” Ph.D. thesis. The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, 2005.

Tomczyk, M. “Ideały i wzory osobowe w ujęciu o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” Ph.D. thesis. The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, 2011.

Complementary works

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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.

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—. “Osobliwość metodologiczna teorii bytu,” in Jak ﬁlozofować? Studia z metodologii ﬁlozoﬁi klasycznej, pp. 71–87. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1989.

Kant, I. Antropologia w ujęciu pragmatycznym. Translated by E. Drzazgowska, P. Sosnowska. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, 2005.

—. Metaphysik der Sitten: Tugendlehre. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990.

Kiereś, B. Człowiek i wychowanie: od osoby do osobowości. Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2017.

—. Osoba i społeczność. Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2013.

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Krąpiec, M.A, Filozoﬁa co wyjaśnia? Warszawa: Gutenberg Print, 1997.

—. Realizm ludzkiego poznania. Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1995.

—. Ludzka wolność i jej granice. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2004.

Leibniz, G.W. Teodycea: o dobroci Boga, wolności człowieka i pochodzeniu zła. Translated by M. Frankiewicz, J. Kopania. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2001.

Leon XIII. Encyklika Rerum Novarum (Opera, ed. Desclée, vol. 4). Kraków: Wydawnictwo Księży Jezuitów, 1931.

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MacCunn, J. Kształcenie charakteru. Zagadnienie etyczno-pedagogiczne. Translated by Z. Jętkiewiczowa. Warszawa–Lwów: Książnica Atlas, 1933.

Mandonnet, P. Siger de Brabant et l’averroïsme latin au XIIIme siècle: étude critique et documents inédits. Fribourg: Librairie de l'Université, 1899.

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Mausbach, J. Grundlage und Ausbildung des Charakters nach dem hl. Thomas von Aquin. Freiburg: Herder, 1920.

Mercier, D.-J. “Rozwój psychologii kartezjańskiej”,in Historia psychologii nowożytnej. Translated by W. Kosiakiewicz, pp. 45–73. Warszawa: Nakładem “Przeglądu Filozoﬁcznego”, Księgarnia J. Fiszera, 1900,

—. Wszechpośrednictwo Najświętszej Marii Panny i Prawdziwe nabożeństwo do Marii według bł. Ludwika Grignon de Montfort. Translated from French. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Księży Pallotynów, 1928.

Merkelbach, B.H. Summa Theologiae Moralis. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1936.

Michalski, K. “La sublimation thomiste,” Angelicum 14 (1937), pp. 212–222.

—. Między heroizmem a bestialstwem. Częstochowa: Częstochowskie Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne “Regina Poloniae”, 1983.

Lecensier, A. Comment développer le bon sens. Bruxelles: De Lannoy, 1924.

Lindworsky, J. Willensschule. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1923.

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Peillaube, É. “L’habitude,” in Caractère et personnalité, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1935.

Roton de, P. “Habitus et habitudes,” in Les Habitus: leur caractère spirituel. Paris: Labergerie, 1934.

Salamucha, J. “Uwagi na temat kształcenia charakteru,” Miesięcznik Katechetyczny i Wychowawczy 22, no. 1 (1933), pp. 6–28.

Saxby, I.B. “Powstanie nawyków i ich wytwarzanie,” in Kształcenie postępowania. Translated by I. Pannenkowa. Warszawa–Lwów: Książnica Atlas, 1928.

Schell, H. Dogmatik. Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1889–1893.

Skrzydlewski, P. “Ontyczne podstawy wychowania,” in Pedagogika rodziny. Podejście systemowe, vol. 2: Wychowanie rodzinne. Edited by M. Marczewski, R. Gawrych, D. Opozda, T. Sakowicz, P. Skrzydlewski, pp. 87–115. Gdańsk: Wyższa Szkoła Społeczno-Ekonomiczna, 2017.

—. “Wychowanie rodzinne a wychowawcza posługa państwa,” in Pedagogika rodziny. Podejście systemowe, vol. 2: Wychowanie rodzinne. Edited by M. Marczewski, R. Gawrych, D. Opozda, T. Sakowicz, P. Skrzydlewski, pp. 629–659. Gdańsk: Wyższa Szkoła Społeczno-Ekonomiczna, 2017.

Skrzyniarz, R. “Modlitwa i jej rozumienie w życiu studentów. Uwagi pedagogiczne,” Biograﬁstyka Pedagogiczna 2, no. 1 (2017), pp. 295–320.

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Stern, W. Die menschliche Persönlichkeit, vol. 2: Person und Sache. System das kritischen Personalismus. Leipzig: V. Bildsamkeit, 1923.

Swieżawski, S. Byt. Zagadnienia metafizyki tomistycznej. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1948.

—. “Centralne zagadnienie tomistycznej nauki o duszy (Commensuratio animae ad hoc corpus),” Przegląd Filozoﬁczny 1–3 (1948), pp. 131–189.

Szirwindt, M.L. Nowe kierunki psychologii – Behawioryzm Watsona. Translated by J. Bogdański. Lwów: Księgarnia Gubrynowicz i Syn, 1936.

Święty Tomasz z Akwinu. Suma teologiczna, O Trójcy Przenajświętszej (I, q. 27–43), vol. 3. Translated by P. Bełch. Londyn: Veritas, 1978.

—. Suma teologiczna, Bóg Stwórca i Aniołowie (I, q. 44–58), vol. 4. Translated by P. Bełch. Londyn: Veritas, 1978.

—. Suma teologiczna. Aniołowie i świat widzialny (I, q. 59–74), vol. 5. Translated by P. Bełch. Londyn: Veritas, 1979.

—. Suma teologiczna. O człowieku (I, q. 75–84), vol. 6. Translated by P. Bełch. Londyn: Veritas, 1980.

—. Suma teologiczna. O sprawnościach (I–II, q. 49–70), vol. 11. Translated by F.W. Bednarski. Londyn: Veritas, 1965.

Twardowski, K. O ﬁlozoﬁi średniowiecznej wykładów sześć. Lwów: Nakładem Henryka Altenberga, 1910.

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Walewander, E. Pedagogika katolicka w diecezji lubelskiej 1918–1939. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2007.

Wojtyła, K. Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2011.

Zdybicka, Z.J. Człowiek i religia. Zarys ﬁlozoﬁi religii. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993.

Fr. Jacek Woroniecki’s personal archive; no. 39/1, Personal documents: birth certificate, identification documents, passports, diplomas, academic degrees et al; years 1878–1949.

Fr. Jacek Woroniecki’s personal archive; no. 39/19, Biographies and memoirs.

I.Z. Błeszyńska, O. Jacek Woroniecki – Dominikanin – Wychowawca – Patriota 1878–1949 (Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2006), pp. 49–54.

K. Kalinowska, Jacek Woroniecki o społeczeństwie i państwie (Lublin: Fundacja Servire Veritati Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2005), p. 169.

I.Z. Błeszyńska, O. Jacek Woroniecki – Dominikanin – Wychowawca – Patriota 1878–1949, pp. 100–101.

  Jacek Woroniecki’s personal archive, no. 39/23; Posthumous memories.

M.L. Niedziela, “Jacek Woroniecki OP i jego troska o nową świadomość chrześcijaństwa w Polsce,” in Człowiek – moralność – wychowanie. Życie i myśl Jacka Woronieckiego OP, eds. J. Gałkowski, M.L. Niedziela (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2000), p. 79.

R. Polak, “Woroniecki Jacek,” in Encyklopedia Filozofii Polskiej, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 2 (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2011), p. 844.

P. Szydłowski, “Woroniecki Jacek,” in Wizerunki filozofów i humanistów polskich wiek XX, ed. J. Szmyd (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Edukacyjne, 2000), p. 412.

  Personalence: One of the key concepts in Woroniecki’s writings. It is understood by him as perfection, to which the development of human personality should ultimately lead, on account of its personal status and rational nature. Personalence demonstrates how a particular person should behave and act with a sense of responsibility for oneself.

  CT, p. 69.

  Ibidem.

  FCC, p. 21.

  CT, p. 69.

FCC, pp. 9–15.

R. Polak, “Filozofia wychowania o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” in Przyszłość cywilizacji zachodu. Filozofia i edukacja, ed. P. Jaroszyński et al (Lublin: Fundacja Lubelska Szkoła Filozofii Chrześcijańskiej, 2005), pp. 159–176.

  Ibidem, p. 161.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 113.

Ibidem, vol. 3, pp. 250–251.

  FCC, p. 24.

S. Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski. Studya o strukturze duszy kulturalnej (Lwów: Drukarnia Wieku Nowego, 1910), pp. 72–73.

  FCC, p. 26.

  Ibidem, p. 29.

Ibidem, pp. 30–31.

  Ibidem, p. 32.

  Ibidem, p. 33.

Ibidem, pp. 35–36.

  Ibidem, p. 40.

  Ibidem, p. 39.

  Ibidem.

  Ibidem, p. 44.

CEE, vol. 1, pp. 206–234.

  FCC, p. 47.

Ibidem, p. 132; CEE, vol. 1, pp. 32–33, 84, 86–88, 103–104.

J. Woroniecki, Co to jest filozofia? Typescript in the Archive of the Polish Province of Dominicans in Krakow (No. II 2011, col. 16), quoted after R. Polak, “Filozofia wychowania o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” pp. 161–162.

  FCC, p. 153.

Ibidem, pp. 153–154.

Ibidem, pp. 154–155.

  Ibidem, p. 155.

Ibidem, pp. 156–158.

S. Kamiński, “Osobliwość metodologiczna teorii bytu,” in S. Kamiński, Jak filozofować? Studia z metodologii filozofii klasycznej (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1989), pp. 71–73.

J. Gałkowski, “Filozofia i człowiek w Katolickiej Etyce Wychowawczej Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” in Człowiek – moralność – wychowanie. Życie i myśl Jacka Woronieckiego OP, p. 87.

  M.A. Krąpiec, “Wprowadzenie,” in CT, p. 5.

  Ibidem, p. 45.

  Ibidem, p. 49.

  Ibidem, p. 48.

  Ibidem.

  In concordance with this approach Woroniecki advocated the limitation of intellectual property rights. CT, p. 55.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 110.

  Ibidem, p. 115.

  CT, p. 63. Woroniecki does not mean the instrumentalization of cognition, which is specific for the contemporary approach to knowledge, but the connection of the effort linked with the person who cognizes it.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 74.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 53.

M.A. Krąpiec, Filozofia co wyjaśnia? (Warszawa: Guntenberg Print, 1997), p. 97.

  CT, p. 61.

S. Kamiński, “Jak filozofować?” in S. Kamiński, Jak filozofować? Studia z metodologii filozofii klasycznej, p. 37.

CEE, vol. 1, p. 95. One should also add two remarks to the proposal of the systematization of the problem of cognition that Woroniecki conducts inspired by Aquinas’s thought: (1) the subject of cognition, about which he speaks, are always actions (human acts), but an action for him, as it was mentioned above, is a being, just like everything else; and (2) there is no differentiation between the Aristotelian understanding of knowledge as praxis, which serves moral action, and knowledge as poiesis, which serves reasonable creativity.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 92.

S. Kamiński, “Osobliwość metodologiczna teorii bytu,” p. 74; cf. Z.J. Zdybicka, Człowiek i religia. Zarys filozofii religii (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993), p. 148.

  CT, p. 61.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 50.

M.A. Krąpiec, Realizm ludzkiego poznania (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1995), p. 45.

  Ibidem, p. 46.

  Ibidem, p. 47.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 110.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 92.

  PTFChTM, p. 100.

  Ibidem, p. 101.

A. Gehlen, Człowiek. Jego natura i stanowisko w świecie, transl. R. Michalski, J. Rolewski, E. Paczkowska-Łagowska (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2017).

  DPM, p. 61.

  Ibidem, p. 60. Woroniecki is not looking for a new way of defining the personal status of the human being. He is rather imitative in relation to tradition in accordance with the social character of knowledge.

  Ibidem, p. 60.

  Ibidem, p. 61.

  Ibidem, p. 60.

  HS, p. 43.

Ibidem, pp. 44–45.

Ibidem, pp. 44–45.

  Ibidem, p. 46.

  Ibidem, p. 46.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 150.

  DPM, p. 62.

  FTMF, p. 215.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 121.

  CEE, vol. 2, p. 210.

  Ibidem, vol. 2, p. 227.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 121.

  Ibidem vol. 1, p. 149.

  PTFChTM, p. 100.

Ibidem, pp. 71–108, cf. NS.

  SUSW, p. 14.

J. Gałkowski, “Filozofia i człowiek w Katolickiej Etyce Wychowawczej Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” p. 89.

RLCPI, pp. 23–70.

CEE, vol. 1, pp. 139–140.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 145.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 139.

  Z. Pańpuch, “Doniosłość antropologiczna pedagogiki Jacka Woronieckiego,” in CEE, vol. 1, p. 43.

J. Horowski, Paedagogia perennis w dobie postmodernizmu. Wychowawcze koncepcje o. Jacka Woronieckiego a kultura przełomu XX i XXI wieku (Toruń: Europejskie Centrum Edukacyjne – Adam Marszałek, 2007), p. 179.

J. Gałkowski, “Filozofia i człowiek w Katolickiej Etyce Wychowawczej Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” pp. 99–100.

  Wojtyła does not negate Woroniecki’s concept, nor does Woroniecki’s concept oppose Wojtyła’s proposal. In his study Wojtyła puts emphasis on cognitive purposes, because his goal is to cognize the person. Woroniecki, on the other hand, focuses on the issue of the manner of the practical actualization of the person.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 77.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 87.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 89.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 92.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 117.

CEE, vol. 1, p. 91; cf. Ethics, p. 181.

J. Woroniecki, “Moralność a religia,” in J. Woroniecki, U podstaw kultury katolickiej (Lublin: Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2002), pp. 56–57.

R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP. Filozoficzne podstawy katolickiej etyki wychowawczej i jej zasady, p. 181.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 99.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 101.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 105.

Ethics, p. 184.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 119.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 121.

  Ibidem.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 128.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 245.

  Woroniecki criticizes both autonomous and heteronomous concepts of moral norms. Christian ethics, to which he refers to, assumes that the criterion of morality is internal and objective (cf. CEE, vol. 1, p. 222). This criterion is the rational human nature which the human being must read in theoretical cognition. Essentially it encompasses the principal tasks of the human being, inscribed in his or her nature, defining the human being’s relation to oneself, to other people and to God, constituting a norm for one’s action.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 274.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 160.

According to Woroniecki the conscience is an activity of the practical mind which is under the influence of the will. Cf. Ethics, p. 201.

CEE, vol. 1, pp. 170–171.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 174.

Ethics, p. 231.

M.A. Krąpiec, Ludzka wolność i jej granice (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2004), p. 60.

K. Wojtyła conducted an in-depth analysis of this classic approach to self-determination in which the subjective “I want” grows out of the experience of “I can”, “I don’t have to”. K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2011), pp. 151–165, passim.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 207.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 224.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 232.

Wojtyła speaks here of the “integration of the person within the act”. K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne, pp. 229–300.

Ethics, p. 241.

  CEE, vol. 3, p. 402.

S. Gałkowski, Ku dobru. Aktualność filozofii wychowania Jacka Woronieckiego (Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Rzeszowie, 1998), p. 30.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 82.

  PP, p. 11.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 82.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 117.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 118.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 77.

  PP, p. 15.

  Ibidem, p. 17.

Ibidem, pp. 87–88.

S. Gałkowski, Ku dobru. Aktualność filozofii wychowania Jacka Woronieckiego, p. 33.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 158.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 156.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 121.

  CPP, p. 21.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 155.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 154.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 123.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 420.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 441.

  CPP, p. 28.

SU, pp. 30–31.

Ibidem, pp. 30–31.

  Ibidem, p. 55.

Ibidem, pp. 55–56.

  Ibidem, p. 52.

  Ibidem, p. 41.

  Ibidem, p. 196.

  UM, pp. 191, 199.

  CPP, p. 18.

  Ibidem, p. 21.

  Ibidem, p. 29.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 465.

  Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 471.

  PP, p. 3.

  Ibidem, p. 7.

  FTMF, p. 240.

  Ibidem, p. 241.

Ibidem, pp. 220–221.

  Ibidem, p. 245.

  Ibidem, p. 225.

  Ibidem, p. 236.

  Ibidem.

  Ibidem, p. 212.

  NS, p. 29.

  Ibidem, p. 17.

  Ibidem, p. 20.

  Ibidem.

  Ibidem, p. 21.

Ibidem, pp. 22–23.

  Ibidem, p. 30.

  Ibidem, p. 43.

Ibidem, pp. 56–57.

  Ibidem, p. 55.

  Ibidem, p. 56.

  Ibidem, p. 58.

  Ibidem, p. 54.

CEE, vol. 2, pp. 32–46; CEE, vol. 3, pp. 366–368.

  SU, pp. 94, 95.

  Ibidem, p. 108.

NS, p. 61.

  Ibidem, p. 70.

  Ibidem.

Ibidem, pp. 68–69.

  CEE, vol. 3, p. 5.

  Ibidem, vol. 3, p. 6.

  Ibidem.

  UM, p. 156.

  Ibidem, p. 157.

  Ibidem, p. 164.

Ibidem, pp. 161–162.

  Ibidem, p. 167.

  Ibidem, p. 180.

  Ibidem, p. 167.

  FTMF, p. 240.

  CEE, vol. 3, p. 418.

  Ibidem, p. 265.

B. Pylak, “Maryjność Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” in Człowiek – moralność – wychowanie. Życie i myśl Jacka Woronieckiego OP, p. 193.

J. Woroniecki, Podkamień. W dwóchsetletnią rocznicę koronacji cudownego obrazu Najświętszej Marii Panny (Lwów: Wydawnictwo oo. Dominikanów, 1927).

D.J. Mercier, Wszechpośrednictwo Najświętszej Maryi Panny i Prawdziwe nabożeństwo do Maryi według bł. Ludwika Grignon de Monfort, translated from the French (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Księży Pallotynów, 1928).

J. Woroniecki, “Rola Najświętszej Marii Panny w świetle nauki św. Pawła,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 14, no. 5 (1937), pp. 298–309.

J. Woroniecki, Wiara, nadzieja i miłość w życiu Najświętszej Maryi Panny (Toruń: Instytut Różańcowy, 1939).

J. Woroniecki, Macierzyńskie Serce Maryi. Rozważania o Jej pośrednictwie na tle Ewangelii i Dziejów Apostolskich (Poznań–Warszawa–Lublin: Albertinum, 1946).

B. Pylak, “Maryjność Jacka Woronieckiego,” p. 197–205.

J. Woroniecki, “S.O.S. katolicyzmu w Polsce,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 18, no. 5–6 (1939), p. 282.

B. Przybylski, “Ojciec Jacek Woroniecki OP (W 25 rocznicę śmierci),” Tygodnik Powszechny no. 1326/3 (1974), p. 3.

A. Usowicz, “O. Jacek Woroniecki,” Przegląd Powszechny 228, no. 66 (1949), p. 129.

J. Woroniecki, Królewskie kapłaństwo. Studium o powołaniu i wychowaniu kapłana katolickiego (Warszawa: Biblioteczka Akcji Katolickiej w Polsce, 2000), p. 12.

E. Gliński, “O. Jacek Woroniecki, OP,” Homo Dei 18, no. 5(65) (1949), p. 478.

  B. Przybylski, “Ojciec Jacek Woroniecki OP (W 25 rocznicę śmierci),” p. 3.

J. Woroniecki, Królewskie kapłaństwo, pp. 14–36.

Ibidem, pp. 37–59.

Ibidem, pp. 123–150.

J. Woroniecki, “Mąż Kościoła. Pamięci Kardynała Aleksandra Kakowskiego,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 18, no. 2 (1939), p. 65–69; idem, “Vir desidorium. Pamięci śp. Arcybiskupa Teodorowicza,” ibidem, no. 1, pp. 7–11; idem, “W hołdzie Piusowi XII,” ibidem, no. 5–6, pp. 265–268.

M. Tomczyk, Ideały i wzory osobowe w ujęciu o. Jacka Woronieckiego (Lublin 2011) [doctoral dissertation in the Archives of the Catholic University of Lublin].

J. Woroniecki, “Doskonałość kapłańska w nauce św. Tomasza z Akwinu,” Głos Kapłański 13, no. 1 (1939), pp. 8–10.

Idem, “Nauka o doskonałości chrześcijańskiej w Seminariach Duchownych,” Ateneum Kapłańskie 48 (1948), p. 348.

Idem, “Lingua eucharis (na marginesie doktryny kaznodziejskiej św. Tomasza z Akwinu: Summa theologica II-a II-ae, q. 177),” Przegląd Homiletyczny, 2 (1924), p. 253.

Idem, “Z powodu książki o roli Ojca duchownego w Seminarium Duchownym,” Przegląd Katolicki 62, no. 20 (1924), p. 315.

  M.L. Niedziela, “Jacek Woroniecki OP i jego troska o nową świadomość chrześcijaństwa w Polsce,” p. 65.

J. Woroniecki, “Chrześcijańskie wychowanie charakteru wysnute z dogmatu”, Szkoła Chrystusowa 10, no. 2 (1935), pp. 55–58; idem, “Wady moralne i stopnie ich nasilenia,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 17, no. 4 (1938), pp. 241–249.

CEE, vol. 1, pp. 359–385.

J. Woroniecki, Wiara, nadzieja i miłość w życiu Najświętszej Maryi Panny, p. 5.

  Ibidem.

  B. Pylak, “Maryjność Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” p. 192.

J. Woroniecki, Wiara, nadzieja i miłość w życiu Najświętszej Maryi Panny, p. 49.

  B. Pylak, “Maryjność Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” p. 202.

J. Woroniecki, Wiara, nadzieja i miłość w życiu Najświętszej Maryi Panny, p. 35.

R. Polak, “Jacka Woronieckiego pedagogia cnót,” Cywilizacja no. 10 (2004), p. 141.

J. Woroniecki, Tajemnica Miłosierdzia Bożego. Nauka chrześcijańska o Miłosierdziu Bożym i o naszej wobec niego postawie (Lublin: Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 2016).

Idem, Pełnia modlitwy. Studium teologiczne dla inteligencji (Poznań: W Drodze, 1982).

At the beginning he presented general works, encompassing the entire history of the Church, followed by its specific periods, enumerating the best researched lives of saints. J. Woroniecki, Przewodnik po literaturze religijnej dla osób pragnących pogłębić swe wykształcenie w dziedzinie katolickiej (Lwów–Włocławek: Gubrynowicz i Syn, 1914), pp. 109–148.

Idem, Hagiografia, jej przedmiot, trudności i zadania w Polsce. Rzecz o świętych polskich (Kraków: Gebethner i Wolf, 1940).

R. Polak, “Jacek Woroniecki – życie i twórczość naukowa,” Człowiek w Kulturze 12 (1999), p. 233.

J. Woroniecki, “Miłosierdzie i nasza na nie odpowiedź,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 11, no. 5 (1935), p. 209.

J. Woroniecki, “Św. Dominik jako wzór modlitwy,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 5, no. 7–8 (1932), pp. 14–27; idem, Pełnia modlitwy. Studium teologiczne dla inteligencji; idem, Św. Jacek Odrowąż i wprowadzenie Zakonu Kaznodziejskiego do Polski (Katowice: Księgarnia św. Jacka, 1947), pp. 53–57, 78.

Idem, Święty Jacek Odrowąż i wprowadzenie Zakonu Kaznodziejskiego do Polski.

Idem, “Corona Fratrum,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 19, no. 8 (1939), pp. 65–78.

Idem, Błogosławiony Czesław dominikanin (1175 [?]–1242) (Opole: Nakładem Drukarni Diecezjalnej, 1947).

Idem, “Teologowie polscy w hołdzie Królowej Jadwidze. Przemówienie na Zjeździe Teologicznym w Krakowie, dnia 1 września 1938 roku,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 17, no. 10 (1938), pp. 219–235.

J. Woroniecki, Ethics, vol 2; idem, “Długomyślność jako właściwa cnota wychowawcy,” Szkoła Chrystusowa 1, no. 4 (1930), pp. 178–195; idem, Misja św. Teresy od Dzieciątka Jezus. Teologiczne podstawy drogi dziecięctwa duchowego. Konferencja wygłoszona w Warszawie w “Bibliotece Wiedzy Religijnej” w dniu poświęcenia jej św. Teresie od Dzieciątka Jezus 17 V 1925 (Warszawa: Kronika Rodzina, 1926).

S. Bareła, “O. Jacek Woroniecki,” Roczniki Teologiczno-Kanoniczne 6, no. 1–2 (1959), pp. 17–18.

J. Woroniecki, Historia katolickiej akcji społecznej w XIX wieku. Szkic historyczno-społeczny (Lublin: Nakładem Autora, 1906), p. 39.

J. Horowski, Paedagogia perennis w dobie postmodernizmu, pp. 77–82.

J. Gałkowski, “Filozofia i człowiek w Katolickiej Etyce Wychowawczej Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” in Człowiek – moralność – wychowanie. Życie i myśl Jacka Woronieckiego OP, pp. 96–97.

  E.g. CT; FCC, passim.

K. Twardowski, O filozofii średniowiecznej wykładów sześć (Lwów: Nakładem H. Altenberga, 1910), p. 68, who claims that “apart from popularization—no role is left for Thomism.”

CT, pp. 71–72.

CEE, 1, p. 86; R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, pp. 46–47; J. Horowski, Paedagogia perennis w dobie postmodernizmu, pp. 63–64.

R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, p. 50.

J. Woroniecki, “Z powodu książki o roli ojca duchownego w seminarium duchownym,” Przegląd Katolicki 62, no. 20 (1924), pp. 59–61; R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, pp. 59–61.

FCC, p. 13.

R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, p. 28.

FCC, p. 17. This idea is confirmed among others by: M.A. Krąpiec, Realizm ludzkiego poznania, pp. 64–65; P. Jaroszyński, Nauka w kulturze (Radom: Polskie Wydawnictwo Encyklopedyczne, 2002), pp. 236–244.

J. Woroniecki, Co to jest filozofia? manuscript, cited after: R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, p. 38.

R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, pp. 41–42.

PP, pp. 14–15; R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, p. 43.

CT, p. 71; R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, p. 46.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 77.

J. Woroniecki, “Moc i wartość spekulatywna cech tomizmu,” Przegląd Teologiczny 8, no. 1 (1927), p. 31; idem, CT, pp. 23–24; idem, “Nawyk czy sprawność. Centralne zagadnienie pedagogiki katolickiej,” Ku Szczytom 2, no. 4–5 (1939), p. 320; R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, pp. 84–85.

Cited by R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, p. 98; J. Woroniecki, “Zdolność wychowawcza szkoły publicznej i jej granice,” Miesięcznik Katechetyczny i Wychowawczy 13, no. 5–7 (1924), p. 66.

CEE, 1, p. 80.

R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, pp. 108–110, 113.

J. Woroniecki, “Program integralnej pedagogiki katolickiej,” Ateneum Kapłańskie 47 (1947), pp. 28–36.

CPP, pp. 37–46.

Ibidem, p. 59; R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, p. 132.

R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, p. 123.

According to Kazimierz Krajewski, it was present in two variants: empiricist (sensualist) and metaphysical. K. Krajewski, Etyka jako filozofia pierwsza. Doświadczenie normatywnej mocy prawdy źródłem i podstawą etyki (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2006), pp. 146–147.

J. Woroniecki, “Program integralnej pedagogiki katolickiej,” pp. 3, 30; R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, p. 77.

  CEE, vol. 1, p. 468.

R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, p. 78.

J. Kostkiewicz, Kierunki i koncepcje pedagogiki katolickiej w Polsce 1918–1939 (Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza Impuls, 2013), p. 446.

J. Woroniecki, Z powodu ostatniego dzieła profesora Zdziechowskiego (Lwów: [s.n.], 1916), pp. 2–3; M. Turzyński, “Spór filozoficzny o. Jacka Woronieckiego OP z profesorem Marianem Zdziechowskim o podstawowe zagadnienia myśli katolickiej,” Universitas Gedanensis 18, no. 1 (2006), pp. 37–87.

J. Woroniecki, Przewodnik po literaturze religijnej dla osób pragnących pogłębić swe wykształcenie w dziedzinie wiary katolickiej, p. 11.

The Great Emigration (Polish: Wielka Emigracja) involved the emigration of thousands of Poles, particularly from the political and cultural elites, from 1831 to 1870, after the failure of the November Uprising and of other uprisings (1846, 1863). The name is somewhat misleading, as the number of political exiles did not exceed more than 6,000 during this time. The exiles included soldiers and officers of the uprising, the Sejm of Congress Poland of 1830–31, and several prisoners-of-war who escaped captivity.

FCC, pp. 32–34.

Ibidem, p. 52; idem, CEE, vol. 2, part 1, p. 148; R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, p. 154.

FCC, pp. 29–36.

J. Woroniecki, Posłuszeństwo a przełożeństwo (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Księży Jezuitów, 1938), p. 20; R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, p. 377.

J. Woroniecki, Państwo i szkoła. Rozprawa z etatyzmem kulturalnym. Typescript, p. 3–4; CEE, vol. 1, p. 96; idem, “Ofiarność społeczna i warunki jej rozwoju,” Wiadomości Towarzystwa Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego no. 2 (1923), p. 16; R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, pp. 345–346.

J. Woroniecki, Państwo i szkoła. Rozprawa z etatyzmem kulturalnym, p. 43; R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, pp. 418, 420.

  FCC, p. 41.

R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, pp. 343–486.

  R. Polak, “O. Jacek Woroniecki – postać i dzieło,” in SU, p. 7.

Sługa Boży ojciec Jacek Woroniecki uczy, ed. M.L. Niedziela (Warszawa: Maurycy Lucjan Niedziela, 2006); I.Z. Błeszyńska, O. Jacek Woroniecki – Dominikanin – Wychowawca – Patriota 1878–1949; Próba biografii Jacka Woronieckiego OP i jego Wyznania, ed. M.L. Niedziela (Lublin: Gaudium, 2011).

F.W. Bednarski, Przedmiot etyki w świetle zasad św. Tomasza z Akwinu (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1956).

H. Kiereś, Osoba i społeczność (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2013).

S. Gałkowski, “Aktualność filozofii wychowania Jacka Woronieckiego,” Człowiek w Kulturze 12 (1999), pp. 37–43; idem, Ku dobru. Aktualność filozofii wychowania Jacka Woronieckiego; idem, Długomyślność. Wprowadzenie do filozofii wychowania (Kraków: Akademia Ignatianum, Wydawnictwo WAM, 2016).

Z. Pańpuch, “Sprawności jako sposoby doskonalenia natury ludzkiej,” Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 11 (2016), fasc. 3, pp. 67–83.

P. Skrzydlewski, “Ontyczne podstawy wychowania,” in Pedagogika rodziny. Podejście systemowe, vol. 2: Wychowanie rodzinne, eds. M. Marczewski, R. Gawrych, D. Opozda, T. Sakowicz, P. Skrzydlewski (Gdańsk: Wyższa Szkoła Społeczno-Ekonomiczna, 2017), pp. 87–115; idem, “Wychowanie rodzinne a wychowawcza posługa państwa,” in ibidem, pp. 629–659.

I. Chłodna-Błach, “Uniwersalizm tomizmu a uniwersalizm etyczny i pedagogiczny Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” Studia z Filozofii Polskiej 2 (2007) pp. 117–132.

R. Polak, Człowiek i moralność w myśli Jacka Woronieckiego OP, as well as his earlier publications.

A. Andrzejuk, Prawda o dobru. Problem filozoficznych podstaw etyki tomistycznej (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo UKSW, 2000), pp. 80–84, 232–233.

M. Gogacz, Podstawy wychowania (Niepokalanów: Wydawnictwo Ojców Franciszkanów, 1993).

K. Kalka, Filozoficzna antropologia tomistyczna okresu międzywojennego w Polsce jako podstawa kształtowania charakteru (Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uczelniane Akademii Bydgoskiej, 2000).

W. Kamińska, “Podstawy filozoficzno-teologiczne systemu wychowawczego o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” Słupskie Studia Filozoficzne 1 (1998), pp. 259–271.

T. Krajski, “Jacek Woroniecki jako przedstawiciel filozofii społecznej i politycznej,” in Człowiek w zmieniającej się współczesnej kulturze, eds. K. Kalka, A. Musielewicz (Elbląg: Wydawnictwo EUH-E, 2009), pp. 103–111.

R. Król, Filozofia osoby w koncepcjach Jacka Woronieckiego i Tadeusza Ślipki: analiza ontologiczna i aksjologiczna (Kraków: Fall, 2005); idem, “Osoba ludzka – ujęcie w świetle pedagogii Woronieckiego,” Logos i Ethos no. 2 (2005), pp. 66–81; idem, “Pedagogia jako wyraz antropologii i filozofii moralnej według Woronieckiego,” Przegląd Powszechny 124, no. 6 (2007), pp. 46–55; idem, “Koncepcja osoby według Jacka Woronieckiego,” Lumen Poloniae: Studia z Filozofii Polskiej no. 1 (2010), p. 103–116; idem, “Społeczna natura człowieka i jej cel według Jacka Woronieckiego,” Lumen Poloniae: Studia z Filozofii Polskiej no. 1 (2011), pp. 103–111.

J. Grzybowski, “O. Jacek Woroniecki OP – prekursor myśli tomistycznej w Polsce,” Studia Płockie 35 (2007), pp. 151–158; idem, “Filozoficzne skutki kontrkultury: profetyczne diagnozy o. Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” Universitas Gedanensis 40, no. 22 (2010), pp. 17–35.

M.M. Boużyk, “Język – wyraz ducha czy materii? Refleksja w oparciu o teksty Jacka Woronieckiego i Mieczysława A. Krąpca,” in Spotkanie z kulturą duchową: studia interdyscyplinarne, eds. A. Jachimowicz, T. Żurawlew (Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza Atut, 2016), pp. 97–127.

K. Kalinowska, “Liberalizm w ujęciu o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” Lithuania no. 1 (2006), p. 185–188.

R. Polak, “Woroniecki Jacek Adam,” pp. 838–841; M. Malinowski, A. Krajska, A. Andrzejuk, “Jacek Woroniecki (1878–1949)” in Tomizm polski 1919–1954. Słownik filozofów, eds. B. Listkowska, A. Andrzejuk (Radzymin: Wydawnictwo von Borowiecky, 2014), pp. 121–135.

M. Krasnodębski, “Pedagogika Jacka Woronieckiego i Feliksa Wojciecha Bednarskiego jako egzemplifikacja etyki tomizmu tradycyjnego,” Studia Ełckie 11 (2009), pp. 29–58.

W. Kamińska, “O poszukiwaniu idei ‘paedagogia perennis’ we współczesnym modelu edukacyjnym,” in Człowiek – moralność – wychowanie. Życie i myśl Jacka Woronieckiego OP, p. 138.

M.M. Boużyk, “Myśl pedagogiczna Jacka (Adama) Woronieckiego w wybranych publikacjach z okresu 1903–1918,” Polska Myśl Pedagogiczna 1, no. 1 (2015), pp. 221–240; eadem, “Jacek Woroniecki o modlitwie jako czynniku doskonalącym naturę ludzką,” Rocznik Tomistyczny 5 (2016), pp. 357–373.

B. Czupryn, “Antropologiczne podstawy teorii wychowania według Woronieckiego,” Człowiek w Kulturze 12 (1999), pp. 23–29.

J. Horowski, Paedagogia perennis w dobie postmodernizmu; idem, “Wstyd a rozwój moralny: o antropologicznych fundamentach neotomistycznej teorii wychowania moralnego,” Polska Myśl Pedagogiczna 2, no. 2 (2016), pp. 231–244.

J.L. Jabłońska, “Autorytet wychowawcy w koncepcjach pedagogicznych Heleny Radlińskiej i o. Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” Kultura i Edukacja no. 4 (1996), pp. 93–104.

K. Kalinowska, “Nie grzebać w przeszłości, ale z całym zapałem patrzeć w przyszłość’ – na 50. rocznicę śmierci o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” Paedagogia Christiana 4 (1999), pp. 177–187.

G. Karolewicz, “Ojciec Jacek Woroniecki (1878–1949) jako wychowawca inteligencji katolickiej,” in Ideały wychowania i wzory osobowe narodu polskiego w XIX i XX wieku, ed. E.J. Kryńska, vol. 2 (Białystok: Trans Humana, 2006), pp. 149–158.

B. Karpińska, “Aktualności ‘Katolickiej etyki wychowawczej’ Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” Pedagogika Społeczna 3 (2002), pp. 126–132.

B. Kiereś, Człowiek i wychowanie: od osoby do osobowości (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2017).

J. Kostkiewicz, “Potencjalność podmiotu wychowania w ujęciu antropologii katolickiej,” Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici, Nauki Humanistyczno-Społeczne, Pedagogika 25 (2009), pp. 11–27.

M. Krasnodębski, “Pedagogika Jacka Woronieckiego i Feliksa Wojciecha Bednarskiego jako egzemplifikacja etyki tomizmu tradycyjnego,” Studia Ełckie 11 (2009) pp. 29–58.

R. Król, Klasyczny ideał wychowania w kręgu wartości tradycyjnych (Warszawa–Łódź: Heliodor, 2015).

L. Marchlewicz, “Koncepcja pedagogiki w pismach o. Jacka Woronieckiego (1878–1949),” Życie i Myśl no. 4 (1999), pp. 91–94.

K. Olbrycht, O roli przykładu, wzoru, autorytetu i mistrza w wychowaniu osobowym (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2007).

R. Polak, “Jacka Woronieckiego głos w sprawie programów szkolnych, cech osobowych nauczyciela oraz zadań wychowawczych szkoły w okresie II Rzeczypospolitej,” Człowiek w Kulturze 12 (1999), pp. 45–62; idem, “Jacka Woronieckiego pedagogia cnót,” pp. 137–147.

K. Radzki, Prowadzić w życie: antropologiczne podstawy wychowania u Jacka Woronieckiego (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Wrocławskiej Księgarni Archidiecezjalnej, 2011).

M. Rembierz, “‘Sensus catholicus’: uniwersalizm, obiektywizm, realizm. Myśl filozoficzno-teologiczna i działalność pedagogiczno-duszpasterska Jacka Woronieckiego OP w rozprawach i wspomnieniach Stefana Swieżawskiego,” in Człowiek – moralność – wychowanie. Życie i myśl Jacka Woronieckiego OP, pp. 207–233.

A. Robaczewski, “Doskonałość człowieka celem wychowania,” Człowiek w Kulturze 12 (1999), pp. 31–35.

A. Rynio, M. Tomczyk, “Sprawności moralne jako elementy konstytutywne w formowaniu moralnego charakteru człowieka w twórczości o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” in Sprawności moralne w wychowaniu – wyzwania i rzeczywistość, eds. I. Jazukiewicz, E. Kwiatkowska (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe US, 2012), pp. 13–47.

R. Skrzyniarz, “Modlitwa i jej rozumienie w życiu studentów. Uwagi pedagogiczne,” Biografistyka Pedagogiczna 2, no. 1 (2017), pp. 295–320.

K. Śleziński, “Założenia realizmu ontologicznego i aksjologicznego w koncepcji wychowania Jacka Woronieckiego,” Polska Myśl Pedagogiczna 2, no. 2 (2016), pp. 175–187.

E. Walewander, Pedagogia katolicka w diecezji lubelskiej 1918–1930 (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2007).

G. Wistuba, “Ojca Jacka Woronieckiego pedagogia perennis,” Cywilizacja 7 (2003), pp. 235–246.

E.g. doctoral dissertations by: G. Sernikov, Praktyka cnót jako droga spełniania się życia osobowego człowiek w ujęciu o. Jacka Woronieckiego (Lublin 2005) [philosophy, Archive of the Catholic University of Lublin); M. Tomczyk, Ideały i wzory osobowe w ujęciu o. Jacka Woronieckiego (Lublin 2011) [pedagogy, Archive of the Catholic University of Lublin), there were also numerous master’s and bachelor’s theses written about him (pedagogy, philosophy and theology at the Catholic University of Lublin).

J. Hochleitner, “Religijność w ujęciu Jacka Woronieckiego,” Zeszyty Naukowe WSZiP im. Bogdana Jańskiego 8 (2001), pp. 223–242.

M.J. Kempys, Rola cnót moralnych w dążeniu ku pełni człowieczeństwa w świetle pism o. Jacka Woronieckiego (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PAT, 2005); idem, “Zagadnienie rozwoju osoby ludzkiej w ujęciu o. Jacka Woronieckiego”, Polonia Sacra 10, no. 18 (2006), pp. 229–242; idem, “Charakterystyka gniewu na podstawie pism o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” Polonia Sacra 11, no. 20 (2007), pp. 241–256.

R. Kostecki, Tajemnice serca (Kraków: Wydawnictwo oo. Karmelitów Bosych, 1981).

G. Wistuba, “Chrześcijańskie zobowiązanie przemieniania świata: zadania wynikające z funkcji pasterskiej pośrednictwa zbawczego w ujęciu o. Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” Warszawskie Studia Pastoralne 10 (2009), pp. 47–55; eadem, “Obowiązek poznawania i przekazywania prawdy objawionej w ujęciu o. Jacka Woronieckiego OP,” Roczniki Teologiczne Warszawsko-Praskie 6 (2010), pp. 125–160; eadem, Prowadzić ku Zbawcy: duszpasterstwo w nauczaniu i posłudze o. Jacka Woronieckiego OP (Sandomierz: Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne i Drukarnia, 2011).

N. Lietz, “Formacja chrześcijańska w ujęciu Jacka Woronieckiego,” Studia Bobolanum 3 (2006), pp. 151–170.

J. Misiurek, “Tajemnica Bożego Miłosierdzia w świetle wypowiedzi Sługi Bożego Jacka Woronieckiego,” Studia Włocławskie 18 (2016), pp. 103–119.

J. Grzybowski, “Źródła współczesnych przemian kulturowych: społeczno-religijne intuicje Jacka Woronieckiego,” Warszawskie Studia Teologiczne 23, no. 2 (2010), pp. 295–308.

Recovered Territories (Polish: Ziemie Odzyskane, literally “Regained Lands”) was an official term used in the People’s Republic of Poland to describe the territory of the former Free City of Danzig and the parts of pre-war Germany that became part of Poland after World War II. The rationale for the term “Recovered” was the Piast Concept that these territories had been once part of the traditional Polish homeland. They had been part of, or fiefs of, a Polish state during the medieval Piast dynasty.

R. Polak, Jacek Woroniecki – życie i twórczość, p. 235; J. Woroniecki, Błogosławiony Czesław dominikanin (1175 [?]–1242).

  NS.

E.g. ibidem; idem, “Konkordat czy rozdział,” Rok Polski 3, no. 6 (1918), pp. 352–363; idem, “Kościół i państwo. Zagadnienie układu ich stosunków,” Wiadomości Duszpasterskie 2, no. 5 (1946), pp. 3–7; no. 6, pp. 3–6; no. 7, pp. 3–7; no. 8, pp. 3–6; idem, “Dowody polskości na Ziemiach Odzyskanych,” Róża Duchowna 52, no. 7 (1950), pp. 192–195.

U. Schrade, “Problem Narodu i Ojczyzny w ujęciu J. Woronieckiego i I.M. Bocheńskiego,” Arcana: Kultura, Historia, Polityka 3 (2000), pp. 60–78; K. Kalinowska, Jacek Woroniecki o społeczeństwie i państwie; J. Grzybowski, “Czy idee nacjonalistyczne zakwestionują społeczeństwo liberalno-demokratyczne?: Rozważania o przyszłości narodu w świecie diaspory i bezdomności,” Civitas: Studia z Filozofii Polityki 14 (2012), pp. 137–163.

T. Lenczewski, “Rodzinne tajemnice o. Jacka Woronieckiego: korzenie dominikanina,” Do Rzeczy: Tygodnik Lisickiego 33 (2016), pp. 64–66.

R. Polak, “Jacek Woroniecki – życie i twórczość naukowa,” p. 239; A. Usowicz, “O. Jacek Woroniecki,” p. 131.

R. Polak, “Jacka Woronieckiego głos w sprawie programów szkolnych, cech osobowych nauczyciela oraz zadań wychowawczych szkoły w okresie II Rzeczypospolitej,” p. 48.

Ł. Stefaniak, “Język ojczysty w mediach i jego oddziaływanie na kulturę narodową: z perspektywy nauczania o. Jacka Woronieckiego,” in Medialne reprezentacje kultury. Literatura, teatr, sztuka, religia, vol. 1, ed. A. Sugier-Szerega (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2015), pp. 251–258; R. Król, “Woronieckiego spojrzenie na Dostojewskiego,” Colloquia Theologica Ottoniana 1 (2007), pp. 119–128.

FCC; also upbringing and the skill as well as the ability to rule and govern people: idem, Umiejętność rządzenia i rozkazywania.

E.g. J. Horowski, “O dojrzewaniu do moralności cnoty w kontekście kultury (post)modernistycznej,” Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici, Nauki Humanistyczno-Społeczne, Pedagogika 27 (2011), pp. 83–101.

W.F. Bednarski, “P. Adamo Giacinto Woroniecki, O.P. pioniere della rinascita del tomismo in Polonia,” Atti del’VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale 3 (1981), pp. 400–405; E. Tończak, “I presupposti antropologici dell’etica delle virtù nel pensiero di J. Woroniecki,” Studia Bobolanum 4 (2005), pp. 67–85; idem, Le virtù nell’educazione morale: secondo il pensiero di J. Woroniecki, ibidem, pp. 125–142; R. Król, “The subject’s functional unity – the synergy of human powers,” Reports on Philosophy 21 (2003), pp. 21–32.

See S.Th. II–II, q. 166 and 167. Also the Commentary on 1 Cor 8, lesson 1.

I tried to prove this more specifically when discussing the question of the morality of human deeds in my study Katolickość tomizmu, 2nd ed. (Warszawa 1938 [3rd ed., Lublin 1999]). The transcendentality of Thomism which it owes to its universalism is also strongly emphasized in the outstanding work of M. Barbado, Introduction à la psychologie expérimentale (Paris 1931), p. 416. There the author perfectly highlights the universalism of the Thomistic solution of the fundamental problems of psychology in comparison with the particularism of their solution by the main psychological directions of modern philosophy. See also J. Maritain, Eléments de philosophie, I: Introduction générale à la philosophie, 6e éd. (Paris 1930), where the issue is clearly presented in a graphic way in particular sections of philosophy.

Such an attempt is found, for example, in E. Janssens in his Introduction historique au cours de lu morale générale, p. 29, where he counts Christian ethics among eudemonistic systems, which … is erroneous. Also B. H. Merkelbach did not notice the transcendental character of Christian ethics and counted it among eudemonistic currents. See Appendix: De philosophorum systemotibus in his work Summa Theologiae Moralis, I, pp. 739–748.

J. Ochorowicz, “Nasze osobnictwo,” in Psychologia – pedagogika – etyka (Warszawa 1917), XII, pp. 302–365.

Presently, one who more carefully considered the question of human potentiality is W. Stern, Die menschliche Persönlichkeit, vol. 2: Person and Sache. System das kritischen Personalismus. 3rd ed. (Leipzig 1923), Chapter V: Bildsamkeit.

This explains that both in Greek and in Latin the words denoting the face or the mask used by actors in the theater, “prosopon” and “persona,” over time began to be used to denote the individuality of man, that which constitutes his personality and physical and moral separateness. To denote personality, the Russian language created an expression taken from “face:” “licznost” derived from “lico,” which in Polish means the same as face. On this subject, see the good study by Thomas Demon, “Sur l’usage de la notion de personne en philosophie morale,” Studia Philosophica 7 (1947), pp. 41–86. Therein one can find an extensive bibliography on the development of the meaning of the words “prosopon” and “persona.”

J. Chevalier, L’habitude. Essai de métaphysique scientifique (Paris 1929). Chapter VIII: La transfiguration de l’habitude par l’esprit, pp. 224–227.

In this way this position was formulated by St. Thomas, I–II, q. 50, a. 6.

From the struggles that St. Thomas had been engaged in for the issue of the substantial unity of human nature, it was inferred that the human souls within themselves did not differ from each other, and, if so, then there was no difference between the soul of Christ and the soul of Judas. Hence, this claim was included in the list of theses condemned in Paris, after the death of St. Thomas, by Bishop Stephen Tempier (thesis 124). See P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant (Fribourg 1901), 1st ed, p. CCLIII.

The bibliography on this topic is given in my article: “Nawyk czy sprawność.”

For those familiar with scholastic terminology, I will add that Thomists in general agree that the difference between souls is “accidentalis—sumpto accidenti pro praedicabili”—and that it is not “accidentalis” but “substantialis—sumpto accidenti pro praedicamento.” Recently, a good study on this topic has been made by S. Swieżawski, “Centralne zagadnienie tomistycznej nauki o duszy. (Commensuratio animae ad hoc corpus),” Przegląd Filozoficzny 1–3 (1948), pp. 131–189.

Aristotle, De anima II, 9, Commentary by St. Thomas Lect. XIX. See a very interesting comparison of touch with taste and smell. The greater sensitivity in the area of touch testifies to having a better sensual complexity which is of great importance in mental life. See also I, q. 76, a. 5.

St. Thomas accepts this division of St. Augustine, seeing—in mental memory—the receptive intellect (intellectus possibilis) which receives and stores notions observed by the light of active intellect (intellectus agens), q. 79, a. 7.

J. Mausbach, Grundlage and Ausbildung des Charakters nach dem hl. Thomas von Aquin, 2nd ed. (Freiburg im Breisgau 1920), 1: Die Wesensgrundlage des Charakters, p. 14. Schell, Dogmatik III, 916, is cited there.

The striking example of how, even in the case of severe congenital abnormalities, a high mental development is possible, is Helena Keller. Having lost sight and hearing in childhood, she managed, under the guidance of a very wise teacher, to develop a sense of touch so that with its help, she completed higher studies and even wrote books. See S. Swieżawski, Byt. Zagadnienia metafizyki tomistycznej (Lublin 1948), p. 66.

Qu. disp. de Virtutibus in communi, a. 1.

  Ibidem, note 11.

To those who would think that I too strongly contrast mental desire with sensual desire, that I too schematically copy the difference between mental and sensual cognition, I am ready to offer against myself an argument from my own arsenal, namely the text of St. Thomas (Contra gentes, III. 26). He says there that “the will is not peculiar to intellectual nature by virtue of being an appetite, but only in so far as it depends on intellect. However, the intellect, in itself, is peculiar to an intellectual nature” [trans. Vernon J. Bourke]! It could be understood so that the appetitive power of the soul is the only thing that differentiates depending on whether it has to react to something signaled from the top floor by mental cognition or from the bottom floor by the senses. I do not know any other text where St. Thomas would express the same thought. On the contrary, in Summa I, q. 77, a. 5–8, and especially q. 80, a. 2, where he had the opportunity to develop it, he clearly distinguishes in the soul itself the disposition to spiritual desiring from the disposition to sensual desiring, which it shares with the body animated by itself.

This position is occupied by Fr. T.J. Lindworsky, who generally denies that the will is some strength and that it can be increased. He reduces the process of willing to motivation alone. He allows the will only for decision. His views on this subject have been recounted by J. Salamucha in: “Uwagi na temat kształcenia charakteru,” Miesięcznik Katechetyczno-Wychowawczy, no. 1 (1933), pp. 8–12. I do not think that it would be possible—as K. Michalski did in his posthumously published work Między heroizmem a bestialstwem (p. 292)—to count Lindworsky as a Thomist, not only because he did not distinguish sensual feelings from affections of the will, but because he was involved in experimental psychology and never dealt with the speculative side.

I. Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten: Tugendlehre. Einleitung, XIII–XIV.

In this way, the teaching on freedom was very precisely formulated in the twenty first Thomistic thesis of Pius X. Pius X’s thesis fundamentally differs from Suárez’s indeterminist doctrine which is still contained in textbooks on Catholic ethics or psychology. The solution of the problem of the will, which the thesis provides, rises beyond unilateral solutions offered by determinism and indeterminism. The best way to refer to the solution proposed by the thesis is to call it self-determinism, for indeed it contains determination, but such that a man alone imposes it on himself in keeping with what suits him more. See: J. Woroniecki, Katolicka Etyka Wychowawcza, vol. I, Chapter V, § 11.

I–II, q. 56, a. 4. Key-texts to understand St. Thomas’s teaching on sublimation are ibidem, q. 50, a. 3 and Disp. de Veritate, q. 20, a. 2.

A good study on the sublimation of sensual life was published by A. Usowicz, Tomistyczna sublimacja uczuć w świetle nowożytnej psychologii, Kraków 1946. See also: K. Michalski, “La sublimation thomiste,” Angelicum 14, no. 1–2 (1937), pp. 212–222.

II-II, q. 124, a. 5, ad 3. Therefore, one can say that the common good of the society is the highest human good. On the other hand, one cannot say that the common good of the society is the highest good of a man, since man has a higher good than that, which is not of a human level, but of a divine level. See also Comm. to Ethics.

III Sent. dist. 35, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 1. Aristotles’s words that the common good is higher and more divine, “theióteron,” than the good of an individual man, are cited by St. Thomas several times, always—of course—with reference to earthly life.

It was perfectly expressed by J. Chevalier in his interesting, although negatively influenced by Bergson, study L’habitude. Essai de métaphysique scientifique (Paris 1929): „Pédagogiquement toute l’éducation consiste dans la formation des habitudes”, p. 1.

The most characteristic is probably … a paragraph from Kant’s Anthropology (part I, book I, § 12).

W. James, Précis de psychologie. Trans. into French by Baudin-Bertier (Paris 1924), chapter X.

See the bibliography of Polish works on behaviorism in the introduction to: M.L. Szirwindt, Nowe kierunki psychologii: Behavioryzm Watsona. (Lwów 1936).

J.B. Saxby, Kształcenie postępowania (trans. into Polish I. Pannenkowa, Lwów 1928), chapter VI: Powstanie nawyków i ich wytwarzanie.

K. Dworak, Zarys psychologii doświadczalnej (Kielce 1933), chapter IX: O zjawiskach woli, § 6: Czynności nawykowe: „In this case then the decision is made without a second thought, without any distinct consideration. Action which follows that decision is called habitual action (or psychomotoric, mechanical or automatical action) … Simplified, mechanical choices-actions are the essence of the so-called virtue; virtue—psychologically—is nothing other than a strong habit, an addiction(?) of deciding always(?) in favor of a positive ethical action” (p. 211).

J. Mercier, Historia psychologii nowożytnej (Warszawa 1900), chapter II: Rozwój psychologii Kartezjańskiej.

J. Lindworsky, Willensschule (Paderborn 1923), Willenskraft, p. 32–40.

J. Salamucha, “Uwagi na temat kształcenia charakteru,” Miesięcznik Katechetyczny i Wychowawczy no. 1 (1933).

Fr. Lindworsky’s doctrine, undermining the basis of the traditional Christian asceticism, met with considerable criticism by Fr. F. Hatheyer in „Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie” (Innsbruck 1919): Neues und altes zum Problem der Willensstärkung und Willenserziehung (p. 474–700).

P. de Roton, Les habitus. Leur caractère spirituel (Paris 1935). Here in chapter VII (Habitus et habitudes) we have a good survey of modern doctrines on that subject, but the comparison of skill and habit is not sufficient and would require some deepening.

E. Peillaube, Caractère et personnalité (Paris 1935), chapter L’habitude.

G. Dwelshauvers, L’exercice de la volonté (Paris 1935), chapter II: L’habitude: 1. Considérations générales, 2. Les habitus, 3. Les habitudes, 4. Les question pratique: L’éducation des habitudes.

J. MacCunn, Kształcenie charakteru. Zagadnienie etyczno-pedagogiczne, trans. into Polish by Z. Jętkiewiczowa (Lwów–Warszawa: Książnica Atlas, 1925). Part I, chapter VII: Addiction and its insufficiency, Part III, chapter I: Sound moral judgment and chapter II: Formation of moral judgment.

T. Steinbüchel, “Die philosophische Grundlegung der katholischen Sittenlehre,“ in Handbuch der katholischen Sittenlehre, ed. F. von Tillmann (Düsseldorf: Mosella-Verlag, 1938), vol. I, part II, chapter 10, § 3: Selbsttreue und Tutgend.

  It is known that this point of the doctrine of St. Thomas was the most attacked by the contemporaries, for he on the one hand opposed the Averroesian artists, i.e. philosophers, and Augustinian theologians on the other.

Ex professo St. Thomas raises this issue in I–II, q. 50, a. 6, c, where he asks the question, whether pure spirits are subject to dispositions and improvements. He gives an affirmative answer inasmuch as the question is not about the field of being, but about the field of action, and explains it with the potentiality of the creation. However, he strongly underlines the difference between the potentiality of matter and that of spirit, thereby also the skill is of different nature in each field.

On the distinction between willing and knowing, see: Disp. de veritate, q. 22, a. 10.

Disp. de veritate, q. 24, a. 12.

De bono conjugali, c. 21.

De anima, lib. III, c. 18. Both these definitions of St. Augustine and Averroes are cited by St. Thomas: I–II, q. 49, a. 3, sed contra.

Nicomachean Ethics, II, c. 6, 1.

Ibidem, II, c. 3, 1. On the distinction between satisfaction resulting from a predilection in object and functional satisfaction resulting from an acquired skill, see in St. Thomas, I–II, q. 100, a. 9, ad 3.

Theodicy, I, no. 51.

The interaction of the reason and the will was perfectly summarized by St. Thomas in: I, q. 82, a. 4 c. and ad. 1. See also I–II, q. 17, a. 1 and 5. Disp. de veritate, q. 10, a. 9, ad. 3 in contra.

The brochure of A. Lecensier, Comment développer le bon sens (Bruxelles: De Lannoy, 1924), is a quite good study on fostering prudence. It lacks, however, a deeper analysis of components of prudence. Also J. MacCunn, in his above-mentioned book, The Making of Character: Some Educational Aspects of Ethics. Part III, chapter I: Sound moral judgment and chapter II: Formation of moral judgment, makes some constructive comments on this subject.

Summa Theologiae, I–II, q. 91, a. 5 and q. 100, a. 8. In the cited fragments, St. Thomas singles out a three-fold task of state power: the first one is general, i.e., purely positive, namely preserving the common good; two others are particular: the primary one is negative and aims at the defense of justice by repelling the attacks of evil; the secondary one is positive and aims at strengthening the good by the development of virtues. See the same teaching about the tree-fold task of the state in Leo XIII’s encyclical letter “Rerum Novarum” (Opera, ed. Desclée, vol. IV, pp. 193–202).

  It refers to the argument “BUT ON THE OTHER HAND” [translator’s note].